James R. Dutton v. School Zone Safety Program

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: March 31, 2025
• Docket: A25I0174
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________ March 31, 2025

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A25I0174. DUTTON v. SCHOOL ZONE SAFETY PROGRAM.

As more fully detailed in the attached opinion, the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals of Georgia hereby DENIES the application for appellate review.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 03/31/2025 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk. FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

April 1, 2025

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25I0174. DUTTON v. SCHOOL ZONE SAFETY PROGRAM.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

James R. Dutton brought a proceeding in state court to challenge a civil penalty

he received under OCGA § 40-14-18. That Code section authorizes civil monetary

penalties for speeding violations in school zones by on the basis of photographically

recorded images — without a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.

The Code section puts the burden on the recipient of a citation to contest it. But

it does not specify how such a challenge should be styled. Dutton styled his challenge

a “special demurrer and motion to dismiss.” In that pleading, he asserted various

constitutional challenges to the statute and its enforcement against him. At a hearing, the trial court rejected Dutton’s constitutional challenges and,

after receiving evidence, held that Dutton was liable on the citation and imposed a

$100 fine. The trial court later entered a written order denying the “special demurrer

motion to dismiss” and granted Dutton’s petition for a certificate of immediate review

of that order.

Dutton then filed an application for discretionary appeal with the Supreme

Court of Georgia, but the Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the

arguments raised in Dutton’s application addressed the constitutionality of the

enforcement of the statute, rather than the constitutionality of the statute itself. The

Court transferred the application to this court and Dutton filed a supplemental

application in which he clarified that he is challenging the constitutionality of OCGA

§ 40-14-18.

As an initial matter, we note that although Dutton styled his filing a “special

demurrer and motion to dismiss” and sought a certificate of immediate review of the

trial court’s order denying that motion, his application is not, in fact, interlocutory in

nature. He has been adjudicated liable and ordered to pay a fine on the citation, and

it appears that nothing remains pending below. Under OCGA § 40-14-18 (f), he is

2 entitled to seek appellate review of the trial court’s ruling under the procedures for

discretionary appeals set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35. While OCGA § 40-14-18 does not

describe how a pleading contesting a citation should be styled, we recommend using

“petition for review” to avoid confusion on this issue.

But Dutton has not convinced us that discretionary appellate review is

warranted in this case. Notwithstanding the arguments in his supplemental application

to this court, we cannot consider any challenges to the constitutionality of OCGA §

40-14-18 itself; we are bound by our Supreme Court’s determination that this case

concerns only challenges to the constitutionality of the statute’s enforcement. And

Dutton’s arguments on that issue are not persuasive.

Application denied. Hodges and Pipkin, JJ., concur.