James O'Hagan v. Northwest Farm Credit Services

Ninth Circuit

James O'Hagan v. Northwest Farm Credit Services

670 F. App'x 545

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 4, 2016

Docket14-35142

StatusUnpublished

This text of 670 F. App'x 545 (James O'Hagan v. Northwest Farm Credit Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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James O'Hagan v. Northwest Farm Credit Services, 670 F. App'x 545 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

James J. O’Hagan appeals pro se from the district court’s decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting Northwest Farm Credit Services, FLCA’s motion for contempt based on violations of the automatic stay. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We. review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the same standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s decision. Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by finding O’Hagan in contempt for violating the automatic stay because O’Hagan openly admitted to taking possession of estate property and refused to cease state court litigation in an effort to obtain an interest in the property. See Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (a party seeking an order of contempt has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnor violated the automatic stay (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying O’Hagan’s recusal request because O’Hagan did not demonstrate any basis for recusal. See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 721 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013) (a bankruptcy court judge must recuse him or herself when “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be *546 questioned” (citation omitted)); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

O’Hagan’s pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

James J. O’Hagan appeals pro se from the district court’s decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting Northwest Farm Credit Services, FLCA’s motion for contempt based on violations of the automatic stay. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We. review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the same standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s decision. Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by finding O’Hagan in contempt for violating the automatic stay because O’Hagan openly admitted to taking possession of estate property and refused to cease state court litigation in an effort to obtain an interest in the property. See Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (a party seeking an order of contempt has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnor violated the automatic stay (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying O’Hagan’s recusal request because O’Hagan did not demonstrate any basis for recusal. See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 721 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013) (a bankruptcy court judge must recuse him or herself when “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be *546 questioned” (citation omitted)); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

O’Hagan’s pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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670 F. App'x 545, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/james-ohagan-v-northwest-farm-credit-services-ca9-2016.

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