JAMES P. LAUREUS v. CAROL MICI & Another.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedMarch 5, 2025
Docket24-P-0046
StatusUnpublished

This text of JAMES P. LAUREUS v. CAROL MICI & Another. (JAMES P. LAUREUS v. CAROL MICI & Another.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JAMES P. LAUREUS v. CAROL MICI & Another., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-46

JAMES P. LAUREUS

vs.

CAROL MICI1 & another.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, James P. Laureus, appeals from a judgment of

the Superior Court dismissing his complaint for declaratory

relief on the ground that it failed to state a claim on which

relief could be granted, Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass.

754 (1974). Concluding that the plain language of the St. 2018,

c. 72, § 16, requires that G. L. c. 94C, § 32H1/2, is

inapplicable to the plaintiff's sentence, we affirm.

"We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo."

Cubberley v. Commerce Ins. Co., 495 Mass. 289, 292 (2025),

1Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction.

2Joann M. Lynds, Superintendent of the Northeastern Correctional Center. quoting Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676

(2011). "In doing so, we accept 'as true all well-pleaded facts

alleged in the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences

therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determining whether the

allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to

relief.'" Vita v. New England Baptist Hosp., 494 Mass. 824, 832

(2024), quoting Marsh v. Massachusetts Coastal R.R., 492 Mass.

641, 645-646 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2519 (2024).

The plaintiff's claim in his complaint is premised on the

proposition that G. L. c. 94C, § 32H1/2, governing the earning

of good conduct credits by criminal defendants serving minimum

mandatory sentences, applies to sentences for crimes committed

before the effective date of St. 2018, c. 72, which created that

section. "Where, as here, we are called upon to construe a

statute, we begin with its plain language, which, if

unambiguous, is 'conclusive as to legislative intent.'" Matter

of the Trusts Under the Will of Kline, 495 Mass. 1, 5 (2024),

quoting Six Bros., Inc. v. Brookline, 493 Mass. 616, 622 (2024).

The statutory text here states, "Section 32H1/2 of chapter 94C

of the General Laws shall apply to any sentence for an offense

committed after the effective date of this act." St. 2018,

c. 72, § 16. As this statutory language is unambiguous, we must

apply it as written.

2 To this, the plaintiff repairs to G. L. c. 4, § 6, which

provides a presumption that the repeal of a statute shall act

prospectively only, with certain exceptions. These exceptions

are irrelevant, because the statute is irrelevant. There is no

need to repair to the presumption in G. L. c. 4, § 6, because

the plain language of the statute provides that it acts

prospectively only. A finding that the presumptions in G. L.

c. 4, § 6, were "repugnant to the context of the same statute"

would do nothing but eliminate the force of the presumption.

G. L. c. 4, § 6. The presumption, however, has no force because

the question is controlled by explicit statutory text, not

presumption. Cf. Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 325, 331-

333 (2019) (considering whether presumption applies to statute

containing no provision regarding retroactivity); Commonwealth

v. Didas, 471 Mass. 1, 9-10 (2015) (applying presumption to part

of statute containing no provision regarding retroactivity);

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 555-561 (2013) (same).

3 Accordingly, the motion judge properly dismissed the complaint.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand & Walsh, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: March 5, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Didas
26 N.E.3d 732 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2015)
Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc.
458 Mass. 674 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2011)
Commonwealth v. Bradley
998 N.E.2d 774 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2013)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth
122 N.E.3d 532 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2019)

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JAMES P. LAUREUS v. CAROL MICI & Another., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/james-p-laureus-v-carol-mici-another-massappct-2025.