IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION. RENDERED: JUNE 17, 2021 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky 2019-SC-0728-MR
JAMES T. HINMAN, II APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE ANDREW SELF, JUDGE NO. 17-CR-00355
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
On retrial, a Christian County jury found Appellant James T. Hinman, II,
guilty of three counts of first-degree rape, one count involving serious physical
injury to the victim. The trial court sentenced Hinman to life in prison. He
brings four claims of error on appeal. He claims the trial court improperly
allowed a nurse to testify to a doctor’s notes; the trial court erred by not
granting a directed verdict on the third rape charge; palpable error occurred
when testimony prohibited by Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 532.055(2)(a)
was entered into evidence; and palpable error occurred when a probation
officer did not fully inform the jury about probation eligibility in relation to the
sex offender treatment program (SOTP) requirements. Upon review, we affirm
the Christian Circuit Court’s judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is Hinman’s second appeal to this Court. After a prior reversal, he
was found guilty again for his actions in March 2013. The underlying facts of
his case, presented in our 2016 opinion (Hinman I), follow.
Appellant and his wife, Lily,1 married in the fall of 2012. Almost immediately, the relationship began to deteriorate. According to Lily’s trial testimony, Appellant became angry on March 12, 2013 after she rejected his sexual advances. He warned Lily that he would teach her to never to reject him again and, for the next two hours, he repeatedly struck her about the face and head with his fists and kicked her legs and torso. At one point, he jumped onto her chest with all his weight. He then removed her clothing, commented on the battered condition of her body, and resumed kicking and hitting her until she passed out. He roused her back to consciousness by shaking her and resumed beating her.
After the attack, according to Lily’s testimony, Appellant demanded her assurance that she would not again reject his sexual advances. He then forced Lily to wear a dress belonging to her daughter.2 He began fondling her and calling her by her daughter’s name as he looked at a photograph of her daughter. He then initiated vaginal intercourse to which Lily acceded out of fear that she would again be beaten, or even killed.
The next evening, March 13, Appellant told Lily he would not physically hurt her again but that he was not finished punishing her. He took Lily, dressed only in pajamas, outside in freezing
1 Lily is a pseudonym. Ordinarily, we have used pseudonyms only to protect the anonymity of juveniles. Appellant’s wife is not a juvenile but in his brief to this Court, he used this pseudonym and the Commonwealth continued to do so in its brief. We continue the use of this pseudonym to be consistent with the parties’ arguments.
2 Lily’s daughter lived with the daughter’s father. Lily had two sons living with her and Appellant.
[During Hinman’s second trial, he testified the blue dress was a costume “Cinderella dress” belonging to Lily, not her daughter, and that he was the one who wore it during sex. The Commonwealth introduced photographic evidence of Lily’s daughter wearing the dress to her biological father’s wedding.]
2 weather where he placed a dog collar around her neck and ordered her into the doghouse. He left her there for about an hour before he returned, allowing her into the residence only after she agreed to his demand to do everything her “master” told her to do.3 When back in the house, Appellant forced her to lick his feet and fellate him. After that, Appellant forced Lily to commit acts of anal sodomy on him, and then he subjected her to vaginal and oral intercourse repeatedly through the night.
The next morning, March 14, Lily was unable to walk. She was dizzy, sore, and bleeding from her vagina. She testified that later that evening, Appellant again made sexual advances and they had vaginal intercourse. She testified that she had no desire for intercourse, but she did not refuse him because she “wanted to stay alive” and escape with her children when she could.
On the morning of March 15, Lily devised a plan to get away from the house with her children. After escaping, she reported the preceding events to law enforcement authorities and had a CT scan and a rape examination performed. As a result of the assault, she sustained a concussion and severe bruising about her head and body. She suffered from headaches, dizziness, and pain for several weeks.
Hinman v. Commonwealth, 2014-SC-000474-MR, 2016 WL 1068421, at *1-2
(Ky. Mar. 17, 2016).
Hinman was found guilty of second-degree assault and first-degree rape,
serious physical injury, by a Christian County jury in 2014. See id. at *1.4
The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced him to serve
ten years in prison for the assault and forty years in prison for the rape, the
sentences to be served concurrently. See id. Hinman successfully appealed
3Lily testified that she could have escaped when she was left outside but she did not do so out of fear for her sons who remained in the house with Appellant.
