James T. Jameson v. Judicial Conduct Commission

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: August 22, 2024
• Docket: 2022-SC-0496
• Status: Published

Opinion

RENDERED: AUGUST 22, 2024 TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2022-SC-0496-RR

JAMES T. JAMESON APPELLANT

V. IN SUPREME COURT

JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE LAMBERT

AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART

This matter involves an appeal from a ruling of the Judicial Conduct

Commission (JCC), which charged and found Judge James “Jamie” Jameson

guilty of seven counts of misconduct. The JCC ordered that Judge Jameson be

permanently removed from office as a circuit judge for the 42nd Judicial

Circuit.

For the reasons provided herein, we hold that the JCC failed to carry its

burden of proof in relation to some, but not all, of the misconduct alleged

under Counts I and III and that it failed to prove all allegations of misconduct

under Counts IV, V, and VI. We further hold that based on the misconduct

proven under Counts I, II, III, and VII, Judge Jameson’s removal from office

was appropriate, but that the JCC does not have the authority to permanently

remove a judge from office. I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For context, we will begin with an overview of some of the uncontested

facts of this case. This section of the opinion does not cover all of Judge

Jameson’s alleged misconduct, which is discussed in greater detail in Section

II(E) below.

In 2015, Judge Jameson became a circuit court judge for the 42nd

Judicial Circuit which is comprised of Marshall and Calloway Counties. Soon

after, he identified two ongoing problems within his judicial circuit. The first

was that nearly all of his criminal docket involved cases either directly or

tangentially related to substance use disorder (SUD), yet he believed

defendants did not have sufficient access to SUD treatment. The second

problem was overcrowding in the county jails and the accompanying cost to the

counties associated with housing defendants awaiting trial.

By November 2017, Judge Jameson had begun developing a potential

plan of attack to address these issues. Primarily, he intended to form a

community corrections board under KRS 1 196.700, et seq, and thereafter

create a 501(c)(3) non-profit funding arm for the board. The non-profit arm of

the board would in turn fund the construction of a 100-bed in-patient SUD

treatment facility to serve the 42nd Circuit. In addition, he wanted to ensure

that more criminal defendants could be placed on ankle monitors as a bond

condition by utilizing a more affordable ankle monitor provider than the

1 Kentucky Revised Statute.

2 providers being used at that time. To that end, in August 2017 Judge Jameson

began discussions with Ed Brennen, a regional sales representative for Track

Group, an ankle monitor manufacturing company. On December 19, 2018,

Judge Jameson directed a meeting with several local officials during which he

lauded both the affordability of Track Group’s services as well as the superior

design of the ankle monitors they produced.

On November 21, 2018, Judge Jameson sent an email to legal counsel

for the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) seeking guidance on two

pertinent issues. One, whether it would be appropriate for a CCB formed

pursuant to KRS Chapter 196 to be involved in activities related to pretrial

supervision, and two, whether it would be appropriate for circuit court clerks to

collect the fees associated with a pretrial ankle monitoring program. Counsel

for AOC responded on December 4 with a memorandum stating that its “office

[had] not found any guidance in KRS Chapter 196 or elsewhere in either

statutory or case law” concerning “the authority of [a] Community Corrections

Board regarding the handling of funds associated with pretrial releasees and

GPS monitoring” and it therefore could not “provide definitive answers.”

Concerning the question of whether circuit court clerks should collect fees

associated with a pretrial ankle monitoring program, AOC’s response was: “No,

we do not recommend it.” Judge Jameson never sought an opinion from the

Judicial Ethics Committee about these issues.

Less than a month later, on December 31, 2018, Judge Jameson filed

the Articles of Incorporation for the “42nd Judicial Circuit Community

3 Corrections Board” (CCB). The Articles stated that Judge Jameson was the

CCB’s incorporator, registered agent, and one of three board members. The

other two board members were Don Cherry, Judge Jameson’s father-in-law and

Calloway County Fiscal Court member, and Dave Berndt, a local philanthropist

that Judge Jameson met at the Kentucky Opry. The mailing address for the

CCB’s principal office was the Marshall County Judicial Building, the location

of Judge Jameson’s primary judicial chambers. The CCB received its 501(c)(3)

non-profit status from the Internal Revenue Service three months later in

March 2019.

Also in March 2019, Judge Jameson made voluntary appearances before

the Marshall and Calloway County Fiscal Courts and advised those bodies that

the then-existing process of placing criminal defendants on ankle monitors

violated the law. At that time, defendants in the 42nd Circuit who were

ordered to be on an ankle monitor would directly contract with a private ankle

monitoring company. Neither Marshall County nor Calloway County had a

contract with an ankle monitoring company. Judge Jameson advised the fiscal

courts that KRS 67.372 and KRS 67.374 required that, one, in order for a

judge to place an individual on an ankle monitor the county must first have a

contract with an ankle monitor provider and, two, that the contract between

the county and the ankle monitor provider must be selected via a public

bidding process.

Acting on Judge Jameson’s advice, the Calloway County Fiscal Court

decided to issue a public request for proposal (RFP) seeking bids for an ankle

4 monitor service contract. 2 The RFP was prepared by the Calloway County

Attorney, Bryan Ernstberger. On May 11, 2019, prior to the issuance of the

RFP, Judge Jameson sent Ernstberger an email containing “recommendations

for terms to be included in the RFP.” The email included an attached

memorandum with several suggested “ankle monitor requirements.” The

suggestions included in that memorandum were listed, verbatim, in the RFP

that was ultimately issued by the fiscal court. Additionally, on July 7, 2020,

Judge Jameson sent Ernstberger an email that included an attachment titled

“Ankle Monitor Program RFP by Ernstberger (edit 1).docx[.]” The

accompanying message from Judge Jameson said, “Attached is the final

version of the RFP. While this document does not cover every piece of

equipment that will be made available to the counties, it gets the job done so

we can move forward. Please let me know if you have any questions.” Each

page of the draft RFP attached to that email was virtually identical to the RFP

later issued by the fiscal court.

The Calloway Fiscal Court issued the RFP on July 21, 2020. The CCB

submitted its responsive bid on July 27, which included a cover letter signed

by “Jamie Jameson, Director, 42nd Community Corrections Board.”

Ernstberger reviewed the three bids that were submitted in response to the

2 While the RFP was issued by the Calloway County Fiscal Court, it is this

Court’s understanding that the company who submitted the winning bid would provide services to both Calloway and Marshall Counties pursuant to an interlocal agreement in accordance with KRS 67.372(7) (“Agreements between counties for monitoring services may, with the approval of their governing bodies, be consummated by a contract signed by all counties party thereto or by an interlocal cooperation agreement[.]”).

5 RFP and recommended to the fiscal court that the CCB’s bid be selected.

Acting at least in part on Ernstberger’s recommendation, the fiscal court

selected the CCB’s bid on August 19, 2020. The CCB’s ankle monitoring

program was implemented in the 42nd Circuit sometime in late fall of 2020.

The CCB’s ankle monitoring program functioned as follows. Judge

Jameson, whose court was the only court of general jurisdiction in the 42nd

Circuit, would decide whether a qualifying criminal defendant should be placed

on an ankle monitor as a condition of his or her bond. If so, the defendant

would enter into a “Monitoring Services Agreement” with the CCB that detailed

the defendant’s responsibilities, including payment amounts, under the

agreement. The signature block of that document provided places for the

defendant and “James Jameson, Correction’s Board President and Director” to

sign and date.

Participants in the ankle monitor program were then monitored by the

CCB’s Director of GPS Services, Christine Pickett. Pickett was a third-year law

student doing an unpaid externship in Judge Jameson’s office when he asked

her to take the position; 3 she had no prior experience in that kind of work.

Pickett was a contract employee of the CCB and received compensation. She

was responsible for monitoring all program participants and would receive real-

3 When Pickett’s externship ended on May 31, 2021, Madison Dorris took the

position. Dorris had been an intern from Murray State in Judge Jameson’s office during the spring 2021 semester and took the position after her internship ended. The manner in which the program ran did not change once Dorris became the Director of GPS Services.

6 time violation notifications for things like strap tampers, low battery alerts,

entry of a defendant into an exclusion zone, or the departure of a defendant

from an inclusion zone. Judge Jameson, 911 dispatch, two individuals from

Track Group, and Dominik Mikulcik, Judge Jameson’s staff attorney, also

received instantaneous violation notifications.

Most of the violation alerts that occurred were resolved between Pickett

and the participant, but if the issue could not be resolved or if the violation was

classified as “high risk” she would issue a “notice of violation” report. A

violation report provided a factual account of the alleged violation and would

either state the CCB’s intention of revoking the participant’s monitor or request

a summons or a warrant. Most violation reports did not result in the

immediate issuance of an arrest warrant. But, on some occasions, Judge

Jameson directed the circuit court clerk’s office to issue an arrest warrant

upon receipt of a violation report. The defendant would then be taken into

custody and Judge Jameson would set a bond violation hearing for the next

available docket date. Judge Jameson never issued an arrest warrant based

solely on a participant’s failure to pay his or her ankle monitoring fees.

Against the recommendation of AOC’s legal counsel, the Marshall and

Calloway Circuit Clerks collected the fees from defendants participating in the

CCB’s ankle monitor program. After collecting the fees, the clerks would write

a monthly check to the CCB. Those funds were then distributed amongst

various entities via checks signed by Judge Jameson. The clerks’ offices did

not receive a fee for providing these services.

7 In addition to the funds raised by the ankle monitoring program, which

were scant, the CCB sought to raise funds by applying for grant money and

fundraising. On March 17, 2021, Judge Jameson submitted a grant

application with the Kentucky State Corrections Commission 4 on behalf of the

CCB seeking $25,000.00 to increase the hourly pay of the CCB’s Director of

GPS Services. The grant application explained that paying the Director of GPS

Services with the requested grant money, as opposed to funds from the ankle

monitoring program, would allow more funds from the program to be funneled

towards building an SUD treatment facility. The corrections commission

ultimately denied funding.

As for fundraising, Judge Jameson and the CCB partnered with The

Fletcher Group, a 501(c)3 nonprofit corporation founded by former Kentucky

Governor Ernie Fletcher and his wife, Glenna. The Fletcher Group’s purpose is

to, inter alia, provide assistance with building SUD treatment centers in rural

areas and is funded through federal grant money. On July 15, 2020, Judge

Jameson attended a meeting with The Fletcher Group wherein it agreed to

assist him in his endeavor to fund the construction of an SUD treatment

facility. The plan to build the facility was christened “the Re-Life project.” A

website for the Re-Life project where donations could be made was created, and

the Fletcher Group helped organize and hold a fundraiser for the Re-Life

project on May 20, 2021. Judge Jameson presented a PowerPoint during the

4 See generally KRS 196.702; KRS 196.710.

8 “educational” half of the event regarding local SUD issues. The fundraiser and

the Re-Life program were also promoted via radio ad and emails which we

address in greater detail below.

This brings us to the JCC proceedings now before us. On June 21,

2021, a disgruntled participant in the CCB’s ankle monitoring program filed a

judicial complaint against Judge Jameson. 5 On October 15, 2021, the JCC

held an informal hearing with Judge Jameson pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule (SCR) 4.170(2). Judge Jameson prepared a written statement for that

informal hearing that addressed the judicial complaint and discussed,

generally, his involvement with the CCB and the GPS program. A week after

the informal hearing a second JCC complaint was filed by a different

participant in the ankle monitoring program. 6 After several months of further

investigation, the JCC issued a notice of formal proceedings and charges and

an amended notice of proceedings and charges on June 13, 2022, and July 21,

2022, respectively. Both the notice and the amended notice alleged the same

four counts of misconduct related to the CCB, the Re-Life project, the ankle

5 The complaint itself, filed by Amber Fralix, was not included in the record

before us. However, it appears that on June 9, 2021, the Director of GPS Services issued a violation report for Fralix based on her “failure to properly communicate with the CCB.” That violation report was then sent to Judge Jameson via email who then emailed the Marshall County Circuit Clerk’s Office and requested that an arrest warrant be issued for Fralix. 6 The second complaint, filed by Tina Mull, was not included in the record.

Unlike Fralix, Mull’s violation report is also not in the record. On October 8, 2021, Judge Jameson emailed the Marshall County Circuit Clerk’s Office requesting that an arrest warrant be issued for Mull based on “a GPS violation.”

9 monitoring program, Judge Jameson’s courtroom conduct, acts of retaliation,

and the solicitation of campaign contributions. 7

After a temporary removal hearing the following month, the JCC voted 3-

2 to temporarily remove Judge Jameson from office pending the outcome of a

final hearing. Judge Jameson filed a writ of prohibition in this Court against

the enforcement of the JCC’s temporary suspension order. This Court ruled

that the temporary suspension order was void ab initio due to the JCC’s failure

to comply with SCR 4.120, which mandates that “the affirmative vote of at least

4 members shall be required for the suspension. . .of a judge for good cause.”

See Jameson v. Jud. Conduct Comm’n, 2022-SC-0454-OA (Ky. Oct. 31, 2022).

However, this Court did not rule on Judge Jameson’s writ of prohibition until

after his final hearing before the JCC.

In the interim, following Judge Jameson’s temporary removal but prior to

the final hearing, the JCC issued a second amended notice of formal

proceedings and charges. The second amended notice added two counts of

misconduct that alleged, respectively, that Judge Jameson had attempted to

dissuade his judicial staff from complying with a JCC subpoena duces tecum

issued after his temporary removal and that he failed to adhere to the terms of

his temporary removal by contacting his judicial staff and using judicial

resources. Three days later, the JCC filed its third and final amended notice of

7 The only difference between the original notice of formal proceedings and the

amended notice of formal proceedings appears to be their distribution lines, as Judge Jameson obtained new counsel after the original notice was filed.

10 proceedings and charges. The third amended notice added one count of

misconduct which alleged that Judge Jameson had coerced a public radio

station manager at Murray State University (MSU) into not pursuing a story

about a security video of Judge Jameson walking around the Marshall County

courthouse in his underwear. The conversation between the station manager

and Judge Jameson had occurred earlier in the year, but the station manager

did not inform the JCC of the alleged misconduct until after he learned of its

investigation into Judge Jameson.

Following a four-day final hearing the JCC found Judge Jameson guilty

of seven counts of misconduct, and unanimously voted to have him

permanently removed from office. Judge Jameson appealed the JCC’s findings

of fact, conclusions of law, and order to this Court. After review, we remanded

the case to the JCC and ordered that it supplement its findings of fact. The

JCC then issued a supplemental findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final

order that incorporated its original findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

order. The JCC’s rulings and recommendations are now before us for review.

Additional facts are discussed below as necessary.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The JCC is required to prove the substance of its charges by clear and

convincing evidence. SCR 4.160. “[C]lear and convincing proof does not

necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of a

probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to

11 convince ordinarily prudent-minded people[.]” Gentry v. Jud. Conduct Comm’n,

612 S.W.3d 832, 846 (Ky. 2020). This Court must accordingly accept the

JCC’s findings and conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous, i.e.,

unreasonable. Id. at 840. “By rule, on any judge's appeal, we have broad

power to ‘affirm, modify or set aside in whole or in part the order of the

Commission, or to remand the action to the Commission for further

proceedings.’” Id. (citing SCR 4.290(5)).

B. Judge Jameson’s arguments concerning the JCC’s temporary suspension hearing and temporary suspension order are moot.

Judge Jameson has raised several arguments in relation to the JCC’s

temporary removal hearing and its order temporarily removing him from office.

As discussed, supra, this Court previously held that the JCC’s order

temporarily removing Judge Jameson was void ab initio because it was not

supported by the required number of votes under SCR 4.120. We accordingly

hold that these arguments are moot and consequently decline to address them.

C. Pursuant to SCR 4.020, the JCC lacked jurisdiction to pursue claims against Judge Jameson for the alleged abuse of his contempt powers, but it did not lack jurisdiction to pursue its other claims against him based solely on a lack of a finding that Judge Jameson acted in bad faith.

Judge Jameson asserts that the JCC lacked jurisdiction to pursue any of

the charges against him because there was no evidence that any of his

misconduct was committed in bad faith. In support of this argument, he cites

SCR 4.020(2), which states that “[a]ny erroneous decision made in good faith

shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.” Judge Jameson

12 contends that in order for the JCC to have jurisdiction over alleged misconduct

by a judge, that judge must have committed the misconduct in bad faith.

Recently, in Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, this Court reiterated

the long-standing meaning of this rule, stating: “This section's purpose is to

merely make clear that normal legal decisions made by a judge, in her judicial

role as a judge, are not subject to review by the Commission; instead litigants

and lawyers are required to abide by appellate processes to contest erroneous

decisions.” 612 S.W.3d 793, 804 (Ky. 2020). In support, the Maze Court relied

upon Nicholson v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Commission, rendered over

four decades prior, which first articulated the reason for the addition of

subsection (2)’s 8 language to SCR 4.020:

The purpose of this addition was to make explicit that which we recognized to be implicit in our constitution and the rule. In a state which has an elected judiciary incompetence which is not gross and persistent can be safely left to elimination at the ballot box. Error can be adequately corrected by the appellate courts. Any other approach to the problem would destroy judicial independence by causing judges to keep one eye on their reversal rate and the other on the Commission. Both judicial eyes should be trained on the just disposition of the case at hand and not on the welfare of the sitting judge.

562 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Ky. 1978). Accordingly, SCR 4.020(2) does not provide

Judge Jameson with a total jurisdictional shield for extrajudicial acts of

misconduct alleged in this case as he claims. However, as we discuss in

Section II(E)(3)(b) below, this rule prohibited the JCC from pursuing charges

against him in relation to the alleged abuse of his contempt powers.

