RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-1308-MR
JAMES RAMSEY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00077
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: James David Ramsey appeals from the judgment of conviction
and sentence of the Fulton Circuit Court entered on September 14, 2022. After our
review, we affirm.
On July 14, 2022, Ramsey was indicted on one count of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug
paraphernalia. He was charged as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO I).
He entered into a plea agreement. In exchange for his unconditional guilty plea to first-degree trafficking and possession of drug paraphernalia, the Commonwealth
offered to dismiss the PFO I count. The Commonwealth agreed to recommend a
seven-year sentence for trafficking and a twelve-month sentence for possession of
drug paraphernalia. Ramsey accepted the plea offer and pleaded guilty. He
appeared in court by Zoom. Ultimately, the PFO I charge was dismissed, and the
court sentenced Ramsey in accordance with the Commonwealth’s recommendation
on September 14, 2022. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Ramsey argues that the conviction and sentence must be
vacated because his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Additionally, he contends that his physical absence from the courtroom invalidated
the proceedings.
In the plea agreement, Ramsey expressly waived many constitutional
rights -- including his right to appeal. Nevertheless, he appeals, arguing that his
plea failed to meet constitutional standards. He claims that it was not entered
knowingly because the trial court neglected to ensure that he understood that by
pleading guilty, he would give up his right not to incriminate himself and his right
to appeal his conviction. Additionally, he complains that the trial court never
inquired of defense counsel regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the terms and
consequences of the agreement.
-2- A waiver of the right to appeal a guilty plea does not extinguish all
issues. See Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. 2010). Some
questions survive the waiver; i.e., whether the plea was made knowingly and
voluntarily and in accordance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). We address this issue first.
We are persuaded that Ramsey’s plea was made knowingly and
voluntarily. In his motion to enter the guilty plea, Ramsey acknowledged that he
had reviewed the indictment and discussed with his attorney the facts relevant to
the charges and any possible defenses. He indicated that he understood that he
could plead either guilty or not guilty to the charges. Additionally, the motion
provided as follows:
I further understand the Constitution guarantees to me the following rights:
(a) The right not to testify against myself;
(b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at which I would be represented by counsel and the Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
(c) The right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses called to testify against me;
(d) The right to produce any evidence, including attendance of witnesses, in my favor;
(e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court.
-3- I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these rights.
In the motion, Ramsey indicated that he understood the nature of the proceedings
and the matters contained in the motion. He declared that his attorney had fully
explained his constitutional rights to him and that his guilty plea was made “freely,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”
The plea agreement that Ramsey executed also shows that he was
informed of and that he understood his constitutional rights. He and his counsel
signed the agreement, which provided, in part, as follows:
4. I understand that I may plead “NOT GUILTY” to any charge against me, in which event the Constitution would guarantee me the following rights:
(b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at which I would be represented by counsel and the Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
(c) The right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses called to testify against me;
(d) The right to produce any evidence, including attendance of witnesses, in my favor;
I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these rights.
-4- Again, Ramsey indicated that he understood the charges against him,
the possible defenses to them, the penalties he faced, and the fact that the
Commonwealth was recommending a sentence in exchange for his plea.
Additionally, Ramsey acknowledged in the agreement that “no one, including my
attorney, has promised me any other benefit in return for my guilty plea. . . .”
Furthermore, Ramsey’s counsel executed a certificate confirming that
Ramsey “understands the allegations contained in the indictment.” Counsel
indicated that he had fully discussed with Ramsey the charges against him and any
possible defenses. He said that he believed Ramsey fully understood.
Additionally, counsel indicated that he had reviewed the Commonwealth’s plea
offer with Ramsey -- as well as the motion to enter his guilty plea. Counsel
certified that he believed Ramsey understood the documents. Counsel represented
to the court that he had “fully explained” Ramsey’s constitutional rights to him and
that he believed that Ramsey understood them. Finally, Counsel declared that to
the best of his knowledge and belief, Ramsey’s guilty plea was made freely,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
The trial court confirmed that Ramsey understood that he was waiving
many of his constitutional rights by pleading guilty. Ramsey notes in his brief that
the court did not specifically reiterate the waiver of the right to appeal or the
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Ramsey claims that his plea was invalid
-5- because the trial court failed to advise him that he was waiving his right against
self-incrimination and his right to appeal. However, Boykin “does not require
separate enumeration of each right waived.” Fontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d
514, 516 (6th Cir. 1975). Where the defendant has a full understanding of what the
plea means and its consequences, it is valid. Grigsby, supra.
Ramsey offers no authority for the proposition that the trial court is
required to inform him specifically that he was waiving his right to appeal and his
right against self-incrimination. In fact, guilty pleas are routinely upheld even
where specific rights are not enumerated by the trial court during the plea hearing.
Id.
We have reviewed the following factors: the representations that
Ramsey made in the plea agreement and the motion to plead guilty; the
certification of counsel concerning Ramsey’s understanding and decision to plead
guilty; and the trial court’s inquiry during the plea hearing and its express finding
regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the proceedings.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-1308-MR
JAMES RAMSEY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00077
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: James David Ramsey appeals from the judgment of conviction
and sentence of the Fulton Circuit Court entered on September 14, 2022. After our
review, we affirm.
On July 14, 2022, Ramsey was indicted on one count of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug
paraphernalia. He was charged as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO I).
He entered into a plea agreement. In exchange for his unconditional guilty plea to first-degree trafficking and possession of drug paraphernalia, the Commonwealth
offered to dismiss the PFO I count. The Commonwealth agreed to recommend a
seven-year sentence for trafficking and a twelve-month sentence for possession of
drug paraphernalia. Ramsey accepted the plea offer and pleaded guilty. He
appeared in court by Zoom. Ultimately, the PFO I charge was dismissed, and the
court sentenced Ramsey in accordance with the Commonwealth’s recommendation
on September 14, 2022. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Ramsey argues that the conviction and sentence must be
vacated because his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Additionally, he contends that his physical absence from the courtroom invalidated
the proceedings.
