IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-KA-00383-SCT
JAMES T. ROCHE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/23/2004 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. R. I. PRICHARD, III COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN A. HOWELL ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: CLAIBORNE (BUDDY) McDONALD NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/14/2005 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE WALLER, P.J., GRAVES AND RANDOLPH, JJ.
WALLER, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A Pearl River County Circuit Court jury convicted James T. Roche of commercial
burglary. The trial court subsequently sentenced Roche, per Mississippi’s habitual offender
statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (Rev. 2000), to seven years in prison without eligibility
for parole. Roche now appeals the conviction which we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. In the early morning hours of November 12, 2002, Officer Raymond Rickoll, an off-
duty police officer, sat on his front porch smoking a cigarette when he noticed a two-toned, gold or champagne-colored Lexus pass by his home in Picayune two or three times. Officer
Rickoll said he was intentionally keeping an eye on the Sunflower grocery store, about 100
yards away, because his training officer had advised him that drug activity had been going on
near the store at night.
¶3. At 1:57 a.m., he saw a black male get out of the Lexus, carry a black jacket in his hand,
and approach the Sunflower.1 Officer Rickoll then heard banging sounds coming from the
store but was unable to discern the source of the noise. He called the police, describing the
driver as a 195-pound black male, five feet, nine inches tall, wearing a black hat and black pants,
and carrying a black jacket in his hands. The man subsequently drove away before Officer
Rickoll could reach him.
¶4. Shortly thereafter, Officer Charles Esque, Jr. arrived at the Sunflower after hearing
Officer Rickoll’s message over the radio. After the store’s owner arrived and opened the door,
he and Officer Rickoll investigated the scene and discovered the window had been broken and
two black cash till drawers were missing as well as the change that had been left inside them. 2
A third till drawer had been emptied of its change and left in the Sunflower parking lot. The
1 Rickoll testified the lights in the parking lot enabled him to observe the man. We note that although the record includes photos of the different views from Rickoll’s property (some of which preclude the possibility Rickoll could have seen the Sunflower at all), the photos were apparently taken on or next to the street. This diminishes the helpfulness of the photos since Rickoll testified he was sitting on his porch when he witnessed the burglary and also specifically testified the photos did not represent an accurate depiction of his view from the porch. 2 The owner, Nam Nguyen, testified that prior to the robbery it was his practice to count the bills and leave the change in the drawers.
2 officers discovered nothing else missing and later found the other two drawers discarded on
different streets in Picayune.
¶5. Officer Chad Dorn said that after receiving a call from dispatch conveying Officer
Rickoll’s description of the perpetrator, he noticed a “gold or brownish,” two-toned Lexus
traveling through east Picayune. He followed the vehicle until it stopped at the local Texaco
station. James T. Roche, the driver, got out of the vehicle and started walking toward Officer
Dorn. The passenger, Joseph Parkman, exited the vehicle and entered the store. After Roche
asked what was going on, Officer Dorn informed him he was driving a vehicle believed to be
involved in a local burglary. At that point, Officer Dorn placed Roche in investigative custody.
¶6. At 3:20 a.m., Officer Rickoll received a call from the police department summoning
him to the Texaco station. When he arrived, he recognized the Lexus as being the one he had
seen about an hour and a half earlier. The driver of the car, Roche, who is a black male, was
wearing a black hat and dark clothing. Officer Rickoll also noticed a black jacket in the back
seat of the car. Although he could not identify Roche’s face, he testified that Roche was the
same height and build of the man he saw in the Sunflower parking lot. Slightly contrary to
Officer Rickoll’s initial description of the perpetrator was Roche’s testimony that he is five
feet, eleven inches tall (as opposed to five feet, nine inches tall) and weighs 220 pounds (rather
than 195 pounds).
¶7. Officer Esque looked through the window of the vehicle and saw two paper bags. On
one of the bags someone had written “Nickles - $7.00" and on the other bag someone had
3 written “Dimes - “$8.00.”3 Roche later stated he had hand-written the totals on the bags.
Officer Esque also saw a black jacket in the back seat.
¶8. The officers searched the vehicle and, in addition to the bagged change, found $11.50
in quarters, $0.20 in nickels, and $0.03 in pennies in the console. After examining the jacket
in the back seat, Officer Esque said he noticed it was glittering with tiny pieces of glass.4 The
officers also found a car jack in the trunk. Finally, the officers confiscated three rolls of
pennies Parkman used to pay for a pack of cigarettes.5
¶9. At trial, Roche testified he and Joseph Parkman had been watching movies together,
listening to music, and drinking alcohol that night. Both men testified that around midnight,
Roche left the house and said he was going back to his house to rob his piggy bank.6 He stated
he drove home, took a jug full of change, emptied it, counted it all out, placed the nickels and
dimes in separate bags, and returned by 12:30 a.m. 7 He testified that he and Parkman left
sometime later to purchase cigarettes and liquor, and were confronted by police after stopping
at the Texaco. Furthermore, on the stand, Roche contemporaneously estimated he “had about
$10 or $11 worth of quarters” in the console, but stated that the large amount of quarters in
his console was the result of dropping extra change in there over time.
