James Laurent v. United States

2012 DNH 069

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 6, 2012
• Docket: 12-CV-019-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

James Laurent v. United States 12-CV-019-SM 4/6/12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

James Laurent, Petitioner

v. Case No. 12-cv-19-SM Opinion No. 2012 DNH 069 United States of America, Respondent

O R D E R

Petitioner, James Laurent, was convicted by a jury of six

counts of distributing crack cocaine and one count of possessing

with the intent to distribute crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 84 months in prison, but that

sentence was recently reduced to 68 months pursuant to

retroactively applicable amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines

relative to crack cocaine ranges. Petitioner now seeks habeas

relief, styling his petition as one brought under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, rather than § 2255.

Discussion

It is not clear why petitioner describes his petition as one

brought under § 2241. Federal prisoners may invoke § 2241 to

challenge the execution, rather than the legality or validity, of

their sentences. Here, however, as in United States v. Barrett.

178 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 1999), petitioner is not challenging the

execution of his sentence - the conditions of his confinement, for example - but the legality of that sentence. And, a § 2241

petition is properly brought in the district with jurisdiction

over the prisoner's custodian (here New Mexico). See United

States v. Glantz. 884 F.2d 1483, 1489 (1st Cir. 1989).

Under normal circumstances, the court might dismiss the

petition, as styled, for want of jurisdiction. Alternatively, it

might afford petitioner an opportunity to declare his intent to

have the petition treated as one filed under § 2255 before so

construing it. But, petitioner unequivocally seeks review of his

conviction and sentence on traditional § 2255 grounds, and the

one-year limitations period applicable to such petitions expired

on January 19, 2012 (one year after the United States Supreme

Court denied his petition for certiorari). 28 U.S.C. §

2255(f)(1). Accordingly, failure to construe this petition as

what it undoubtedly was intended to be would render a later filed

petition untimely.

So, construing the petition favorably to Laurent, as one

seeking relief under § 2255, it is clear that he "filed" the

petition on January 9, 2012, under the "mail rule," and the

petition was docketed on January 17, 2012. Both dates are within

the one-year limitations period.

2 The Merits

With respect to the merits of petitioner's initial claim -

that videotape evidence allegedly destroyed by the government

(or, state officers) entitles him to some form of relief beyond

this court's earlier dismissal of the charge to which the

videotape related, that precise issue was raised in the court of

appeals and rejected on the merits. United States v. Laurent,

607 F.3d 895 (1st Cir. 2010). His claims related to this court's

earlier rulings denying his motions to suppress evidence were

also raised before, and rejected by, the court of appeals on

direct review. Id.

Absent an intervening change in the law, petitioner cannot

relitigate on collateral review issues that were raised on direct

appeal. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974);

Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir. 1994).

Nor may petitioner litigate issues on collateral review that

could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, absent a

showing of cause excusing the default and actual prejudice from

the error he asserts. United States v. Fradv, 456 U.S. 152, 167-

68 (1982); Suveges v. United States, 7 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir.

1993) .

Petitioner also advances an "actual innocence" claim. That

argument reads like a challenge to the sufficiency of the

3 evidence, but it is a nonstarter. The government produced more

than sufficient evidence to establish petitioner's guilt beyond

any reasonable doubt as to each count of conviction, and nothing

in the record or the petition even remotely calls the verdicts

into question. As the court of appeals summarized:

Multiple members of the surveillance team identified Laurent as Frenchie; he was seen making multiple drug deals almost all in daylight with an undercover officer; and surveillance followed his car from the last drug transaction to the stop where officers found marked bills and more drugs on his person.

Laurent, 607 F.3d at 901. Petitioner did not raise the

sufficiency of evidence as an issue on direct appeal, and has not

shown cause or prejudice for that failure. See Bouslev v. United

States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). Even if he could overcome the

"cause" hurdle, nothing in the petition puts in doubt the

overwhelming record evidence of guilt in this case, so he could

not possibly meet the "prejudice" hurdle.

Finally, petitioner asserts, in passing, that his defense

counsel was inadequate in that he failed to challenge the

composition of the jury pool and petit jury on grounds that

neither represented a fair cross-section of the community

because, as he says, there were no African-Americans or Hispanics

in the pool or on the petit jury. Assuming there were not, this

claim also fails. First, petitioner does not assert that he

4 asked counsel to raise the issue, or that he provided counsel

with any information that might have suggested a viable legal or

constitutional claim related to the jury's composition (or that

counsel should have known about such information).

Even accepting for argument's sake that no African-Americans

or Hispanics were among those persons called for jury service or

seated on the petit jury, that fact alone does not establish a

constitutional violation. A criminal defendant is not entitled

to have members of any particular racial or ethnic background on

a jury or in a jury pool and the jury chosen in a particular case

need not "mirror the community and reflect the various

distinctive groups in the population." Holland v. Illinois, 493

U.S. 474, 483 (1990). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.

522, 528 (1975); United States v. Cooke. 110 F.3d 1288, 1301 (7th

Cir. 1997). Rather, defendants are entitled not to have

potential jurors systematically excluded from the selection

process based upon protected characteristics, like race or

national origin. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) .

There is nothing in the petition or record that suggests any

basis upon which petitioner's counsel should have considered

challenging the empaneled jury on constitutional or statutory

grounds. Indeed, nothing in the petition or record suggests that

the jury was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of

5 such persons in the community or that any supposed under­

representation of African-Americans or Hispanics was due to their

systematic exclusion from the selection process. In short, the

petition fails to provide any basis upon which it might be found

that defense counsel's representation was in any way objectively

unreasonable or fell outside the wide range of professional

competence expected of counsel. See generally Strickland v.

Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Conclusion

Petitioner claims are without merit. The petition, files

and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is

entitled to no relief, and the petition is dismissed.

The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

Rule 11(a), Rules governing Section 2255 Proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Sbeven J. /McAuliffe United States District Judge

April 6, 2012

cc: James Laurent, pro se Seth R. Aframe, AUSA