James Mebane v. GKN Driveline North America, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 25-2191
• Status: Published

Opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-2191

JAMES MEBANE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

and

ANGELA WORSHAM, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

GKN DRIVELINE NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cv-00892-CCE-LPA)

Argued: May 6, 2026 Decided: June 2, 2026

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Thacker joined.

ARGUED: Gilda Adriana Hernandez, LAW OFFICES OF GILDA A. HERNANDEZ, PLLC, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellant. Paul DeCamp, EPSTEIN, BECKER & GREEN, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Laura Fisher, THE LAW USCA4 Appeal: 25-2191 Doc: 41 Filed: 06/02/2026 Pg: 2 of 11

OFFICES OF GILDA A. HERNANDEZ, PLLC, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellant. Adriana S. Kosovych, EPSTEIN, BECKER & GREEN, P.C., New York, New York, for Appellee.

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RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff–Appellant James Mebane brought a class-action lawsuit against his former

employer, Defendant GKN Driveline North America, Inc., alleging that violations of the

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (NCWHA)

resulted in unpaid overtime compensation and unpaid wages. The district court certified

two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and conditionally certified an FLSA

collective action. After developments in the litigation, however, the court decertified the

classes and the collective action.

Mebane now appeals the district court’s decertification order. But before he filed

his notice of appeal, Mebane voluntarily settled his individual FLSA and NCWHA claims

in the district court. That means Mebane lacks standing to appeal the district court’s

decertification order. As a result, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

A.

GKN operates three manufacturing facilities in North Carolina. At all three

facilities, GKN had a policy of rounding employees’ time entries. At first, GKN had a 7/8

rounding policy, under which “seven (7) minutes [would] round down and eight (8)

minutes [would] round up” to the nearest quarter hour. J.A. 302. For example, if an

employee’s shift was scheduled to start at 6:00 a.m. and he clocked in at 6:07 a.m., his time

entry would be rounded down to 6:00 a.m. If he clocked in at 6:08 a.m., however, his time

entry would be rounded up to 6:15 a.m. Eventually, GKN changed its 7/8 rounding policy

to a 3-minute rule. Under that rule, GKN would round time entries to the scheduled start

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of a shift if the employee clocked in within 3 minutes of the shift’s scheduled start time.

Similarly, if an employee clocked out within 3 minutes of the shift’s scheduled end time,

his time entry would be rounded to the shift’s scheduled end. In January 2020, GKN

stopped rounding time.

GKN also had a policy of automatically deducting meal breaks from employees’

recorded time. Under that policy, GKN would automatically deduct a 30-minute, unpaid

meal break from employees’ recorded hours. Employees were not required to clock in and

out when taking meal breaks, and the policy deducted the 30-minute breaks from

employees’ time without regard to whether employees took their break or continued

working. But “employees [were] expected to be completely relieved of their work duties

during breaks.” J.A. 2301.

B.

Plaintiffs James Mebane and Angela Worsham—both former GKN employees—

sued GKN on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. 1 They alleged in their

operative complaint that GKN’s rounding and automatic deduction policies resulted in

“unpaid overtime compensation” and “unpaid wages,” in violation of both the FLSA and

the NCWHA. 2 J.A. 2169, 2188–2192.

1 Worsham is not a party to this appeal. 2 Mebane also asserted, on his own behalf, an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim and several North Carolina common law claims. He settled those individual non-wage claims before the district court issued the decertification ruling at issue in this appeal.

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Plaintiffs moved for class certification under Rule 23 and conditional collective

action certification under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The district court largely granted Plaintiffs’

motion. First, it conditionally certified an FLSA collective action based on GKN’s

rounding policy. See Mebane v. GKN Driveline N. Am., Inc., 337 F.R.D. 479, 485–486

(M.D.N.C. 2020). Second, it certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class to pursue an NCWHA claim

also based on GKN’s rounding policy. Id. at 492–494. And third, it certified another Rule

23(b)(3) class, this one to pursue an NCWHA claim based on GKN’s automatic deduction

policy. See Mebane v. GKN Driveline N. Am., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-892, 2022 WL 3043655,

at *4–7 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 2, 2022).