3 Officer Esque counted $7.00 in nickels in the first bag and $9.10 in dimes in the second. 4 The State did not submit into evidence the pieces of glass described by Officer Esque. 5 Although Nam Nguyen testified he believed some of the stolen change was loose and some wrapped, he was not completely certain. 6 His house is six to seven blocks away. 7 Parkman could not remember how long Roche was gone.
4 ANALYSIS
¶10. On appeal, Roche raises five grounds of error: (1) the trial court erred in overruling
Roche’s objection to Officer Rickoll’s identification of him as the perpetrator; (2) the trial
court erred in failing to suppress evidence collected during the search of Roche’s vehicle; (3)
the trial court erred in refusing to strike the entire jury panel and declare a mistrial; (4) the
verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; and (5) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the verdict.
A. Identification
¶11. Roche contends he was impermissibly identified by Officer Rickoll in a “show-up”
procedure at the Texaco and argues the trial court’s failure to sustain his objection to the
identification violated his constitutional right to due process. The standard of review for trial
court decisions regarding pretrial identification is “whether or not substantial credible
evidence supports the trial court's findings that, considering the totality of the circumstances,
in-court identification testimony was not impermissibly tainted.” Ellis v. State, 667 So. 2d
599, 605 (Miss. 1995) (citing Magee v. State, 542 So. 2d 228, 231 (Miss. 1989); Nicholson
v. State, 523 So. 2d 68, 71 (Miss. 1988); Ray v. State, 503 So. 2d 222, 224 (Miss. 1986)). We
will only disturb the order of the trial court “where there is an absence of substantial credible
evidence supporting it." Id. (citing Ray, 503 So. 2d at 224).
¶12. We have previously held that “pretrial identifications which are suggestive, without
necessity for conducting them in such manner, are proscribed.” York v. State, 413 So. 2d
1372, 1383 (Miss. 1982). The United States Supreme Court has also stated, “[t]he practice
of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a
5 lineup, has been widely condemned.” Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127,
22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 11
L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)).
¶13. There is support for Roche’s argument that it was impermissibly suggestive for the
officers to use a show up procedure to assist in his identification. When Officer Rickoll, the
only witness to the crime, arrived at the Texaco the police were questioning only one man,
Roche. Roche wore the same type clothing Rickoll had seen the burglar wearing and stood
next to a Lexus which was similar in color to the one Rickoll reported seeing the burglar
driving. Inside the car was evidence which ostensibly linked the driver to the crime. Rickoll
then identified Roche as the individual he saw breaking into the Sunflower. To quote Foster,
“The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it all but inevitable that
[Rickoll] would identify [Roche] whether or not he was in fact ‘the man.’ In effect, the police
. . . said to the witness, ‘This is the man.’” Foster, 394 U.S. at 443. The show up identification
in question conspicuously singled Roche out and was impermissibly suggestive.
¶14. However, the presence of an impermissibly suggestive identification is not the end of
our inquiry. Such identification is admissible if, considering the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the identification procedure, the identification did not give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of misidentification. York, 413 So. 2d at 1383 (quoting Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)).8 Reliability is the linchpin of
the inquiry. Gray v. State, 728 So. 2d 36, 68 (Miss. 1998) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
8 This standard applies to both in-court and out-of-court identifications. York, 413 So. 2d at 1383.
6 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Nathan v. State, 552 So. 2d 99, 104
(Miss. 1989)). Under Biggers, the factors to be considered in evaluating reliability of the
identification under the totality of the circumstances include
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; see, e.g., Gray v. State, 728 So. 2d 68-69 (finding show-up
procedure impermissibly suggestive but declaring identification reliable and admissible after
reviewing circumstances under Biggers factors). We therefore review, under the Biggers
factors, the reliability of Officer Rickoll’s identification of Roche and weigh it against the
corrupting effect of the suggestive identification.
1. Opportunity to view the accused
¶15. Rickoll viewed the burglar from approximately 100 yards away at a very early hour of
the morning. Though he testified the lighting in the parking lot enabled him to view the man,
his opportunity to see the perpetrator’s face was limited by his distance from the perpetrator
and the darkness of the hour.
2. Degree of attention.
¶16. As a result of being warned by his training officer, Rickoll was already vigilant about
criminal activity going on in his neighborhood during late hours. This indicates the degree of
attention to which he paid the event was heightened under the circumstances.
