STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1329
James Paul Aery, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed May 20, 2024 Affirmed Gaïtas, Judge
Beltrami County District Court File No. 04-CR-18-3347
James Paul Aery, Bemidji, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen, Assistant County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
A petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation
under the Minnesota Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 611.362-.368 (2022), when the petitioner’s conviction for actual possession of an
unlawful item was reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required
suppression of the evidence. OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In 2020, this court reversed the drug-possession conviction of appellant James Paul
Aery because a search that revealed drugs in his pocket and his subsequent arrest violated
his constitutional rights. Following the reversal of his conviction, Aery petitioned the
district court for an order declaring him eligible for exoneration compensation under
MIERA. The district court denied Aery’s petition, determining that Aery was not eligible
for exoneration compensation because his conviction was reversed on a legal ground and
not based on his factual innocence. Aery now challenges the district court’s denial of his
petition.
We conclude that a petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking
exoneration compensation under MIERA when the petitioner’s conviction for actual
possession of an unlawful item was reversed solely on the ground that an unconstitutional
search required suppression of the evidence. Because we reversed Aery’s conviction based
on the unconstitutionality of the search that revealed the drugs in his pocket, he was not
exonerated as defined by MIERA. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Aery’s
FACTS
Aery was a passenger in the backseat of a car that police stopped for a traffic
violation. During the stop, police officers saw suspected drugs in plain view near the
driver’s seat. They asked the driver and the other people in the car, including Aery, to exit
the car. While police officers searched the car, one officer reported that Aery put his hand
2 in his pocket. According to that officer, when Aery removed his hand from his pocket, a
small bag containing a trace amount of a crystalline substance fell to the ground. Based on
this observation, the officer handcuffed Aery and searched him. In Aery’s pants, the officer
found three glass smoking pipes and another small bag, which contained
methamphetamine.
Following this incident, respondent State of Minnesota charged Aery with fifth-
degree possession of methamphetamine. Aery moved to suppress the evidence, asserting
that it was discovered during an unlawful search. The district court denied Aery’s
suppression motion, ruling that the officers had probable cause to arrest Aery for
constructively possessing the drugs observed near the driver and that the search of Aery’s
person was a lawful search incident to his arrest. Following a stipulated-evidence court
trial, the district court found Aery guilty and sentenced him to prison.
Aery appealed his conviction to this court, challenging the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress. We reversed Aery’s conviction, determining that the
search of his pants violated the federal and state constitutions, which required suppression
of the evidence. State v. Aery, No. A19-1845, 2020 WL 7134872, at *1 (Minn. App.
Dec. 7, 2020).
Aery then petitioned the district court for an order determining that he was eligible
for compensation under MIERA. The district court observed that Aery’s conviction was
reversed because the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and
not because Aery was “factually innocent” or “on grounds consistent with innocence.”
3 Thus, the district court concluded that Aery “[did] not meet the statutory definition of
‘exonerated’” and was not eligible for compensation.
Aery appeals.
ISSUE
Was Aery exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation under
MIERA when this court reversed his drug-possession conviction on the ground that the
police discovered the drugs in his pocket during an unconstitutional search?
ANALYSIS
In this case, we consider whether a petitioner who was convicted for actual
possession of an unlawful item is eligible for exoneration compensation under MIERA
when the conviction is later reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required
suppression of the item. MIERA provides that formerly convicted people may obtain
compensation after exoneration if they meet specified criteria. Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-
.368. It “establishes a multistep process for receiving compensation.” Back v. State, 992
N.W.2d 363, 366 (Minn. 2023). Whether an individual has been exonerated is the
threshold determination under MIERA. Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Minn.
2022). A petitioner seeking exoneration compensation must first obtain a district court
order “under section 590.11 determining that the person is entitled to compensation based
on exoneration.” Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subd. 1; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2022).
Section 590.11 defines the term “exonerated.” Relevant here, the statute provides
that a person is “exonerated” if a court “reverse[s]” the person’s conviction “on grounds
4 consistent with innocence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). “[G]rounds consistent
with innocence” means the petitioner was either:
(1) exonerated, through a pardon or sentence commutation, based on factual innocence; or
(2) exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.
Id., subd. 1(c)(1), (2).
