COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 2-07-287-CR NO. 2-07-288-CR NO. 2-07-289-CR
JAMES MICHAEL DEAN APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
------------
FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
Appellant James Michael Dean appeals four forty-five-year sentences
imposed by a jury following his guilty pleas and convictions for four counts of
aggravated robbery. In his sole point, appellant contends that the trial court
erred by admitting unduly prejudicial punishment evidence against him. See
Tex. R. Evid. 403. We affirm.
1 … See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. Background Facts
Near midnight on October 25, 2006, appellant and another individual
went to Moe’s Short Stop, a Hurst convenience store. When appellant arrived,
store employee Rajesh Bajracharya was outside loading a truck. Appellant
charged at Rajesh with a knife, knocked him down, and held the knife about
four inches from Rajesh’s face as appellant’s partner entered the store and took
some money. After appellant’s partner left the store, he and appellant searched
Rajesh’s pockets and appellant took Rajesh’s wrist watch. Four days later,
appellant and his partner went to another convenience store in Bedford, Texas,
where they robbed Chhitis Bhattachani.2
On the evening of November 2, 2006, appellant returned to Moe’s Short
Stop, wearing black clothing, gloves, and sunglasses. He walked behind the
counter and pointed a knife at Nikesh Shrestha, who was helping a friend run
the store. While doing so, appellant commanded Nikesh to “get down, bitch,
or else I am going to stab you.” While appellant continued to point the knife at
Nikesh, his partner took money from the store’s register. During the robbery,
appellant also stole Nikesh’s backpack, his cell phone, and some of his cash.
2 … Because Chhitis did not testify, specific details regarding this incident are absent from the record.
2 Three days later, appellant went to the Quick Track convenience store in
Bedford, again wearing black clothing, gloves, and sunglasses. While holding
a knife, appellant quickly walked around the counter and ordered store clerk
Santosh Gyawali to kneel. After Santosh complied with appellant’s command,
appellant took Santosh’s money, his wallet, and his cell phone, as well as some
of the store’s cigarettes before leaving. The Hurst and Bedford police
departments conducted a joint investigation and determined that appellant
participated in each of the incidents. They charged appellant with four counts
of aggravated robbery.3 At trial, after the parties conducted voir dire and the
State read appellant’s indictments, appellant pled guilty to each of the four
charges. In exchange for appellant’s guilty pleas, the State waived the habitual
offender enhancement paragraphs contained in the indictments, rendering
3 … The four robbery charges were indicted in three separate cases and each indictment contained a habitual offender enhancement paragraph. However, the cases were tried concurrently.
3 appellant’s range of punishment at five to 99 years or life.4 See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a), 29.03(b) (Vernon 2003).
Before testimony began on the issue of punishment, appellant’s counsel
alerted the trial court that the State planned to introduce photographs of
appellant’s tattoos, which connected appellant to racist organizations and
beliefs. Appellant’s counsel argued that the photographs were inadmissible
because they were “not relevant to the proceeding” and they were “overly
inflammatory and prejudicial and not necessary to the conduct of the case or
to anything the State [was] required to prove.” The State responded by
contending that the photographs demonstrated appellant’s negative character
traits and his affiliation with a prison organization that was associated with
criminal activities. The trial court deferred its ruling on the photographs until
they were actually offered in evidence.
4 … Because the waiver of the enhancement paragraphs affected only the minimum amount of punishment appellant could have received, rather than capping the maximum amount, no “plea bargain” occurred for the purposes of Rule 25.2(a)(2) of the rules of appellate procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); see Taplin v. State, 78 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); Perez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (noting that “[o]nly a plea bargain that incorporates an agreed recommendation as to punishment and is accepted by the court” triggers jurisdictional restrictions under Rule 25.2(a)(2)).