3. Accuracy of prior description
7 ¶17. Rickoll described the burglar as a 195-pound black male, five feet, nine inches tall,
wearing a black hat and black pants, carrying a black jacket in his hands, and driving a two-
toned, gold or champagne-colored Lexus. Roche is a black male; he was wearing a black hat
and black pants when Officer Dorn stopped him; he had a black jacket in the back seat of his
vehicle; and he was driving a Lexus within the range of color Rickoll described. And though
Roche testified he is, in fact, 220 pounds and five feet, eleven inches tall, the slight disparities
in weight and height are, by no means, so inconsistent as to render Rickoll’s prior description
inaccurate.
4. Witness's level of certainty at confrontation
¶18. Upon seeing Roche at the gas station, Rickoll identified Roche as having the same
height and build of the man he saw outside the Sunflower. He also was certain the clothing was
the same clothing he described to the police when he reported the burglary. Even so, we note
that Rickoll’s certainty was necessarily limited by the fact that he had not seen the burglar’s
face.
5. Length of time between the crime and the confrontation
¶19. Rickoll identified Roche approximately an hour and a half after witnessing the burglary.
¶20. As noted above, the “show up” procedure used by the Picayune Police Department was
impermissibly suggestive, but we do not turn a blind eye to the reliability demonstrated by
Rickoll’s identification of Roche. Though Rickoll’s opportunity to view the accused may have
been slightly limited, any concerns about the reliability of his identification are wholly
alleviated by the degree of attention to which he paid the event, the level of certainty upon
viewing Roche, the length of time between the crime and the confrontation, and, in particular,
8 the accuracy of his description despite the darkness of the hour and the fact that he was 100
yards away. As we stated in York,
It can thus be observed that an accused who seeks to exclude identification testimony based upon an alleged due process violation faces a very heavy burden. Even though the pretrial identification is impermissibly suggestive, he must still show the conduct gave rise to a very substantial likelihood of . . . misidentification.
413 So. 2d at 1384. Roche has not met his very heavy burden of showing the conduct gave
rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification, and this issue is without merit.
B. Legality of Search
¶21. Upon placing Roche in investigative custody, the officers searched the Lexus and
recovered a car jack from the trunk, two bags of change, an abundance of loose change, and a
black jacket. Roche argues the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence collected during
the search of his vehicle. In determining whether evidence should have been suppressed, we
will not disturb a trial court’s findings of fact on appeal unless the trial judge applied an
incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Taylor v. State, 733 So. 2d 251, 255 (Miss. 1999).
¶22. “The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a
cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). There is an exception to the warrant
requirement in the context of vehicle searches. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466, 119
9 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999). When probable cause justifies the search of vehicle
which police have lawfully stopped, “it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 825. The United States
Supreme Court has also stated,
We made this clear in United States v. Ross, [456 U.S. at 809], when we said that in cases where there was probable cause to search a vehicle ‘a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.’ In a case with virtually identical facts to this one (even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of the car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam), we repeated that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: ‘If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.’ Id. at 940.
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467 (alterations omitted).
¶23. The search of Roche’s vehicle falls squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s
automobile exception. The facts at hand justified issuance of a warrant to search Roche’s
vehicle. The car was readily mobile, and probable cause existed to believe it contained
contraband; therefore, the Fourth Amendment permitted the officers to search the vehicle
without a warrant. Every item the officers discovered came about as the result of a legal
search. The trial court did not err, and we find this issue is without merit.
C. Striking of Jury Panel
¶24. During voir dire, Roche’s attorney asked the jury panel if Roche’s prior convictions
would have an influence on whether they perceived him to be less believable. Several of the
jury members responded in the affirmative. The attorney then requested the trial court strike
everyone who said they would find Roche less believable as a result of his prior convictions.
10 Rather than strike them, the trial judge questioned the jurors as to whether they could follow
the applicable law even if the convictions Roche’s attorney mentioned were raised during the
trial. Since no juror responded that he or she could not follow the law, the judge denied the
motion.
¶25. Roche argues on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the entire jury
panel and declare a mistrial. Without citing any case law, he generally argues the trial court’s
decision irreparably prejudiced his defense and deprived him of due process under the federal
and state Constitutions. Roche states, “While the trial court has no control over the
understanding of the jurors as to the basic rights in a criminal trial, it is unlikely that jurors who
believe a person should testify would be convinced by jury instructions that the presumption
of innocence attends the defendant throughout the trial.” He also argues “such an attitude or
lack of understanding on the part of the jury has a chilling effect on the [d]efendant’s right to
be heard under Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution.”
¶26. Roche is procedurally barred from raising this issue for two reasons. First, he did not
request a mistrial. We have held
It is now well settled that when anything transpires during the trial that would tend to prejudice the rights of defendant, he cannot wait and take his chances with the jury on a favorable verdict and then obtain a reversal of the cause in this Court because of such error, but he must ask the trial court for a mistrial upon the happening of such occurrence when the same is of such nature as would entitle him to a mistrial.