4 Hinman was indicted for first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, second-degree assault, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and first-degree criminal abuse. The jury acquitted him of sodomy, unlawful imprisonment, and criminal abuse. Id. at *2.
3 his rape conviction to this Court where the conviction was reversed because
Hinman’s right to a unanimous verdict was violated. Id. at *3. Specifically, the
trial evidence reflected at least three instances during the March 12-15, 2013
timespan that supported a conviction for first-degree rape, but the jury
instruction did not direct the jury to consider any of the specific instances of
alleged rape and it did not provide a verdict form that would clearly indicate
unanimity based upon the same criminal act. Id. On remand, Hinman was
indicted on three counts of first-degree rape, one involving serious physical
injury. After a trial on these charges, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all
three counts and recommended a sentence of life for first-degree rape, serious
physical injury, and twenty years for each of the other counts, all to run
consecutively. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation except
Hinman was sentenced to serve the three sentences concurrently for a total of
life in prison.
The parties agree that the jury heard substantially the same evidence
discussed in Hinman I. This included testimony from the victim, investigating
officers, and the nurse who treated Lily at the emergency room. The
Commonwealth also introduced Lily’s smashed cell phone, Lily’s daughter’s
dress that Hinman forced Lily to wear while he raped her, photos of Lily’s
injuries, Lily’s medical records (including testimony on the rape kit that
evidenced Hinman’s semen), and Hinman’s police interview. The jury heard
that when Hinman was detained and interviewed by the police, he denied that
he had beaten or sexually assaulted his wife, claiming her bruises were a result
4 of her falling out of bed and hitting a nightstand, and that he and his wife had
wild but consensual sex. During trial, Hinman testified to a series of events
different from Lily’s testimony and from what Hinman originally told the
detective. Hinman testified that he was transgender and identified as a
lesbian. He admitted beating Lily “half to death” but claimed that she verbally
provoked him. He also testified that he beat Lily March 9-10, not March 12.
He denied raping Lily on the evening of March 14 but claimed he and Lily had
consensual sex on the evening of March 12 and the evening of March 13 only.
On appeal Hinman claims the trial court erred by 1) improperly allowing
a nurse to testify to a doctor’s notes; 2) not granting a directed verdict on the
third rape charge; 3) allowing the Commonwealth to introduce improper
criminal history evidence during the penalty phase; and 4) allowing the
Commonwealth to introduce misinformation about the SOTP during the
penalty phase.
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Allowing a Nurse to Read the Emergency Room Doctor’s Clinical Impression Notes
The registered nurse who assisted in Lily’s care with the emergency room
doctor on March 15, 2013 testified for the Commonwealth. The nurse agreed
that she was present in the emergency room when Lily was brought in to be
examined and evaluated for her injuries—sexual assault, physical injuries.
5 Defense counsel did not object to this testimony but objected when the nurse
was asked to read parts of the doctor’s notes. The trial court allowed the
testimony. The jury heard that the doctor noted Lily had bruising
of the face, back, right arm, left arm, right hip, right lower leg, and left lower
leg and in terms of the doctor’s clinical impressions, he listed closed head
injury, concussion, multiple contusions, and alleged physical and sexual
assault.5
Hinman claims his right to confront the witness was violated and
because he was unable to confront the doctor directly about his clinical
impression, the doctor’s notes unfairly vouched for Lily’s testimony regarding
her injuries. Hinman complains that the nurse’s reading of the doctor’s notes
was prejudicial because the doctor’s clinical impression notation of “alleged
physical and sexual assault” is the same as the doctor testifying he believed the
victim was telling the truth, the type of testimony Hoff v. Commonwealth, 394
S.W.3d 368, 376 (Ky. 2011), proscribes as improper bolstering.
Hinman cites Little v. Commonwealth, 422 S.W.3d 238, 245-46 (Ky.
2013), and the authority it relies upon to argue the doctor’s clinical impression,
particularly the statement of “alleged physical and sexual assault” was
testimonial and he should have been allowed to confront the doctor. Like
Whittle v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 898 (Ky. 2011) (forensic lab report found
to be testimonial), Little particularly relies upon Melendez-Diaz v.