In the plea agreement, Ramsey expressly waived many constitutional
rights -- including his right to appeal. Nevertheless, he appeals, arguing that his
plea failed to meet constitutional standards. He claims that it was not entered
knowingly because the trial court neglected to ensure that he understood that by
pleading guilty, he would give up his right not to incriminate himself and his right
to appeal his conviction. Additionally, he complains that the trial court never
inquired of defense counsel regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the terms and
consequences of the agreement.
-2- A waiver of the right to appeal a guilty plea does not extinguish all
issues. See Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. 2010). Some
questions survive the waiver; i.e., whether the plea was made knowingly and
voluntarily and in accordance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). We address this issue first.
We are persuaded that Ramsey’s plea was made knowingly and
voluntarily. In his motion to enter the guilty plea, Ramsey acknowledged that he
had reviewed the indictment and discussed with his attorney the facts relevant to
the charges and any possible defenses. He indicated that he understood that he
could plead either guilty or not guilty to the charges. Additionally, the motion
provided as follows:
I further understand the Constitution guarantees to me the following rights:
(a) The right not to testify against myself;
(b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at which I would be represented by counsel and the Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
(c) The right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses called to testify against me;
(d) The right to produce any evidence, including attendance of witnesses, in my favor;
(e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court.
-3- I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these rights.
In the motion, Ramsey indicated that he understood the nature of the proceedings
and the matters contained in the motion. He declared that his attorney had fully
explained his constitutional rights to him and that his guilty plea was made “freely,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”
The plea agreement that Ramsey executed also shows that he was
informed of and that he understood his constitutional rights. He and his counsel
signed the agreement, which provided, in part, as follows:
4. I understand that I may plead “NOT GUILTY” to any charge against me, in which event the Constitution would guarantee me the following rights:
(b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at which I would be represented by counsel and the Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
(c) The right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses called to testify against me;
(d) The right to produce any evidence, including attendance of witnesses, in my favor;
I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these rights.
-4- Again, Ramsey indicated that he understood the charges against him,
the possible defenses to them, the penalties he faced, and the fact that the
Commonwealth was recommending a sentence in exchange for his plea.
Additionally, Ramsey acknowledged in the agreement that “no one, including my
attorney, has promised me any other benefit in return for my guilty plea. . . .”
Furthermore, Ramsey’s counsel executed a certificate confirming that
Ramsey “understands the allegations contained in the indictment.” Counsel
indicated that he had fully discussed with Ramsey the charges against him and any
possible defenses. He said that he believed Ramsey fully understood.
Additionally, counsel indicated that he had reviewed the Commonwealth’s plea
offer with Ramsey -- as well as the motion to enter his guilty plea. Counsel
certified that he believed Ramsey understood the documents. Counsel represented
to the court that he had “fully explained” Ramsey’s constitutional rights to him and
that he believed that Ramsey understood them. Finally, Counsel declared that to
the best of his knowledge and belief, Ramsey’s guilty plea was made freely,
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
The trial court confirmed that Ramsey understood that he was waiving
many of his constitutional rights by pleading guilty. Ramsey notes in his brief that
the court did not specifically reiterate the waiver of the right to appeal or the
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Ramsey claims that his plea was invalid
-5- because the trial court failed to advise him that he was waiving his right against
self-incrimination and his right to appeal. However, Boykin “does not require
separate enumeration of each right waived.” Fontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d
514, 516 (6th Cir. 1975). Where the defendant has a full understanding of what the
plea means and its consequences, it is valid. Grigsby, supra.
Ramsey offers no authority for the proposition that the trial court is
required to inform him specifically that he was waiving his right to appeal and his
right against self-incrimination. In fact, guilty pleas are routinely upheld even
where specific rights are not enumerated by the trial court during the plea hearing.
Id.
We have reviewed the following factors: the representations that
Ramsey made in the plea agreement and the motion to plead guilty; the
certification of counsel concerning Ramsey’s understanding and decision to plead
guilty; and the trial court’s inquiry during the plea hearing and its express finding
regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the proceedings. After our consideration of
these elements of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is no doubt that
Ramsey’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. Ramsey was clearly aware
that he was waiving his constitutional rights by entering the plea of guilty and that
he would be sentenced to seven-years’ imprisonment. In exchange, he knew that
the Commonwealth would recommend that sentence and dismiss the PFO I charge.
-6- This knowledge satisfies the requirements of Boykin. Consequently, his conviction
and sentence cannot be vacated on this basis.
Next, Ramsey argues that his conviction must be vacated because his
physical absence from the courtroom at the time of entry of his guilty plea and
sentencing rendered the proceedings illegal. He suggests that the trial court’s
decision to conduct the proceedings remotely rendered them invalid.
Ramsey concedes that this argument was not preserved for our
review. Nevertheless, he requests that we consider whether his physical absence
from the courtroom constitutes palpable error pursuant to the standard established
by our RCr1 10.26.
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by . . . an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error. Id.
We cannot conclude that manifest injustice has been shown.
“Manifest injustice is found if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the proceeding.” McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d
100, 112 (Ky. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ramsey cannot show and
the record does not reflect how his physical presence during the proceedings rather
1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-7- than his remote appearance would have resulted in a different outcome. See Miller
v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857 (Ky. 2013); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 60
S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001). Consequently, Ramsey is not entitled to relief under
our palpable-error standard.
We affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the
Fulton Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sarah D. Dailey Daniel Cameron Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Christopher Henry Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-