HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
Dr. P. J. Ciccone, Director of the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, appeals from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri that ordered the petitioner, James Vernon Sellers, transferred to “camp”
status at the institution and admitted to the institution’s. x-ray technician training program with reasonable dispatch. The District Court, on the basis of the magistrate’s report and recommendation and supplements thereto, found that the reasons for denial of the petitioner’s application to the x-ray technician training program lacked a rational basis in fact and were arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, Sellers’
pro se
ha-beas corpus petition challenging the conditions of his confinement was granted.
We reverse.
Sellers was convicted on his plea of guilty of nine offenses of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), and of one offense of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. On June 1, 1973, his original sentence was modified to an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years of imprisonment under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2). He was then brought to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners for evaluation. While at the Medical Center, Sellers applied for and was denied admittance to the institution’s x-ray technician training program. The only reason advanced on appeal
for the refusal to accept the petitioner’s application is that he, being a long-term inmate, is not within ten years of a firm release date as required by the Medical Center’s policy.
Sellers has approximately fourteen years to serve before that time.
Sellers alleges in his
pro se
petition that he “is being denied his rights to rehabilitation”. The allegation is over-broad. He has not been denied the right to participate in other available rehabilitative programs. The narrow question presented is whether Sellers is entitled to relief in habeas corpus because he has been denied admittance to a specific rehabilitative program.
The administration of the rehabilitative programs for federal prisoners is statutorily vested within the discretionary authority of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001(b)(2) and 4042. The courts will not, as a general rule, audit the exercises of that discretionary power.
See Burns v. Swenson,
430 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062, 92 S.Ct. 743, 30 L.Ed.2d 751
(1972);
Harris v. Settle,
322 F.2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied,
377 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 1171, 12 L.Ed.2d 179 (1964). Judicial relief will be granted, however, upon a showing that the discretionary-authority has been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
See Daugherty v. Harris,
476 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied,
414 U.S. 872, 94 S.Ct. 112, 38 L.Ed.2d 91 (1973);
Smith v. Schneckloth,
414 F.2d 680, 681 (9th Cir. 1969);
Holland v. Ciccone,
386 F.2d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 1967) (per curiam),
cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1045, 88 S.Ct. 1646, 20 L.Ed.2d 307 (1968).
The prison policy advanced to justify the petitioner’s exclusion from the x-ray technician training program states:
The long-term inmate, to be eligible for consideration, must be * * * within ten (10) years of a firm release date at the time of referral.
The District Court found the exclusionary provision arbitrary because “there can be [no] rational discrimination between prisoners within 10 years of their ‘firm release date’ and those only slightly over the 10-year mark.” But, because the petitioner may relatively soon satisfy the eligibility requirement, having approximately fourteen years to serve before his firm release date, does not make the provision unconstitutional.
See Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522, 548 (1975). It is inherent in the use of such predictive exclusionary factors, which draw a clear objective line of demarcation, that those close to the line may not be within the class of persons intended to be excluded.
As the Supreme Court stated in another context:
[T]he question raised is not whether a statutory provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in the statute. Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions, and would be directly contrary to our holding in
Mourning,
supra. Nor is the question whether the provision filters out a substantial part of the class which caused congressional concern, or whether it filters out more members of the class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.
Id.
at 777, 95 S.Ct. at 2472, 45 L.Ed.2d at 545-546.
The respondent advanced as a reasonable justification for the exclusionary provision the following:
The length remaining to be served on Petitioner’s sentence would in the
opinion of most prison administrators be a factor against admission to such a training course. It is of course beneficial to the prison system to have a highly trained motivated individual available for work for a long period of time. Nevertheless, the training exists primarily for the benefit of the inmate and not the prison authorities.
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HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
Dr. P. J. Ciccone, Director of the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, appeals from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri that ordered the petitioner, James Vernon Sellers, transferred to “camp”
status at the institution and admitted to the institution’s. x-ray technician training program with reasonable dispatch. The District Court, on the basis of the magistrate’s report and recommendation and supplements thereto, found that the reasons for denial of the petitioner’s application to the x-ray technician training program lacked a rational basis in fact and were arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, Sellers’
pro se
ha-beas corpus petition challenging the conditions of his confinement was granted.
We reverse.
Sellers was convicted on his plea of guilty of nine offenses of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), and of one offense of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. On June 1, 1973, his original sentence was modified to an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years of imprisonment under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2). He was then brought to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners for evaluation. While at the Medical Center, Sellers applied for and was denied admittance to the institution’s x-ray technician training program. The only reason advanced on appeal
for the refusal to accept the petitioner’s application is that he, being a long-term inmate, is not within ten years of a firm release date as required by the Medical Center’s policy.
Sellers has approximately fourteen years to serve before that time.
