James Malone v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 3, 2006
• Docket: 14-05-00033-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Reversed and Acquitted and Opinion filed August 3, 2006

Reversed and Acquitted and Opinion filed August 3, 2006.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

_______________

NO. 14-05-00033-CR

JAMES MALONE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 23rd District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 45,743

O P I N I O N

James Malone appeals a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver^[1] on the grounds that: (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence.  We reverse and render a judgment of acquittal.

Corroboration of Confidential Informant=s Testimony

Appellant=s first point of error argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction because it was based on insufficiently corroborated testimony by a confidential informant.  Specifically, appellant contends that the only evidence connecting him to the offense was: (1) a tape recording of the alleged drug transaction authenticated only by an informant; and (2) a police officer=s testimony that he saw appellant go into the house where the transaction occurred.

A defendant may not be convicted based on the testimony of a person who is not a licensed police officer or special investigator, but is acting covertly on behalf of law enforcement, unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.141 (Vernon 2005).  In applying this rule, courts have adopted the standards for corroboration of accomplice-witness testimony.^[2]  In conducting a sufficiency review under the accomplice-witness rule, a reviewing court must eliminate the accomplice testimony from consideration and then examine the remaining portions of the record to see if there is any evidence that tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime.  Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).  The accused=s mere presence in the company of the accomplice before, during, and after the commission of the offense is insufficient to corroborate the testimony unless it is coupled with other suspicious circumstances tending to connect the accused to the offense.  Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 851-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).  We view the corroborating evidence in the light most favorable to the finding of guilt.  Knox v. State, 934 S.W.2d 678, 686-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  However, where corroborating evidence required for a conviction is lacking, the defendant is entitled to a verdict of acquittal.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.17 (Vernon 2005).

In this case, Investigator Jay Grimes of the Clute Police Department used two confidential informants, Jason Harris and Christopher Olachia, to purchase cocaine from appellant on September 22, 2003.  Prior to the transaction, the informants and their vehicle were searched, and the police provided one of them $1,000 in cash and a micro-cassette recorder with which to record the transaction.  Grimes followed the informants to appellant=s house, keeping sight of them the entire way.  When the informants arrived at appellant=s house, they helped an unidentified female move her car out of the mud, and then entered the house with appellant.  According to Olachia, while they were in the house, appellant Acooked@ crack cocaine for them.  An unidentified male also entered and left the house while the informants were inside.  The informants bought the crack cocaine, using the $1,000, and then returned to the police station, with Grimes following them the entire way.  When they arrived at the police station, Grimes again searched the informants and their vehicle.  The informants turned over several Acookies@ of crack cocaine and the tape recording. 

At trial, only three witnesses testified: Grimes, Olachia, and a crime lab director.  The audio recording made by Olachia was played for the jury, with Olachia describing the events that occurred and identifying the voices on the tape, including appellant=s.  However, excluding Olachia=s (the informant=s) testimony from consideration, the record reflects only that: (1) Harris and Olachia, while being watched by Grimes, went to appellant=s house with no drugs, a micro-cassette recorder, and $1,000 provided to them by Grimes; (2) Grimes observed appellant, Harris, and Olachia going into appellant=s house, where they stayed for approximately 80 minutes; and (3) Harris and Olachia, followed by Grimes, returned directly to the police station with several cookies of crack cocaine and a tape recording.  Because there is no identification of the voices^[3] on the tape recording without Olachia=s testimony, the tape recording does not tend to connect appellant to the offense, and without Olachia=s testimony describing what occurred, we are not even able to discern from the tape that a drug transaction was occurring.  In addition, the State offered no other corroborating evidence that either identified appellant=s voice on the tape or showed any suspicious circumstances that, coupled with appellant=s presence at the scene of the crime, would sufficiently tend to connect appellant to the offense.^[4]  Absent such other suspicious circumstances, appellant=s mere presence at the scene of the crime does not sufficiently corroborate Olachia=s testimony.  See Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 852; Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 178-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

Because the corroborating evidence necessary to sustain appellant=s conviction is lacking, we sustain appellant=s first issue and thus need not address his second issue.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment of acquittal.

/s/        Richard H. Edelman

Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed August 3, 2006.

Panel consists of Justices Fowler, Edelman and Guzman.

Do not publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]           A jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at 25 years confinement.

^[2]           See Jeffery v. State, 169 S.W.3d 439, 447 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2005, pet. ref=d); Dennis v. State, 151 S.W.3d 745, 748-49 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 2004, pet. ref=d); Jefferson v. State, 99 S.W.3d 790, 793 (Tex. App.CEastland 2003, pet. ref=d); Young v. State, 95 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref=d).

^[3]           Because appellant did not testify, the jury had no opportunity to independently identify his voice.

^[4]           See Young, 95 S.W.3d at 452; Morrison v. State, 631 S.W.2d 242, 243-44  (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1982, pet. ref=d) (applying the accomplice-witness rule); cf. Dennis, 151 S.W.3d at 749 (holding corroborating evidence sufficient even though the investigator did not actually see the transaction because the informant was searched prior to the meeting and wore a recording device that was monitored by the investigator, the investigator identified appellant=s voice on the recording, the informant was observed going to appellant=s house, appellant was seen approaching the informant=s car, and the informant gave the officer cocaine on his return from the transaction); Jefferson, 99 S.W.3d at 792-93 (holding corroborating evidence sufficient even though the informant went by herself to a house to make a purchase because she had been searched before she left, the officer watched her go into the house, a recording was made of the transaction, the officer testified that appellant=s voice was on the recording, and the informant gave the officer cocaine when she returned to his vehicle).