4 During appellant’s trial on punishment, Hurst Police Detective Chad
Woodside (who had previously served on a gang task force) testified about
white supremacist gang activity. Specifically, Detective Woodside testified that
he was familiar with the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), that the KKK was “usually
involved in crime,” including violent crime, and that the KKK’s typical targets
were minorities or individuals from other countries. Detective Woodside also
testified about an organization called the White Knights, which he explained
was an offshoot of the KKK. He testified that the White Knights also engaged
in violent criminal activity.5
Detective Woodside then stated that both of these groups associate
themselves with particular symbols, such as swastikas, and also associate
themselves with specific historical figures, such as Adolf Hitler. He related that
members of these groups commit violent activities while incarcerated.
During a voir dire examination while the jury was excused, the State then
questioned Detective Woodside about photographs of appellant’s tattoos, which
5 … Over an objection by appellant’s counsel, the trial court admitted a completed Tarrant County jail classification form (based on answers given by appellant during the book-in process) which indicated that appellant was a member of the White Knights and that appellant had problems with “blacks and Mexicans.” Testimony indicated that the White Knights are a gang that was formed in the Texas prison system. The classification form also indicated that appellant was a daily user of methamphetamine and that he had previously served time in prison.
5 depicted, among other images, a swastika and the faces of Adolf Hitler, George
Rockwell (the founder of the American Nazi Party), and Reinhard Heydrich (one
of the architects of the Holocaust and the man considered by Hitler to be his
successor). Detective Woodside admitted that while the tattoos indicated that
appellant had negative character traits, they did not specifically identify
appellant as a member of a particular white supremacist group, and a person
could have such tattoos without belonging to any particular group. Detective
Woodside also conceded that he was not an expert on the philosophical
principles of white supremacist groups and their connection with criminal
activity.
After the conclusion of the voir dire examination, appellant’s counsel
argued that the photographs were an avenue of political expression, that they
were insufficient to establish appellant’s link to any particular criminal
organization, and that there was no evidence that appellant’s robberies were
racially motivated. Appellant’s counsel therefore contended that admission of
the photographs would punish appellant for exercising his constitutional rights
and would unduly prejudice him.6 The State responded by asserting that the
6 … Despite arguing that the photographs should be excluded, Appellant’s counsel stipulated to the admissibility of some white supremacist literature appellant had possessed. Appellant’s counsel also stipulated to the admissibility of “pen packs” which established that appellant had previously
6 photographs related to appellant’s general reputation and his character and
were therefore admissible in the punishment phase of a trial. After hearing
these arguments, the trial court overruled appellant’s objection to the
photographs and granted appellant a running objection to all evidence relating
to the tattoos. 7
In its closing argument, the State contended that appellant should have
received a life sentence because, in part, his tattoos demonstrated that he had
a hateful, malicious character. In response, appellant’s counsel asserted that
appellant had joined the White Knights in prison as an avenue of survival, that
there was no evidence that the crimes he had pled guilty to were racially
motivated, and that appellant had exercised his constitutional rights in
maintaining his white supremacist beliefs. After deliberating, the jury convicted
appellant of each of the four robbery charges (as instructed by the trial court
pursuant to appellant’s guilty pleas), and then sentenced him to forty-five years’
confinement on each charge.
been convicted of six various felony offenses. 7 … Several other photographs were later admitted in evidence which further depicted appellant’s tattoos. For instance, one of these photographs demonstrated that “White Knights” was tattooed on appellant's left forearm, and another exhibited a burning cross and three hooded KKK Klansmen, with one of the Klansmen holding a noose and another holding a shotgun.
7 Admission of Tattoo Photographs
In his sole point, appellant asserts that his sentences should be reversed
because the trial court erred in its decision to admit the photographs of his
tattoos.
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an
abuse of discretion standard. Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); Stevens v. State, 234 S.W.3d 748, 786 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2007, no pet.). Under this standard, if “the ruling was correct on any
theory of law applicable to the case, in light of what was before the trial court
at the time the ruling was made,” then we must uphold the trial court’s
decision. Martin, 173 S.W.3d at 467. The trial court’s ruling must stand as
long as it was “at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id.
The trial court’s evidentiary decision must be reasonable in light of all
relevant facts. Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). However, the “mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within
his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a
similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has
occurred.” Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Further, even if erroneous, the admission or exclusion of evidence is a
non-constitutional error governed by rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of
8 Appellate Procedure if the trial court’s ruling merely offends the rules of
evidence. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Matz v. State, 21 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2000, pet. ref’d) (op. on remand). 8 Therefore, the error must be ignored
unless it had “a substantial, injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.”