Eventually, GKN moved to decertify the classes and the collective action, and the

district court granted GKN’s motion. See Mebane v. GKN Driveline N. Am., Inc., No. 1:18-

cv-892, 2023 WL 3435007 (M.D.N.C. May 12, 2023). The court found that an FLSA

collective action based on GKN’s rounding policy would be unsustainable given the

individualized inquiries that would be necessary to determine whether employees’ rounded

minutes were compensable and how many minutes were unlawfully deducted from each

employee’s time. Id. at *4–5. The district court also observed that, based on data from

GKN’s expert, it was “unclear” “whether all employees were even impacted by the

rounding policy in a negative manner.” Id. at *6. The court therefore decertified the FLSA

collective action, and it decertified the Rule 23(b)(3) class based on GKN’s rounding policy

for the same reasons. Id. As for the Rule 23(b)(3) class based on the automatic deduction

policy, the court found that a class action would be inappropriate given evidence that not

all employees regularly worked during the automatically deducted 30-minute meal breaks.

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Id. at *8. The court also found that individualized inquiries would be necessary to

determine whether GKN supervisors actually or constructively knew that employees were

working during the automatically deducted period. Id. For these reasons, the district court

decertified the Rule 23(b)(3) class based on GKN’s automatic deduction policy. Id. at *9.

After the classes and collective action were decertified, the case proceeded on

Plaintiffs’ individual FLSA and NCWHA claims. But in November 2024, Plaintiffs settled

those claims. Specifically, the parties agreed that GKN would pay Plaintiffs a sum of

money “which represent[ed] adequate consideration in full and final settlement of the

claims released herein, but excluding Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees and expenses which

Plaintiffs’ counsel [would] petition [for] separately” at a later date. ECF No. 231 at 2. The

agreement’s release provision in paragraph 7 stated:

By signing this Agreement, Plaintiffs are generally waiving all remaining claims, whether or not raised in the litigation, with the exception of Plaintiffs’ right to petition for attorneys’ fees and costs, in addition to, appealing the Court’s May 12, 2023 decertification order, including via substitute [sic] of named plaintiffs, to proceed accordingly with appeal.

Id. at 4 (citation omitted).

Paragraph 8 of the settlement agreement advised that Plaintiffs’ counsel would

petition for attorneys’ fees and costs “no later than December 17, 2024.” Id. And

paragraph 9 made clear that “[t]he Parties specifically understand and agree that Plaintiffs

preserve the right to appeal this Court’s May 12, 2023 decertification order.” Id. Lastly,

paragraph 5 provided that “Plaintiffs retain the right to request a monetary service award

in connection with” certain related cases. Id. at 3.

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Plaintiffs petitioned for attorneys’ fees and costs by the deadline provided in the

settlement agreement, and GKN opposed the petition. Once the petition was fully briefed,

the district court accepted the parties’ settlement agreement in a consent judgment and

dismissed all remaining substantive claims with prejudice. The court then denied

Plaintiffs’ petition for fees and costs without prejudice. Plaintiffs did not refile their

petition for fees and costs. Mebane then appealed the district court’s decertification order. 3

II.

Mebane’s primary contention on appeal is that the district court abused its discretion

in decertifying the FLSA collective action and the two Rule 23(b)(3) classes. He also takes

issue with the standard the district court applied in evaluating the collective action, the

timing of the court’s Rule 23(c)(2)(B) notice for the automatic deduction class, and the

court’s reliance on declarations from current GKN employees. GKN defends the district

court’s conclusions on the merits. But it also argues that Mebane lacks standing to appeal

the district court’s decertification order because he voluntarily settled his FLSA and

NCWHA claims. Because we agree with GKN that Mebane lacks standing to pursue this

appeal, our discussion begins and ends with that issue.

“‘To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must

be extant at all stages of review . . . .’” Toms v. Allied Bond & Collection Agency, Inc.,

179 F.3d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Arizonans for Off. English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.

3 Mebane did not appeal the denial of his petition for attorneys’ fees and costs. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2191 Doc: 41 Filed: 06/02/2026 Pg: 8 of 11

43, 67 (1997)). “On appeal, just as at trial, a party must hold a concrete interest in the

litigation to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.” Id.

“The Supreme Court has recognized two such [concrete] interests in the class action

context.” Id. First, a class representative has a concrete interest “in the substantive claim

he or she asserts.” Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 636 F.3d 88, 99 (4th Cir.

2011). Second, a class representative may assert “a distinct procedural right to represent

the interests of similarly situated individuals,” id., which can give rise to an interest “in

shifting the costs of litigation to the remainder of the class,” Toms, 179 F.3d at 105; see

Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336–337 (1980). A plaintiff, however,

can bargain these interests away “by negotiating a settlement agreement with the

defendant.” Toms, 179 F.3d at 105.

Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, we have recognized that a plaintiff who

involuntarily loses an interest in his substantive claims nevertheless may be able to rely on

the “second, representative interest” to establish standing to appeal an adverse certification

ruling. Rhodes, 636 F.3d at 99–100 (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.

388, 402 (1980); Roper, 445 U.S. at 340); see also Toms, 179 F.3d at 106. But we have

squarely held that “when a putative class plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the individual

claims underlying a request for class certification,” the second, representative interest

cannot supply standing to appeal because “there is no longer a ‘self-interested party

advocating’ for class treatment in the manner necessary to satisfy Article III standing

requirements.” Rhodes, 636 F.3d at 100 (emphasis added) (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at

403); accord Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. 23, 45 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in

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the judgment) (“Class allegations, without an underlying individual claim, do not give rise

to a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”); see Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.10 (reserving the question).

Applying these principles, Mebane lacks standing to appeal the district court’s

decertification order. In the settlement agreement, Mebane “generally waive[d] all

remaining claims” in this suit. ECF No. 231 at 4. As Mebane concedes, that general waiver

covered his substantive FLSA and NCWHA claims—i.e., the claims underlying the

collective action and the Rule 23 classes. Mebane therefore has no remaining interest in

his “substantive claim[s]” to establish standing to pursue this appeal. Rhodes, 636 F.3d at

99; see Toms, 179 F.3d at 105–106.

Nor can Mebane rely on any interest in shifting the costs of litigation to the

remainder of the class or his contractual reservation of the right to appeal the decertification

order, to seek attorneys’ fees and costs, and to seek a service award in related cases. Rhodes

categorically held that when a putative class plaintiff “has voluntarily settled or dismissed”

his individual substantive claims, he no longer possesses “a sufficiently concrete interest

in the certification question to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”

636 F.3d at 99; see id. at 100. Because Mebane voluntarily dismissed his individual claims

underlying the request for class certification, he lacks standing to appeal the district court’s

decertification order. Id. at 100; see Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 705 F.3d 839, 844

(8th Cir. 2013) (“agree[ing] with” and adopting this Court’s decision in Rhodes).

Mebane protests that, unlike the settlement agreement in Toms and the stipulation

of dismissal in Rhodes, his settlement agreement with GKN explicitly preserved the right

to appeal the decertification order, seek attorneys’ fees and costs, and request a service

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award in connection with related cases. According to Mebane, our inquiry turns on the

language of the parties’ settlement agreement, and because he purported to preserve some

interests in having the decertification order reversed, he has standing to appeal.

Rhodes directly forecloses Mebane’s assertion. It is true that, there, the Court

contrasted the terms of the parties’ stipulated dismissal with the language of the settlement

agreement in Toms. See Rhodes, 636 F.3d at 100. The plaintiff in Toms released all his

individual claims and class-based interests, whereas the stipulation in Rhodes dismissed

the plaintiffs’ individual claims without mentioning their representative interests. See id.;

Toms, 179 F.3d at 105–107. Yet the Rhodes Court ultimately rejected the idea “that the

language of a plaintiff’s settlement agreement is determinative of that plaintiff’s ‘stake’ in

an appeal,” concluding instead that the Court must “focus [its] review on the standing

requirements of Article III.” 636 F.3d at 100. The Court then broadly held that a plaintiff

who “voluntarily dismisses the individual claims underlying a request for class

certification” has no standing to appeal a district court’s class certification ruling. Id. That

holding in no way depended on the language of the parties’ stipulated dismissal. Rhodes

controls here, and Mebane therefore lacks standing to appeal the district court’s

decertification of the Rule 23(b)(3) classes.

To be sure, Rhodes dealt only with Rule 23 class actions. It did not address whether

a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses individual claims underlying an FLSA collective

action lacks standing to appeal an adverse certification ruling. That said, Rhodes’s logic

applies equally to a representative plaintiff appealing an adverse certification ruling in an

FLSA collective action. The Third Circuit, citing Rhodes, has held that the lead plaintiff

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in an FLSA collective action “extinguishe[s] . . . any residual representational interest that

[he] may have once had” by voluntarily dismissing his individual claims with prejudice.

Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Rhodes,

636 F.3d at 100; Ruppert, 705 F.3d at 844). Given our decision in Rhodes, we agree and

conclude that Mebane also lacks standing to appeal the district court’s decertification of

the FLSA collective action.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, Mebane lacks standing to appeal the district court’s order

decertifying the two Rule 23(b)(3) classes and the FLSA collective action. We therefore

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED