James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor v. The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company

235 F.2d 942, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4565
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJuly 20, 1956
Docket168, Docket 23739
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 235 F.2d 942 (James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor v. The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor v. The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company, 235 F.2d 942, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4565 (2d Cir. 1956).

Opinion

WATERMAN, Circuit Judge.

This action, involving the validity under § 7(e) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(e), of guaranteed wage contracts of the so-called Belo type, was brought by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. (hereafter “Hartford”) from violating the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed the Secretary’s complaint on the ground that defendant’s guaranteed wage contracts were not in violation of § 7(e) of the Act, and the Secretary appeals.

Hartford is a Connecticut corporation engaged in the casualty insurance business, primarily the insuring of steam boilers, pressure vessels, and machinery. It employs approximately 600 inspectors, whose duty it is to determine the initial and continuing suitability of boilers, machinery, etc. for insurance. The duties of these inspectors necessitate irregular hours of work, typically fluctuating between 35 and 50 hours per week. Since 1950 Hartford has paid its inspectors under individual guaranteed wage contracts providing for an hourly rate of pay for the first 40 hours in each work week, time and one-half for each hour over 40, and a weekly guarantee *943 of an amount equivalent to the amount payable if 60 hours were actually worked. Each inspector was notified by a form letter accompanying his contract that it was not contemplated that he would have to work more than 60 hours in any work week, and each employee was required to get company authorization before doing so. In actual practice, only one quarter of 1% of the work weeks over a two-year period exceeded 60 hours. The District Court found that the hours worked “were expected to fluctuate but to be kept below 60 hours in all but the most exceptional cases.”

The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether a guaranteed wage contract complies with § 7(e) of the Act, 29 U. S.C.A. § 207(e), even though the employees subject to that contract do not work a number of hours in excess of the guarantee period specified in the contract in a “substantial proportion” or “significant number” of work weeks. 1 The Secretary, relying primarily on the judicial interpretation of “regular rate” prior to 1949, when the Act was extensively revised and § 7(e) added, contends that the phrase “regular rate of pay” in § 7(e) impliedly incorporates the “substantial proportion” requirement; Hartford disagrees. To resolve the issue, we must refer to the words of the statute, its purpose and history, and the cases construing it.

The basic overtime pay requirement of the Act is contained in § 7(a). 2 It expresses the employer’s obligation in terms of a duty to pay for overtime not less than one and one-half times “the regular rate at which he is employed.” The term “regular rate” was not defined in the original Act, nor was any reference made to guaranteed wage contracts. This absence of precise statutory criteria necessarily left to the courts the problem of giving content to the statutory language and of defining the limits within which employers and employees might establish basic and overtime rates by contract. The Department of Labor, which has consistently opposed guaranteed wage plans, initially took the position that any wage plan which did not reflect the actual hours worked in each workweek was invalid. However, this position was rejected by the Supreme Court in Walling v. A. H. Belo Corporation, 1942, 316 U. S. 624, 62 S.Ct. 1223, 86 L.Ed. 1716, and guaranteed wage contracts of the type now sanctioned by § 7(e) were held valid. Walling v. A. H. Belo Corporation, supra; Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 1947, 331 U.S. 17, 67 S. Ct. 1056, 91 L.Ed. 1312. Other Supreme Court cases, while accepting Belo as an exception to the usual rule, tended to narrow its application. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 1944, 323 U. S. 37, 65 S.Ct. 11, 89 L.Ed. 29; Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 1945, 325 U.S. 419, 65 S.Ct. 1242, 89 L.Ed. 1705; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corporation, 1945, 325 U.S. 427, 65 S.Ct. 1250, 89 L.Ed. 1711; 149 Madison Ave. Corporation v. Asselta, 1947, 331 U.S. 199, 67 S.Ct. 1178, 91 L.Ed. 1432; Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 1948, 334 U.S. 446, 68 S.Ct. 1186, 92 L.Ed. 1502. The Courts of Appeals, con *944 fronted by an exception of uncertain scope, evolved different criteria with the result that each case turned “pretty much on its particular facts.” McComb v. Roig, 1 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 726, 727; cf. McComb v. Pacific & Atlantic Shippers Ass’n, 7 Cir., 1949, 175 F.2d 411; McComb v. Utica Knitting Co., 2 Cir., 1947, 164 F.2d 670.

It was against this background of uncertainty that Congress, as part of an extensive revision of the Act in 1949, enacted the present § 7(e). 3 Section 7 (e) represents a codification of the previous case law only to the extent that it constitutes an express recognition of the validity of guaranteed wage contracts, limited in their use to employees who must work irregular hours and subject to the requirement that the contract be a “bona fide individual contract” or “an agreement made as a result of collective bargaining.” The only express limitation on the contract guarantee of pay is that it be “for not more than sixty hours.” There is no requirement expressed in the section that there be any sort of relation between that guarantee and the number of hours actually worked.

The Secretary, however, contends that the use of the term “regular rate” in § 7(e) was meant to incorporate the pre-1949 judicial interpretation of that term, and that these pre-1949 cases establish that specified hourly rates are not “regular rates” unless they have actually received significant or substantial use in determining amounts to be paid to employees. Since the specified hourly rates are only operative when the employees work hours in excess of those guaranteed in the contract, this is an assertion that a guaranteed wage plan can only be valid if the employees who are subject to the contract work a number of hours in excess of the guarantee period in a “substantial proportion” or “significant number” of workweeks. For the reasons stated below, we think the Secretary’s contention that Congress intended to impose a “significant number of workweeks” test on guaranteed wage plans, which in all other respects comply with § 7(e), is an incorrect interpretation of the Act.

First,

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235 F.2d 942, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4565, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/james-p-mitchell-secretary-of-labor-v-the-hartford-steam-boiler-ca2-1956.