In his petition for exoneration compensation, Aery alleged that the reversal of his
conviction on appeal constituted an exoneration under section 590.11. But the district court
determined that the reversal of Aery’s conviction did not amount to an exoneration because
Aery’s conviction was not reversed “on grounds consistent with innocence.”
Aery, who is self-represented on appeal, challenges the district court’s
determination. He argues that he is factually innocent because his arrest and the subsequent
search of his person were unlawful. Whether a petitioner meets the definition of an
“exonerated” person for the purpose of MIERA presents a question of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. Buhl v. State, 922 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App.
2019).
In Kingbird, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the term “factual innocence”
as used in section 590.11. 973 N.W.2d at 641-42. Kingbird, who was convicted for
unlawfully possessing a firearm based on his possession of a BB gun, sought exoneration
compensation after the supreme court held that a BB gun is not a firearm, and his conviction
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STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1329
James Paul Aery, petitioner, Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Filed May 20, 2024 Affirmed Gaïtas, Judge
Beltrami County District Court File No. 04-CR-18-3347
James Paul Aery, Bemidji, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen, Assistant County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
A petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation
under the Minnesota Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA), Minn. Stat.
§§ 611.362-.368 (2022), when the petitioner’s conviction for actual possession of an
unlawful item was reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required
suppression of the evidence. OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
In 2020, this court reversed the drug-possession conviction of appellant James Paul
Aery because a search that revealed drugs in his pocket and his subsequent arrest violated
his constitutional rights. Following the reversal of his conviction, Aery petitioned the
district court for an order declaring him eligible for exoneration compensation under
MIERA. The district court denied Aery’s petition, determining that Aery was not eligible
for exoneration compensation because his conviction was reversed on a legal ground and
not based on his factual innocence. Aery now challenges the district court’s denial of his
petition.
We conclude that a petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking
exoneration compensation under MIERA when the petitioner’s conviction for actual
possession of an unlawful item was reversed solely on the ground that an unconstitutional
search required suppression of the evidence. Because we reversed Aery’s conviction based
on the unconstitutionality of the search that revealed the drugs in his pocket, he was not
exonerated as defined by MIERA. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Aery’s
FACTS
Aery was a passenger in the backseat of a car that police stopped for a traffic
violation. During the stop, police officers saw suspected drugs in plain view near the
driver’s seat. They asked the driver and the other people in the car, including Aery, to exit
the car. While police officers searched the car, one officer reported that Aery put his hand
2 in his pocket. According to that officer, when Aery removed his hand from his pocket, a
small bag containing a trace amount of a crystalline substance fell to the ground. Based on
this observation, the officer handcuffed Aery and searched him. In Aery’s pants, the officer
found three glass smoking pipes and another small bag, which contained
methamphetamine.
Following this incident, respondent State of Minnesota charged Aery with fifth-
degree possession of methamphetamine. Aery moved to suppress the evidence, asserting
that it was discovered during an unlawful search. The district court denied Aery’s
suppression motion, ruling that the officers had probable cause to arrest Aery for
constructively possessing the drugs observed near the driver and that the search of Aery’s
person was a lawful search incident to his arrest. Following a stipulated-evidence court
trial, the district court found Aery guilty and sentenced him to prison.
Aery appealed his conviction to this court, challenging the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress. We reversed Aery’s conviction, determining that the
search of his pants violated the federal and state constitutions, which required suppression
of the evidence. State v. Aery, No. A19-1845, 2020 WL 7134872, at *1 (Minn. App.
Dec. 7, 2020).
Aery then petitioned the district court for an order determining that he was eligible
for compensation under MIERA. The district court observed that Aery’s conviction was
reversed because the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and
not because Aery was “factually innocent” or “on grounds consistent with innocence.”
3 Thus, the district court concluded that Aery “[did] not meet the statutory definition of
‘exonerated’” and was not eligible for compensation.
Aery appeals.
ISSUE
Was Aery exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation under
MIERA when this court reversed his drug-possession conviction on the ground that the
police discovered the drugs in his pocket during an unconstitutional search?