8 Then subsection (d).

13 D. The inclusion of lay persons on the JCC is not unconstitutional.

Judge Jameson next argues that permitting lay persons to serve on the

decision-making arm of the JCC violates the due process rights protected by

the Constitutions of both the United States and the Commonwealth. However,

the Kentucky Constitution itself provides the requirements for the composition

of the JCC, and it states:

Subject to rules of procedure to be established by the Supreme Court, and after notice and hearing, any justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals, Circuit Court or District Court may be retired for disability or suspended without pay or removed for good cause by a commission composed of one judge of

the Court of Appeals, selected by that court, one circuit judge and one district judge selected by a majority vote of the circuit judges and district judges, respectively, one member of the bar appointed by its governing body, and two persons, not members of the bench or bar, appointed by the Governor. The commission shall be a state body whose members shall hold office for four-year terms. Its actions shall be subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court.

Ky. Const. § 121 (emphasis added). The inclusion of laypersons on the JCC

accordingly does not violate the Kentucky Constitution.

Moreover, Jameson does not explain how the inclusion of laypersons on

the JCC runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution by depriving him of due process. 9

“As did the [U.S.] Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama, [287 U.S. 45 (1932)],

we consider due process as embodying those fundamental principles of liberty

9 Judge Jameson’s argument also states that the inclusion of laypersons on the

JCC violates the separation of powers doctrine but fails to elaborate on that contention.

14 and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.” Ditty v.

Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Ky. 1972).

In Ditty, Kentucky’s then highest Court addressed whether due process

entitled a criminal defendant in a police court 10 to have his or her case

presided over by a judge who was a licensed attorney. Id. at 774-76. It held:

Due process, as regards the tribunal hearing a case, usually has been considered to require only that the tribunal be fair and impartial. The function of the court is not to defend the accused, or to represent him, but to decide fairly and impartially. . . [T]he judge is not one of the accused's adversaries, and is not there either to defend or to prosecute him. So the fact that the accused needs a lawyer to defend him does not mean that he needs to be tried before a lawyer judge.

Long before Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S. 335 (1963)], it was recognized that both in civil and in criminal cases a party who

could and did employ counsel was entitled as a matter of due process to be heard by that counsel. Yet it never was suggested that there was a concomitant right to a lawyer judge. To the contrary, in Morrissey v. Brewer, [408 U.S. 471 (1972)], the Supreme Court held that in a parole-revocation proceeding, due process required only a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers.

[. . .]

The inescapable conclusion is that traditional concepts of fundamental fairness do not require that an accused be tried by a lawyer judge, and that the staffing of police courts by laymen judges does not offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.

Id. at 774-775 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

10 See KRS 26.010, et seq., “Police Courts” (repealed).

15 Although police courts such as the one at issue in Ditty no longer exist,

the notions that due process usually requires only that a tribunal be “fair and

impartial” and that a layperson’s service as a member of a tribunal “does not

offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscious of our

people as to be ranked as fundamental” remain extant. Indeed, our reliance in

Ditty on Morrissey v. Brewer regarding parole revocation proceedings requiring,

inter alia, “a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole

board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers” remains good

law. See Jones v. Bailey, 576 S.W.3d 128, 138 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Morrissey,

408 U.S. at 489). Moreover, in criminal trials where the stakes are arguably

higher than in any other form of litigation, the fact-finding body is typically

composed entirely of lay persons charged with applying sometimes complicated

legal standards to a set of proven facts.

Based on the foregoing discussion, this Court can discern no reason why

the inclusion of lay persons on JCC panels violates the principles of due

process embodied in either the U.S. Constitution or the Kentucky Constitution.

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Before we address the substance of the JCC’s charges against Judge

Jameson we are compelled to note that, although we previously remanded this

case to allow the JCC to supplement its findings of fact and conclusions of law,

JCC’s manner of analysis is deficient as will be noted herein. In the interest of

finally having a resolution in this case, we choose to not remand it again and

instead seek to provide guidance to the JCC moving forward. We urge the JCC

16 to, when applicable, engage in the application of relevant case law and statutes

to support its conclusions. Moreover, the JCC should explain in greater detail

how an alleged act of misconduct violated a given rule. The JCC is further

encouraged to cite to specific portions of testimony to support a given fact

finding rather than the entirety of an individual’s testimony.

1) Count I

Under Count I, the JCC found Judge Jameson guilty of several varying

acts of misconduct that can be distilled into the following: (a) Judge Jameson

created the CCB for an improper purpose; (b) Judge Jameson, or persons

under his direct supervision, developed procedures, local rules, and forms for

the operation of the CCB’s ankle monitoring program without the approval of

the Chief Justice; (c) Judge Jameson improperly appeared before two legislative

bodies (the Marshall and Calloway Fiscal Courts) and injected himself into

public bidding process in a manner that constituted the rigging of a public bid;

(d) Judge Jameson engaged in the direct solicitation of funds for the Re-Life

project; and (e) Judge Jameson submitted a grant application for an improper

purpose and attempted to use the prestige of his office to influence a grant

process. We will address each finding in turn.

(a) Judge Jameson created the CCB for an improper purpose.

The JCC found that Judge Jameson’s purposes in creating the CCB—

funding the construction of an SUD treatment center and running a pre-trial

ankle monitoring program—were improper under KRS 196.700 to KRS

196.735, the statutes governing community corrections programs and

17 community corrections boards. A discussion of what community corrections

programs and community corrections boards are, as well as their

corresponding statutory purposes, is therefore necessary.

The Kentucky State Corrections Commission (the commission) is a

statutory entity created by KRS 196.701. The twenty-three-member

commission was created “[t]o develop and implement a statewide strategic plan

for the state and community corrections programs[.]” KRS 196.701(1). The

commissions functions are, inter alia, conducting statewide assessments of

community corrections programs, awarding grant monies to qualifying

community corrections programs, and reviewing community corrections

program plans to ensure compliance with the statewide strategic plan. See

generally KRS 196.702. The goals of the statewide strategic plan include

ensuring that public safety is maintained while implementing a community

corrections program, reducing local commitments to the department of

corrections, reducing recidivism rates, and reducing probation and parole

revocations. KRS 196.702(4)(a)-(d).

A community corrections program is “a local government agency, private

nonprofit, or charitable organization” within a judicial circuit which “shall

perform” one or more of the following:

(a) Prepare community penalties plans; 11

11 A community penalty plan is “a plan presented in writing to the sentencing

judge which provides a detailed description of and rationale for the targeted offender's proposed sentence to a community corrections program or to one (1) or more special programs, conditions of probation, community punishments, or sanctions in lieu of lengthy incarceration[.]” KRS 196.700(4).

18 (b) Directly provide, arrange, or contract with public and private agencies for sentencing services for offenders; and

(c) Monitor the progress of offenders placed on community penalty plans or who receive sentencing services through provisions of KRS 196.700 to 196.735[.]

KRS 196.700(2)(a)-(c). The exclusive statutory purposes of the commission and

community corrections programs are to:

(1) Provide the judicial system with sentences to be used in lieu of incarceration;

(2) Develop community-based sentencing alternatives to incarceration for certain individuals convicted of a felony;

(3) Monitor and enforce the payment of restitution to victims of crime and the community through financial reimbursement, community service, or both;

(4) Stimulate local involvement in community corrections programs to assure that they are specifically designed to meet the needs of the sentencing court and the community; and

(5) Reduce expenditures of state funds by increasing community-based sentencing, reducing the rate of

recidivism, and reducing revocations of probation and parole.

KRS 196.705(1)-(5). To serve these purposes, community corrections programs

are “responsible for providing services for targeted offenders,” 12 i.e., “persons

charged with or convicted of one (1) or more felonies who under application of

12 KRS 196.715.

19 law are eligible for probation or suspension of sentence.” 13 The services

provided by community corrections programs to targeted offenders

shall include one (1) or more of the following:

(a) Preparing detailed community penalty plans for presentation to the prosecution, the sentencing judge, and by the offender's attorney.

(b) Providing treatment, punishment, management, supervision, rehabilitation, mentoring, employment, and other services to targeted offenders, or contracting or arranging with public or private agencies for services for targeted offenders, as described in the community corrections plan.

(c) Monitoring the progress of offenders under community penalty plans.

KRS 196.715(1)(a)-(c).

Community corrections boards are created by community corrections

programs “to provide direction and assistance to the community corrections

program in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the community

corrections program plan.” 14 KRS 196.725. A community corrections board

must be organized as a nonprofit corporation pursuant to KRS Chapter 273,

and “shall consist of not less than eight (8) members[.]” Id. The eight members

of the board “shall include, insofar as possible, judges, Commonwealth’s

attorneys, defense attorneys, crime victims or survivors, community leaders,

social workers, law-enforcement officers, probation officers, and other

13 KRS 196.700(8) (defining “targeted offenders”).

14 A community corrections program plan is “a written plan for the

development, implementation, operation, and improvement of a community corrections program.” KRS 196.700(3).

20 interested persons.” Id. The duties of a community corrections board “shall

include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) Development and

recommendation of an annual budget for the community corrections program;

(2) Selection of new or additional board members; (3) Arranging for a private

and independent annual audit; and (4) Development of procedures for

contracting for services.” Id.

In this case, we note that there was no evidence that a community

corrections program existed prior to the creation of the “42nd Judicial Circuit

Community Corrections Board,” nor was there any evidence that the 42nd

Circuit’s CCB was established by a community corrections program. See KRS

196.725. Judge Jameson alone filed the CCB’s articles of incorporation as its

incorporator, registered agent, and one-third of its board of directors. In

addition, the articles of incorporation state that mailing address for the

principal office of the CCB was the address of the Marshall County Courthouse

and it was undisputed that the CCB’s business was conducted from Judge

Jameson’s Marshall County judicial chambers. It was also undisputed that the

CCB never had eight board members as required by KRS 196.725 during the

span of time at issue in this case.

Throughout these proceedings Judge Jameson has continually argued

that the 42nd Circuit’s CCB was not a community corrections board pursuant

to KRS 196.700, et seq, and was instead simply a nonprofit corporation that

used the name “community corrections board.” He therefore contends that the

CCB was not required to comply with the foregoing statutes. But the record

21 demonstrates that, prior to the JCC’s investigation, Judge Jameson repeatedly

represented that the CCB was formed in accordance with the applicable

statutes. For example, when he contacted legal counsel for AOC in November

2018 for advice concerning whether the CCB could run a pre-trial ankle

monitoring program and whether circuit clerks could handle funds associated

with the program, he stated that “I, along with other local leaders, have formed

a community corrections board for our judicial circuit pursuant to KRS 196[.]”

In addition, his cover letter for the CCB’s responsive bid to the Calloway Fiscal

Court’s RFP said, “[o]ur organization is a statutory entity formed pursuant to

KRS 196.725 whose membership, by statute, consists of judges,

Commonwealth’s attorney, licensed attorneys, community leaders and elected

officials, law-enforcement officers, and other interested persons.” This Court

consequently finds no merit in his argument that he never intended his CCB to

be formed under KRS 196.700, et seq.

Moreover, based on the plain language of the applicable statutes, the

legislature intended community corrections programs to be focused on

implementing post-conviction sentencing alternatives that have the potential to

reduce long term incarceration rates and on providing services that allow

qualifying individuals with a felony conviction to return to and remain in their

communities. It further appears that community corrections boards are meant

to serve in an advisory and administrative capacity to a given community

22 corrections program. Nothing in this Court’s review of KRS 196.700 to KRS

196.735 suggests that a community corrections board should be involved in

providing pre-trial ankle monitoring services to defendants that are ordered to

be monitored as a bond condition. Concerningly, Judge Jameson himself

appeared to reach the same conclusion prior to filing the CCB’s articles of

incorporation. In his December 2018 letter to counsel for AOC he noted that

KRS 196 sets out what a community corrections board is and its purpose, in general. That chapter clearly directs that grant monies delved out by [the Commission] should be used consistent with the purposes set out in KRS 196.720. All of those purposes appear to be related to post-conviction incarceration relief of some form.

Yet despite this acknowledgement, he persisted with his plan forming a CCB

that was in violation of KRS Chapter 196 in both the manner it was formed and

in its overall purposes and goals.

We likewise find no support in the relevant statutes for Judge Jameson’s

belief that a proper function of a community corrections board could be

funding the construction of an SUD treatment facility. As noted, by statute,

the purpose of a community corrections board is “to provide direction and

assistance to the community corrections program in the design,

implementation, and evaluation of the community corrections program[,]” and

its statutory duties include things such as recommending the program’s

budget, selecting new board members, arranging for annual audits, and

developing procedures for contract services. KRS 196.725. As laudable as the

goal may be, we simply cannot extrapolate from these advisory and

23 administrative statutory purposes that community corrections boards were

ever meant to raise funds for the construction of an SUD treatment facility.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the JCC’s finding that Judge

Jameson created the 42nd Circuit’s CCB for an improper purpose was

supported by clear and convincing evidence.

(b) Judge Jameson, or persons under his supervision, developed procedures, local rules, and forms for the operation of the ankle monitoring program without the approval of the Chief Justice.

The JCC next found that Judge Jameson or persons under his

supervision developed procedures, local rules, and forms for the operation of

the CCB ankle monitoring program without the approval of the Chief Justice.

Judge Jameson acknowledged as much during questioning by the JCC panel:

JCC Panel: Did you ever get a set of local rules from the chief justice approved to allow you to do this [ankle monitoring] program?

Jameson: I’ve sent two different sets in since I’ve been judge, neither one has been responded to in any way form or fashion.

JCC Panel: So you never got approval, and you realize in order to have a valid set of local rules they have to be approved by the Chief Justice.

Jameson: I understand.

...

JCC Panel: So you realize in order to have a program like this and run something like this you have to have the approval of the court of justice which means the chief justice.

Jameson: Mhm (affirmative).

JCC Panel: And you never did, right? These forms you were going to use and all this other stuff were never approved by the Chief, correct? 24 Jameson: Correct.

SCR 1.040(3) directs in pertinent part that “[n]o local rules shall be of binding

effect unless in writing, approved by the Chief Justice, and filed with the

Supreme Court Clerk[.]” In addition to running the ankle monitoring program

itself, the CCB also developed documents such as the “monitoring services

agreement” and the “notice of violation” report, both non-AOC forms, that were

utilized for the program. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the JCC’s

finding was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

(c) Judge Jameson improperly appeared before a legislative body and unethically affected the fairness of a public bidding process, but he did not engage in “bid rigging.”

The JCC next found that Judge Jameson’s appearances before the

Marshall and Calloway County fiscal courts in March 2019 were improper and

that he later used his position as judge to rig the public bidding process for

those counties’ ankle monitoring contract.

Judge Jameson testified several times that upon taking office he became

dissatisfied with the existing ankle monitoring provider and procedure.

Criminal defendants who were ordered to participate in GPS monitoring as a

bond condition contracted directly with a private company, as the counties did

not have a direct contract with an ankle monitor provider. Defendants were

being charged approximately twenty dollars per day for monitoring services,

making it unfeasible for most people, particularly those that were indigent, to

use its monitors. In addition, Judge Jameson believed there were issues with

both the speed and manner in which violations of ankle monitor conditions 25 were being reported and the quality of the monitors being used, which were

made of plastic.

According to the written statement Judge Jameson prepared for the

JCC’s informal hearing, he asked one of his law school interns “to look into the

issue of provision of GPS devices: what the law was on the issue, if there was

any, and then, look for an alternative solution for the provision of [those]

devices.” The intern’s search found Track Group, and Judge Jameson met

with a regional sales representative for Track Group for the first time on August

16, 2017. As a result of his discussions with that representative, he learned

that Track Group could provide its services for a lower cost than the current

providers and that its ankle monitor was made of “hardened steel.”

In March 2019, Judge Jameson voluntarily appeared before the Calloway

and Marshall County Fiscal Courts. He told the fiscal courts that he had an

intern research ways to potentially lower the cost of ankle monitor services and

that the intern found a company that was both a manufacturer of ankle

monitors and a provider of monitoring services making its prices “extremely

low.” He further told them that a representative from the company was

available to answer any questions the fiscal courts may have about the

company’s services and pricing. We note that Judge Jameson never identified

Track Group by name during his presentation.

Judge Jameson also told the fiscal courts that their existing ankle

monitoring process was illegal pursuant to KRS 67.372 and KRS 67.374.

Specifically, he advised that the judicial system within a county is not

26 permitted to place someone on an ankle monitor unless and until the county

has a contract with an ankle monitor provider and that the contract for those

services must come from a public bidding process. While discussing that the

existing ankle monitoring process also did not have a sliding scale of payment

responsibility for indigent defendants, Judge Jameson promoted his nonprofit

corporation as an entity that could run the ankle monitoring program. He

said:

So, how do you come up with a contract where a judge gets to decide whether or not somebody has to pay a fee and how much is paid and then someone on the other side can count on still covering their costs and hopefully making some money. So what I had proposed to a couple of folks was we’ve recently created a community corrections board which is a statutory structure. . . And one of the things that our community corrections board specifically could do is be the contracting entity between the manufacturer or provider and the defendant themselves and that would be a way to do the reduced fees for the indigent and have the higher fee for the non-indigent individuals. I don’t know how else to work that and keep the lower sort of numbers we were hoping to get.

After Judge Jameson’s presentation was concluded, the fiscal court voted to

move forward with public bidding process to obtain an ankle monitoring

contract.

The Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, commands that “[a]

judge shall conduct the judge’s personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize

the risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial office.” Rule 3.2 then directs,

in its entirety, that:

A judge shall not appear voluntarily at a public hearing before, or otherwise consult with, an executive or a legislative body or official, except:

27 (A) in connection with matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice;

(B) in connection with matters about which the judge acquired knowledge or expertise in the course of the judge's judicial duties; or

(C) when the judge is acting pro se in a matter involving the judge's legal or economic interests, or when the judge is acting in a fiduciary capacity.

Comment [1] to Rule 3.2 explains that “[j]udges possess special expertise in

matters of law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, and may

properly share that expertise with governmental bodies and executive or

legislative branch officials.” However, Comment [2] cautions that

[i]n appearing before governmental bodies or consulting with government officials, judges must be mindful that they remain subject to other provisions of this Code, such as Rule 1.3, prohibiting judges from using the prestige of office to advance their own or others' interests, Rule 2.10, governing public comment on pending and impending matters, and Rule 3.1(C), prohibiting judges from engaging in extrajudicial activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality.