5 The nurse’s notes entered into evidence contained similar information. As the presenting complaint, the nurse’s notes read in part, “Patient . . . reports repeated physical and sexual ass[a]ult [for] 3 days.” 6 Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (finding affidavits reporting the results of
forensic analysis of seized material were testimonial and noting, id. at 312, n.2,
medical reports created for treatment purposes, would not be testimonial under
its decision), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (finding blood
alcohol concentration report testimonial and noting State did not claim that the
report was necessary to provide medical treatment). These post-Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), decisions distinguish between testimonial
medical records and records intended for medical treatment. However, unlike
Whittle, Little concluded the hospital lab report at issue was not testimonial.
422 S.W.3d at 246. Little explains, if the primary purpose of the medical
record at issue was not to establish or prove a fact or serve as a “substitute for
trial testimony,” the admissibility of the content of the medical record is
governed by the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE), and not by the
Confrontation Clause. Id.
Lily went to the hospital for treatment of her injuries where an
assessment of her injuries allegedly resulting from physical and sexual assault
was necessary. The form used, the “Emergency Physician Record,” contains
the kind of information relevant to an emergency physician treating a patient
with the complaint of sexual and physical assault, including information about
the complaint, symptoms, past medical history, and the physical exam. The
7 doctor’s “Clinical Impression” is the last major section of that Emergency
Physician Record.6
Because Hinman admitted assaulting Lily, the question before this Court
is whether the emergency room doctor’s clinical impression statement, “alleged
sexual assault,” was testimonial. To assess whether the Confrontation Clause
was violated, we must determine whether the content of the doctor’s clinical
impression arose from the doctor’s primary purpose of promoting treatment or
for proving a fact necessary for Hinman’s conviction, i.e., that Hinman sexually
assaulted Lily. “In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules
of hearsay . . . will be relevant.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358-59
(2011). As applied to medical treatment, KRE 803(4) explains that
“[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis” may ordinarily be
admitted at trial despite their hearsay status.
This Court has previously recognized that a doctor’s testimony and
report containing the rape victim’s assertion that she had been vaginally raped
repeatedly over eight years was admissible under KRE 803(4) because it was
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment, describing the cause or
6 The “Physician Documentation,” also a part of the medical records, contained a disposition summary with “Impression: Closed Head Injury, Concussion, Multiple Contusions, Alleged Adult Physical Abuse, Alleged Adult Sexual Abuse.”
8 external source of her injury. Hoff, 394 S.W.3d at 372. As in Hoff, it is fair to
say that a statement about alleged recent physical and sexual assault was
relevant to the injuries reported and that is the type of statement a doctor may
rely on when treating or diagnosing a patient. Although Hinman claims that
the doctor’s notes were testimonial, he has not shed light on how the doctor’s
clinical impression, using the term “alleged” and reflecting Lily’s assertion that
she was sexually assaulted, had a primary purpose of use at trial rather than
diagnosis and treatment. We conclude Hinman’s Sixth Amendment right was
not violated.
Nevertheless, even if the nurse’s reading of the doctor’s notes was
somehow error under the Confrontation Clause, it was harmless error under
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.24 and the constitutional
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Under the constitutional
standard, we judge whether the “error [is] unimportant in relation to everything
else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.”
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). When doing so, we consider such
factors as “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case,
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
684 (1986) (citations omitted).
9 The doctor’s notes from Lily’s medical records were certified and properly
admitted into evidence prior to the nurse’s testimony, with no objection from
Hinman. He does not now challenge the admission of the notes. Reading of
the notes was cumulative to the medical records already entered in evidence.
The nurse testified to her own observation of Lily’s bruising. Hinman did not
cross-examine the nurse about the doctor’s or her notes reporting Lily’s
allegations of physical and sexual assault. He cross-examined the nurse about
the pelvic examination notes for which “no trauma seen” was documented for
the vulva, introitus, vagina, and cervix. He elicited from the nurse that “no
trauma seen” was the doctor’s note. Hinman also elicited that according to the
medical records Lily had a CT scan of her head on March 15 and March 20,
2013, and the results of both scans were normal.