See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Matz, 21
S.W.3d at 912. In other words, we must uphold the trial court’s judgment if
we have a “fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but
a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998). Also, improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible
error if the same facts are proved by other properly admitted evidence. Reyes
v. State, 84 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Matz, 21 S.W.3d at
912 (holding that the trial court’s admission of videotaped testimony was not
a reversible error where live testimony established the same facts).
When a defendant pleads guilty before a jury, the proceeding becomes a
unitary trial where the state may introduce evidence allowing the jury to
intelligently exercise discretion in the assessment of punishment. Carroll v.
8 … Rule 44.2(b) states that any error in a criminal case other than constitutional error that “does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).
9 State, 975 S.W.2d 630, 631–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Evidence of the
defendant’s criminal record, his character, and his reputation is admissible. See
Basaldua v. State, 481 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see also
Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), petition for cert.
filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. July 24, 2008) (No. 08-6624) (explaining that
when a “defendant pleads guilty to a jury, the jury need not return any verdict
of guilty,” and that the case “simply proceeds with a unitary punishment
hearing”).
Evidence is relevant to punishment where it is “helpful to the jury in
determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a particular
case.” Rodriguez v. State, 203 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The
evidence that may be admitted in punishment “is a function of policy rather
than a question of logical relevance,” because “[d]eciding what punishment to
assess is a normative process, not intrinsically factbound.” Sunbury v. State,
88 S.W.3d 229, 233–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (adding that one of the policy
goals is to provide “complete information for the jury to tailor an appropriate
sentence”).
Appellant argues that the admission of the photographs depicting his
tattoos improperly directed the jurors to consider his ethnicity, wrongly focused
on his membership in a gang as a sentencing factor, punished him for exercising
10 his First Amendment rights, and unduly prejudiced him by inflaming the jury.
He therefore contends that the photographs should have been excluded. In
support of his argument that the jury was improperly directed to consider his
ethnicity, appellant cites section 3(a)(2) of article 37.07 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(2) (Vernon
Supp. 2008). That provision states that “evidence may not be offered by the
state to establish that the race or ethnicity of the defendant makes it likely that
the defendant will engage in future criminal conduct.” Id.
However, the record in this case does not indicate that the photographs
of appellant’s tattoos were offered to establish that appellant would engage in
future criminal conduct merely because he was white. Instead, at the time the
photographs were offered and during closing argument, the State contended
that the photographs established that appellant was connected with criminally
violent groups, that because of this connection he could engage in future
criminal activities, and that the tattoos reflected negatively on appellant’s
general reputation and character. Because the photographs did not focus on
appellant’s race but on his negative character as demonstrated by his beliefs
and associations, no violation of section 3(a)(2) occurred. Id.; see also Hicks
v. State, Nos. 05-04-01664-CR, 05-04-01665-CR, 05-04-01666-CR,
05-04-01667-CR, and 05-04-01668-CR, 2005 WL 3540844, at *3 (Tex.
11 App.—Dallas Dec. 28, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(upholding the trial court’s admission of photographs depicting white
supremacist tattoos because they were offered “as evidence of appellant’s
selfishness, and his impact on the victims, not as evidence to establish that his
race would make him more likely to engage in future criminal conduct”).
Next, appellant asserts that the admission of the photographs wrongfully
focused on his membership in white supremacist gangs as a sentencing factor,
relying on Beasley v. State, 902 S.W.2d 452, 455–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
In Beasley, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that where evidence
indicates that a gang engages in criminal activities and has a negative
reputation in the community, then evidence that a defendant is a member of the
gang is admissible at punishment because it relates to the defendant’s
character. Id. at 456. Specifically, the court held that such evidence is
admissible as long as the jury is (1) provided with evidence of the defendant’s
gang membership, (2) provided with evidence of the character and reputation
of the gang, (3) not required to determine if the defendant committed the bad
acts or misconduct, and (4) only asked to consider the reputation or character
of the accused. Id. at 457.