Accordingly, solely by way of example, if Judge Jameson had not been

involved with the CCB and did not have a pre-existing relationship with Track

Group, his appearances before the fiscal courts likely would have been

permissible under Rule 3.2(A). He, as a sitting judge with special knowledge of

these issues, had concerns about the existing ankle monitoring process and

believed from his review of two statutes that the counties were violating the

law. Under such circumstances, his presentation could have been considered

a matter “concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of

justice[.]” Notwithstanding, even under such assumed facts, Judge Jameson 28 should have been more cautious with his legal conclusions and made it clear to

the fiscal courts that his interpretation of the relevant statutes could have been

mistaken. This Court has been unable to locate any appellate court decision

interpreting KRS 67.372 and KRS 67.374 to mandate a county to have an

ankle monitoring contract in place before its court system may order an

individual to be on an ankle monitor. 15 Judge Jameson should have therefore

included the caveat that this is an unsettled area of the law rather than

represent that his personal legal conclusions were correct.

Moving away from theoretical and into what actually occurred, Judge

Jameson was the CCB’s incorporator, was one of its three board members, and

the CCB operated out of his judicial chambers. Based on his own statements

to the fiscal courts, he clearly had an interest in having the CCB run the ankle

monitoring program and wanted Track Group to be the ankle monitor services

15 As the correctness of this legal conclusion has not been fully briefed or

argued, and because such a ruling could impact other counties of the Commonwealth, it would not be appropriate for this Court to opine on it in this case. But it is important to note that the relevant statutes on this issue appear to be in conflict. KRS 67.372 and KRS 67.374 are housed under KRS Chapter 67 titled “County Government (Fiscal Courts and County Commissioners).” And the statues under Chapter 67 use permissive language around the subject of an ankle monitoring contract. See, e.g., KRS 67.372 (“Any county or combination of counties may operate a global positioning monitoring system program. . .”); KRS 67.374(2) (“A county or combination of counties electing to participate in a global positioning monitoring system program shall. . .”) (emphasis added). Yet the statues under KRS Chapter 431 and KRS Chapter 533 concerning ankle monitoring seem to require a county contract. See, e.g., KRS 533.250(2)(a) (“[A] court ordering pretrial diversion may order the person to: Participate in a [GPS] monitoring system program through the use of a county operated program pursuant to KRS 67.372 and KRS 67.374. . .”); KRS 431.520(5)(a) (“During all or part of a person’s period of release pursuant to this section, order the person to participate in a [GPS] monitoring system program operated by a county pursuant to KRS 67.370 and 67.374. . .”) (emphasis added). At any rate, Judge Jameson’s appearances before the fiscal courts were unethical in this case regardless of the accuracy of his legal conclusions.

29 provider. Consequently, going before the fiscal courts in his capacity as a

circuit court judge was inappropriate as he remained prohibited under Rule

3.2, Comment [2] from “using the prestige of office to advance [his] or others’

interests” and from “engaging in extrajudicial activities that would appear to a

reasonable person to undermine [his] independence, integrity, or impartiality.”

We therefore hold that the JCC’s finding that his appearances before the fiscal

courts were unethical was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Next, concerning the bidding process itself, two months after Judge

Jameson’s appearances before the fiscal courts, he sent an email and an

attached memorandum to Ernstberger, the Calloway County Attorney who

prepared the RFP, with the subject line “Information regarding RFP for ankle

monitoring services.” The email read:

My office has put together the following detailed information regarding the statutory requirements to have a proper GPS ankle monitoring system in place. We have also included in the attached document recommendations for terms to be included in the RFP, or at least, any final contract. I am submitting this for your review in hopes of having an RFP forthwith in order to begin addressing our large jail populations. Please advise if you need any additional information at all.

The section labeled “How program should function” in the attached

memorandum stated, in pertinent part:

Consistent with the presentations made to both the Marshall & Calloway County fiscal courts and discussions with all effected agencies, it is believed that the following should be included in the RFP:

1. Ankle monitoring requirements. That the RFP should also dictate that the provider make available ankle monitors that have all of the provisions as the Relialert XC3 manufactured by Track Group as well as the accompanying 30 high risk offender bracelet equivalent to the Track Group ‘Securecuff’[.]

3. [. . .] Any contractor must also provide a victim alert system that can be operated via any smartphone by an alleged victim of criminal activity, and that system must work in conjunction with the offender’s monitoring device in

such a manner to alert the alleged victim of the presence of the offender within a specified distance of the offender. This technology should be substantially similarly (sic) to the “Empower” software provided by Track Group.

6. Alcohol monitoring device. The contractor must also make available, at the request of the monitoring agency, a reasonable number of electronic devices similar in purpose to the “BACtrack” mobile device manufactured by Track Group.

On August 21, 2019, Judge Jameson emailed an example of a bid he

received from Total Court Services, a different ankle monitor service provider,

to Ed Brennen, Track Group’s Regional Sales Representative. Judge Jameson

requested that Brennen “[edit] out the lines that would prevent Track Group

from being able to meet the RFP and send it back to me[.]” Brennen responded

with an email and an attachment including “the specs [they] discussed[.]” That

email exchange was then forwarded by Judge Jameson to Ernstberger on

September 17, 2019.

On January 13, 2020, Judge Jameson sent an email to Brennen with an

attachment titled “Ankle Monitor Program RFP prepared by Ernstberger.docx.”

The email read: “We FINALLY have a rough draft of an RFP directed at utilizing

your products. I have attached it for your review. Please review closely to 31 ensure that this RFP will not disqualify track group from bidding.” On July 7,

2020, Judge Jameson sent an email to Ernstberger with an attachment titled

“Ankle Monitor Program RFP prepared by Ernstberger (edit 1).docx.”

Attached is the final version of the RFP. While this document does not cover every piece of equipment that will be made available to the counties, it gets the job done so we can move forward. Please let me know if you have any questions. If not, please let me know when your respective county governments will be posting the RFP and any further developments.

Every page of the RFP attached to that email was essentially identical to the

RFP issued by the fiscal courts. For example, the RFP issued specified, in

accordance with the memorandum Judge Jameson sent to Ernstberger in May

2019, that the provider “must make available ankle monitors that have all of

the minimum capabilities as the Relialert XC3 ankle monitor manufactured by

Track Group” as well as an “accompanying high risk offender bracelet similar

to the Track Group ‘Securecuff” and must be able to make available upon

request “a reasonable number of electronic devices similar in purpose to the

‘BACtrack mobile’ device manufactured by Track Group.”

It was undisputed that no other potential bidders were permitted to

suggest specifications regarding the language of the RFP, nor were they able to

review and edit the RFP prior to its issuance. Indeed, a representative from

Ensite, one of the providers that had been providing ankle monitoring services

to defendants, contacted Judge Jameson on March 4, 2019, prior to either of

his fiscal court appearances, and expressed Ensite’s interest in continuing its

ankle monitoring services for the counties and wanted to discuss “what the

county might need to be included in a contract.” Judge Jameson responded, 32 I have made the fiscal courts aware of the statutory requirements with regard to having ankle monitor services that are not currently being met. It is my understanding that, in order to provide those services, the county will be having to make some changes. I will be doing a presentation tomorrow on the subject. Where it goes from there remains to be seen. Thank you for reaching out.

Later, on July 29, 2020, eight days after the RFP was issued, Buddi US, LLC, a

different ankle monitor company, sent a letter to the Calloway County Judge

Executive concerning the RFP. In it, Buddi questioned whether the intent of

the court was to receive competitive proposals from interested vendors because

the fiscal courts had “listed requirements that are specific to a device that is

manufactured and available by only one Original Equipment Manufacturer.”

After noting some of the specifications listed in the RFP, Buddi opined:

These are specific to one vendor in the entire industry and as it is currently written, the RFP uses words like must and shall in describing requirements that indicate alternative functionality will not be considered. This means that no one but Track Group or their value-added resellers can submit a responsive proposal.

After receiving a response to its inquiries from Ernstberger, Buddi decided it

“[wouldn’t] make sense for Buddi to submit a response” to the RFP.

After being the driving force behind the fiscal court’s decision to issue an

RFP, Judge Jameson made suggestions directly to the county attorney

responsible for preparing the RFP on what ankle monitor specifications should

be listed therein, specifically, that only bidders who could provide equipment

manufactured solely by Track Group would be considered. Judge Jameson

also got to view the draft RFP and edit it before sending it back to the county

attorney as “the final version.” Judge Jameson did all of this with knowledge

that his corporation, the CCB, would submit a responsive bid to the RFP that 33 would utilize the Track Group monitor specifications that he suggested

Ernstberger put in the RFP.

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the JCC’s conclusion that Judge

Jameson’s unethically interfered with a public bid. However, we disagree with

the JCC’s conclusion that his conduct constituted “bid rigging” as that term is

defined by the Kentucky Model Procurement Code. KRS 45A.325 defines bid

rigging as “agreement or collusion among bidders or prospective bidders

which restrains, tends to restrain, or is reasonably calculated to restrain

competition by agreement to bid at a fixed price, or to refrain from bidding, or

otherwise[.]” (Emphasis added). As explained by the U.S. Department of

Justice, “In simple terms, bid rigging is fraud which involves bidding. It is an

agreement among competitors as to who will be the winning bidder. Bid

rigging occurs when a purchaser solicits bids to purchase goods or services.

The bidders agree in advance who will submit the winning bid.” Preventing And

Detecting Bid Rigging, Price Fixing, And Market Allocation In Post-Disaster

Rebuilding Projects, https://www.justice.gov/atr/preventing-and-detecting-bid-

rigging-price-fixing-and-market-allocation-post-disaster-rebuilding (last

accessed Aug. 2, 2024).

Here, there was no collusion amongst multiple bidders to determine the

successful bid in advance. Rather, in what this Court must imagine is an

extremely rare set of circumstances, a single bidder, the CCB, had exclusive

insider access to the process of preparing the purchaser’s RFP. The CCB, via

Judge Jameson, used that insider access to ensure that its bid was tailor made

34 to meet the RFP. While this conduct certainly unethically affected the fairness

of a public bidding process and created the appearance of impropriety, it did

not constitute bid rigging.

(d) Judge Jameson engaged in the direct solicitation of funds for the Re-Life project.

The JCC found that Judge Jameson “personally coordinated funding

activities through the CCB and engaged in direct solicitation of contributions to

fund construction of the [SUD] treatment facility.” Rule 3.7 directs, in

pertinent part:

(A) Subject to the requirements of Rules 3.1 and 3.4, a judge may participate in activities sponsored by organizations or governmental entities concerned with the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, and those sponsored by or on behalf of educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not conducted for profit, including but not limited to the following activities:

(1) assisting such an organization or entity in planning related to fund-raising, and participating in the management and investment of the organization's or entity's funds;

(2) personally soliciting contributions for such an organization or entity, but only from members of the judge's family, or from judges over whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority;

[…]

(4) appearing or speaking at, receiving an award or other recognition at, being featured on the program of, and permitting his or her title to be used in connection with an event of such an organization or entity, even if the event serves a fundraising purpose, but may not personally engage in direct solicitation of contributions[.]

The JCC findings first state that Judge Jameson “personally coordinated

funding activities through the CCB.” Although the JCC does not expound 35 further on this finding, we discern from elsewhere in its opinion that it is

referring to Judge Jameson’s actions in aiding the Fletcher Group with

planning the fundraiser event held on May 20, 2021. Rule 3.7(A)(1) clearly

states that a judge may assist a charitable, nonprofit organization “in planning

related to fund-raising[.]” Consequently, to the extent the JCC found Judge

Jameson committed misconduct by participating in the planning of the May

2021 Re-Life fundraising event, we disagree and will not consider that alleged

misconduct when determining an appropriate sanction.

The JCC’s findings go on to state that Judge Jameson engaged in the

direct solicitation of contributions through the Re-Life website, a radio ad

promoting the Re-Life fundraiser, and through emails. We address each in

turn.

As previously noted, after the Fletcher Group became involved with

Judge Jameson’s goal of building an SUD treatment facility a website was

created for the Re-Life project. Screenshots from the website were entered into

evidence demonstrating that the website requested donations and that

donations could be made on the site. Under a section titled “OUR HISTORY,”

the website read: “Re-Life is the dream of Marshall & Calloway County Circuit

Court Judge, Jamie Jameson. Born out of a desire to address the

overwhelming public health crisis in Benton, Murray, and all surrounding

communities caused by substance abuse.” And, under a section of the website

titled “OUR TEAM,” the website read:

Judge Jameson chairs the 42nd Judicial Circuit Community Corrections Board, Inc., that is served by board members who 36 make up our local criminal justice system, community service providers, and concerned citizens who have been personally impacted by SUD, or are aware of the seriousness of the problem and want to prevent SUD from changing [paragraph is cut off].

The JCC found that Judge Jameson “directed the creation of the Re-Life

website for the CCB for the sole purpose of soliciting online donations.”

However, the JCC cites only the website itself as proof of this assertion and

does not provide any citation to the video record that would support it. Judge

Jameson testified that the Fletcher Group set up the website, and the JCC

presented no evidence to rebut that claim. Of course, if the JCC had offered

evidence demonstrating that Judge Jameson was responsible for the creation of

the website or had directed that it be created, its finding of direct solicitation

could be upheld. But, absent that proof, this Court cannot say that its finding

was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Next, a radio ad promoting the fundraiser began running locally on May

14, 2021. In the ad, an unknown male who was not Judge Jameson

announced, in pertinent part, “On May twentieth, there’s an informational

forum and fundraiser for the Re-Life Project to bring a 100-bed in-patient drug

treatment facility to the area. Former Governor Ernie Fletcher’s Recovery

Kentucky Group has teamed up with Judge Jamie Jameson and other leaders

to help make this happen.” The ad then played a brief pre-recorded statement

from Governor Fletcher. The JCC found that “Judge Jameson was featured” in

the ad. But, to be clear, only Judge Jameson’s name and title were used.

Rule 3.7(A)(4) states that a judge may participate in activities sponsored

by charitable nonprofit organizations, such as the Fletcher Group, and that a 37 judge’s participation in such activities may include “permitting his or her title

to be used in connection with an event of such an organization or entity, even if

the event serves a fundraising purpose, but may not personally engage in direct

solicitation of contributions[.]” Accordingly, there was nothing unethical about

Judge Jameson allowing his title to be used in connection with the Fletcher

Group’s fundraising event so long as the ad did not involve Judge Jameson’s

personal solicitation of contributions. At no point during the radio ad does

Judge Jameson make “a direct request. . . for financial support[.]” SCR 4.300,

Terminology (defining “personally solicit”). We therefore hold that the JCC’s

finding that Judge Jameson engaged in the direct solicitation of financial

contributions through the radio ad was not supported by clear and convincing

evidence.

The final two findings of solicitation each related to emails Judge

Jameson sent in relation to the Re-Life program and fundraiser. On May 10,

2021, before the Re-Life fundraiser was held, a program supervisor with the

Department of Specialty Courts sent out a mass email to hundreds of people

announcing an upcoming drug court graduation to be held on May 20. Judge

Jameson “piggybacked” off the drug court email recipient list and sent an email

to that list that stated:

I would like to add that on the same night as graduation, we are hosting an informational/fundraising event for the Re-Life Project. This is a joint venture of our local Community Corrections Board (which is also a 501(c)(3)) and the Fletcher Group, Inc., a nonprofit headed by former Governor Ernie Fletcher to bring a 100 bed long term [SUD] treatment and job skills facility to our circuit! . . . Please come and learn about just how devastating this problem is in our community and our plan to take it on! If you would like 38 more info on this project, please go to www.re-life.us. This is the project website. It is not complete, but has more information about the project.

Rule 3.7 permits a judge to assist in the planning related to a fundraising

event, 16 allows a judge’s title to be used in connection with a fundraising event,

and allows a judge to appear, speak, or receive an award or other recognition at

a fundraising event. 17 However, nothing in Rule 3.7 allows a judge to “host” or

personally promote a fundraising event. Comment [3] provides some guidance:

Mere attendance at an event, whether or not the event serves a fund-raising purpose, does not constitute a violation of paragraph (A)(4). It is also generally permissible for a judge to serve as an usher or a food server or preparer, or to perform similar functions, at fund-raising events sponsored by educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations. Such activities are not solicitation and do not present an element of coercion or abuse the prestige of judicial office.

We accordingly agree with the JCC’s finding of misconduct insofar as the rules

of judicial ethics did not permit Judge Jameson to host a fundraising event,

nor was he permitted to personally promote a fundraising event.

Last, a flyer was made to promote the Re-Life project. The full color flyer

included a three- and one-half inch by two- and one-half inch headshot of

Judge Jameson in his robe in the top right-hand corner. The body of the flyer

stated: “With $2.7 million already pledged, we need just $3 million more to

provide the recovery facilities our community needs to stop the cycle of

reincarceration. Your generous donation can make a difference! –Kentucky

16 Rule 3.7(A)(1).

17 Rule 3.7(A)(4).

39 42nd Circuit Court Judge James Jameson[.]” Below that, the flyer said, “BE

THE CHANGE. DONATE TODAY!” and provided contact information for the

CCB. Below the CCB’s contact information, the flyer stated that “[t]he 42nd

Judicial Circuit Community Corrections Board is a 501c3 non-profit charity.

Donations may be tax deductible.”

Judge Jameson was confronted with the flyer during the JCC’s final

hearing and claimed that it was created by the Fletcher Group and that he had

never seen it before that day. Counsel for the JCC later challenged Judge

Jameson’s claim that he had never seen the flyer by showing him an email he

sent to a local attorney on May 10, 2021, that said, inter alia, “Attached is a

one page promotional flyer that gives the general info regarding the project.”