Box v. State, 610 So. 2d 1148, 1154 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis omitted). We apply this rule in
all cases unless a fundamental right is involved. Id. Though Roche cursorily names two
federal constitutional amendments as well as two sections of the Mississippi Constitution, he
11 makes no specific arguments, reinforced with authority, which demonstrate a violation of any
fundamental right. This issue is therefore procedurally barred for the additional reason of his
failure to cite to supporting authority. See Dycus v. State, 875 So. 2d 140, 169 (Miss. 2004)
(“[F]ailure to cite any authority may be treated as a procedural bar, relieving us of any
obligation to consider the assignment.”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 125 S.
Ct. 1589 (March 7, 2005) (for further consideration in light of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
___, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005)).
D. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence9
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶27. In the recent case of Bush v. State, __ So. 2d ___, 2005 WL 312039, *4-*5 (Miss.
2005), we discussed the standard which applies in a challenge to a verdict based on the
sufficiency of the evidence:
In Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889 (Miss. 1968), we stated that in considering whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.’ However, this inquiry does not require a court to 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
9 Roche’s brief overlaps his arguments regarding the standards of weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We address them separately to provide a clear analysis of these two distinct issues.
12 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence ‘point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,’ the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render[, i.e. reverse and discharge]. Edwards v. Stat e, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985)(citing May v. Stat e, 460 So. 2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984); see also Dycus v. State, 875 So. 2d 140, 164 (Miss. 2004). However, if a review of the evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, ‘having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,’ the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient.
¶28. In order to prove Roche committed the crime of commercial burglary, the State was
required to prove he (1) broke and entered; (2) in the day or night; (3) any shop; (4) with intent
to steal. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-33 (Rev. 2000). Considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, we find there was sufficient evidence with which to convict Roche of
commercial burglary.
¶29. In the early morning hours, Officer Rickoll saw a black man with the same build as
Roche, who, like Roche, was driving a Lexus, wearing a black outfit (including a black cap), and
carrying a black jacket. The man (1) broke and entered; (2) at night; (3) the Sunflower store;
and (4) stole change from the register tills. Shortly after the Sunflower break-in, officers
stopped Roche and discovered $0.03 in pennies, $7.20 in nickels, $9.10 in dimes, and $11.50
in quarters. In light of these facts, which we view in the light most favorable to the State, we
find that any rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the elements
had been met by the State in proving Roche committed the crime of commercial burglary. This
issue is without merit.
13 2. Weight of the Evidence
¶30. In Bush v. State, we also discussed the standard which applies in a challenge to a verdict
based on the weight of the evidence.
When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. We have stated that on a motion for new trial, the court sits as a thirteenth juror. The motion, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.
However, the evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict. A reversal on the grounds that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict. Rather, as the ‘thirteenth juror,’ the court simply disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of opinion does not signify acquittal any more than a disagreement among the jurors themselves. Instead, the proper remedy is to grant a new trial.
__ So. 2d at ___, 2005 WL 312039 at *4-*5 (footnotes, citations, & internal quotations
omitted).
¶31. Sitting as a limited “thirteenth juror” in this case, we cannot view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and find an unconscionable injustice will result from the
jury’s determination of Roche’s guilt. The numerous consistencies between Rickoll’s
description of the perpetrator and Roche gave the jury more than enough evidence with which
to convict. This is particularly true in light of the early hour of the morning which the burglar
broke into the store and Roche’s appearance just an hour and a half later carrying a variety of
demarcated change. Furthermore, we cannot fault the jury for refusing to believe Roche’s
tenuous explanation for the presence of the change in his vehicle. Roche testified that in a
14 mere thirty minutes he drove home, emptied his change jug, only counted out nickels and
dimes, placed them in separate paper bags, and returned to Parkman’s house. He further
explained the $11.50 in quarters came from occasionally dropping change in his console,
despite the fact that there were only twenty-three cents in other change there. The evidence
by no means heavily preponderates against the verdict, and we affirm the trial court’s decision
to deny the Motion for New Trial.
CONCLUSION
¶32. After a complete review of the trial record in the underlying case, we find the trial court
properly admitted the evidence of Roche’s identification as well as the evidence collected
during the search of his car; the evidence was sufficient to convict; the verdict was not against
the weight of the evidence; and Roche is procedurally barred from arguing the trial court erred
in refusing to strike the entire jury panel. Accordingly, we affirm the Pearl River County
Circuit Court’s judgment.
¶33. CONVICTION OF COMMERCIAL BURGLARY AND SENTENCE OF SEVEN (7) YEARS, AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., COBB, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.