NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-569
JAMES MORETTI
vs.
LAURIE A. BRUMGARD.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, James Moretti, appeals from an order
allowing the motion of the defendant, Laurie A. Brumgard, for a
directed verdict on Moretti's unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit claims. 1 We affirm.
Background. We summarize the core facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See Nickerson v. Flynn-Morris, 103
Mass. App. Ct. 703, 704 (2024). In 2007, Moretti and Brumgard
met, and Brumgard moved in with Moretti about five months later.
In October 2009, Brumgard bought a home in Wakefield. Moretti's
name was not on the title, and he did not contribute to the down
1 Moretti also appeals the judgment on the jury verdict on his conversion claim, speculating that the jury might have found that Brumgard converted his property if the judge had not granted the motion for a directed verdict on his unjust enrichment claim. Because we conclude that the judge did not err by directing the verdict, we do not reach this argument. payment on the home. Moretti contributed $1,000 per month to
the mortgage payments for seven to eight months. 2 Brumgard paid
over $150,000 toward the mortgage during the time they lived at
the Wakefield home.
Moretti orally promised that he would renovate the
Wakefield home to compensate for Brumgard's financial
investment. He did not formalize this arrangement because it
was motivated by his love for Brumgard and desire to make the
Wakefield property "a nice home for [her] to live in." He
renovated parts of the home, including replacing the front
walkway, re-flooring the living room, and installing new
cabinets. All building materials were purchased with Brumgard's
credit card. Moretti testified that he reimbursed Brumgard for
the cost but did not specify an amount or produce any
documentary evidence to buttress his testimony.
In January 2013, Brumgard sold the Wakefield home and
bought a home in Middleton for about $525,000. Moretti was not
listed on either the purchase and sale agreement or the mortgage
settlement statement for the Middleton home. Brumgard made the
down payment, at least in part, using proceeds from the sale of
2 Moretti testified that he paid up to $8,000, but he did not produce any documentary evidence and Brumgard testified he paid nothing. We recite the evidence in the light most favorable to Moretti.
2 the Wakefield home. Moretti made some renovations to the
Middleton home, including painting, landscaping, and re-tiling.
In or around 2015, Moretti and Brumgard's relationship
became strained. Brumgard eventually moved to Canada for work,
while Moretti continued to live at the Middleton home without
paying rent until the relationship ended in 2018. Moretti
retrieved some of his personal property from the Middleton home
and left other personal property.
Discussion. "In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict,
we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and disregard that favorable to the moving
party." Nickerson, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 708. We evaluate
"whether anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived,
any combination of circumstances could be found from which a
reasonable inference could be made in favor of the [nonmovant]."
Id., quoting Parsons v. Ameri, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 105 (2020).
"A claim in quantum meruit is closely related to a claim
for unjust enrichment." Sugarman & Sugarman, P.C. v. Shapiro,
102 Mass. App. Ct. 816, 820 n.7 (2023), citing Salamon v. Terra,
394 Mass. 857, 859 (1985). However, they are two distinct
causes of action with different requirements. We agree with the
trial judge that the evidence was insufficient to support either
claim.
3 1. Unjust enrichment. "Unjust enrichment occurs when a
party retains the property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice or equity and good conscience" (quotation
and citation omitted). Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass. App. Ct.
622, 625 (2017). "The plaintiff must establish not only that
the defendant received a benefit, but also that such a benefit
was unjust. Whether the benefit was unjust turns on the
reasonable expectations of the parties." (Quotations and
citations omitted.) Id. Further,
"[i]f two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship resembling marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to which the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form of property or services, the person making such contributions has a claim in restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment upon the dissolution of the relationship."
Id., quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 28(1) (2011).
Here, Moretti argues that his renovations to the two homes
were "substantial contributions" that more than compensated
Brumgard for the value of his living in the homes, thus unjustly
enriching her at his expense. He claims that his renovations
resulted in a higher sale price for the Wakefield home, as well
as an increase in value for the Middleton home. However, the
evidence does not support Moretti's assertions.