Other proof included numerous photographs, Hinman’s admission that
he had beaten Lily prior to the occurrence of the sexual encounters, Lily’s
testimony, the investigating detectives’ testimony, and the March 15 rape kit
evidencing Hinman’s semen. Consequently, if the nurse’s reading of the
doctor’s notes was error, it was an “error unimportant in relation to everything
else the jury considered on the issue” of Hinman physically and sexually
assaulting Lily. Yates, 500 U.S. at 403.
Hinman further argues that the doctor’s notes improperly bolstered both
Lily’s testimony and the nurse’s testimony, which he claims also vouched for
Lily’s testimony that she was sexually assaulted. “The rule against bolstering
or vouching addresses attempts by one witness to express belief in the
10 credence of another witness.” Ruiz v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 675, 683
(Ky. 2015).
As noted above, Hoff, a child sexual abuse case, recognized that in order
to make a proper diagnosis, a doctor is required to consider the facts as given
in the history along with any physical evidence. 394 S.W.3d at 375-76.
However, in Hoff, the doctor’s statement included language supportive of
believing the victim and the doctor also included the statement that he could
say with reasonable medical probability that the victim’s description of what
happened to her was the true cause of her injuries. Id. at 376. Unlike in Hoff,
the doctor’s or the nurse’s notes here that Lily suffered an alleged physical and
sexual assault does not indicate that the doctor or the nurse believed Lily’s
allegations. Instead, use of the terms “alleged” and descriptions of what the
“patient reports,” simply suggests that Lily made the claim she was assaulted,
not that the assault had been confirmed or proven and that the doctor believed
Lily’s stated reason for coming to the emergency room. Under these
circumstances we cannot find improper bolstering.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying a Directed Verdict on the “Serious Physical Injury” Allegation
The indictment charged that Hinman raped Lily on or about March 12,
on or about March 13, and on or about March 14, 2013. At the close of the
Commonwealth’s case, Hinman moved for a directed verdict on the first rape
charge. He argued that the timeline failed to establish he raped Lily on March
12 since she testified that the rape occurred during the early hours of March
11 13.7 The trial court denied the motion, finding the Commonwealth presented
evidence of three distinct instances of alleged rape, the dates being established
by the testimony. Hinman again moved for a directed verdict at the close of
evidence but this time he argued the evidence did not support the jury finding
that he physically assaulted Lily on March 12, 13, or 14 because he testified to
beating Lily days before then. The trial court denied the motion. Hinman now
claims the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict on the third
charge, that being a rape on or about March 14, 2013. He argues that Lily’s
trial testimony did not present evidence that she had vaginal intercourse on the
evening of March 14.
Recently, Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250 (Ky. 2020), clarified the
procedure for preserving for appeal an alleged directed verdict issue. A
defendant must:
(1) move for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence; (2) renew the same directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence, unless the defendant does not present any evidence; and identify the particular charge the Commonwealth failed to prove, and must identify the particular elements of that charge the Commonwealth failed to prove. Criminal defendants may move for directed verdict on one count of a multiple count indictment without rendering the alleged error unpreserved; defendants are not required to move for directed verdict on any lesser included offenses to a particular charge in order to preserve the issue; and, nor are they required to object to instructing the
7 Defense counsel explained this argument to be premised upon Hinman I’s discussion of the evidence presenting at least three instances in the March 12-15 time frame that would support a conviction for first-degree rape. The jury was instructed on first-degree rape, serious physical injury, as to the intercourse Lily testified to in the early morning hours of March 13; first-degree rape as to the intercourse Lily testified to in the early morning hours of March 14; and first- degree rape as to the intercourse Lily testified to in the nighttime hours of March 14.
12 jury on that particular charge to preserve the alleged directed verdict error.
Id. at 266.
Hinman’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence
differed from his motion at the close of the Commonwealth’s case. He did not
renew his initial motion but provided different grounds for a directed verdict,
indeed grounds different from that which he now argues. Although Hinman
cites preservation of his argument for appellate review based upon the two
directed verdict motions decided by the trial court, those two motions were
decided on different grounds. Only those particular issues considered by the
trial court can be considered properly preserved. Id. at 265; see Kentucky Rule
of Civil Procedure 50.01 (“A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
grounds therefor.”).
