James, M. v. McManus, G.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 15, 2025
• Docket: 1162 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A25034-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MOJIRADE JAMES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : GINETTE MCMANUS, LOUISE : No. 1162 EDA 2024 MARZULLI, TIVOLI CONDOMINIUM : ASSOCIATION, EAGLE : INSPECTIONS, ERIC SCHARDINGER :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 200601149

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2025

Mojirade James (“James”) appeals from the trial court’s order clarifying

the amount of the judgment entered in favor of James and against Ginette

McManus1 (“Appellee”) in this proceeding under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade

Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”).2 For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm.

Because of our resolution of this matter, we need not discuss in depth

the facts underlying James’s claim, except to note that, following a trial, a jury

awarded James $43,300.00 in damages against Appellee. See Trial Court

____________________________________________

1 The remaining defendants are not a party to this appeal.

2 See 73 P.S. 201-1, et seq. J-A25034-24

Opinion, 5/17/24, at 1. James subsequently filed a post-trial motion seeking

treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs pursuant to 75 P.S. § 201-9.2(a).

See James’s Amended Post-Trial Motion, 3/29/23, at 2 (unnumbered). James

attached a proposed order to the motion. See id. at Order. The trial court

subsequently denied in part and granted in part James’s motions. Rather than

drafting its own order, the trial court adapted James’s proposed order with

cross-outs and additions. See Order, 4/14/23, at 1 (unnumbered). In

pertinent part, the order reads:

Order, 4/14/23, at 1 (unnumbered).

In May 2023, James’s then counsel, Denise A. Kuestner, Esquire (“prior

counsel”) praeciped for entry of judgment, which the prothonotary entered in

the amount of $137,767.89, which constituted the original jury verdict, and

attorneys’ fees and costs. See Praecipe to Enter Judgment, 5/19/23, at 1

(unnumbered). Neither party appealed.

Contentious proceedings to collect on the judgment ensued. At some

point, James hired current counsel, Glenn A. Brown, D.M.D., Esquire (“current

counsel”). In December 2023, current counsel filed a praecipe for a writ of

execution in the amount of $137,767.89. See Praecipe for a Writ of Execution,

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12/6/23, at 1 (unnumbered). Late that month, current counsel filed a

separate praecipe to enter judgment on the verdict in the amount of

$43,300.00. See Praecipe to Enter Judgment on the Verdict, 12/18/23, at 1

(unnumbered).

In January 2024, in response to opposing counsel’s motion to withdraw,

current counsel, for the first time, informed the court he believed the total

amount of damages was the $137,767.89 of damages the court awarded (that

included the jury award, attorneys’ fees and costs) plus an additional

$43,300.00, for a total award of $181,067.89. See Opposition to Motion to

Withdraw as Counsel, 1/19/24, at 1. Later that month, current counsel filed

a praecipe to enter judgment on the final verdict and/or order in the amount

of $181,067.89. See Praecipe to Enter Judgment on the Verdict and/or Order,

1/31/24, at 1 (unnumbered).

In February 2024, Appellee filed a motion to clarify the judgment

asserting the correct amount of the award was the $43,300.00 awarded by

the jury, plus attorneys’ fees in the amount of $86,500.00, and costs in the

amount of $7,967.89 for a total of $137,767.89, the amount for which James

originally praeciped. See Motion to Amend Judgment, 2/8/24, at 1

(unnumbered). A hearing on the motion took place in March 2024. Current

counsel unsuccessfully argued the original praecipe prior counsel filed was

incorrect and the total verdict was $181,067.89. See N.T., 3/21/24, at 9-12.

Current counsel based this argument on prior counsel’s use of the word

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“additional” in the proposed order, which the trial court should have blacked

out but did not. See id.3 The court issued a new, oral order identical to the

April 14, 2023, order except instead of referring to “a total additional award”

it stated the amount was the “a total award” of $137,767.89 See id. at 15.

James moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. See Order,

4/3/24, at 1 (unnumbered). The instant appeal followed. 4 Subsequent to the

filing of this appeal, James praeciped to enter judgment in the amount of

$94,467.89, the amount of the expert fees and attorneys’ fees. See Praecipe

to Enter Judgment on the Order, 4/25/24, at 1 (unnumbered).

On appeal, James presents the following issue for our review:

1) Whether the March 21, 2024 order granting reconsideration of, and making modifications to, the April 17, 2023 final order by striking the words “additional award” from the phrase “total additional award of $137,767.89” (leaving the phrase “total of $137,767.89”), resulting in a reduction of $43,300.00 from the $181,067.89 total award to [James], exceeded the [trial court’s] inherent power to correct obvious and patent mistakes, and the power to correct formal error under Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1) because the order made substantive modifications resulting in a reduction of $43,300.00 from the award to [James], and the April 17, 2023 order contains no patent and obvious mistake, is not incompatible with the record, and is not incompatible with black letter law, thereby rendering the March 21, 2024 Order a legal nullity?

3 Although the trial court initially accused current counsel of attempting to perpetrate fraud on the court, the court acknowledged the possibility of good faith mistake and further very clearly stated that it had never intended an award of damages in excess of $137,767.89. See id. at 9, 13.

