James Michael Greason v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: February 14, 2023
• Docket: 0406221
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges Humphreys, AtLee and Raphael Argued at Williamsburg, Virginia

JAMES MICHAEL GREASON MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0406-22-1 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. FEBRUARY 14, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS C. Peter Tench, Judge Designate1

(Joshua A. Goff; Goff Voltin, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

Suzanne Seidel Richmond, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; David M. Uberman, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a jury trial, the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News (“trial court”)

convicted James Michael Greason of rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-61, and incest, in violation of

Code § 18.2-366. On appeal, Greason contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 1 Judge Timothy S. Fisher presided over the jury trial, while Judge Tench presided over sentencing. I. BACKGROUND2

In the summer of 2019, M.G. was eighteen years old and living with her father, Greason, in

the city of Newport News. M.G. had recently moved to Newport News from Maryland to get to

know Greason, who was, for the most part, absent from her life. Greason lived in a one-bedroom

apartment with his girlfriend Robin. On the evening of June 28, 2019, Greason, Robin, M.G., and

Greason’s friend Steven were at the apartment drinking alcohol, which Greason provided. Feeling

“a little bit tipsy” and “wobbly,” M.G. went inside to lie down.

Although she normally slept on the couch, M.G. went to Greason’s bedroom and laid on the

bed because Steven was already asleep on the couch. The room was separated from the rest of the

apartment only by a curtain. M.G. fell asleep and later awoke to find Greason touching the bottom

of her legs. When M.G. realized that her father was touching her, she tried to push him away, but

Greason held M.G.’s hand to her head and pulled down her shorts. M.G. pulled them back up, but

Greason kept trying to remove them. M.G. tried to get away from him, but Greason “would just

grip on [her] hair more.” M.G. reached toward Greason’s desk to try to find something with which

to hit him as they struggled. Eventually, Greason successfully pulled M.G.’s shorts down and

penetrated her vagina with his penis. In disbelief, M.G. “froze,” and remained “completely silent.”

Afterwards, M.G. ran to the living room. Steven testified that M.G. “came out of the

bedroom screaming, [‘]my daddy just raped me.[’]” M.G.’s demeanor was “[c]rying and

panicked.” Steven decided to take M.G. to a hotel where they waited for M.G.’s mother and

grandmother to pick her up. Before they left, Greason told M.G. it was “not his fault” and

complained that M.G. should “never [have] been in his bed.”

2 “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016)). -2- Forensic nurse examiner Kacey Jenkins examined M.G. the morning after the assault. M.G.

was angry, disappointed, and “kind of disheveled in a way.” After conducting a thorough interview

with M.G., Jenkins collected physical evidence.

Newport News Police Detective Stacy Heusterberg met M.G. at the hospital. Heusterberg

obtained a search warrant for Greason’s DNA and executed it the same day. At trial, forensic

scientist Brenden Graney testified as an expert in forensic biology. Graney compared Greason’s

DNA sample with the evidence recovered from M.G.’s exam. Graney concluded that Greason

could not be eliminated as a contributor to sperm samples taken from M.G.’s vagina and thighs.

Greason testified that on the night of the offense he went to bed at around 7:30 or 8:00 p.m.

When he went to bed, Robin and Steven were still drinking. He did not see M.G. drink. He stated

that he woke up with someone “on top of [him]” and he assumed it was Robin because she was the

only female who should be in his bedroom. He testified that he did not know it was M.G. despite

the fact that Robin was shorter than and weighed more than M.G., and unlike M.G., who had short

hair, Robin’s hair was very long. When he realized the person on top of him was not Robin,

Greason pushed the person off and was “kind of stunned” to discover it was M.G. He explained

that when M.G. said he raped her, he responded that “there was no possible way.” Greason denied

wanting any sexual contact with M.G. On cross-examination, Greason also denied that his penis

entered M.G.’s vagina.

The jury found Greason guilty of both offenses. He received a total sentence of 66 years in

prison, with 22 years suspended. Greason appeals, arguing that the evidence of his guilt was

insufficient because M.G. was an inherently incredible witness and the jury should have accepted

his alternative hypothesis of innocence.

-3- II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Code § 18.2-366(B) defines incest, in part, as “[a]ny person who engages in sexual

intercourse with his daughter.” Code § 18.2-61 defines rape as any person “ha[ving] sexual

intercourse with a complaining witness . . . against the complaining witness’s will, by force, threat

or intimidation . . . or . . . through the use of the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or physical

helplessness.” Greason does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove any specific

element of these offenses; rather, he contends that M.G.’s testimony was inherently incredible as a

matter of law and that the jury wrongfully rejected his claim of innocence. 3

3 Although Greason’s assignment of error contends that M.G.’s testimony was inherently incredible, he offers no law or argument on that standard. Rule 5A:20(e) (An appellant’s brief must contain “argument (including principles of law and authorities) relating to each assignment -4- It is well-settled that determining the credibility of the witnesses “is within the exclusive

province of the jury, which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses

as they testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (quoting Lea v.