The email also provided information about the “informational event/fundraiser”

held for the Re-Life project on May 20. The promotional flyer was attached to

the email, and the title for the attachment read “CALLOWAY AND MARSHALL

COUNTY DONATION FLYER WITH JUDGE JAMESON PHOTO (March 9

V2).pdf[.]” Upon being confronted with the email Judge Jameson asserted, and

continues to assert before this Court, that the email was something he “quickly

forwarded” without looking at the attached flyer.

We hold that the JCC’s finding that flyer constituted a personal

solicitation of funds was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The flyer

featured a photograph of Judge Jameson and a quote credited to him as “42nd

Circuit Court Judge James Jameson” stating that an additional $3 million in

funds were needed and that “[y]our generous donation can make a difference.”

40 This was clearly a direct request for financial support. Judge Jameson claimed

that he never looked at the promotional flyer before sending it as an email

attachment, but that is beside the point. As a judge he had a duty to conduct

himself in a manner that avoided impropriety or the appearance of impropriety.

Canon 1, Rule 1.2. This duty included taking the time to review a document

that included “JUDGE JAMESON” and “DONATION FLYER” in its title before

sending it to another person. Thus, he was responsible for the content of the

attachment which he forwarded to others as a direct solicitation for donations.

(e) Judge Jameson submitted a grant application for an improper purpose.

The JCC’s final findings of misconduct under Count I were that “Judge

Jameson submitted a grant application to the Kentucky Department of

Corrections seeking funding for an improper purpose on behalf of the CCB

despite not qualifying with laws governing community corrections boards[,]”

and that the use of his name on the grant application was “a blatant abuse of

power in attempting to use the prestige of his office to influence a grant process

operated by an executive branch agency in Kentucky.”

As previously discussed, in March 2021, Judge Jameson filed a grant

application with the State Corrections Commission, a division of the

Department of Corrections, seeking funds to increase the hourly pay of the

CCB’s Director of GPS Services. Pursuant to KRS 196.710(1) the commission

is vested with the authority to “award grants to community corrections

programs in accordance with the policies established by KRS 196.700 to

196.735,” i.e., the statutes governing community corrections programs and 41 community corrections boards as explained supra. “Grants shall be awarded

to community corrections programs whose community corrections program

plans meet the requirements set forth in KRS 196.720 and which, in the

commission’s judgment, promise to meet the goals set forth in KRS 196.700 to

196.735.” KRS 196.710(2).

As explained in Section II(E)(1)(a) of this Opinion, Judge Jameson’s CCB

was created for a purpose and in a manner that did not satisfy the statutory

requirements of KRS 196.700, et seq. And, under KRS 196.710, grant money

may only be awarded by the commission to community corrections programs

that meet the plan requirements of KRS 196.720 and that will serve the

policies established by KRS 196.700 to KRS 196.735. We accordingly agree

with the JCC that it was legally impermissible for Judge Jameson to seek

funding from the commission for any reason, including the purpose of

increasing the pay of the CCB’s director of GPS services. Notwithstanding we

disagree with the JCC that Judge Jameson’s act of simply putting his title of

“circuit judge” on the grant application constituted a “blatant abuse of power”

and, without more evidence, we cannot agree that doing so was an attempt to

use the prestige of his office to influence a grant process.

However, the JCC found that Judge Jameson violated: Canon 1, Rule

1.1: “A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial

Conduct”; Canon 1, Rule 1.2: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that

promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of

the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety”;

42 Canon 1, Rule 1.3: “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to

advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow

others to do so”; Canon 2, Rule 2.1: “The duties of judicial office, as

prescribed by law, shall take precedence over all of a judge's personal and

extrajudicial activities”; Canon 2, Rule 2.4(B): “A judge shall not permit family,

social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the

judge's judicial conduct or judgment”; Canon 3, Rule 3.1(A):“[W]hen engaging

in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall not participate in activities that will

interfere with the proper performance of the judge's judicial duties”; Canon 3,

Rule 3.1(C): “[W]hen engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall not

participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine

the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality”; Canon 3, Rule 3.1(D):

“[W]hen engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall not engage in conduct

that would appear to a reasonable person to be coercive”; Canon 3, Rule 3.2:

“A judge shall not appear voluntarily at a public hearing before, or otherwise

consult with, an executive or a legislative body or official, except in connection

with matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of

justice; [or] in connection with matters about which the judge acquired

knowledge or expertise in the course of the judge's judicial duties”; and Canon

3, Rule 3.7(A)(4): “Subject to the requirements of Rules 3.1 and 3.4, a judge

may participate in activities . . .sponsored by or on behalf of. . .charitable . . .

organizations not conducted for profit, including but not limited to the

following activities: appearing or speaking at, receiving an award or other

43 recognition at, being featured on the program of, and permitting his or her title

to be used in connection with an event of such an organization or entity, even if

the event serves a fundraising purpose, but may not personally engage in direct

solicitation of contributions.”

Based upon our extensive review of Count I discussed above, we agree

that Judge Jameson violated the foregoing judicial canons and rules.

2) Count II

The misconduct charged under Count II solely concerned the

implementation and operation of the CCB’s ankle monitoring program. The

JCC found that Judge Jameson was the appointing authority for Kentucky

Court of Justice (KCOJ) employees that he utilized to perform duties on behalf

of the CCB, including drafting documents for the CCB, overseeing the GPS

monitoring program, and reporting violations of the ankle monitoring program

directly to him. 18 The JCC further found that Judge Jameson received direct

notifications of alleged ankle monitor violations and, on more than one

occasion, issued arrest warrants for ankle monitor program participants upon

receipt of a notice of violation reports from CCB employees who were not KCOJ

employees. Finally, the JCC found that Judge Jameson improperly ordered

defendants who appeared before him in circuit court to participate in an ankle

18 The JCC cites to, but does not discuss, the testimonies of Dominik Mikulcik,

Christine Pickett, Sarah Gipson, and Landon Norman, in support of this contention. But, to clarify, neither Gipson, Judge Jameson’s administrative assistant, nor Norman, his staff attorney, ever testified that they performed any work for the CCB or the ankle monitoring program.

44 monitoring program run by the CCB, a corporation for which he held the titles

of president and director and participated in its finances.

Dominik Mikulcik was one of Judge Jameson’s staff attorneys and was a

KCOJ employee. Although the CCB’s articles of incorporation were filed by

Judge Jameson, the document states: “This instrument was prepared by:

Dominik Mikulcik, Staff Attorney to Judge James T. Jameson.” Mikulcik

initially asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent regarding any

work he performed in relation to the CCB, but he ultimately acknowledged

doing legal research on ankle monitoring and community corrections programs

during his employment with Judge Jameson and at Judge Jameson’s direction.

Christine Pickett was never a KCOJ employee. Rather, she was initially a

third-year law student doing an unpaid externship with Judge Jameson.

Pickett testified that during her time as an extern, Mikulcik asked her to

prepare a spreadsheet for participants in the CCB’s ankle monitoring program

that covered, “what payments they had made thus far, how much they owed,

[and] when their next payment was going to be.” Pickett said she compiled the

spreadsheet over a weekend and not during her extern hours. Mikulcik

reviewed the document and then showed it to Judge Jameson, who

immediately offered Pickett the position of director of GPS services for the CCB.

Pickett testified that Judge Jameson was her direct supervisor in her role

as director of GPS services and that she was compensated via checks, at least

some of which were signed by Judge Jameson. Her duties as director included

monitoring participants in the ankle monitoring program; collecting money

45 from the clerks paid by the participants; keeping track of how much money

participants in the program had paid; directly communicating with defendants,

the jails, and Track Group; and helping victims set up the Empower

application 19 on their phones.

Concerning the ankle monitoring program itself, Pickett testified that

after a defendant was ordered by Judge Jameson to be placed on an ankle

monitor either she or Mikulcik would prepare the monitoring services

agreement for the defendant and deliver it to the jailer. After the defendant

was placed on an ankle monitor, Pickett was responsible for monitoring the

individual and ensuring they compiled with the monitoring services agreement.

In addition to Pickett, Judge Jameson, Mikulcik, two Track Group employees,

and 911 dispatch received immediate notifications of violation alerts from the

Track Group electronic monitoring program. Pickett would contact a defendant

as soon as she received a violation alert. For less serious alerts, such as a low

battery, Pickett would resolve the issue with the defendant herself. For more

serious alerts, such as a defendant attempting to cut their ankle monitor off or

being near the alleged victim, she would contact law enforcement and Judge

Jameson, if he did not contact her first. Neither the commonwealth’s attorney

nor the defendant’s attorney would be contacted at the time an alleged violation

was occurring, but, if a violation report was issued, they were sent a copy of

19 The Empower application, provided by Track Group, works in conjunction

with a defendant’s ankle monitor to inform an alleged victim if the defendant is near them.

46 the report after the situation with a defendant had been resolved. Pickett

initially created a form to be used as the CCB’s violation report. Judge

Jameson reviewed the form and suggested changes which Pickett incorporated

resulting in the form that the CCB issued when a violation occurred.

The JCC also presented evidence from three criminal cases in which

Judge Jameson directed the circuit clerk’s office to issue a bond violation

warrant for a participant in the GPS monitoring program.

On April 13, 2021, Pickett sent Judge Jameson an email that read:

“[Trever Tucker] has missed payments for his ankle monitor and has failed to

communicate with the Corrections Board on numerous occasions. The

Community Corrections Board is requesting a warrant.” It appears that a

notice of violation report was sent as an attachment to the email, but the report

itself was not included in the record before us. On the same day, Judge

Jameson forwarded Pickett’s email and violation report to the Marshall County

Circuit Clerk’s Office with the message “Please issue a bond violation warrant.”

Two days later Judge Jameson forwarded Pickett’s email and attachment

again, this time to the Marshall County Circuit Clerk’s Office and Chris

Freeman, an individual from Marshall County 911 dispatch, with a message

that said, “This is our first ankle monitor violation. Please issue a bond

violation warrant. Chris, I spoke with Chief Reynolds already about this. The

plan is to get him today if possible before he knows about the warrant, etc.”

On June 10, 2021, Madison Dorris, Pickett’s successor as the CCB’s

director of GPS services, emailed Judge Jameson a violation report for Amber

47 Fralix. Judge Jameson forwarded the violation report to the Marshall County

Circuit Clerk’s Office with a message stating “Please issue a warrant for Ms.

Fralix.” And, on October 8, 2021, Judge Jameson sent an email directly to the

Marshall Circuit Clerk’s Office that read, “We need to issue an arrest warrant

for Tina Mull based on alleged bond condition violations. Specifically, a GPS

violation. This is time sensitive. Please issue immediately.” That email did not

include a notice of violation report.

Finally, it was undisputed that as a circuit court judge, Judge Jameson

had the responsibility of deciding whether a defendant should be released on

bond and whether a condition of that bond should include participation in GPS

monitoring. Once he made that ruling, he would require qualifying defendants

to enter into an agreement to pay the CCB, of which Judge Jameson was the

president, incorporator, and one third of the board, for the privilege of using

the ankle monitor. The JCC also presented evidence that, despite Judge

Jameson presiding over cases where he ordered defendants to pay the CCB, he

signed checks on behalf on the CCB that were distributed to, for example,

Pickett, the Marshall and Calloway Sheriffs Offices, the Marshall County

Detention Center, Marshall County 911, the Calloway County Fiscal Court, and

Track Group. Although Judge Jameson was never accused of mishandling or

misusing any CCB funds, the appearance of impropriety this process created

was blatant and extreme and Judge Jameson himself conceded its impropriety.

Accordingly, the JCC proved his allegation by clear and convincing evidence.

48 Based on the foregoing, the JCC also presented clear and convincing

evidence that Mikulcik, a KCOJ employee for whom Judge Jameson was the

appointing authority, drafted the CCB’s articles of incorporation, conducted

legal research for the benefit of the CCB, prepared monitoring services

agreements for participants in the ankle monitoring program, and received real

time violation alerts for participants in the ankle monitoring program. And,

while Pickett was not a KCOJ employee, she was hired by Judge Jameson to be

an employee of a corporation for which he served as president. Pickett was

therefore subject to Judge Jameson’s direction and supervision. The JCC’s

evidence demonstrated that Pickett was primarily responsible for monitoring

the participants in the CCB’s program and that she sent notice of violation

reports directly to Judge Jameson, who then issued arrest warrants for the

violations.

The JCC further proved by clear and convincing evidence that Judge

Jameson received direct notifications of ankle monitor violation alerts and, on

at least three occasions, ordered arrest warrants to be issued upon receipt of a

violation report from Pickett or Dorris, who were both employees of a

corporation for which Judge Jameson served as president. We want to be clear

for the benefit of other judges in the Commonwealth that, under normal

circumstances, KRS 431.520(9) permits a judge to order the arrest of a

defendant upon being advised that a defendant has not complied with the

conditions of his or her release, and that statute does not specify from whom

that information must come. See also RCr 4.42(1) (“If at any time following the

49 release of the defendant and before the defendant is required to appear for trial

the court is advised . . . that the defendant has not complied with all conditions

imposed upon his or her release, the court having jurisdiction may order the

defendant's arrest[.]”). However, under the set of highly unusual

circumstances presented by this case, it was not appropriate or ethical for

Judge Jameson to issue arrest warrants based solely on information that came

from an employee of his own corporation.

The JCC found that Judge Jameson violated the following rules of

judicial conduct in relation to Count II: Canon 1, Rule 1.1: “A judge shall

comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct”; Canon 1, Rule

1.2: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence

in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety”; Canon 1, Rule 1.3: “A judge

shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or

economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so”; Canon 2,

Rule 2.1: “The duties of judicial office, as prescribed by law, shall take

precedence over all of a judge's personal and extrajudicial activities”; Canon 2,

Rule 2.2: “A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties

of judicial office fairly and impartially”; Canon 2, Rule 2.4(B): “A judge shall

not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships

to influence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment”; Canon 2, Rule 2.9(C):

“A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall

consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be

50 judicially noticed”; Canon 2, Rule 2.12(A): “A judge shall require court staff,

court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control to act in

a manner consistent with the judge's obligations under this Code”; Canon 3,

Rule 3.7(6)(a): “[A] judge may participate in activities sponsored by

organizations or governmental entities concerned with the law, the legal

system, or the administration of justice, and those sponsored by or on behalf of

educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not

conducted for profit, including but not limited to the following activities:

serving as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of such an

organization or entity, unless it is likely that the organization or entity will be

engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the judge[.]”

Based on the JCC’s findings of fact, which we hold were supported by

clear and convincing evidence, we agree that Judge Jameson violated the

foregoing rules of judicial conduct.

3) Count III

Under Count III the JCC found, broadly, that “Judge Jameson

mismanaged his courtroom, engaged in acts of retaliation, and deviated from

acceptable standards of judicial conduct.” Count III then covers varied

allegations of misconduct that can be broken down into four general

allegations: (1) that Judge Jameson violated the principles of constitutional

separation of powers by ordering individuals to participate the ankle

monitoring program provided by the CCB; (2) that Judge Jameson abused his

contempt powers and otherwise displayed behavior towards persons in his

51 courtroom that was not patient, dignified, or courteous; (3) that Judge

Jameson pressured an attorney who regularly appeared before him in court to

file a bar complaint against another attorney; and (4) that Judge Jameson

engaged in two acts of retaliation.

(a) Judge Jameson violated the constitutional principles of separation of powers.

The JCC first found under Count III that Judge Jameson violated the

doctrine of separation of powers by ordering individuals to participate in pre-

trial ankle monitoring services provided by a corporation for which he served as

president and one third of the board. It is important to note that the JCC’s

charging documents never explicitly charged Judge Jameson with a separation

of powers violation under Count III. Rather, the notice of formal proceedings

and charges state that Judge Jameson “deviated from acceptable standards of

judicial conduct including but not limited to. . . .” Nevertheless, based on the

discussion of the evidence provided under Count II, the evidence was clear and

undisputed that Judge Jameson, an elected judicial branch official, ordered

defendants that appeared before him to participate in the ankle monitoring

program ran by the CCB, a corporation for which Judge Jameson was the

president and one third of the board. The supervision of defendants who have

been conditionally released from custody is traditionally an executive branch

function. We therefore hold that the JCC’s finding was supported by clear and

convincing evidence even though it failed to explicitly charge a separation of

powers violation.

52 (b) Under the specific facts in this case, the JCC was without jurisdiction to pursue charges against Judge Jameson for the alleged abuse of his contempt powers. 20

The JCC next alleges under Count III that Judge Jameson abused his

contempt powers against a man named Richard Hoefle in January 2018 and

against Marshall County Deputy Jailer Sean Goard in November 2020. 21

Judge Jameson held Hoefle in direct criminal contempt after he made several

outbursts during a hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion to void his

granddaughter’s pretrial diversion. Deputy Jailer Goard was held in civil

contempt for his failure to honor a court order issued by Judge Jameson to

accept a defendant into the jail’s custody after she arrived at her sentencing

hearing under the influence of methamphetamine. This Court’s review of the

video records concerning Hoefle and Goard does not bear out the JCC’s finding

that Judge Jameson conducted himself in a manner that was not patient,

dignified, and courteous in his interactions with Hoefle and Goard. And, there

is no evidence of record that Hoefle or Goard appealed Judge Jameson’s

findings of contempt to an appellate court, nor is there any evidence that

20 As with the JCC’s allegation that Judge Jameson violated the doctrine of

separation of powers, this Court is concerned that the JCC’s charging documents do not specifically allege that Judge Jameson abused his contempt powers under Count III. However, each of the video records concerning the abuse of contempt allegations were played at Judge Jameson’s temporary removal hearing without objection. He therefore had actual notice of these allegations and was able to present a defense in relation to them during the final hearing. 21 The JCC also cites the cases of Danny Dale and William McAlpin in its factual

summary of this issue but does not make any findings of fact in relation to those cases. This Court therefore will not consider them.

53 Hoefle or Goard themselves filed a judicial complaint against Judge Jameson

and neither individual testified during the JCC’s proceedings.

As noted supra, SCR 4.020(2) states that “[a]ny erroneous decision made

in good faith shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.” This

Court has previously expounded “that ‘erroneous decision’ is a term of art

which refers to judicial decisions made by judges in the course of their official

duties.” Summe v. Jud. Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Ky. 1997).

And, that the purpose of SCR 4.020(2) is to ensure that errors made by judges

in their official capacities that are not “gross and persistent” could be solved via

the appellate process rather than sanctions by the JCC. See Nicholson, 562

S.W.2d at 310. This rule accordingly serves the limitation set out in Scope [5]

of SCR 4.300, which directs that “[t]he Rules should not be interpreted to

impinge upon the essential independence of judges in making judicial

decisions.” The judges who serve in our district and circuit courts make

hundreds of rulings every week and have innumerable encounters with the

individuals present in their courtrooms. In accordance with the foregoing

principles, they should remain free to make potentially erroneous rulings in

good faith without having “to keep one eye on their reversal rate and the other

on the Commission.” Nicholson, 562 S.W.2d at 310.

A judge’s discretion to exercise his or her contempt powers in particular

is “nearly unlimited,” 22 because that power goes to the heart of a judge’s ability

22 Meyers v. Petrie, 233 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Smith v. City of

Loyall, 702 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Ky.App.1986)).

54 to maintain order in his or her courtroom and to sanction willful disobedience

to their orders. Indeed, the only previous instances of the JCC attempting to

sanction a judge for the exercise of their contempt powers are Gormley v.

Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 332 S.W.3d 717 (Ky. 2010) and Hinton v. Judicial

Retirement and Removal Comm'n, 854 S.W.2d 756 (Ky. 1993), overruled on

other grounds by Gormley v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 332 S.W.3d 717 (Ky.

2010).

In Hinton, Judge Hinton presided over the trial of Patrick Huron, who

was accused of murder. 854 S.W.2d at 757. Virgil and Shirley Dermon, a

married couple, were present at the time of the murder and Virgil’s gun was the

murder weapon. Id. The couple hired Anderson, an attorney, to represent

them as witnesses in the case. Id. During the trial, Judge Hinton was

informed that Virgil would be claiming his Fifth Amendment right not to testify,

and that Shirley was refusing to testify under a claim of spousal privilege. Id.

Judge Hinton ostensibly held Shirley in contempt based on her refusal to

testify. Id. The following day, when Anderson discovered Shirley was being

held in contempt, there was a bench conference and following a two-minute

exchange about it, Judge Hinton held Anderson in contempt and sentenced

him to three days in jail; he was released later that day. Id. at 757-58.

Anderson did not appeal Judge Hinton’s ruling to hold him in contempt,

but he thereafter filed a judicial complaint with the JCC. Id. at 758. The JCC

found that Judge Hinton committed misconduct by summarily jailing Anderson

55 for contempt and ordered that he be publicly reprimanded. Id. at 757-58. This

Court reversed the JCC’s ruling and set it aside; it reasoned:

It is the responsibility of the trial judge to maintain control of the courtroom and sometimes that must be done by a legitimate exercise of the contempt power.

The decision by Judge Hinton not to permit Anderson to appear on behalf of the witnesses after Anderson had failed to comply with local rules of procedure by filing an entry of appearance or pretrial motion was not arbitrary. His subsequent decision to hold Anderson in contempt was the result of judicial discretion; there was no abuse of discretion. The proper remedy for correcting an alleged abuse of discretion is by appeal. Anderson, as a nonparty contemner, could have sought review by means of appeal but he did not do so.

Id. at 759 (emphasis added).

In Gormley, there was a scheduled hearing before Judge Gormley on a

pro se motion by a wife to modify the no contact provision of a domestic

violence order previously entered against her husband. 332 S.W.3d at 721.

The parties, though represented, arrived for the hearing without counsel. Id.

While the parties were waiting in the hallway, the bailiff informed Judge

Gormley that the husband spoke to the wife and tried to get her to leave the

courthouse. Id. Judge Gormley called the parties into the courtroom and—

without informing the husband that it was a criminal contempt hearing, that

he had the right to counsel, that he had the right to remain silent, and that his

statements could be used against him—proceeded to hold an indirect criminal

contempt hearing. Id. Judge Gormley called one witness to discuss the

contact made in the hallway and did not allow the husband to question the

witness. Id. Judge Gormley also questioned the husband under oath, who

56 admitted the contact in the hallway as well as contacting the wife at her home

the previous night at her request. Id. Following the hearing, Judge Gormley

held the husband in criminal contempt and sentenced him to six months

imprisonment. Id.

The husband appealed Judge Gormley’s ruling to the Court of Appeals,

which reversed and remanded “for an appropriate evidentiary hearing

concerning all the allegations of contempt.” Id. The JCC later charged and

found Judge Gormley guilty of several counts of misconduct, including a count

related to the misuse of her contempt powers. Id. This Court affirmed the

JCC’s ruling and rejected Judge Gormley’s claim that SCR 4.020(2) shielded

her from being found guilty of misconduct. Id. at 726. The JCC first found

that Judge Gormley’s ruling was legally wrong, as summary proceedings are

not an appropriate means to hold someone in indirect criminal contempt. Id.

It went on to hold that she also acted in bad faith:

Finding Judge Gormley clearly erred on the law is only the first half of the analysis. Judge Gormley, citing SCR 4.020(2), asserts that she made the decision in good faith and cannot be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction for good faith, but erroneous, decisions. To err is human. Our present Kentucky Constitution, Section 115, recognizes that a judge may err by providing most judgments are subject to at least one appeal. A party that

believes the judge erred has the right to appellate review to seek a change in the judgment—that is judicial review. If the judge erred, the judgment can be corrected. Incompetent judges can be eliminated at the ballot box.

Judicial misconduct is different. The Judicial Conduct Commission's review is not focused merely on the judge's findings, conclusions, and ultimate judgment, but on the judge's demeanor, motivation, or conduct in following (or in not following) the law.

57 The Commission conducted its review and concluded the errors in Count I were so egregious that Judge Gormley could not claim the errors were made in good faith. We believe Judge Gormley's handling of the matter, together with the egregious rulings, displayed a bias or preconception or a predetermined view against the husband so as to impugn the impartiality and open- mindedness necessary to make correct and sound rulings in the case. In other words, we agree with the Commission's implicit finding that Judge Gormley acted in bad faith.

Id. at 726-27 (emphasis added). The Gormley Court went on to hold that “a

judicial officer may be sanctioned if the judge committed at least one serious,

obvious, egregious legal error that is clearly contrary to settled law.” Id. at 728.

This was the portion of the opinion that overruled Hinton, which the Gormley

Court interpreted to hold that a judge must engage in a pattern of misconduct

before he or she could be sanctioned by the JCC. Id. at 727.

The common thread running through Hinton and Gormley is that an

individual who has been held in contempt, and believes that ruling to be

erroneous, should first seek review of the ruling with an appellate court, not

the JCC. Given Scope [5] of SCR 4.300’s directive that the rules of judicial

conduct “should not be interpreted to impinge upon the essential independence

of judges in making judicial decisions[,]” a clear standard is necessary. We

accordingly hold that, in the absence of an appellate court ruling that a judge

has improperly exercised his or her powers of contempt and in the absence of

an allegation that a judge has made erroneous rulings that were “gross and

persistent,” the JCC is precluded by SCR 4.020(2) from charging a judge with

misconduct in relation to the exercise of his or her contempt powers.

58 In this case, neither Hoefle nor Goard appealed the very distant in time

rulings made by Judge Jameson which found them to be in contempt, and

there has been no appellate court ruling that he abused his discretion by

exercising his contempt powers against them. The JCC was therefore without

jurisdiction to charge Judge Jameson with misconduct in relation to the abuse

of his contempt powers.

(c) Judge Jameson pressured an attorney to file a bar complaint against another attorney.

Judge Jameson has consistently maintained throughout these

proceedings that the judicial complaints filed against him were the result of a

political conspiracy to harm his reputation and ensure he would not win his

bid for re-election. Lisa DeRenard, a local solo practitioner, testified that on

January 19, 2022, she was approached by a local public defender, Amy

Harwood-Jackson. Both attorneys regularly practiced in Judge Jameson’s

court. According to DeRenard, Harwood-Jackson engaged in a “hateful rant”

about Judge Jameson and told DeRenard that she and a few other people

intended to file multiple judicial complaints against Judge Jameson. Harwood-

Jackson further told DeRenard that they were looking for someone neutral to

make a Facebook post about the number of complaints against him. DeRenard

declined to do so.

On May 4, 2022, a “flustered” and “upset” Judge Jameson called

DeRenard and informed her that multiple judicial complaints had been filed

against him and asked her what she knew about them. DeRenard then

recounted the conversation she had with Harwood-Jackson in January to him. 59 DeRenard testified that Judge Jameson was upset with her for not telling him

about her conversation with Harwood-Jackson sooner and explained:

I felt like he was guilt tripping me about not telling him back in January or February or March or April and he was telling me that what I needed to do was file a bar complaint against [Harwood- Jackson]. That if I couldn’t file a bar complaint to at least contact the commission and let the commission know about this situation[.]

DeRenard testified she was “horrified” at Judge Jameson’s request to file a bar

complaint against Harwood-Jackson and that she did not want to do that, but

she feared not doing anything because she still had clients with pending cases

before him. DeRenard elected to contact the JCC’s investigator and gave a

statement.

The JCC’s finding that Judge Jameson attempted to pressure DeRenard

into filing a bar complaint against Harwood-Jackson was accordingly

(d) Judge Jameson engaged in two acts of retaliation.

The JCC last alleged under Count III that Judge Jameson engaged in two

acts of retaliation. The circumstances surrounding these acts of retaliation are

discussed in more detail under Count VII below which we hold was supported

by clear and convincing evidence. For our purposes here, the evidence clearly

demonstrated that, after a rumor began spreading concerning security footage

of Judge Jameson walking around the Marshall County courthouse in his

underwear, he engaged in acts of retaliation against two individuals in relation

to that video.

60 The first individual was Chad Lampe, a radio station manager at MSU.

After the radio station filed an open records request for access to the security

footage, Judge Jameson called the president of MSU and informed him about

the open records request. Judge Jameson then asked Lampe to call him and

told Lampe during that call that he had already spoken with the president and

that the president was not happy about the open records request. Lampe

testified that he was later made to give an accounting of his conversation with

Judge Jameson to his direct supervisor and MSU’s provost, who answers only

to the president. Lampe testified that he soon after left his employment with

MSU and that, although the situation that occurred with Judge Jameson was

not the sole reason he left, it “accelerated [his] departure.”

The second individual was Sergeant Jeff Daniel, the head of security for

the Marshall County courthouse. After the rumor about the security footage

began to spread, Judge Jameson became convinced that Sergeant Daniel was

the individual that informed media outlets of its existence. Judge Jameson

first complained to the sheriff’s department about Sergeant Daniel in an

attempt to have him removed from the Marshall County courthouse. The

sheriff’s department treated Judge Jameson’s request as an official complaint

and investigated Sergeant Daniel. It found no evidence of wrongdoing and

informed Judge Jameson that he could not be removed absent a finding of

misconduct. When that did not work, Judge Jameson complained to the

sheriff that he feared Sergeant Daniel might plant evidence in his office or “do

something” in his courtroom. The sheriff testified that, based on Judge

61 Jameson’s continued complaints, he reassigned Sergeant Daniel. Although the

sheriff continued to believe Sergeant Daniel had not and would not commit

such misconduct, he was forty-five days out from retirement and was a “chain

of command” officer who would not fight the decision to reassign him.

Based on the foregoing, the JCC’s finding that Judge Jameson engaged

in two acts of retaliation was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The JCC found that Judge Jameson violated the following rules of

judicial conduct in relation to Count III: Canon 1, Rule 1.1: “A judge shall

comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct”; Canon 1, Rule

1.2: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence

in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety”; Canon 2, Rule 2.2: “A judge

shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office

fairly and impartially”; Canon 2, Rule 2.3(A): “A judge shall perform the duties

of judicial office, including administrative duties, without bias or prejudice”;

Canon 2, Rule 2.3(B): “A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties,

by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment,

including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race,

sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual

orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and

shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge's

direction and control to do so”; Canon 2, Rule 2.4(B): “A judge shall not permit

family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence

62 the judge's judicial conduct or judgment”; Canon 2, Rule 2.8(B): “A judge shall

be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers,

court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official

capacity, and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court

officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control.” 23

We agree with the JCC’s findings that Judge Jameson violated the

foregoing canons and rules under Count III, save for two. First, there was no

evidence that Judge Jameson violated Canon 2, Rule 2.3(A). Comment [2] to

Rule 2.3 provides that:

Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.

The JCC presented no evidence that Judge Jameson displayed such bias or

prejudice in the performance of his judicial duties. In that vein, Canon 2, Rule

2.3(B) also forbids a judge to display bias or prejudice in the performance of

their judicial duties and further forbids them to engage in harassment.

Comment [3] to Rule 2.3 defines harassment as “verbal or physical conduct

that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward a person on bases such

23 To clarify, while Judge Jameson did not violate this rule in relation to Hoefle

or Goard, it was undignified of him to ask DeRenard to file a bar complaint against Harwood-Jackson. His actions concerning Sergeant Daniel were likewise undignified.

63 as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual

orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.”

Again, the JCC presented no evidence that Judge Jameson engaged in such

conduct.

4) Count IV

Under Count IV, the JCC found by a vote of 5-0 that “Judge Jameson

used his influence and the prestige of his judicial office to pressure persons to

donate to or support his political campaign,” and that this finding was

supported by the testimonies of Lisa DeRenard and Landon Norman. The JCC

found that Judge Jameson improperly solicited campaign donations from

DeRenard during a December 15, 2021, phone call and thereafter contacted

her on “several other occasions in March of 2022” requesting her attendance at

campaign events and seeking additional financial support. The JCC noted that

DeRenard felt pressured to donate because she had pending felony criminal

cases in Judge Jameson’s court. The entirety of the JCC’s findings concerning

Norman were that “Landon Norman testified that during his initial interview for

the position of staff attorney for the 42nd Judicial Circuit, the subject of Judge

Jameson’s campaign was raised. Mr. Norman testified that, in response to the

subject, he indicated he would be glad to assist with Judge Jameson’s

campaign.”

64 Based on the foregoing, the JCC found that Judge Jameson violated

Canon1, Rule 1.1; 24 Canon 1, Rule 1.2; 25 Canon 1, Rule 1.3; 26 and Canon 4,

Rule 4.1(A)(8). 27 After thorough review, we hold that the factual record is

insufficient to uphold the JCC’s findings of misconduct under Count IV and

dismiss it in its entirety.

We begin with Judge Jameson’s alleged misconduct of asking Lisa

DeRenard to support his campaign. DeRenard testified that Judge Jameson

called her on her personal cellphone on December 15, 2021. He first asked

after her wellbeing, as a devastating tornado had recently hit the area. He then

informed her that someone had filed to run against him in the upcoming

election. DeRenard testified about the conversation as follows:

I asked who [was running against him], and he told me the name of the person and said that he needed support, and he was asking me for my support. . . He did describe to me what his goals were in the future for continuing treatment for people who are criminally accused, you know, basically telling me what he’s running on for his campaign. But I got from the conversation that he was very hurt that someone was running against him, that he really loves his job, and that he needed support. And I said, “Well you say support, what do you mean by that? Are you asking for money?” And he kind of laughed and said, “Well, yeah, that would help.”

24 “A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.”

25 “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in

the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” 26 “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal

or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.” 27 “Except as permitted by law, or by Rules 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, a judge or a

judicial candidate shall not . . . personally solicit or accept financial or in-kind campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee authorized by Rule 4.4[.]” We note that the JCC’s supplemental order lists this as a violation of “Canon 4, Rule 4.8,” which does not exist. Based on context and the language in the order, we discern that the JCC intended to list Rule 4.1(A)(8).

65 Later, on cross-examination concerning the December 2021 phone call,

DeRenard testified as follows:

Counsel: The person that brought up whether money was involved was you.

DeRenard: Yes.

Counsel: [Judge Jameson] did not say, “Hey Lisa I need you to give me money.”

DeRenard: No, he did not use that term he said support.

DeRenard agreed with Jameson’s counsel that “support” could mean many

things apart from a financial contribution.

During the December 2021 conversation, DeRenard told Judge Jameson

that she could only afford to donate $250 at that time but if she could afford to

donate additional money later, she would. Judge Jameson requested that she

send the money to his campaign committee and gave her the contact

information to do so. DeRenard testified that she interpreted his request to

mean a financial contribution and felt as though she could not decline his

request because she had clients with pending felony criminal cases in his

court. She further stated that she would not have otherwise donated to his

campaign, nor anyone else’s campaign, at that time because she had been

financially affected by the tornado, it was ten days before Christmas, and her

young grandchild had recently contracted COVID.

Despite the JCC finding that Judge Jameson called DeRenard “several”

times in March 2022, DeRenard only testified about two phone calls that

occurred that month. DeRenard testified that the first phone call, on March 4,

66 concerned yard signs and an upcoming campaign event at Pagliai’s Pizza in

Murray. DeRenard testified that Judge Jameson asked her if she wanted a

yard sign during the March 4 phone call. She said she told him that it would

be futile to put a yard sign in the yard of her home because she lived on a

dead-end street but offered to put one in her office window where it would be

seen by more people. DeRenard testified she was unable to go to the event at

Pagliai’s, so she donated an additional $250 through Judge Jameson’s

campaign website.

DeRenard then testified that later in March, on an unspecified date,

Judge Jameson called her again and requested her attendance at a different

campaign event at Marcella’s Kitchen in Benton. She also claimed that during

this call Judge Jameson asked her to ask her office building’s landlord if he

could place a larger sign at an intersection on the building’s property. She

claimed that on the same day he requested this, she spoke with her landlord

who approved of the sign being placed.