4 Moretti presented no evidence to establish either the value
of his labor or what he spent out-of-pocket for the materials,
purchased on Brumgard's credit cards, used to renovate the
homes. Nor did he present competent evidence that any
appreciation in value to either home was due to his
contributions. Instead, he merely offered photographs of the
homes and his own opinion of the Middleton home's value. On the
other hand, there was uncontroverted evidence that Brumgard
spent an estimated $450,000 on mortgages, utilities, and
building materials for the two homes. Even if we accept that
Moretti paid $1,000 per month for the first eight months at the
Wakefield home, he otherwise lived rent free for roughly eight
years in Brumgard's homes. Moreover, there was no evidence that
Moretti expected to be compensated for any services he rendered.
To the contrary, Moretti testified repeatedly that he renovated
Brumgard's properties because he "love[d] her," not because he
thought that the renovations entitled him to a stake in the
home. 3 Cf. Bonina, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 622-626 (plaintiff
professional contractor contributed "countless hours" of his own
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-569
JAMES MORETTI
vs.
LAURIE A. BRUMGARD.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, James Moretti, appeals from an order
allowing the motion of the defendant, Laurie A. Brumgard, for a
directed verdict on Moretti's unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit claims. 1 We affirm.
Background. We summarize the core facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See Nickerson v. Flynn-Morris, 103
Mass. App. Ct. 703, 704 (2024). In 2007, Moretti and Brumgard
met, and Brumgard moved in with Moretti about five months later.
In October 2009, Brumgard bought a home in Wakefield. Moretti's
name was not on the title, and he did not contribute to the down
1 Moretti also appeals the judgment on the jury verdict on his conversion claim, speculating that the jury might have found that Brumgard converted his property if the judge had not granted the motion for a directed verdict on his unjust enrichment claim. Because we conclude that the judge did not err by directing the verdict, we do not reach this argument. payment on the home. Moretti contributed $1,000 per month to
the mortgage payments for seven to eight months. 2 Brumgard paid
over $150,000 toward the mortgage during the time they lived at
the Wakefield home.
Moretti orally promised that he would renovate the
Wakefield home to compensate for Brumgard's financial
investment. He did not formalize this arrangement because it
was motivated by his love for Brumgard and desire to make the
Wakefield property "a nice home for [her] to live in." He
renovated parts of the home, including replacing the front
walkway, re-flooring the living room, and installing new
cabinets. All building materials were purchased with Brumgard's
credit card. Moretti testified that he reimbursed Brumgard for
the cost but did not specify an amount or produce any
documentary evidence to buttress his testimony.
In January 2013, Brumgard sold the Wakefield home and
bought a home in Middleton for about $525,000. Moretti was not
listed on either the purchase and sale agreement or the mortgage
settlement statement for the Middleton home. Brumgard made the
down payment, at least in part, using proceeds from the sale of
2 Moretti testified that he paid up to $8,000, but he did not produce any documentary evidence and Brumgard testified he paid nothing. We recite the evidence in the light most favorable to Moretti.
2 the Wakefield home. Moretti made some renovations to the
Middleton home, including painting, landscaping, and re-tiling.
In or around 2015, Moretti and Brumgard's relationship
became strained. Brumgard eventually moved to Canada for work,
while Moretti continued to live at the Middleton home without
paying rent until the relationship ended in 2018. Moretti
retrieved some of his personal property from the Middleton home
and left other personal property.
Discussion. "In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict,
we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and disregard that favorable to the moving
party." Nickerson, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 708. We evaluate
"whether anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived,
any combination of circumstances could be found from which a
reasonable inference could be made in favor of the [nonmovant]."
Id., quoting Parsons v. Ameri, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 105 (2020).