ANALYSIS
In this case, we consider whether a petitioner who was convicted for actual
possession of an unlawful item is eligible for exoneration compensation under MIERA
when the conviction is later reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required
suppression of the item. MIERA provides that formerly convicted people may obtain
compensation after exoneration if they meet specified criteria. Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-
.368. It “establishes a multistep process for receiving compensation.” Back v. State, 992
N.W.2d 363, 366 (Minn. 2023). Whether an individual has been exonerated is the
threshold determination under MIERA. Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Minn.
2022). A petitioner seeking exoneration compensation must first obtain a district court
order “under section 590.11 determining that the person is entitled to compensation based
on exoneration.” Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subd. 1; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2022).
Section 590.11 defines the term “exonerated.” Relevant here, the statute provides
that a person is “exonerated” if a court “reverse[s]” the person’s conviction “on grounds
4 consistent with innocence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). “[G]rounds consistent
with innocence” means the petitioner was either:
(1) exonerated, through a pardon or sentence commutation, based on factual innocence; or
(2) exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.
Id., subd. 1(c)(1), (2).
In his petition for exoneration compensation, Aery alleged that the reversal of his
conviction on appeal constituted an exoneration under section 590.11. But the district court
determined that the reversal of Aery’s conviction did not amount to an exoneration because
Aery’s conviction was not reversed “on grounds consistent with innocence.”
Aery, who is self-represented on appeal, challenges the district court’s
determination. He argues that he is factually innocent because his arrest and the subsequent
search of his person were unlawful. Whether a petitioner meets the definition of an
“exonerated” person for the purpose of MIERA presents a question of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. Buhl v. State, 922 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App.
2019).
In Kingbird, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the term “factual innocence”
as used in section 590.11. 973 N.W.2d at 641-42. Kingbird, who was convicted for
unlawfully possessing a firearm based on his possession of a BB gun, sought exoneration
compensation after the supreme court held that a BB gun is not a firearm, and his conviction
was reversed on this ground. Id. at 642 (relying on State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485
5 (Minn. 2016)). In considering whether Kingbird was exonerated for the purpose of section
590.11, the supreme court observed that “‘factual innocence’ is the state of being not guilty
of a crime (innocence) but only when the reason is restricted to or based on facts (factual).”
Id. Applying that interpretation of the term, the supreme court concluded that the change
in the law that resulted in the reversal of Kingbird’s conviction did not make Kingbird
factually innocent. Id. It noted that the facts of Kingbird’s case “did not change;” it
remained undisputed that Kingbird possessed a BB gun when he was not eligible to possess
one. Id. at 642-43. Rather, Kingbird’s case was reversed based on an issue of “legal
significance”—a change or error in the law. Id. at 642. Given this circumstance, the
supreme court concluded that Kingbird was not exonerated for the purpose section 590.11.
Id.at 643.
In Back, the supreme court again noted the distinction between a reversal of a
conviction based on factual innocence and one based on “an issue of legal significance.”
992 N.W.2d at 369. Back argued that she was exonerated when the supreme court reversed
her culpable-negligence-manslaughter conviction on direct appeal because the state had
failed to establish that she owed a duty of care to the shooter or the victim, which was an
element of the offense. Id. at 364-65. But the supreme court determined that Back was
not entitled to exoneration compensation because the reversal of her conviction “turn[ed]
on an issue of legal significance” and there was no new “evidence of factual innocence.”
Id. at 369.
Against this legal backdrop, we consider whether Aery was exonerated for the
purpose of section 590.11. Aery’s conviction was reversed. But it was not reversed “on
6 grounds consistent with innocence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). The conviction
was reversed because Aery was subjected to an unconstitutional search and the drugs found
in his pocket should have been suppressed. When a conviction for actual possession of an
unlawful item was reversed on the ground of an unconstitutional search that required
suppression of the evidence, the reversal was based on an issue of legal significance.
Notwithstanding the legal error in Aery’s case, Aery was not factually innocent. He had
illegal drugs in his pocket. And Aery has not established any new facts suggesting that he
is factually innocent. Thus, we conclude that Aery was not exonerated as defined by
section 590.11.
DECISION
Aery was not exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation
under MIERA because his drug-possession conviction was reversed based on an issue of
legal significance and not based on his factual innocence. Because Aery was not eligible
for exoneration compensation, the district court did not err in denying his petition for
exoneration compensation.
Affirmed.