Finally, DeRenard testified about an email she received from Judge

Jameson’s campaign committee promoting the Marcella’s Kitchen event. The

flyer stated that $250 was a minimum contribution and $900 was an average

contribution. Based on that flyer she donated an additional $400 so that she

would be considered an “average” donor. She also attended the Marcella’s

Kitchen event and gave an impromptu speech in support of Judge Jameson at

the event.

67 The primarily applicable judicial rule to address this alleged misconduct

is SCR 4.1(A)(8) which states that “(A) Except as permitted by law, or by Rules

4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, a judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . personally solicit

or accept financial or in-kind campaign contributions other than through a

campaign committee authorized by Rule 4.4[.]” The “terminology” section of

SCR 4.300 defines “personally solicit” as “a direct request made by a judge or a

judicial candidate for financial support or in-kind services, whether made by

letter, telephone, social media, or any other means of communication.”

Preliminarily, we note that there was evidence of record that contradicted

DeRenard’s version of events. Included in the evidentiary record is a

screenshot of three text messages DeRenard sent Judge Jameson on March 3,

the day before she claimed the first call in March 2022 occurred. The first text

message from DeRenard in that exchange said she had asked her landlord that

day if Judge Jameson could place a sign on the building’s property and that

her landlord approved. The second text message provided her “personal email

contact where [she] would want to receive info on events[.]” And the third said,

“I am requesting a yard sign to put in my window please let me know if I would

need to pick it up and if so where. Thanks. Lisa DeRenard.” In addition, on

March 6, DeRenard and Judge Jameson’s wife exchanged several Facebook

messages. In one of those messages DeRenard said, “[H]ope you got my

message that [my landlord]. . . approves of Jamie putting his signs there and I

need a yard sign for my office window.”

68 More importantly, based on DeRenard’s own testimony, Judge Jameson

did not make a direct request for a financial campaign contribution. Rather, he

asked for her “support,” and she brought up the subject of a monetary

contribution. The question, then, is whether it was ethical for Judge Jameson

to not reject her suggestion that she make a financial contribution to his

campaign and thereafter direct her to send the funds to his campaign

committee. We hold that it was.

While there is no published case law addressing this specific set of

circumstances, we note that the facts of this case are not like those of Alred v.

Commonwealth, Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 395 S.W.3d 417 (Ky. 2012) or

Gentry, supra, both of which affirmed a JCC finding that a judge had

personally solicited money.

In Alred, Judge Alred had filed a complaint against Kentucky Utilities

(KU) with the Public Service Commission. 395 S.W.3d at 444. He later decided

to dismiss the complaint and contacted counsel for KU on the phone to inform

him or her of his intention. Id. During that phone call “he urged counsel for

KU to agree to donate $12,500 for playground equipment at the elementary

school that [his] children attended.” Id. This Court affirmed the JCC’s finding

that “Judge Alred personally solicitated (sic) the donation from counsel for KU.”

Id. In Gentry, this Court upheld the JCC’s finding that Judge Gentry, a family

court judge, coerced members of her GAL 28 panel to donate the maximum

28 Guardian ad litem.

69 amount to her campaign. 612 S.W.3d at 836. As Judge Gentry stipulated to

this misconduct, the factual details are omitted from the Gentry Opinion. But

the JCC found that based on Judge Gentry’s testimony and the totality of the

evidence “she had clear expectations of the level of participation by her panel

members as to . . . money contributed . . . and insufficient participation led to

retaliation.” Id.

Moreover, in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015), the

United States Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to

Florida Canon of Judicial Conduct 7C(1), which is substantially similar to SCR

4.1(A)(8). 29 The Court concluded that the canon served a compelling state

interest in preserving the integrity of the judiciary and was not overly restrictive

because it

restricts a narrow slice of speech . . . Canon 7C(1) leaves judicial candidates free to . . . write letters, give speeches, and put up billboards. They can contact potential supporters in person, on the phone, or online. They can promote their campaigns on radio, television, or other media. They cannot say, “Please give me money.” They can, however, direct their campaign committees to do so.

Id. at 452. Indeed, Comment [5] to SCR 4.1 directs that “[t]hese Rules do not

prohibit candidates from campaigning on their own behalf.”

Accordingly, there was nothing unethical about Judge Jameson

contacting DeRenard and asking for her “support.” Further, there is nothing in

29 The Florida Canon states that candidates for judicial office “‘shall not

personally solicit campaign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons’ to raise money for election campaigns.” 575 U.S. at 433.

70 the rules of judicial ethics that required him to reject DeRenard’s offer of a

monetary donation in response to his request for support. Apart from

requesting a monetary donation, the rules only prohibited him from personally

accepting a financial donation, which he did not do. Rather, it was undisputed

that he directed DeRenard to send her donation to his campaign committee.

While we understand and acknowledge DeRenard’s testimony that she felt

pressured to make a monetary donation, it would be inappropriate to conclude

that Judge Jameson committed misconduct based solely on DeRenard’s

subjective belief that he meant a financial contribution when her own

testimony was that he only requested her “support.” 30

Next, concerning Landon Norman, one of Judge Jameson’s staff

attorneys, we reiterate that the JCC found Judge Jameson to have violated,

inter alia, SCR 4.1(A)(8), which prohibits the personal solicitation of campaign

contributions, and note that the “terminology” section of SCR 4.300 defines

“contribution” as “both financial and in-kind contributions, such as . . .

volunteer services . . . which, if obtained by the recipient otherwise, would

require a financial expenditure.” Therefore, Judge Jameson’s alleged

misconduct, if proven, could have fallen under this rule. But an equally if not

more applicable rule, which the JCC did not address, is Rule 4.1(A)(10), which

30 Although it was not directly addressed by the JCC, we further note for clarity

that there was nothing unethical about the flyer for the Marcella’s Kitchen campaign event providing recommended contributions, as that flyer states that the event was “organized and carried out by the Committee to Re-Elect Judge Jamie Jameson” and was emailed to DeRenard by Judge Jameson’s wife.

71 states: “Except as permitted by law, or by Rules 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, a judge or a

judicial candidate shall not . . . use court staff, facilities, or other court

resources in a campaign for judicial office[.]” Comment [11] to Rule 4.1

explains that “Paragraph A(10) does not prohibit court staff from using their

own time, while not being paid as court staff, to assist in a campaign for

judicial office consistent with Part III of the Administrative Procedures of the

Kentucky Court of Justice, Personnel Policies.”

In a May 24, 2024, letter from Norman to the JCC he explained the

context of the conversation with Judge Jameson and his personal desire to

work on his judicial campaign. In it, he wrote:

During my initial interview for [the position of staff attorney], held on May 5, 2021, Judge Jameson and I discussed in depth the campaign and the election process. The Conversation arose from my degree from Georgetown College. I expressed that I had a great interest in politics and elections. . . At the time of the interview, Judge Jameson did not have a challenger in the upcoming election. However, we discussed the potential scenario where he did, in fact, have an opponent. The possibility of gaining insight into how to successfully operate a campaign was invaluable to me with regard to any personal future political aspirations. It was at this time that Judge Jameson indicated that, if desired, I could participate on his campaign committee. Judge Jameson specified that this would be on a volunteer basis and would be separate from the duties as Staff Attorney for the 42nd Judicial Circuit. I jumped at the opportunity without hesitation. . . I do not recall a single incident in which I have been asked to perform campaign tasks during the workday. It has always been understood, per numerous conversations with Judge Jameson and I, that campaign projects are separate from my duties as a staff attorney. I have always consented to participating in any campaign tasks. Any suggestion otherwise is meritless.

72 Norman’s subsequent testimony before the JCC regarding this issue was

entirely consistent with his letter. Specifically, he testified as follows in

response to questioning by the JCC panel:

JCC Panel: And do you help judge on his campaign?

Norman: I do.

JCC Panel: And did he ask you to do that, or did you volunteer?

Norman: I volunteered. That was one of my main talking points in the interview for the job. I had a background in political science from Georgetown so I have an interest in politics, and he told me that it would be an election year in my time here. From the very beginning I said I would be happy to help him with his campaign because it’s a great experience for whatever I do later on down the road.

Norman further testified that none of his work for Judge Jameson’s campaign

was done during his work hours as a staff attorney.

Thus, the evidence concerning Norman did not prove by clear and

convincing evidence that Judge Jameson made a direct request that Norman

provide volunteer work for his campaign in violation of SCR 4.1(A)(8). Rather,

Norman was made aware of Judge Jameson’s judicial campaign and

volunteered to help, on his own time, due to his personal interest in politics

and a desire to acquire knowledge on how to run a campaign. For the same

reasons, Judge Jameson also did not run afoul of SCR Rule 4.1(A)(10).

Based on the foregoing, the JCC did not prove by clear and convincing

evidence that Judge Jameson committed the misconduct it alleged under

Count IV. This Court therefore orders that Count IV be dismissed and will not

73 consider the alleged misconduct under Count IV in deciding an appropriate

sanction.

5) Count V

The JCC found under Count V that Judge Jameson “repeatedly

attempted to obstruct justice and impede the [JCC’s] authority to investigate

the charges against him. Specifically, that Judge Jameson intimidated and

attempted to interfere with his judicial staff complying with a [JCC] subpoena.”

The JCC’s findings were as follows:

On September 21, 2022, upon request by Counsel for the [JCC], the Commission issued a subpoena for Kentucky Court of Justice [(KCOJ)] records. . . Judge Jameson’s counsel was provided a copy of the subpoena upon service.

On September 26, 2022, Judge Jameson contacted his administrative support specialist Sarah Gipson via telephone to discuss the subpoena. In short, Judge Jameson instructed his

judicial staff to act in contradiction to their duties and responsibilities as AOC employees, specifically by calling the office and telling the staff not to turn over any subpoenaed documents and to call him if anyone came to the office to pick up the documents. 31

31 Citation to the record and footnotes omitted.

74 The JCC found that this alleged misconduct violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; 32

Canon 1, Rule 1.2; 33 Canon 1, Rule 1.3; 34 and Canon 2, Rule 2.12(A). 35

Upon this Court’s review of the record, there was not clear and

convincing evidence that Judge Jameson told his judicial staff not to comply

with the JCC’s subpoena. Further, the evidence showed that Judge Jameson’s

primary concern was ensuring that non-responsive, confidential documents in

his office not be turned over because they contained documents he had been

working on in response to the JCC’s charges against him.

Gipson testified that on September 26, 2022, after the subpoena had

been issued, Judge Jameson called her while she was in the office gathering

responsive documents to the subpoena. She testified that “[t]he documents in

his office were what he asked me not to turn over, essentially, that that’s what

[the JCC] was not allowed to have.” During her direct examination, when

asked how the call made her feel, she testified:

I took it that he did not want me to comply with that request, at least until he worked on something with his attorney. I was under a court order from that subpoena, so I felt like I needed to comply even though he basically asked me not to. He never said the words ‘don’t comply,’ but that’s what I understood him to be asking me.

32 “A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.”

33 “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in

the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” 34 “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal

or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.” 35 “A judge shall require court staff, court officials, and others subject to the

judge's direction and control to act in a manner consistent with the judge's obligations under this Code.”

75 On cross-examination, Gipson again confirmed that Judge Jameson never told

her not to comply with the subpoena:

Counsel: And I’ve wrote down, listening to your testimony, he never told you not to comply with that subpoena.

Gipson: That’s correct. He never said those words.

Counsel: He never told you that you are not to comply with the subpoena.

Gipson: That’s correct, not in those words.

Counsel: Well, anything else might have been your interpretation of those words, but he never uttered those words.

Gipson: Right.

Landon Norman stated at least twice during his testimony before the JCC that

Judge Jameson never told him not to comply with the subpoena. Rather,

Judge Jameson’s only concern was that the confidential documents in his

office that he had been working on in response to the JCC’s charges against

him not be turned over. This was further supported by an email sent to Gipson

and Norman from AOC’s Deputy General Counsel on September 27 which said:

I spoke with Judge Jameson yesterday regarding the record production the KCOJ is undertaking. I think he had been provided some inaccurate or incomplete information about our record production, so I wanted to make sure you all understood what we’ve asked of you with respect to document production. You do not need to produce any document that is not responsive to the JCC’s subpoena. We do not want any document that is personal or otherwise unrelated to the scope defined by the JCC’s subpoena. With respect to any document or record that has been boxed up from Judge Jameson’s office, we do not need the document scanned unless it is responsive to the subpoena and those

boxes should not be removed from that office in response to this subpoena or for any other reason while the JCC case is pending. Judge Jameson was relieved to know that you all would be 76 reviewing the documents for responsiveness before producing them and that the boxes in his office would not be removed.

(Emphasis added). Gipson responded to the email: “Thank you! Judge

Jameson called our office yesterday and asked that I not turn those things over

so I really appreciate that clarification.”

To be sure, it was wholly improper for Judge Jameson to contact his

judicial staff at that time because the JCC’s temporary removal order had not

yet been voided. But the misconduct of contacting his judicial staff while

subject to the JCC’s temporary removal order was charged under Count VI

below. The misconduct alleged under Count V was that Judge Jameson

“repeatedly attempted to impede and obstruct” the JCC’s investigation by

intimidating and attempting to interfere with his judicial staff’s compliance

with the JCC’s subpoena. Neither Gipson nor Norman testified that Judge

Jameson told them not to comply with the subpoena and, in fact, both stated

multiple times that he did not tell them not to comply with the subpoena.

Gipson testified before the JCC that she interpreted what Judge Jameson said

during the September 26 phone call to mean that she should not comply with

the entirety of the subpoena, even though she acknowledged he never said

those words. But the email response she sent to counsel for AOC the day after

her conversation with Judge Jameson demonstrated that, at that time, she

understood his request to mean the boxes of confidential, non-responsive

documents in his office.

77 Also included under Count V, the JCC found that Judge Jameson’s staff

attorney Landon Norman felt threatened by a Facebook post made by Judge

Jameson’s wife during the time that Norman was cooperating with the JCC’s

investigation. The post said, in pertinent part, “[W]hile persons are free to state

their opinion, YOU CAN BE SUED FOR STATING FACTS THAT ARE NOT

TRUE. There is already a long list of people that fall in that category and will

have to face their recklessness when all is said and done.” As it was

undisputed that Judge Jameson did not make this post, he cannot be found to

have committed misconduct for posting it. While SCR 2.12(A) directs that “[a]

judge shall require court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s

direction and control to act in a manner consistent with the judge’s obligations

under this rule[]” there is no concomitant duty that applies to a judge’s spouse.

Moreover, Norman testified that he does not have a Facebook account. This

Court therefore fails to see how the post could have been intended by Judge

Jameson as a direct threat towards Norman meant to intimidate him into non-

compliance with the JCC’s investigation.

Based on the foregoing, the JCC failed to prove the allegations in Count

V by clear and convincing evidence. This Court therefore orders that Count V

be dismissed and will not consider the alleged misconduct under Count V in

determining an appropriate sanction.

78 6) Count VI

Count VI alleged that Judge Jameson failed to adhere to the terms of the

JCC’s temporary suspension order by contacting his judicial staff and availing

himself of judicial resources. In addition to contacting two members of his

staff, as discussed in Count V, the JCC also alleged that Judge Jameson

continued to use his AOC email and computer.

However, as previously discussed, the JCC’s temporary suspension order

was declared void ab initio by this Court because it was not supported by the

minimum number of votes that SCR 4.120 requires. Accordingly, any alleged

misconduct based on Judge Jameson’s failure to adhere to that order is now

moot. The JCC itself acknowledges that Count VI is moot and that it therefore

did not consider Count VI determining its recommended discipline. This Court

will likewise not consider it.

7) Count VII

Count VII alleged acts of misconduct in relation to a security video of

Judge Jameson recorded in the Marshall County courthouse. In particular, his

attempt to coerce MSU’s radio station manager into not pursuing a story about

the video, and his retaliatory acts against a courthouse security officer who he

believed released the video.

The video, captured on February 11, 2022, at approximately 6:35 am,

depicted Judge Jameson walking downstairs from his chambers to an

employee entrance in a t-shirt, boxers, and socks. After a short interaction

with his wife and two children at the employee entrance, he walked back up

79 the stairs toward his office. A short time later one of the building’s janitors

walked down the same flight of stairs. A rumor soon began to spread amongst

courthouse employees about the judge walking around the courthouse in his

underwear. This rumor eventually made its way to Marshall County Judicial

Center Lead Court Security Sergeant Jeff Daniel. As head of security, one of

Sergeant Daniel’s duties was to investigate unusual occurrences in the

courthouse. He therefore pulled a copy of the video and brought it to the

attention of his administration; it was determined that nothing criminal

occurred. The rumor then spread, as rumors often do, beyond the walls of the

courthouse and two open record requests were filed for access to the video.

One request was filed by an individual from WPSD, a television station in

Paducah, and the second was filed by WKMS, an MSU public radio station.

Both of the requests were denied by AOC prior to April 11, 2022.

On April 11, 2022, Judge Jameson emailed Chad Lampe, the station

manager of MSU’s radio station and asked Lampe to call him. On the following

day, Lampe called Judge Jameson. Lampe testified that their conversation

went as follows:

The conversation started off nice and fine. . . And then he inquired about the open records request. He mentioned to me that the request also had received an appeal after the denial, which I don’t believe that was the case, that we did appeal. And then the judge had mentioned that he had already called Dr. Jackson, the university president, and that he was not happy.

Judge Jameson then conceded to Lampe that there likely was a video of him

walking around the courthouse in his underwear. He explained that he

sometimes works late and sleeps on a couch in his office, and that the video in 80 question would show his wife dropping off one of their children so that Judge

Jameson could take the child to a medical appointment that day. Lampe

testified that

[Judge Jameson] had also mentioned that he wanted to make sure that it wasn’t going to be a story and I told him that I don’t make the decision on stories, our news director and our journalists make the decision because we have a firewall for those editorial decisions. And he wanted me to assure him that it wouldn’t be a story.