Here, Hinman preserved for review whether the evidence was sufficient to
prove Lilly suffered “serious physical harm.” This particular element
determines the felony class upon conviction. If a defendant is convicted for
first-degree rape, serious physical injury, the otherwise Class B felony of first-
degree rape becomes a Class A felony. KRS 510.040(2).
When reviewing a motion for a directed verdict,
the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.
13 Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
Although Hinman argues that the evidence was not sufficient to prove
Lily suffered a serious physical injury on March 12, 13, or 14, Lily’s testimony
of the events beginning the evening of March 12 and ending early morning on
March 13 was sufficient evidence to support the jury finding that he committed
first-degree rape, serious physical injury. The trial court did not err by denying
the motion for a directed verdict.8
III. Admission of the Deputy Clerk’s Penalty Phase Testimony Which Included Testimony Prohibited by KRS 532.055(2)(a) Does Not Warrant Palpable Error Relief
During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony
of a Christian Circuit Court deputy clerk, who read Hinman’s prior criminal
history. The history included a reference to two unnamed charges that had
been dismissed in a Caldwell County misdemeanor marijuana trafficking case;
a Calloway County charge of criminal trespassing that was merged with his
misdemeanor conviction for harassing communications; and a conviction in
McCracken County for contempt of court which stemmed from charges of
failure to yield the right-of-way and failure to wear seatbelts. Hinman points
out that the Commonwealth misinformed the jury as to the seatbelt charge as
8 Citing Campbell v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Ky. 1978) (overruled
by Ray), the Commonwealth addressed Hinman’s third-rape-charge directed verdict argument. The Commonwealth points to Lily’s testimony describing the timeline of the three rapes. Even though this directed verdict argument was not properly preserved, we conclude the evidence on the third rape charge was sufficient to survive a directed verdict motion.
14 the charge was dismissed. He argues that the admission of this evidence
constituted palpable error.
“Kentucky’s Truth-in-Sentencing statute is geared toward providing the
jury with information relevant to arriving at an appropriate sentence for the
particular offender.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 810 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Ky.
1991). KRS 532.055(2)(a) provides that the Commonwealth’s evidence at
sentencing may include the “minimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the
defendant, both felony and misdemeanor” and the “nature of prior offenses for
which he was convicted.” “Nothing in KRS 532.055(2)(a) permits a jury to hear
evidence during the penalty phase of prior charges that have been amended–it
is only permitted to hear evidence of ‘the nature of the prior offenses for which
[the defendant] was convicted.’” Blane v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 140, 152
(Ky. 2012) (abrogated on other grounds by Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d
814 (Ky. 2015)). “[I]t is also well settled that the Commonwealth cannot
introduce evidence of charges that have been dismissed or set aside.” Id.
(quoting Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 365 (Ky. 2004)).
Under RCr 10.26, if an error is found to be palpable and if that
unpreserved error affects the substantial rights of the defendant, the appellate
court may grant appropriate relief if manifest injustice has resulted from the
error. An error is palpable when it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and
readily noticeable.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).
The error must be “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it
15 threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207
S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006).
Hinman cites Stansbury v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 293, 304 (Ky.
2015), to support his argument that the improper introduction of his dismissed
and amended charges is palpable error. In Stansbury, the defendant was
convicted of attempted murder, arson in the first-degree, and for being a
second-degree persistent felony offender. Id. at 297. The Commonwealth
admitted during the sentencing phase exhibits on three convictions. Id. at 303.
Two of the exhibits contained victims’ names. Id. The third exhibit contained a
page showing Stansbury was charged with three counts of wanton
endangerment in the first degree, which were all dismissed as part of a plea
agreement. Id. Because Stansbury’s only prior convictions consisted of two
counts of third-degree burglary and third-degree criminal mischief and one
count each of third-degree assault and third-degree arson, this Court could not
say that introduction of the dismissed wanton endangerment charge, which
was filed in conjunction with the assault and arson charges, did not have an
impact. Id. at 305. The Court concluded likewise as to the introduction of the
identities of local victims with whom the jurors might have had a connection.
Id. We do not find Stansbury comparable to the instant case.