Sellers alleges in his
pro se
petition that he “is being denied his rights to rehabilitation”. The allegation is over-broad. He has not been denied the right to participate in other available rehabilitative programs. The narrow question presented is whether Sellers is entitled to relief in habeas corpus because he has been denied admittance to a specific rehabilitative program.
The administration of the rehabilitative programs for federal prisoners is statutorily vested within the discretionary authority of the Attorney General. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001(b)(2) and 4042. The courts will not, as a general rule, audit the exercises of that discretionary power.
See Burns v. Swenson,
430 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062, 92 S.Ct. 743, 30 L.Ed.2d 751
(1972);
Harris v. Settle,
322 F.2d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied,
377 U.S. 910, 84 S.Ct. 1171, 12 L.Ed.2d 179 (1964). Judicial relief will be granted, however, upon a showing that the discretionary-authority has been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
See Daugherty v. Harris,
476 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied,
414 U.S. 872, 94 S.Ct. 112, 38 L.Ed.2d 91 (1973);
Smith v. Schneckloth,
414 F.2d 680, 681 (9th Cir. 1969);
Holland v. Ciccone,
386 F.2d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 1967) (per curiam),
cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1045, 88 S.Ct. 1646, 20 L.Ed.2d 307 (1968).
The prison policy advanced to justify the petitioner’s exclusion from the x-ray technician training program states:
The long-term inmate, to be eligible for consideration, must be * * * within ten (10) years of a firm release date at the time of referral.
The District Court found the exclusionary provision arbitrary because “there can be [no] rational discrimination between prisoners within 10 years of their ‘firm release date’ and those only slightly over the 10-year mark.” But, because the petitioner may relatively soon satisfy the eligibility requirement, having approximately fourteen years to serve before his firm release date, does not make the provision unconstitutional.
See Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522, 548 (1975). It is inherent in the use of such predictive exclusionary factors, which draw a clear objective line of demarcation, that those close to the line may not be within the class of persons intended to be excluded.
As the Supreme Court stated in another context:
[T]he question raised is not whether a statutory provision precisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual position which generated the congressional concern reflected in the statute. Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions, and would be directly contrary to our holding in
Mourning,
supra. Nor is the question whether the provision filters out a substantial part of the class which caused congressional concern, or whether it filters out more members of the class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.
Id.
at 777, 95 S.Ct. at 2472, 45 L.Ed.2d at 545-546.
The respondent advanced as a reasonable justification for the exclusionary provision the following:
The length remaining to be served on Petitioner’s sentence would in the
opinion of most prison administrators be a factor against admission to such a training course. It is of course beneficial to the prison system to have a highly trained motivated individual available for work for a long period of time. Nevertheless, the training exists primarily for the benefit of the inmate and not the prison authorities. Complex technical programs such as the x-ray training course are designed to make the inmate technically competent through formal and practical studies, to provide a short period of practical application thereafter, and to be fairly quickly paroled. Prolonged utilization in a prison setting is not considered desirable since the inmate may be diverted from his program due to other considerations or may become frustrated in his failure to practice his specialty in a “real” setting.
We find the reason advanced for the denial of the petitioner’s application to the program to be neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Further, there is nothing in the record to show that the use of this exclusionary provision was not justified by the difficulties attendant to individual determinations. Indeed, the abandonment of the criteria for eligibility set out in the prison policy statements in favor of individual review in each case would appear to place the prison administrators in a near impossible situation. Satisfaction of each criterion does not guarantee admittance into the training program. They are, rather, merely screening factors by which the pool of eligible prisoners is determined. Final acceptance into the x-ray technician training program occurs after individual review of those eligible.
Further, we do not agree that the exclusionary provision is in derogation of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) under which the petitioner was sentenced.
Assuming, as found by the District Court,
that the statute “contemplate[s] * * * that the Board of Parole shall exercise its discretion to release the prisoner at the precise point when his rehabilitation has been optimally achieved”, there is nothing to suggest that its purpose will be frustrated. Sellers may pursue any of the other rehabilitative programs for which he is eligible in his effort to
achieve the maximum benefit from his § 4208(a)(2) sentence.
It is not within the province of the courts to determine the nature and purpose of the rehabilitative programs administered by the Attorney General in order to suit the desires of an individual inmate. While it may not be, as the District Court said, “universally true that, in every situation involving x-ray technician training, the training is 'primarily for the benefit of the inmate and not the prison authorities’ ”, it is for the prison officials to determine, absent arbitrariness or caprice, the mix between individual benefit and institutional benefit that is most desirable.
Again, the fact that Sellers is relatively close to being able to satisfy the exclusionary provision at issue does not render that provision invalid.
Having found the exclusionary provision disqualifying the petitioner from eligibility to the x-ray technician training program to be neither arbitrary nor capricious, the judgment of the District Court is reversed.