4 James and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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James’s Brief at 1-2 (capitalization and punctuation regularized).

Prior to addressing the merits of this appeal, we must first decide

whether the matter is properly before us. The appealability of an order directly

implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order. See Siana

v. Noah Hill, LLC, 322 A.3d 269, 275 (Pa. Super. 2024). This Court has the

power to inquire at any time, sua sponte, whether an order is appealable. See

id. Pennsylvania law makes clear:

An appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b) ); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).

Bloome v. Alan, 154 A.3d 1271, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal brackets,

quotation marks, and some citations omitted).

“A final order is generally one which terminates the litigation, disposes

of the entire case, or effectively puts the litigant out of court.” Joseph F.

Cappelli & Sons, Inc. v. Keystone Custom Homes, Inc., 815 A.2d 643,

648 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).

Here, the revised order is a final, appealable order. See Pittsburgh

Const. Co. v. Griffith, 834 A.2d 572, 579 (Pa. Super. 2003) (declining to

quash appeal as interlocutory where trial court issued an order modifying a

final judgment and the appellants appealed within thirty days of the date of

that order). Thus, we will reach the merits of James’s claim.

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In her only issue on appeal, James contends the trial court issued an

untimely order granting Appellee’s “motion for reconsideration” and reducing

the judgment in this matter by $43,300.00. See James’s Brief at 12-30.

The trial court explained it did not grant reconsideration but rather

clarified the order to correct James’s misunderstanding of the verdict, which

is permitted at any time. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/24, at 6. The court

notes the only change to the order was to remove the word “additional.” See

id. at 6-7.

This case presents a pure question of law; therefore, our standard of

review is plenary, and our scope of review is de novo. See In re Estate of

Tomcik, 286 A.3d 748, 758 (Pa. Super. 2022). Pennsylvania law provides a

court “upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30

days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of

court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa. C.S.A.

§ 5505 (emphasis added). However, Section 5505 does not impinge on the

trial court’s inherent power to correct any patent or obvious mistakes in its

orders. See In re K.R.B., 851 A.2d 914, 918 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations

omitted) (finding “[u]nder limited circumstances, even where the court would

normally be divested of jurisdiction, a court may have the power to correct

patent and obvious mistakes”). A trial court has:

inherent power to amend its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in the record at any time. However, [a] major substantive change, such as the total withdrawal of an

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order relative to a motion of record does not constitute a corrective order within the inherent powers of the trial court or the court's statutory authority. Absent a specific rule or statute, the only exception is to correct obvious technical mistakes (e.g., wrong dates) but no substantive changes can be made.

Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC,

108 A.3d 913, 921 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted, emphasis added).

Moreover, our Supreme Court held a trial court can open an unappealed

judgment beyond the thirty-day deadline “if fraud or other equitable

considerations required the granting of such relief.” Gasbarini’s Estate v.

Medical Center of Beaver County, Inc., Rochester Division, 409 A.2d

343, 345 (Pa. 1979) (citations omitted). Citing Gasbarini’s Estate, in First

Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super. 1999), this

Court affirmed a trial court’s acts of opening a judgment more than five years

after its entry and altering it to allow for the payment of additional fees and

costs where the defendant’s dilatory tactics caused additional expenses to

plaintiff which were not accounted for in the original judgment. See id. at

334-35.

Here, James fails to acknowledge current counsel’s at best mistaken

actions forced the trial court to act. While the trial court’s April 2023 order

was inartful, the record cited above reflects that prior counsel understood the

amount of damages was the jury’s award of $43,300.00 plus attorneys’ fees

of $86,500.00, and costs in the amount of $7,967.89 for a total of

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$137,767.89. Assuming, arguendo, current counsel is not bound by his

predecessor’s action, current counsel has not provided a credible explanation

for his interpretation of the April 2023 order as doubling the jury award to

reach the figure of $181,067.89 he says is due, or offer any basis in law for

the trial court to double a jury award sua sponte, which is what the requested

figure represents. Moreover, current counsel does not offer any legal basis

for failing to move either to open or strike the judgment in lieu of filing

multiple praecipes to enter judgment in different amounts.

Under these circumstances, Appellee properly filed a motion seeking

clarification, not as James claims, a reconsideration of the amount of the

original judgment. The trial court appropriately held a hearing, where it

attempted to explain to current counsel why his interpretation of the April

2023 order was incorrect. See N.T., 3/21/24, at 11-14. We have no

hesitation in concluding that the trial court did not err in clarifying the

judgment. See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 108 A.3d at 921; see

also Tomcik, 286 A.3d at 759-60 (affirming Orphans’ Court’s clarification of

a prior, unartfully worded order, where counsel either mistakenly or willfully

persisted in misunderstanding the order). Moreover, even if we were to find

the trial court’s action constituted more than a clarification, the equities in this

matter clearly support intervention and the issuance of a new order, where,

as here, current counsel attempted, without factual or legal support, to double

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the amount of money the jury awarded to James. See Gasbarini’s Estate,

409 A.2d at 345; First Union Mortgage Corp., 744 A.2d at 334-35.

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the order of the

trial court.

Date: 5/15/2025

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