Lampe told Judge Jameson he would call the news director and inform him

that, based on what the judge had told him about the video, it did not appear

to rise to the level of a news story. The news director agreed, and Lampe called

Judge Jameson a second time to inform him that they did not intend to pursue

the story and asked him to inform the university president of that decision.

When counsel for the JCC asked Lampe if he believed Judge Jameson was

trying to intimidate him by telling him that the university’s president was not

happy about the open records request he responded, “Oh certainly.”

Lampe was later instructed by his supervisor, the Dean of MSU’s College

of Business, to detail the conversation he had with Judge Jameson in an email

to MSU’s Provost, who answers only to the university’s president. Lampe did

so in an email dated April 14, 2022, that recounted in pertinent part:

WKMS requested to view the footage via the FOIA 36 request with [AOC], the request was denied. There has been no appeal by WKMS. Judge Jameson emailed me on Monday evening asking me to call him. I did, first thing Tuesday. We discussed the request. . . He said he called Bob Jackson about the request, before he called me. I asked that he call Dr. Jackson back to explain that there

36 Freedom of Information Act.

81 would be no story. He wanted me to confirm that there would be no story, and I called our News Director to confirm there would be no story, then I called [Judge Jameson] back and informed him there would be no story. . . [T]his isn’t a story for us, and it was solved on Tuesday of this week and would have been solved without a call to Dr. Jackson.

Lampe left his employment with MSU two months later. He testified that,

although the incident with Judge Jameson was only one of several factors that

led to his resignation, “it accelerated [his] departure.” He brought the incident

to the attention of the JCC voluntarily once he learned of the JCC’s

investigation because he felt that Judge Jameson’s actions were unethical.

During the same week of April 11, 2022, Judge Jameson sought to affect

the employment of Sergeant Daniel for engaging in the investigation that

uncovered the video. Even though part of Sergeant Daniel’s duties included

investigating unusual events and happenings in the judicial center, Judge

Jameson was adamant in his testimony before the JCC that Sergeant Daniel’s

review of the video was outside the scope of his duties. Judge Jameson went

so far as to testify that his conclusion was supported by AOC policy and that

AOC was “not very happy” with Sergeant Daniel’s actions. This claim was not

borne out by the evidence.

On or around April 12, 2022, the same day Judge Jameson first spoke

with Lampe, he sent texts to Marshall County Sheriff Eddie McGuire to

complain about Sergeant Daniel. Those texts said:

Need to talk about Sergeant Daniel.

I need him out of the building if possible. He is using state resources to sit, on what I believe is work time, to review security videos to see if he can find anything that can make me look bad 82 and then is either by himself or in coordination with one or two clerks, calling media sources and making a news tip regarding the contents of the security videos which, as you know, are confidential. He is doing this in support of my opponent. You can imagine how that makes me feel. I’d really like to talk to you about it before I take any action.

When Sheriff McGuire did not respond to this text immediately, Judge

Jameson sent a substantially identical text to the sheriff’s chief deputy. The

chief deputy understood Judge Jameson’s texts to be a complaint against a law

enforcement officer pursuant to KRS 15.520(3)(a) 37 and began a formal

investigation. A formal investigation report dated April 13 concluded that the

complaints against Sergeant Daniel were unfounded, and that a change in his

position could not be made absent proof of misconduct. The report further

noted that Sergeant Daniel “lives outside the county and cannot vote for either

candidate and in fact is planning on retiring before the election and would not

be working with whoever wins.”

After Judge Jameson’s complaint against Sergeant Daniel failed to bring

about his removal from the courthouse, he persisted in his attempts by telling

Sheriff McGuire that he was afraid Sergeant Daniel might “plant evidence” or

“do something in his courtroom.” These subsequent complaints succeeded in

having Sergeant Daniel removed from the courthouse, as the sheriff reassigned

him to the general investigation division. The sheriff explained that although

37 KRS 15.520(3)(a) provides that “[a]ny complaint taken from a citizen alleging

misconduct on the part of any officer shall be taken as follows . . . If the complaint alleges criminal activity by an officer, the allegations may be investigated without a signed, sworn complaint of the citizen[.]”

83 he had no reason to believe Judge Jameson’s concerns would come to fruition,

Sergeant Daniel only had 45 days left until his retirement and that he was an

“old school,” “chain of command” officer that would not attempt to fight the

decision to reassign him. He further testified that he would not have

reassigned Sergeant Daniel but for Judge Jameson’s complaints.

Based on the foregoing, the JCC found that Judge Jameson violated

Canon 1, Rule 1.1: “A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of

Judicial Conduct”; Canon 1, Rule 1.2: “A judge shall act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety”; Canon 1, Rule 1.3: “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of

judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or

others, or allow others to do so.”

Based on our review of the record, we hold that the JCC proved by clear

and convincing evidence that Judge Jameson committed the misconduct

alleged under Count VII and violated Rule 1.1, Rule 1.2, and Rule 1.3.

F. Appropriate Sanction

As a final matter, we must determine whether the JCC’s ruling to

permanently remove Judge Jameson from office was appropriate.

We begin with the issue of whether the JCC had the authority to

permanently remove Judge Jameson from office. The JCC’s supplemental

findings and order states:

It is the [JCC’s] conclusion and ruling that Judge Jameson is unfit for the judicial office he currently holds and is equally unfit to 84 serve in judicial office in the indeterminate future. Therefore, the [JCC] hereby reaffirms is ORDER that Judge Jameson be, and here by is, REMOVED from judicial office for the term he then held, and that this same unfitness disqualifies judge Jameson from holding office in the indefinite future. The Commission believes it has a good faith basis under Gordon v. Judicial Conduct Commission, [655 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Ky. 2022)], to find and conclude that Judge Jameson should be permanently removed from judicial office because the totality of the clear and convincing evidence presented at the Temporary Suspension Hearing and Final Hearing and as set forth herein establishes that he was unfit and remains unfit for judicial office.

Despite the quoted language above, the JCC argues on appeal to this Court

that its order does not state that he is disqualified from ever holding public

office again, but rather is limited to him being prohibited from seeking election

to the office of judge for the 42nd Judicial Circuit. The JCC therefore contends

that its decision does not encroach upon the legislature’s impeachment powers.

While this Commonwealth’s Constitution grants the JCC the authority to

retire, suspend, or remove a judge, 38 it places the authority to impeach an

elected official solely in the hands of the legislature by simply stating that “[t]he

impeachment powers of the General Assembly shall remain inviolate.” Ky.

Const. § 109. In particular, the House of Representatives has the sole power of

impeachment, and all impeachments must be tried by the Senate. Ky. Const.

§§ 66, 67. The Governor and all civil officers are subject to impeachment “for

any misdemeanors in office; but judgment in such cases shall not extend

further than removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of

honor, trust or profit under this Commonwealth[.]” Ky. Const. § 68.

38 Ky. Const. § 121.

85 While we acknowledge that the JCC now claims its only intention was to

prevent Judge Jameson from holding the office of judge for the 42nd Judicial

Circuit, nothing about the language of its order is so limited. And, while the

JCC certainly had the authority to remove Judge Jameson for the remainder of

his term, 39 this Court has never addressed whether a judge’s removal may

extend beyond that period either for an indefinite period or permanently. The

JCC’s reliance on Gordon is somewhat puzzling, as Judge Gordon was not

permanently removed from office, nor does that opinion address whether

permanent removal from office is a sanction that is available to the JCC.

Regardless, to interpret the JCC’s removal power under Section 121 to include

permanent removal from office encroaches upon the impeachment powers

vested solely in our legislature. The only safe harbor when interpreting

foundational governmental roles is a “strict [adherence] to the separation of

powers doctrine,” 40 a bedrock principle provided for explicitly by our

Constitution. 41 Ky. Const. §§ 27, 28. In accordance with those principles, we

conclude that the permanent removal of a state official elected by the people

must be the result of actions taken by a body of representatives also elected by

the people: our legislature.

39 Kentucky Judicial Conduct Com'n v. Woods, 25 S.W.3d 470 (Ky. 2000)

(holding that “the remedy of removal disqualifies a former judge from judicial office for at least the remainder of the current term.”). 40 Diemer v. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet, Dept. of Highways, 786 S.W.2d

861, 864 (Ky. 1990). 41 Ky. Const. §§ 27, 28.

86 With that established, we must decide whether Judge Jameson’s removal

from office was an appropriate sanction. “Typically, removal stems from a

deliberate course of action or numerous examples of separate violations of the

Code of Judicial Conduct.” Gordon, 655 S.W.3d at 193 (citing Gentry, 612

S.W.3d at 847). Judge Jameson’s misconduct in this case certainly meets that

standard.

To summarize, the evidence demonstrated by clear and convincing

evidence that Judge Jameson committed numerous, intentional, and varied

acts of misconduct across four counts of misconduct. Under Count I, the JCC

proved that Judge Jameson created the CCB in a manner and for a purpose

that did not comply with the statutory mandates surrounding community

corrections programs and boards; that he, or persons under his direct

supervision, developed local rules and procedures concerning the operation of a

pre-trial ankle monitoring program without the approval of the Chief Justice;

that he made improper appearances before two legislative bodies; that he

improperly interfered with and affected the fairness of a public bidding process;

that he engaged in two acts of direct solicitation of donations to the Re-Life

project; and that he submitted an application for grant money on behalf of the

CCB for an improper purpose.

Under Count II, the JCC proved that Judge Jameson used at least one of

his KCOJ employees to perform work for the CCB; that he received direct

notifications for violation alerts and on more than one occasion issued arrest

warrants upon receipt of a notice of violation report from an employee of his

87 corporation; and that, in his capacity as judge, he ordered individuals to

participate in an ankle monitoring program that in turn required participants

to pay his nonprofit corporation for the privilege of using the ankle monitor

while he was simultaneously involved with the corporation’s finances.

Under Count III, the JCC proved that Judge Jameson violated the

doctrine of separation of powers by ordering defendants to participate in an

ankle monitoring program in his judicial capacity and thereafter being an

integral part of monitoring those defendants, a function that is traditionally

exclusive to the executive branch; that he pressured an attorney who regularly

practiced before him to file a bar complaint against another attorney that

regularly practiced before him; and that he engaged in two acts of retaliation.

Finally, under Count VII, the JCC proved that Judge Jameson acted in a

manner that did not promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary,

created the appearance of impropriety, and abused the prestige of his office to

advance his personal interests by having a security officer reassigned from the

Marshall County courthouse and by pressuring a radio station manager not to

pursue a story about an embarrassing video of him.

The foregoing misconduct involved numerous violations of several canons

and rules of judicial conduct including: Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 1, Rule 1.2;

Canon 1, Rule 1.3; Canon 2, Rule 2.1; Canon 2, Rule 2.2; Canon 2, Rule

2.4(B); Canon 2, Rule 2.9(C); Canon 2, Rule 2.12(A); Canon 2, Rule 2.8(B);

Canon 3, Rule 3.1(A); Canon 3, Rule 3.1(C); Canon 3, Rule 3.1(D); Canon 3,

Rule 3.2; Canon 3, Rule 3.7(A)(4); and Canon 3, Rule 3.7(A)(6)(a).

88 Judge Jameson’s misconduct and violations of the canons “[were] not

isolated but [constituted] a pattern of repeated conduct over an extended

period of time . . . and in a variety of ways.” Gordon, 655 S.W.3d at 194. It is

also significant that, prior to the JCC proceedings addressed herein, Judge

Jameson appeared before the JCC three times between January 2016 and

June 2021. According to the JCC, the 2016 complaint “raised strikingly

similar issues involving an out-patient [SUD] treatment program, the judge’s

use of social media to endorse that program, his active participation in the

program, his ordering defendants to participate the program, and family

members involved in running the program.” That complaint resulted in no

disciplinary action but the JCC’s letter announcing its decision cautioned

Judge Jameson to pay particular attention to Canon 1, Rule 1.3; Canon 2, Rule

2.4; and Canon 4, Rule 4.1(A)(2)-(3). The second and third complaints,

ostensibly, resulted in private reprimands.

Based on the foregoing, we agree that the removal of Judge Jameson

from office was an appropriate sanction.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the JCC’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,

and order and its supplemental findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order

are affirmed in part and reversed in part.

VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert and Thompson, JJ., sitting.

Conley and Keller, JJ, concur. Thompson, J., concurs with separate opinion.

VanMeter, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion, in

89 which Bisig, J. joins. Bisig, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by

separate opinion. Nickell, J., not sitting.

THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING: I concur with the majority opinion’s

disposition of the charges and strongly agree that there is overwhelming

evidence that Judge Jameson is guilty of an extremely flagrant appearance of a

conflict regarding his irreconcilable dual roles as a judge and administrator of

the Community Correction Board (CCB).

I write separately to address my concerns that in this particular case, it

appears that the disciplinary process of the Judicial Conduct Commission

(JCC) was mustered for an inappropriate purpose, swaying a judicial election.

I have great respect the often-thankless task that the JCC undertakes in

investigating complaints of judicial misconduct. Having watched numerous

hours of the various hearings involved in Judge Jameson’s discipline case

myself, I understand the incredible devotion that is required.

Judge Jameson’s first defense document alleged that there was

substantial evidence that the complaints made against him to the JCC were

prompted by his political opponent or others acting on her behalf. The purpose

of such actions was to discredit him for the tactical reason that it would make

it easier for her to defeat him at the ballot box.

The Commission and the majority opinion both fail to analyze or address

the issue of this alleged conspiracy and the alleged manipulation of the JCC

during an election year, despite the fact that the JCC states that, even as it

was investigating complaints against Judge Jameson, additional complaints

90 continued to be made. Having reviewed the evidence, there was clear and

convincing proof that at least some complaints were being made for the express

purpose of influencing the outcome of the judicial election.

Judge Jameson faced considerable opposition since taking office.

Calloway County Circuit Clerk Avery opined:

From nearly day one of his judgeship, a small group of attorneys have been whispering gossip that somehow Judge Jameson must be doing something corrupt because nobody cares enough about people to put in hundreds, if not thousands of volunteer hours and spend thousands of dollars of their own money to help make these ideas come to life. Just because these attorneys would never put in the passion and hard work regarding battling addiction that Judge Jameson does, doesn’t mean they are “right”, and he is “wrong.” Judge Jameson is strongly supported by the majority of our local legal community because they believe him to be authentic, passionate about people, and fair. The only people consistently critical of Judge Jameson make up the same small group that have been unaccepting of his approach to the job from day one.

Jameson’s Exhibit 17.

After his political opponent filed to run for Judge Jameson’s seat, Judge

Jameson began to receive reports from other lawyers that there was an active

campaign to enlist and recruit lawyers to: (1) file complaints against him; and

(2) state on Facebook the total number of complaints that had been filed

against him. This was being done to bolster his political opponent’s chances of

winning the election. In Judge Jameson’s answer to the JCC, he explained that

he believed the JCC disciplinary process was being abused by claimants as

part of an organized plot, explaining he had been told about this plot by at

least three attorneys.

91 The JCC did not just have Judge Jameson’s word to support such a

conspiracy. There were many indications which provided the JCC with

confirmation that this was in fact occurring.

Judge Jameson specifically quoted from a recorded interview by an

attorney witness who testified before the JCC investigator. That witness stated

that she was approached by an attorney who “indicated to me that, they [as in

multiple people] were planning to file multiple judicial complaints against

Jameson in the hopes of bolstering [his political opponent’s] chances of

winning the Judicial seat” and the attorney stated she had filed or helped to file

a complaint against Judge Jameson.

Then she looks me right in the eye and said “we really need a third party that’s a disinterested party to get on Facebook and talk about the fact that all these complaints are being filed, once they get filed . . .” I’m like “good luck finding someone.” In other words, I pass, you know. I don’t want to be involved in something like that, and she asked me did I know anyone, could I think of anyone that I could direct her to that could, could do that for them and I, of course said “no.”

Lisa DeRenard, whom the JCC found to be a very credible witness,

testified before the JCC that she was also recruited for the same purpose, to

post the number of complaints on Facebook. Although DeRenard’s testimony

supported the existence of a conspiracy to support Judge Jameson’s political

opponent by filing JCC complaints against him, under Count III, the JCC

concluded that Judge Jameson’s request that DeRenard file a bar complaint

regarding the attorney attempting to organize this scheme was an attempt to

pressure her and constituted misconduct on his part.

92 Judge Jameson, in his Exhibit 20, filed printouts of several Facebook

posts from his political opponent. She posted that Judge Jameson had forty-

five complaints pending against him before the JCC. Only the JCC knows the

number of complaints filed against Judge Jameson and it has never stated how

many there were, whether multiple complaints were filed regarding the same

incidents, or if the judicial discipline process involved all the complaints filed or

a subset of them. If this figure is correct, I can only conclude there is

overwhelming evidence of a conspiracy to file complaints against Judge

Jameson and that someone was collecting reports regarding the filing of these

confidential complaints; if this figure is false, I can only presume that his

political opponent was attempting to manipulate the election through

spreading false information. It is also unclear whether any of the people who

filed complaints were ever called to testify before the JCC.

Judge Jameson’s political opponent also repeatedly attacked Judge

Jameson in her Facebook posts for being a horrible person and judge, giving

various examples that she claimed proved he was a bully. She repeatedly

referred to an incident in which she appeared before Judge Jameson as

counsel for William McAlpin, regarding allegations that Judge Jameson

committed misconduct in relation to exercising the judicial contempt power, as

Judge Jameson was “threatening to put me on the jail line[.]” Jameson’s

Exhibit 20. The civility normally present in most judicial races was noticeably

lacking in her conduct.

93 It is unclear whether Judge Jameson’s political opponent or someone

else filed a JCC complaint against Judge Jameson for inappropriately

threatening her with contempt, but his political opponent was not called to

testify before the JCC regarding such a claim. Having reviewed the video of the

hearing regarding McAlpin’s plea which contained the conduct at issue, I

conclude that Judge Jameson acted appropriately, given all the circumstances.