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “Where credibility issues are resolved by the jury

in favor of the Commonwealth, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly

wrong.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 711, 718 (2010). This Court must accept the jury’s

resolution on the credibility of a witness’s testimony “unless, ‘as a matter of law, the testimony is

inherently incredible.’” Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 759 (2019) (quoting Nobrega

v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 508, 518 (2006)). “To be ‘incredible,’ testimony ‘must be either so

manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to be false by

objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’”

Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006) (quoting Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va.

412, 414 (1968)). “In other words, this Court cannot say a witness’ testimony is inherently

incredible unless it is ‘so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.’”

Lambert, 70 Va. App. at 759 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 315 (2011)).

In this case, M.G.’s testimony, accepted as true, supported the jury’s conclusion that

Greason had sexual intercourse with his daughter against her will by force, threat, or intimidation.

There was nothing inherently incredible about M.G.’s version of events. She described an act of

sexual intercourse, accomplished through the use of force, when Greason, after having provided her

with alcohol, woke M.G. up in the middle of the night, held her hand against her head, gripped her

of error.”). “[W]hen a party’s ‘failure to strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 5A:20(e)’ is significant, ‘the Court of Appeals may . . . treat [an assignment of error] as waived.’” Parks v. Parks, 52 Va. App. 663, 664 (2008) (quoting Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 520 (2008)). Nevertheless, because this issue is inextricable from Greason’s other argument regarding his purportedly reasonable hypothesis of innocence, we assume without deciding that the omission is not significant and is thus not waived. -5- by her hair, and, after a struggle, successfully pulled her shorts down and penetrated her vagina with

his penis. While the Commonwealth’s case largely rested upon M.G.’s testimony, there was other

corroborating evidence. Specifically, the fact that Greason’s sperm was found in M.G.’s vagina and

on her thigh corroborated that sexual intercourse occurred. Furthermore, the fact that M.G.

immediately ran from the room crying and panicked, reported the rape to Steven, and then retreated

to a hotel for safety corroborated the nonconsensual nature of the intercourse. In finding Greason

guilty, the jury clearly believed M.G. It is well-settled that “‘[t]here can be no relief’ in this Court if

a witness testifies to facts ‘which, if true, are sufficient’ to support the conviction ‘[i]f the trier of the

facts’ bases its decision ‘upon that testimony.’” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626

(2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 56 Va. App. at 718-19). Moreover, “the

testimony of a single witness, if found credible by the trial court and not found inherently incredible

by this Court, is sufficient to support a conviction.” McCary v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 27, 41

(2001).

Although Greason acknowledges the fact that “it is ordinarily in the province of the jury to

decide which evidence to believe,” he argues that his testimony offered the jury a reasonable

hypothesis of innocence that was not excluded by the evidence. Specifically, Greason emphasizes

that there was no door separating the bedroom from the living room and that the distance from

where the sexual encounter took place was only six to ten feet away from where Steven was

sleeping. He also notes that although M.G. and Steven were close, she did not call out to him for

help during the encounter. Additionally, Greason claims that Robin’s close proximity would have

reduced the likelihood that he would engage in a sexual encounter with his daughter. Greason

concludes that his version of events was more believable than M.G.’s.

It is true that “[w]hen facts are equally susceptible to more than one interpretation, one of

which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the trier of fact cannot arbitrarily adopt an

-6- inculpatory interpretation.” Case v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 14, 23 (2014) (quoting Moody v.

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706 (1998)). “However, the Commonwealth need only exclude

reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring from the

imagination of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277

(2004)). Moreover, “[i]n its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to

disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to

conceal his guilt.” Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011) (quoting Marable

v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10 (1998)).

Greason’s hypothesis of innocence was not, as he contends, reasonable or believable.

The scenario he describes would require the finder of fact to believe that he thought he was

having sexual intercourse with Robin, his live-in girlfriend, who was heavier than M.G. and had

very long hair and that he only realized it was M.G. when he reached up and felt her short hair.

Moreover, although Greason adamantly denied the act of intercourse, his sperm was found inside

M.G.’s vagina, significantly compromising his credibility. The fact that M.G. did not call for

help or otherwise alert the other occupants does not make her testimony inherently incredible.

M.G. was only eighteen years old and had been drinking heavily and was intoxicated before going

to bed. On appeal, we do not decide which witnesses were truthful. Rather, we consider only

“whether a reasonable [fact finder], upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected [the

appellant’s] theories in his defense and found him guilty” of the offenses beyond a reasonable

doubt. Emerson, 43 Va. App. at 277 (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson,

265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)).

In short, M.G.’s testimony, which was corroborated by other facts contained in the record,

proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Greason committed the offenses of rape and incest, and it

-7- was reasonable for the jury to reject Greason’s hypothesis of innocence and to conclude that he was

lying to conceal his guilt. We find no error in the judgment of the trial court.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that M.G.’s testimony was not inherently incredible, and the Commonwealth’s

evidence was competent and sufficient to prove the elements of each offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Thus, we affirm Greason’s convictions.

Affirmed.

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