JAMES LYONS v. JIM CONROY & Others.

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-1163

JAMES LYONS

vs.

JIM CONROY & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, James Lyons, appeals from an order of the

Superior Court allowing the defendants' special motion to

dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H.

Concluding that the plaintiff, a former chairman of the

Massachusetts Republican Party, failed to establish that

statements allegedly made by the defendants concerning the

party's ward committee membership were devoid of any reasonable

factual support or arguable basis in the law, we affirm.

1. Anti-SLAPP standard. "[A] ruling on a special motion

to dismiss is subject to de novo review on appeal." Columbia

1Ben Maroon, Matthew Sisk, Mark Steffan, Sean Powers, and Brian Wynne. Plaza Assocs. v. Northeastern Univ., 493 Mass. 570, 577 (2024).

We evaluate a special motion to dismiss in two stages. Bristol

Asphalt Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc., 493 Mass. 539,

555-557 (2024). First, "a proponent of a special motion to

dismiss under § 59H must 'make a threshold showing through the

pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are "based

on" the [party's] petitioning activities alone and have no

substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning

activities.'" Bristol Asphalt Co., supra at 555, quoting

Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168

(1998). If this threshold showing is made, "the statute

requires allowance of the special motion to dismiss, 'unless the

[special motion opponent] shows' that the special motion

proponent's exercise of its right of petition '[(1)] was devoid

of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law'

and (2) 'caused actual injury to the [special motion

opponent].'" Bristol Asphalt Co., supra at 557, quoting G. L.

c. 231, § 59H.

2. Petitioning activity. "To fall under the 'in

connection with' definition of petitioning under the anti-SLAPP

statute, a communication must be 'made to influence, inform, or

at the very least, reach governmental bodies -- either directly

or indirectly.'" Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477

2 Mass. 141, 149 (2017), S.C., 483 Mass. 200 (2019), overruled on

other grounds by Bristol Asphalt Co., 493 Mass. at 551-554,

quoting North Am. Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Corcoran,

452 Mass. 852, 862 (2009). Here, the statements at issue were

regarding a dispute about the proper membership of one of the

ward committees within the Massachusetts Republican Party.2

Massachusetts political parties must report ward committee

membership to both the state secretary and the state's office of

campaign and political finance. See G. L. c. 52, § 5. The

plaintiff's counsel explained at oral argument that the

Massachusetts Republican Party "cross checks" the "sworn" names

and addresses of ward committee members submitted to the office

of campaign and political finance against its own forms. Both

parties agree that forming and establishing the membership of

ward committees constitutes petitioning activity, and we accept

that agreement.

The plaintiff, however, argues that establishing the

membership of the committee was not the true purpose of the

allegedly defamatory statements. Rather, he argues, "the

defendants conspired to defame Mr. Lyons as a racist and bigot

not in an effort to rectify any alleged issues with the

2 "Each political party shall, in every ward and town, elect at the presidential primaries a ward or town committee from among the members of the party . . . ." G. L. c. 52, § 2.

3 registration of voters in Boston Republican Ward 15 but for the

alternative purpose of attempting to defeat his reelection

campaign." The possibility that the petitioning activity had an

ulterior motive (or multiple motives), however, is irrelevant.

See Benoit v. Frederickson, 454 Mass. 148, 152 (2009), quoting

Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113, 122 (2002) ("[T]he

motive behind the petitioning activity is irrelevant at this

initial stage"). As the Supreme Judicial Court held, "Ulterior

motives . . . do not bear on the petitioning nature of the

statements to the Boston Globe." Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 151.

3. Arguable basis. "Where a special motion proponent has

met this threshold burden," the judge must allow the special

motion to dismiss "'unless the [special motion opponent] shows'

that the special motion proponent's exercise of its right of

petition 'was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any

arguable basis in law . . . .'" Bristol Asphalt Co., 493 Mass.

at 557, quoting G. L. c. 231, § 59H. In making our

determination, we must "consider the pleadings, as well as the

'supporting and opposing affidavits stating facts upon which the

liability or defense is based.'" 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE

Boston, LLC, 483 Mass. 514, 522 n.3 (2019), quoting G. L.

c. 231, § 59H. The Supreme Judicial Court has "emphasized that

the 'mere submission of opposing affidavits by the [special

4 motion opponent] could not,' in this case involving conflicting

affidavits as to whether a rape had occurred, 'have established

that the [special motion proponents'] petitioning activity,'

i.e., her report of the rape to police, was devoid of any

reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law."

Bristol Asphalt, supra at 558, quoting Benoit v. Frederickson,

454 Mass. 148, 154 n.7 (2009). Proving that petitioning

activity is illegitimate, then, presents a "high bar."

Blanchard, 477 Mass. at 156 n.20.

Here, the petitioning activity consists of statements that

the plaintiff was discriminating against Asian American

Republicans by "selectively enforcing procedural rules and

targeting voters of color."3 The plaintiff made no showing, by

affidavit or otherwise, that this allegation was false, much

less that the defendants had no arguable basis for it. The

record does not even include a sworn statement that the

plaintiff did not attempt to exclude Asian Americans from ward

committee membership or any explanation of his reasons for

3 At oral argument, the plaintiff's counsel explained that the "specific defamatory statement was the headline" of the Boston Globe article, which reads, "Asian American Republicans accuse state GOP of pursuing discriminatory scheme to disenfranchise them in party elections." Whether the plaintiffs could be found liable for an article headline written by the staff at the Boston Globe, although a weighty question, is not a matter for an anti-SLAPP motion.

5 trying to disqualify them. Rather, the plaintiff provided a

deposition by a person whom the defendants hired as a consultant

to assist in organizing and a deposition by another person who

stated that the consultant asked him to call the plaintiff a

child molester and a racist. Devoid from the plaintiff's

showing was any discussion of the defendants' basis for their

statements, much less proof that the defendants lacked an

arguable basis for their statements that the plaintiff was

discriminating against Asian American Republicans. Accordingly,

the order allowing the defendants' special motion to dismiss is

affirmed.4

2. Attorney's fees. The defendants are entitled to an

award of appellate attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 231,

§ 59H. See Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154; McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431

Mass. 343, 350 (2000). Consistent with the procedure set forth

in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004), the defendants

may submit an application for their appellate attorney's fees

4 The plaintiff further requests that this Court, "as a matter of law and/or public policy, . . . deny the defendants’ special motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendants' 'petitioning activity' arises out of their own criminal conduct." The plaintiff did not raise this argument in the Superior Court and thus it is waived. See Rabinowitz v. Schenkman, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 538, 542 (2023), quoting Century Fire & Marine Ins. Corp. v. Bank of New England-Bristol County, N.A., 405 Mass. 420, 421 n.2 (1989) ("An issue not raised or argued below may not be argued for the first time on appeal").

6 and costs, with supporting documentation, within fourteen days

of the release of this decision. The plaintiff shall have

fourteen days within which to respond. See Slive & Hanna, Inc.

v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 100 Mass. App.

Ct. 432, 442 n.20 (2021).

We decline the defendants' request for double appellate

attorney's fees. See G. L. c. 211A, § 15; Mass. R. A. P. 25, as

appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019) ("If an appellate court

determines that an appeal in a civil case is frivolous, it may

award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee,

and such interest on the amount of the judgment as may be

allowed by law"). "Although the [plaintiff's] arguments are

unpersuasive, they are not frivolous." Suwwan de Felipe v. El-

Youssef Suwwan, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 158, 169 n.6 (2025).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Ditkoff & Hand, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: July 17, 2026.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.