James Player v. University of Idaho

Ninth Circuit

James Player v. University of Idaho

683 F. App'x 608

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 20, 2017

Docket15-35933

StatusUnpublished

This text of 683 F. App'x 608 (James Player v. University of Idaho) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

James Player v. University of Idaho, 683 F. App'x 608 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

James W. Player appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments arising from defendants’ restriction on his access to the University of Idaho campus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Player’s claims against the University of Idaho and the other defendants in their official capacities because the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

To the extent that Player sued any defendant in his individual capacity, the claims are barred by qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because the district court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, Player had no right to a jury trial.

We reject as without merit Player’s contention that Magistrate Judge Bush and District Judge Lodge should have recused themselves from this case solely because they graduated from the University of Idaho. See United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman, 145 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that recusal is not required when judge has “minimal alumni contacts” with a defendant university).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

James W. Player appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments arising from defendants’ restriction on his access to the University of Idaho campus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Player’s claims against the University of Idaho and the other defendants in their official capacities because the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

To the extent that Player sued any defendant in his individual capacity, the claims are barred by qualified immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because the district court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, Player had no right to a jury trial.

We reject as without merit Player’s contention that Magistrate Judge Bush and District Judge Lodge should have recused themselves from this case solely because they graduated from the University of Idaho. See United States ex rel. Hochman v. Nackman, 145 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that recusal is not required when judge has “minimal alumni contacts” with a defendant university).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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683 F. App'x 608, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/james-player-v-university-of-idaho-ca9-2017.

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