"A claim in quantum meruit is closely related to a claim
for unjust enrichment." Sugarman & Sugarman, P.C. v. Shapiro,
102 Mass. App. Ct. 816, 820 n.7 (2023), citing Salamon v. Terra,
394 Mass. 857, 859 (1985). However, they are two distinct
causes of action with different requirements. We agree with the
trial judge that the evidence was insufficient to support either
claim.
3 1. Unjust enrichment. "Unjust enrichment occurs when a
party retains the property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice or equity and good conscience" (quotation
and citation omitted). Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass. App. Ct.
622, 625 (2017). "The plaintiff must establish not only that
the defendant received a benefit, but also that such a benefit
was unjust. Whether the benefit was unjust turns on the
reasonable expectations of the parties." (Quotations and
citations omitted.) Id. Further,
"[i]f two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship resembling marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to which the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form of property or services, the person making such contributions has a claim in restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment upon the dissolution of the relationship."
Id., quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 28(1) (2011).
Here, Moretti argues that his renovations to the two homes
were "substantial contributions" that more than compensated
Brumgard for the value of his living in the homes, thus unjustly
enriching her at his expense. He claims that his renovations
resulted in a higher sale price for the Wakefield home, as well
as an increase in value for the Middleton home. However, the
evidence does not support Moretti's assertions.
4 Moretti presented no evidence to establish either the value
of his labor or what he spent out-of-pocket for the materials,
purchased on Brumgard's credit cards, used to renovate the
homes. Nor did he present competent evidence that any
appreciation in value to either home was due to his
contributions. Instead, he merely offered photographs of the
homes and his own opinion of the Middleton home's value. On the
other hand, there was uncontroverted evidence that Brumgard
spent an estimated $450,000 on mortgages, utilities, and
building materials for the two homes. Even if we accept that
Moretti paid $1,000 per month for the first eight months at the
Wakefield home, he otherwise lived rent free for roughly eight
years in Brumgard's homes. Moreover, there was no evidence that
Moretti expected to be compensated for any services he rendered.
To the contrary, Moretti testified repeatedly that he renovated
Brumgard's properties because he "love[d] her," not because he
thought that the renovations entitled him to a stake in the
home. 3 Cf. Bonina, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 622-626 (plaintiff
professional contractor contributed "countless hours" of his own
3 Moretti asserts that the judge erroneously imposed an additional element on his unjust enrichment claim because the judge referred to Moretti's lack of expectation of compensation. We conclude that the judge applied the correct standard and properly considered Moretti's expectations at the time he rendered his services. See Bonina, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 625.
5 labor and over $250,000 in renovations, maintenance, and
mortgage payments).
We therefore discern no record evidence to support a
reasonable inference that Brumgard retained Moretti's property
"against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and
good conscience" (citation omitted). Santagate v. Tower, 64
Mass. App. Ct. 324, 329 (2005).
2. Quantum meruit. To recover under a theory of quantum
meruit, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he conferred a
measurable benefit upon the defendant; (2) he reasonably
expected compensation from the defendant; and (3) the defendant
accepted the benefit with the knowledge, actual or chargeable,
of the plaintiff's reasonable expectation. Finard & Co., LLC v.
Sitt Asset Mgt., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 229 (2011).
Here, there was evidence that Moretti conferred a benefit
on Brumgard. Although Brumgard paid professional contractors
and landscapers who contributed to many of the renovations,
Moretti himself renovated parts of the homes, including
landscaping, painting, and tiling. However, as discussed above,
Moretti did not expect to be compensated for his labor, rather
he did the work because he loved Brumgard and wanted the homes
they shared to be "nice." To the extent Brumgard accepted the
benefit of Moretti's contributions to the homes, there was no
expectation of monetary compensation for his work of which she
6 should have been aware. Thus, Moretti could not recover under a
theory of quantum meruit.
The judge did not err by allowing the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict on the unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit claims.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Hand, Hershfang & Brennan, JJ. 4),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: April 3, 2024.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.