Here, the jury was provided evidence of appellant’s membership in the
White Knights through one of his tattoos which said “White Knights,” through
12 other tattoos commonly associated with the White Knights, and through a jail
classification form which indicated his membership. Testimony (by two former
gang task force officers) established that the White Knights organization is a
prison gang that engages in violent criminal activity against racial minorities.
As we have noted, the State submitted the photographs for the purpose of
relating appellant’s affiliation with the White Knights to his alleged hateful
character, rather than demonstrating that appellant had participated in a
particular act attributed to the gang. For these reasons, the trial court properly
admitted evidence of appellant’s membership in the White Knights. See id.;
Jones v. State, 944 S.W .2d 642, 653 (Tex. Crim App. 1996), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 832 (1997) (noting that evidence of gang membership is “relevant to
show the character of the defendant”); Stevenson v. State, 963 S.W.2d 801,
803 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref’d) (per curiam).
Appellant further argues that admission of the photographs violated his
First Amendment right to not have his associations and expressions admitted
against him at sentencing. For this contention, he cites Dawson v. Delaware,
503 U.S. 159, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). In Dawson, a defendant convicted of
capital murder contended that he had a constitutional right forbidding
consideration in his sentencing of any evidence concerning beliefs or activities
that were protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 164; 112 S. Ct. at 1097.
13 Specifically, Dawson contended that evidence showing he was a member of the
Aryan Brotherhood was inadmissible. Id. at 163, 112 S. Ct. at 1096. The
Supreme Court concluded that “the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier
to the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at
sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the
First Amendment.” Id. at 165; 112 S. Ct. at 1097. However, because there
was no evidence submitted that the Aryan Brotherhood was a gang that was
associated with criminal activity, or that Dawson’s membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood was related to the murder, Dawson’s membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood was “totally without relevance” to his sentencing proceeding, and
the Supreme Court therefore ruled that such evidence should have been
excluded. Id. at 165; 112 S. Ct. at 1097. In contrast, the Supreme Court
noted that in other cases where evidence of such facts does exist,
associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. A defendant’s membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be relevant to a jury’s inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future.
Id. at 166; 112 S. Ct. at 1098.
Unlike Dawson, in this case evidence was presented that the White
Knights (as well as the KKK, as also portrayed by appellant’s tattoos) are
associated with violent criminal activity and other acts of misconduct in the
14 prison setting. For example, Hurst Police Detective Chad Woodside testified
that members of the White Knights or KKK “may do a crime just to get in the
group, or to prove their status in the group” and that such members are “prone
to be involved in violence and criminal activity.” With this type of testimony
as a background to apply to appellant’s connection with these groups, we
conclude that appellant’s First Amendment rights were not violated. See also
Anderson v. State, 901 S.W.2d 946, 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (concluding
that “[a]dmission of evidence of membership in a gang whose primary purpose
is illegal activity is not barred by the First Amendment as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Dawson”); Garcia v. State, 239 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, No. 08-6150, 2008
WL 4107187 (2008) (citing Dawson and upholding the trial court’s admission
of evidence related to the defendant’s gang membership).
Finally, appellant contends that the admission of the photographs violated
Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence because they were unfairly prejudicial.
See Tex. R. Evid. 403. Specifically, appellant argues that the photographs
created an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis and that
they compromised the fairness of the trial.9
9 … The title of appellant’s point on appeal also alleges a violation of Rule 401. Tex. R. Evid. 401. However, appellant admits in the body of his
15 Under Rule 403, otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Tex. R. Evid. 403; see Sanders v. State, 255 S.W.3d 754, 760 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (explaining that unfair prejudice “arises from
evidence that has an undue tendency to suggest that a decision be made on an
improper basis, commonly an emotional one”); Woodward v. State, 170 S.W.3d
726, 729 (Tex. App.— Waco 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that “unfair prejudice”
does not exist where the evidence merely “injures the opponent’s case”). In
applying Rule 403, the admission of photographs is “within the sound discretion
of the trial court.” Hayes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (adding that Rule 403 “favors the admission of relevant evidence and
carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than
prejudicial”).
