James S. King v. Rebecca Davis Jones

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 6, 2001
• Docket: 11-01-00177-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

11th Court of Appeals

11th Court of Appeals

Eastland, Texas

Opinion

James S. King

Appellant

Vs.                   No. 11-01-00177-CV B Appeal from Callahan County

Rebecca Davis Jones

Appellee

 James S. King has litigated the ownership of a tract of land in Callahan County in two prior lawsuits against the current owners of the property.   King had previously owned the property.  On August 5, 1986, the First National Bank of Baird foreclosed on the property.  The Bank sold the property to James C. Tollett and Henry P. Thompson later that year.  Subsequently, Tollett and Thompson sold the property to Myrtle Ann Cunningham.

In1989, King sued the First National Bank of Baird and its trustees, Fred Gobles, James Eubanks, and Jerry Barron, complaining of the foreclosure on the property.  In 1994, the 42nd District Court granted the Bank=s motion for summary judgment, dismissing King=s cause of action with prejudice.

In 1996, King sued Tollett, Thompson, Cunningham, and the Bank to remove a cloud on title and claiming exemplary damages and punitive damages for unlawful possession of the same property.  Cunningham died, and the property was sold to Michael Jones and his wife, Rebecca Davis Jones.  In 1997,  King sued Russell Wade Holland as executor of Myrtle Ann Cunningham=s estate.  King then amended his petition to sue Michael Jones on December 28, 1998.  The district court granted motions for summary judgment for the Bank in 1996; for Tollett and Thompson and for Cunningham=s estate in May of 1999; and for Michael Jones in August of 1999.

In 2001, King sued again.  This time, King sued Michael=s wife, Rebecca Davis Jones.  Rebecca Davis Jones filed a motion for sanctions against King, and a hearing was held on March 29, 2001.  The court found that King had previously litigated ownership of the property twice before and that King=s current pleadings were frivolous.  The court sanctioned King in the amount of $1,000 and required him to pay Rebecca Davis Jones= attorneys= fees in the amount of $1,000.

King appeals the order for sanctions and asserts the following points of error: (1) the trial court failed to render a final judgment on the merits of the case; (2) the order for sanctions is not supported by the evidence; and (3) there is no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We affirm.

In his first point of error, King argues that the trial court erred in failing to render a final judgment on the merits of the case. The order granting Rebecca Davis Jones= motion for sanctions and dismissing King=s suit is a final judgment.  First National Bank of Houston v. Fox, 39 S.W.2d 1085, 1086 (Tex.1931); Armstrong v. Ablon, 686 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.App. B Dallas 1984, no writ).   King=s first point is overruled.

In his second point of error, King urges that the order for sanctions is unsupported by evidence.  TEX.R.CIV.P. 13 authorizes trial courts to impose sanctions against an attorney, a represented party, or both, who filed a pleading that is either: (1) groundless and brought in bad faith; or (2) groundless and brought to harass.  Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129, 136 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 2000, no pet=n); Emmons v. Purser, 973 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.App. B Austin 1998, no pet=n); Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1994, writ den=d); see also Rule 13; GTE Communications Systems Corporation v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730-31 (Tex.1993).  AGroundless@ means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.  Rule 13; GTE Communications Systems Corporation v. Tanner, supra at 730.  The trial court abuses its discretion by imposing Rule 13 sanctions for claims that are not groundless.  Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, supra at 139.

The imposition of Rule 13 sanctions is within the discretion of the trial court; thus, we set aside its decision only on a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.  GTE Communications Systems Corporation v. Tanner, supra at 730; Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, supra at 135. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.  Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. den=d, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, supra at 135.

Rule 13 states that A[n]o sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.@  When imposing Rule 13 sanctions, the trial court is required to make particularized findings of good cause justifying the sanctions.  The failure to comply with this clear directive is an abuse of discretion.  Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, supra at 135; Tarrant County v. Chancey, 942 S.W.2d 151, 155-56 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1997, no writ); Friedman and Associates, P.C. v. Beltline Road, Ltd., 861 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1993, writ dism=d agr.); Zarsky v. Zurich Management, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); GTE Communications Systems Corp. v. Curry, 819 S.W.2d 652, 653-54 (Tex.App. - San Antonio 1991, no writ); Kahn v. Garcia, 816 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).

In the order granting Rebecca Davis Jones= motion for sanctions, the trial court found that King had no claim to the property in question, that King filed the current suit in bad faith, and that his lawsuit was groundless.

Additionally, in the findings of fact requested by King, the trial court found as follows: (1) that King=s suit was groundless and brought in bad faith; (2) that King=s lawsuit was false; (3) that King was not the owner of the property at issue; (4) that King=s suit had no basis in fact; (5) that King=s suit was not warranted by existing good law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (6) that there was no reasonable probability that King would prevail in the litigation against Rebecca Davis Jones; and (7) that prior litigation on the same subject matter had previously been brought by King and this suit was an attempt to re-litigate the same claims previously determined.

The trial court=s decision to sanction King for bringing a groundless lawsuit was reasonable in view of the history of the litigation surrounding the property at issue.  King has sued every owner of the property at issue since he lost title by foreclosure on August 5, 1986.  The sanctions awarded are supported by the evidence.  King=s second point of error is overruled.

In his third point of error, King asserts that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the findings of fact.  The trial court can take judicial notice of documents in the records of other cause numbers.  TEX.R.EVID. 201; Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 25 S.W.3d 863, 872 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet=n).  Therefore, the trial court could take notice of prior adjudications of the ownership of the property between King and subsequent owners.  Likewise, an appellate court may take judicial notice of its judgments and records in the same or related cases.  Rule 201; Izaguirre v. Texas Employers= Insurance Association, 749 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 1988, writ den=d).

A review of prior judicial proceedings involving these parties, as well as the property at issue, provides a basis for the trial court=s decision to sanction King in the current proceeding.  On two prior occasions, King has sued the owners of property which belonged to him prior to its foreclosure asserting that it was still his property.  In the first case, the Texas Supreme Court refused appellant=s application for writ of error.  In the second case, the supreme court denied his appeal.  On February 5, 2001, King filed the current lawsuit against Rebecca Davis Jones, asserting that she wrongfully entered his property and refused to surrender possession on demand.  Because King=s lack of ownership of the property has previously been determined on two occasions and because we have taken judicial notice of the records of these determinations, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support the findings of fact.  King=s third point is overruled.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

PER CURIAM

December 6, 2001

Do not publish.  See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.3(b).

Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and

Wright, J., and McCall, J.