In his answer to the JCC, Judge Jameson questioned “[t]he timing of

these multiple claims made in a short time period” which were distant in time

as “curious at best and more likely intentionally part of the conspiracy to

damage Judge Jameson’s reputation in a desperate attempt to provide his

opponent with a much-needed political boost.” (Emphasis omitted). He was not

the only one to question the timing of the filing of these complaints. Circuit

Clerk Avery noted: “Even the timing of the most recent complaint seems

considerably suspect due to this being an election year.” Jameson’s Exhibit 17.

I consider this conduct extremely serious. An attempt to utilize a

completely non-partisan commission to further political motives is improper

and should be addressed. The JCC has oversight over Judge Jameson’s

political opponent pursuant to Canon 4 as she was a judicial candidate.

Judicial candidates are not allowed to “knowingly, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, make any false statement of material fact” and are required to

“take reasonable measures to ensure that other persons” do not do so “on [her]

behalf[.]” Rule 4.1(A)(11), (B). The issue of “dirty tricks” should have been

addressed by the JCC.

94 I believe if a flurry of complaints is suddenly made in an election year,

the JCC should view such complaints with caution. It should also view with a

more critical eye any complaints that are not made by the person against

whom the misconduct is alleged to occur, or which involve events which

occurred years earlier.

The actions of the JCC combined with the concurrent publicity

surrounding them, were undoubtedly pivotal in Judge Jameson losing his 2022

reelection bid. The final hearing regarding Judge Jameson was held on October

17-20, 2022. The JCC’s Final Order which removed Judge Jameson from office

was entered on November 4, 2022, just days before the general election which

was held on November 8, 2022.

I also have additional concerns about the JCC’s process regarding Judge

Jameson. Judge Jameson alleged he was questioned at an informal hearing

(which was held prior to the temporary removal hearing), without previously

being provided with adequate notice regarding the charges about which he

would be questioned. Therefore, he could not review any records to help refresh

his memory about the incidents at issue. This informal hearing is not part of

the record. Judge Jameson raises the concern that when having to respond

purely based on his memory of certain incidents, some of which occurred much

earlier in time, his inability to perfectly recall the incidents at issue was being

used as proof by the JCC that he was obfuscating when he was in fact trying to

fully cooperate with the JCC.

95 While at this stage any such errors are moot, I am concerned that such

conduct could be capable of repetition yet evade review. Failing to advise Judge

Jameson about the topics under consideration, if true, would be improper.

Similarly, and more egregiously, it is improper for the JCC to find

misconduct based on matters that were never charged. No allegation of bid

rigging or improper use of his judicial contempt powers was contained in any of

the charging documents at any time, yet extensive findings were made that he

violated the canons through committing such actions. Had the majority opinion

not determined that these findings were unsubstantiated, such error would

have provided ample grounds for rejecting such findings.

This is not a typical judicial disciplinary case because it does not involve

money or sex. Instead, it involves a judge spending a great deal of his personal

time trying to do big things in a genuine effort to serve his constituents and the

entirety of 42nd Judicial Circuit.

While I agree that Judge Jameson’s misguided action in managing the

CCB caused an extreme appearance of conflict, that does not mean that he did

not act in good faith or have commendable goals. The JCC itself acknowledged

that Judge Jameson had “altruistic intentions” which were “sincerely held and

true” and that he had a “noble” goal in seeking to build a drug treatment

center. Final Revised Order at 11, 89. Additionally, according to Circuit Clerk

Avery, she and others agreed with Judge Jameson about the need for an

96 effective inpatient facility and appropriate GPS monitoring in the circuit and

partnered with him to try to bring these ideas to fruition. Avery lauded Judge

James’s strong concern for those battling addiction but explained that he

received opposition because he “ruffled feathers” by trying to address

underlying addiction issues in his orders and while some local attorneys were

won over to his approach, others proved intractable. Jameson’s Exhibit 17.

As to ankle monitoring, Judge Jameson testified it always bothered him

that only wealthy defendants could afford to be released from the county jail on

GPS ankle monitoring supervision. Under the prior “Wild West” system,

defendants had to arrange for their own GPS monitoring with one of three

private and unregulated GPS vendors; this resulted in indigent defendants

lingering in incarceration at a high cost to county government because the cost

of ankle monitoring was prohibitive and the “arrange your own monitoring”

scheme did not allow a reduced rate for GPS monitoring for those unable to pay

the full amount. This resulted in discriminatory disparate outcomes depending

upon ability to pay.

Additionally, defendants who could afford GPS monitors were having

trouble getting them placed and removed in a timely manner, and the

equipment was not always reliable. Jameson’s Exhibit 4, Appx. E. As one

attorney explained: “The ankle monitors themselves were second rate. The

batteries would continually run down. My clients would have problems nonstop

with the devices. They were easily tampered with and could be cut off with a

simple pair of scissors.” Jameson Exhibit 4, Appx. R. at 2 (Affidavit of Mitchell

97 T. Ryan). There were also problems with the companies overseeing the

monitoring being difficult to contact, reporting violations sporadically and the

Commonwealth was not getting any information about violations. Id.

Judge Jameson investigated several GPS suppliers, and he decided that

the GPS ankle monitor from the Track Group had objectively superior features.

The Track Group’s monitor was virtually indestructible and would report any

attempt to remove it, and it allowed two-way communication.

Additionally, I believe Judge Jameson was rightfully excited about the

Track Group monitoring software which had the potential to save lives by

monitoring the movements of defendants. Not only was there an inclusion zone

for a defendant to remain within under limited confinement by ankle monitor,

there was also an exclusion zone. A person protected by a no contact order

could download an application via cell phone and if the defendant entered a

zone within a certain distance from that protected person, the protected person

and the GPS Supervisor would be notified immediately on their phones.

Jameson’s Exhibit 4, Appx. R. at 3. Judge Jameson testified that he worked

out an arrangement that if a monitored defendant committed a class one

violation, he could contact local law enforcement who would respond within

minutes of his report. This rapid response could allow a defendant encroaching

on a zone of exclusion to be picked up before the defendant could reach or

harm a victim, a much superior system to a victim having to call 911 when

confronted by a defendant and subject to immediate harm. Defendants

98 knowing about this system could also deter violations from being committed in

the first place.

Ultimately, the fiscal courts agreed that the Track Group product was

superior and specified in their request for proposal (RFP) that this was the

product they wanted. It is not unusual for fiscal courts to specify the

appropriate parameters of what they are seeking. Those who will be impacted

by what is purchased, often provide very specific input to fiscal courts and

recommend specific products as being the best technology to meet their needs.

The County Attorney testified that there were well-attended public hearings to

consider whether and what kind of GPS monitoring system they wished

adopted, the process took a long time, and each fiscal court conducted their

own investigations and consulted with the Commonwealth Attorney, judges,

the jail, and other interested parties before finalizing the RFP. Apparently after

engaging in all this work, they concurred that Judge Jameson had indeed

found a superior and more cost-effective GPS system.

It is not improper for fiscal courts to take into account a judge’s

recommendations as to which monitoring system would be most suitable.

While unpublished therefore not authoritative, Software Tech., Inc. v. Farris,

2008-CA-001678-MR, 2010 WL 1253211 (Ky. App. Apr. 2, 2010)

(unpublished), explains that the involvement of parties who will be affected by

the end result of the bidding process is not prohibited and is instead

appropriate and confirms it is appropriate to change course in favor of new

99 technology which will better serve the needs of those intended to benefit. I

agree with its reasoning.

Adopting a unified system generally, through the Track Group’s product

specifically, was beneficial to all concerned parties because it: (1) enabled more

defendants to be released, thus saving jail costs; (2) lowered the cost overall for

defendants being placed on global position monitoring, thus allowing more

defendants to participate in such monitored release enabling them to work; (3)

reduced the inefficiency of defendants having to arrange for their own

monitoring; (4) was superior in its ability to monitor these defendants than the

private global position monitoring heretofore provided by private companies;

and (5) would not discriminate against impoverished defendants who would be

granted a lower fee. This was a win-win scenario. The only parties not to

benefit were the other vendors who wished to either maintain the profitable

status quo or become the new authorized vendor of ankle monitors but did not

have a product that was nearly as cost-effective or offered the options that the

Track Group’s product did. The only reason there was an impropriety in Judge

Jameson’s actions was because of the conflict between his roles.

While at one time Judge Jameson anticipated using profits from the

ankle monitoring to support the building on an inpatient treatment center,

ultimately the low fees charged did not result in any profit which could be used

in such an endeavor. As witnesses testified, there was simply no profit in

operating the ankle monitoring wing of the CCB and Judge Jameson was never

paid for his services to it. While the appearance of impropriety was extreme, the

100 JCC never made any findings that Judge Jameson either placed any defendant

on ankle monitoring or removed a defendant from such monitoring for an

improper purpose.

Prior to the JCC hearing, Judge Jameson divested from his role with the

CCB and no longer has any involvement with it. See Jameson Exhibit 4, Appx.

R. (Affidavit of Mitchell T. Ryan, current CCB president). Judge Jameson

explained that he planned to withdraw from the CCB immediately upon it

beginning its ankle monitoring operation. He knew he should not be involved in

its receipt of funds or any management of it. He did not follow through with

those plans, likely because no one else wanted to take over the thankless job of

administering it for free.

Circuit Clerk Avery also commented that she and the other circuit clerks

voluntarily participated in collecting fees for the CCB, which was not an

imposition as they already collected fees for CrimeStoppers. She did not think

there was anything wrong with this, and there was evidence that the Court of

Justice made software changes to facilitate this process, thus providing at least

tacit support for this method of collecting fees, despite prior advice

recommending to Judge Jameson that the clerks not collect such fees.

It is true that Judge Jameson made many missteps in his attempts to

serve his community but there is no proof that those mistakes came from

anything other than his selfless zeal for the plight of impoverished and drug

dependent Kentuckians. The JCC’s role is to correct, not irredeemably punish,

a judge’s behavior when possible. See Kentucky Jud. Conduct Comm’n v.

101 Woods, 25 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Ky. 2000) (“it is not the role of the Commission to

stigmatize or punish judges. The Commission’s role is to improve the quality of

justice by hearing specific complaints of judicial misconduct and taking the

least severe action necessary to remedy the situation”).

Given Judge Jameson’s largely exemplary record and divestment of his

interest in the CCB, with this conflict being the primary basis for most of the

substantiated complaints against him, this shows that he understood how he

had erred and was amenable to correction. While the JCC’s decision to remove

Judge Jameson from office may have been appropriate considering how little

time was left in his term, its decision to permanently bar him from serving as a

judge would have been inappropriate, even if the majority opinion had not

determined such an action was unconstitutional.

VANMETER, C.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: I

agree that the JCC sufficiently proved by clear and convincing evidence that

Judge Jameson committed most of the misconduct alleged against him. I also

agree that removal is an appropriate sanction. However, based upon my review

of the record and my understanding of our ethical canons, I would find that the

JCC met its burden with respect to two instances the majority found lacked

sufficient support: (1) the solicitation of campaign “support” from attorney

DeRenard and (2) instructing his judicial staff to violate the JCC subpoena.

“Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean uncontradicted

proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of a probative and substantial nature

carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent-

102 minded people[.]” Gentry v. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 612 S.W.3d 832, 846

(Ky. 2020). But although we have broad power to “affirm, modify or set aside

in whole or in part the order of the Commission, or to remand the action to the

Commission for further proceedings”, SCR 4.290(5), we are nevertheless bound

to “accept the findings and conclusions of the commission unless they are

clearly erroneous; that is to say, unreasonable.” Maze v. Judicial Conduct

Comm’n, 612 S.W.3d 793, 800 (Ky. 2020) (quoting Wilson v. Judicial Ret. &

Removal Comm'n, 673 S.W.2d 426, 427–28 (Ky. 1984)).

In neither instance were the allegations of improper solicitation or

violation of the subpoena clearly erroneous. As to solicitation, Judge

Jameson’s failure to explicitly ask DeRenard to make a financial contribution

to his campaign does not insulate from the charge. I do not believe our ethical

canons are so rigid as to be so easily nullified by oblique requests. Judge

Jameson called DeRenard personally to lay out his platform for re-election. His

request for “support” was accurately interpreted by DeRenard as a request for a

financial contribution, as confirmed by Judge Jameson when he clarified what

he meant by support. Had Judge Jameson not indicated his desire for her

financial support and informed DeRenard how to provide that support,

DeRenard would not have financially contributed to Judge Jameson’s

campaign.

Judicial candidates are prohibited by our rules from “personally

solicit[ing] or accept[ing] financial or in-kind campaign contributions” other

than through their financial committees. Canon 4, Rule 4.1(8). To personally

103 solicit is to make “a direct request made by a judge or a judicial candidate for

financial support or in-kind services, whether made by letter, telephone, social

media, or any other means of communication.” SCr 4.300, Terminology. Of

course, this rule means that a candidate may not personally request financial

contributions, or hand out envelopes for contributions, or in any other way

directly bring to bear their personal clout to compel the giving of money. The

rule also requires a candidate to demur when the topic of money is brought up.

In this instance, when DeRenard broached the question of financial

contributions, the proper response from Judge Jameson would have been

simply to direct her to his financial committee or advise someone from his

committee will be in touch; not suggest that such a contribution “would help.”

Admittedly, the other instances of contact between DeRenard and Judge

Jameson do not lend themselves to the allegation of improper solicitation. The

December 2021 phone call, however, is sufficiently clear and convincing, by my

estimation, to support the charge of misconduct. The JCC’s finding with

respect to Judge Jameson’s improper solicitation of money from DeRenard was

not “clearly erroneous; that is to say, unreasonable.” Maze, 612 S.W.3d at

800.

Regarding the allegation that Judge Jameson directed his judicial staff to

violate the JCC subpoena, I would also find that the JCC met its burden of

proof. Judge Jameson acted improperly by contacting his staff in regard to the

subpoena, but as with the improper solicitation, the fact that Judge Jameson

never spoke the words, “do not comply with the subpoena” does not save him.

104 Again, I do not believe our ethical canons can only be broken by an

unambiguous declaration of intent to break them.

We do not know precisely what Judge Jameson said to Gipson that led

her to believe Judge Jameson was asking her to violate the subpoena, other

than that he never explicitly told her to do so. Whatever was said, Gipson,

Judge Jameson’s administrative support specialist for his judicial office,

interpreted it to mean that she should not comply with the subpoena. Gipson

is not wholly ignorant of the law and, as a member of a judicial staff, possesses

at least a passing familiarity with legal instruments, such as a subpoena.

When she interpreted Judge Jameson’s words as a directive to not comply, she

did so fully aware of her legal obligations under the subpoena. Had Judge

Jameson made abundantly clear that he was referring only to certain materials

in boxes in his office, Gipson would have understood that. 42

I would find the JCC provided clear and convincing evidence to support

the charge. Gipson’s response to Judge Jameson’s directive is sufficiently clear

to at least strongly suggest that she was told to not comply with the subpoena

in some way, shape, or form. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the JCC

to find Judge Jameson’s actions violated our ethical canons.

42 Gipson’s response to an email from AOC Deputy General Counsel does

nothing to indicate otherwise. Although the email mentions boxes of non-responsive materials, Gipson only responded that she was instructed to not turn “those things” over. What she meant could have been as narrow as non-responsive materials within the boxes, but more likely she was instructed to not turn over anything in the office, a clear violation of the subpoena.

105 One more point. I wholeheartedly agree with the majority’s

determination that Jameson violated multiple provisions of the Code of Judicial

Conduct, SCR 4.300, by impermissibly placing himself on both sides of ankle

monitoring in that (i) he, as judge, required defendants to wear and pay for

ankle monitors supplied by his non-profit corporation, and (ii) his non-profit

corporation monitored and reported violations to him for which he then

authorized warrants and then adjudicated. However, another issue is

presented. In KRS Chapter 196, the legislature has deemed fit to include

circuit judges in the mix for both the Kentucky State Corrections Commission,

KRS 196.701(1)(g), and community corrections boards, KRS 196.725. While it

is nice to be wanted, to the extent those bodies can be said to exercise

executive branch powers, judges should be extremely reluctant to participate in

any more than a purely advisory role since doing so may implicate the

prohibition of Kentucky Constitution Section 28: “[n]o person . . . being of one

of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of

the others[.]”

Bisig, J., joins.

BISIG, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: I concur

with the Majority’s conclusion that Judge Jameson’s actions justify the

imposition of our harshest sanction—removal. I further agree with Chief

Justice VanMeter’s Opinion finding that the Judicial Conduct Commission met

its burden with respect to two instances the majority found lacks sufficient

support. But I respectfully disagree with the Majority decision holding that the

106 Commission cannot permanently remove a judge from judicial office. I believe

that the Commission may, in exercising its sound judgment, remove a judge

from sitting within our judiciary entirely if that punishment is supported by

clear and convincing evidence.

Section 121 of the Kentucky Constitution and SCR 4.020, both of which

govern disciplining judges, contain no explicit limitation upon the removal of a

judge from office. In this case, Judge Jameson was removed from office from

November 4, 2022, the date the Commission issued its Final Order, until

December 31, 2022, when his term expired. The Majority allows the removal

here to effectively function as a two-month suspension, despite its recognition

of Judge Jameson’s deliberate course of action resulting in several instances of

misconduct, the breadth of charges against him, and his unwillingness to

understand how his actions undermine faith in the judiciary. I find no

compelling reason for limiting the Commission’s removal power to a certain

period of time. Limiting the Commission’s ability to remove judges poses great

risks to the public and its confidence in our judiciary and compromises the

Commission’s role in maintaining an effective and ethical judiciary. Notably, as

an additional safeguard, the Commission’s final orders are subject to review,

and this Court maintains the authority to affirm, modify, or set aside those

orders pursuant to SCR 4.290.

107 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Bradley Alan Sears Richard Lee Walter Boehl Stopher & Graves, LLP

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Jeffrey Charles Mando Joseph Kenton Hill Adams Law, PLLC