Therefore, under Rule 403, we reverse a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion. Mozon v. State, 991
S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Factors considered in our analysis
of a issue regarding Rule 403 are (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2)
argument that the photographs were relevant to appellant’s punishment. For these reasons, we will limit our analysis as to whether the photographs were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. Tex. R. Evid. 403.
16 the potential to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the
time needed to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the
evidence. See Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
The choice of tattoos may reflect a defendant’s beliefs that make him
prone to future dangerousness. See Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 201
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Woodward, 170 S.W.3d at 729 (explaining that “[a]t
the punishment phase of a criminal trial, evidence may be presented as to any
matter that the court deems relevant to sentencing, including evidence of the
defendant’s background or character,” and a “defendant’s choice of tattoos,
like his personal drawings, can reflect his character”); Hicks, 2005 W L
3540844 at *3.
As we have described, appellant’s tattoos in this case linked him to
groups which (as established by testimony) have criminal connections. For this
reason, we conclude that the photographs depicting the tattoos were probative
of defendant’s character for continuing to engage in criminal activities.10 When
considered against testimony later offered by appellant’s relatives regarding
appellant’s capability for rehabilitation, the State’s need for this type of
10 … The State also contends that appellant’s prejudices, as indicated by his tattoos, contributed to his commission of the burglaries. However, there is no evidence in the record which signals that the robberies were racially motivated.
17 evidence becomes clear. For instance, appellant’s cousin, Rick Sanders,
testified that he believed appellant should be minimally punished because he felt
that appellant did not “want to live this lifestyle,” that appellant had a “passion
for . . . being a responsible citizen,” and that appellant would not “be a threat
to society” if he had an adequate support group. Rita Crouch, appellant’s aunt,
added that appellant is a “very, very loving person, very sweet-hearted,” and
that he “wants deep down to try to do the right thing.” These concepts differ
significantly with the ideas portrayed by tattoos of Adolf Hitler and Klansmen
with shotguns and nooses, among other images.
Further, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the photographs
caused the jury to behave irrationally in sentencing appellant. Instead, beyond
the evidence regarding appellant’s tattoos and affiliations, the jury was also
provided with evidence substantiating appellant’s six previous felony
convictions and relating the fear of appellant’s victims during his robberies. 1 1
Also, by sentencing appellant to forty-five years’ confinement, the jury decided
to assess punishment at the middle of the possible range of five to 99 years or
life, which applied to the four robberies. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§
11 … A jury note submitted to the court during deliberations indicates that the jury reviewed appellant’s prior convictions before making its sentencing decision.
18 12.32(a), 29.03(b). Finally, while a moderate amount of time was needed to
develop testimony regarding appellant’s tattoos and what they portrayed, much
of the testimony and the majority of the exhibits submitted to the jury
concerned other matters.
For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by applying the presumption of admissibility under Rule 403 and
admitting the photographs. See Tex. R. Evid. 403 (stating that to be excluded,
the probative value of evidence must be substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice); Hayes, 85 S.W.3d at 815; Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 846–47.
Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in its decision to admit the
photographs of appellant’s tattoos, appellant stipulated to the admissibility of
over a hundred pages of documentary evidence indicating the same racial and
religious prejudices displayed by the tattoos. The documents included several
copies of essays, articles, and jokes extolling the “White Race” and demeaning
other people groups. For example, the literature contained an essay titled
“Death of the White Race” which stated that “Hitler was a kindly Uncle,
provoked into action by Jewish wickedness.” Also contained in the exhibit was
a series of jokes with a printout of a “Federal Nigger Hunting License.” With
these documents admitted by stipulation, we cannot agree with appellant that
the jury was improperly induced “by the highly prejudicial and inflammatory”
19 tattoo evidence as appellant argues in his brief. See Reyes, 84 S.W.3d at 638
(explaining that a “defendant who allows evidence to be introduced from one
source without objection forfeits any subsequent complaints about the
introduction of the same evidence from another source”).
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting evidence of appellant’s tattoos. Therefore, we overrule appellant’s
sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s only issue, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: November 6, 2008