Here, the Commonwealth properly introduced evidence of six prior
convictions, none of which included victim identity. The convictions were
second-degree assault in Christian County; trafficking in marijuana in
Calloway County; harassing communications in Calloway County; fourth-
16 degree assault, child abuse, in Graves County; second-degree burglary in
McCracken County; and contempt in McCracken County. In the face of the
current convictions and these prior convictions, the admission of dismissed
and merged charges which did not implicate violence–two of which were
unidentified charges, one was criminal trespassing, and one was a traffic
regulation violation–could have had little sway on the jury.
Furthermore, Hinman testified on his own behalf. While testifying that
he had already been convicted for the assault of Lily, was remorseful, and was
benefitting from programs while incarcerated, he opened the door for the
Commonwealth’s impeachment of his statement that he had “never
experienced a situation where [he] lost complete control in violence like that
before.” Hinman denied that he had ever been accused of domestic violence
against his ex-wives. The Commonwealth introduced a copy of the emergency
protective order against him as a result of domestic violence toward an ex-wife
and reminded him that he had been convicted of assaulting a child. Lily also
provided a victim impact statement. Although information regarding crimes for
which Hinman was not convicted should not have been introduced into
evidence, we cannot conclude that this was palpable and so manifest that it
threatened the integrity of the judicial process. We cannot say that “there is a
‘substantial possibility’ that the result in the [penalty phase] would have been
different without the error.” Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 349.
17 IV. The Parole Officer’s Testimony Describing Hinman’s Parole Eligibility Was Not Palpable Error
A probation and parole officer testified during the penalty phase. She
testified as to the minimum and maximum possible sentences Hinman could
receive, and his 85% parole eligibility. A bench conference was held after the
officer explained that Hinman would be eligible for meritorious good-time credit
and if accumulated, with the lowest possible sentence of twenty years, he could
be eligible for parole after fifteen or sixteen years. The trial court instructed the
parties to clarify that while Hinman could receive good-time credit, he could
never reduce his sentence below seventeen years. The officer testified to that
effect on cross-examination. The officer further testified that Hinman would be
required to complete a SOTP.
KRS 197.045(4) states:
Any eligible sexual offender, as defined in KRS 197.410, who has not successfully completed the sex offender treatment program as determined by the program director shall not be entitled to the benefit of any credit on his or her sentence. A sexual offender who does not complete the sex offender treatment program for any reason shall serve his or her entire sentence without benefit of sentencing credit, parole, or other form of early release.
Hinman complains that the officer misinformed the jury because testimony was
not elicited explaining that if he failed to complete the SOTP, he would not be
entitled to any credit on his sentence. He argues that the incomplete
information violated his due process rights to have misleading evidence kept
out of his penalty trial. Hinman seeks palpable error review on this final claim
of error.
18 Robinson v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Ky. 2005), is a case in
which the probation and parole officer provided incorrect information regarding
parole eligibility during the sentencing phase. The prosecutor repeated the
incorrect information during closing argument. Id. Concluding that palpable
error occurred, the Court reversed the defendant’s sentence, stating:
The use of incorrect, or false, testimony by the prosecution is a violation of due process when the testimony is material. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 272, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959). This is true irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-1197, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). When the prosecution knows or should have known that the testimony is false, the test for materiality is whether “there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976).
Id. We fail to see how Hinman’s due process rights were violated by the
parole officer’s testimony regarding the SOTP. As noted previously, KRS
532.055(2)(a) provides that the Commonwealth’s evidence during the penalty
phase may include the minimum parole eligibility. The Commonwealth
presented that evidence. As described above, the parole officer’s incorrect
parole eligibility testimony was corrected so the jury heard that based on the
lowest sentencing option of twenty years, Hinman would not be eligible for
parole until he served seventeen years in prison. The minimum parole
eligibility, as defined by statute, is not changed by a defendant’s refusal to
engage in programs from which he earns the benefit of sentence credit. Or
stated another way, parole eligibility testimony provides the jury with
19 knowledge of the minimal amount of time a defendant may serve, not a
guarantee that a defendant will take advantage of earning sentence credit to
reduce the sentence. Here, the fact that a sex offender must complete a SOTP
in order to be released after serving only 85% of his sentence was not material
to the jury’s sentencing decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Christian Circuit Court’s judgment is
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Robert Chung-Hua Yang Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel J. Cameron Attorney General of Kentucky
Lauren Rachel Lewis Assistant Attorney General
20 21