1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 JAMES H.1, Case No. 2:24-cv-05631-GJS
12 Plaintiff MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 13 v. ORDER
14 LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16
17 18 Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking review of the denial by the Social Security 19 Administration (“SSA”) – sued through its Acting Commissioner of Social Security 20 (“Commissioner”) – of Plaintiff’s applications for Supplemental Security Income 21 and Child’s Insurance Benefits. The parties filed briefs addressing the disputed 22 issue in the case [Dkt. 11 and 14]. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have 23 consented to the undersigned for all purposes. [Dkt. 16.] The Court has taken the 24 parties’ briefing under submission without oral argument. For the reasons discussed 25 below, the Court finds that this matter should be affirmed. 26 27 1 In the interest of privacy, this Order uses only the first name and the first 28 initial of the last name of the non-governmental party. 1 I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 2 A. Agency Proceedings 3 Plaintiff filed his applications for benefits on September 14, 2021. He alleged 4 that his disability began on April 9, 2018, and was the result of a spinal tumor, 5 severe anxiety, and phobias. [Administrative Record, Dkt. 7-1 through 7-8 (“AR”) 6 17, 131-33, 259-72.] On December 14, 2021, the SSA denied Plaintiff’s 7 applications initially, and on April 28, 2022, the SSA denied them again on 8 reconsideration. [AR 134-43, 145-50.] Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was 9 held before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on August 30, 2023. [AR 38-62.] 10 On September 18, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision that was unfavorable to 11 Plaintiff. [AR 14-37, the “Decision.”] Plaintiff appealed, and on May 8, 2024, the 12 Appeals Council denied review. [AR 1-5.] 13 B. Administrative Decision Under Review 14 In his Decision,2 the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process. 15 [AR 18.] See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)-(g)(1). At step one, the ALJ found that 16 Plaintiff had not attained the age of 22 as of, and has not engaged in substantial 17 gainful activity since, his alleged onset date. [AR 19.] At step two, the ALJ found 18 that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: malignant neoplasm 19 of the spinal cord status post laminectomy; anxiety disorder; depressive disorder; 20 and bipolar disorder. [Id.] At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not 21 have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals 22
23 2 The ALJ’s Decision addressed both the physical and mental impairments alleged by Plaintiff. As discussed below, Plaintiff raises only a single issue in this 24 case related to whether a particular mental functional limitation found was properly accounted for by the ALJ in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) he assessed. 25 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings with respect to his physical or mental 26 impairments, or the ALJ’s treatment of the medical evidence, or whether the ALJ properly accounted in the RFC for the other functional limitations he found, or any 27 other such claims. Accordingly, both directly below and in its analysis, the Court has discussed the Decision, Plaintiff’s statements and testimony, and the medical 28 evidence only insofar as they pertain to the specific claim raised in this case. 1 the severity of one of the listed impairments. [AR 20-22.] At step four, the ALJ 2 found that Plaintiff has the RFC “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 3 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).” [AR 23-29.] Specifically, the ALJ identified various 4 physical and exertional efforts Plaintiff could perform and, of relevance here, found 5 that “he can do nonpublic, simple, routine and repetitive tasks.” [AR 23.] The ALJ 6 further found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, but he could perform other 7 work such as a machine pack assembler (DOT3 920.687-122), racker (DOT 8 524.687-018), or small products assembler (DOT 739.687-030), which were light, 9 unskilled work with SVPs4 of 1 and 2. AR 30.] The ALJ determined that Plaintiff, 10 therefore, is not disabled. [AR 31.] 11 12 II. THE PERTINENT RECORD 13 The Administrative Record contains medical evidence and testimony 14 regarding all of Plaintiff’s impairments, both physical and mental. Much of that 15 evidence, however, is not relevant here given the discrete nature of Plaintiff’s single 16 claim. The Court will discuss only those portions of the record pertinent to 17 Plaintiff’s claim, i.e., that relate to a moderate mental limitation found with respect 18 to the functional area of adapting or managing oneself and the RFC. [See AR 22.] 19 A. Plaintiff’s Statements And Testimony 20 Plaintiff testified at the hearing before the ALJ. Plaintiff has had one job 21 since high school – working part-time for two months at a Farmer Boys restaurant. 22 He had to stop working due to his anxiety. [AR 48-49.] He does not drive due to 23 his anxiety, and he does not take public transportation, because he panics unless his 24 mother is present with him. [AR 49-51.] 25 Plaintiff has been under psychiatric care since he was a child. He takes 26
27 3 Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor, 1991).
28 4 Specific Vocational Preparation, as defined in DOT, Appendix C. 1 medication for anxiety, depression, and sleep, and they help “minimally” and relieve 2 his symptoms “mildly,” but he still has a lot of anxiety and depression. [AR 51-52.] 3 When asked about obstacles to working, Plaintiff stated that he gets so 4 anxious that he cannot think and freezes up. He forgets what he is doing and has to 5 be reminded. He also gets shaky and throws up. This happens not only at work but 6 also at home and in a store. Plaintiff’s panic attacks last anywhere from an hour to 7 all day. He takes Lorazepam when he has a panic attack. [AR 54-55.] 8 In his Function Report, Plaintiff stated that he cannot drive and avoids social 9 situations due to his anxiety. [AR 318.] He showers more than once a day because 10 it helps with his anxiety. [AR 319.] He engages in light yard and housework, 11 including watering plants, laundry, vacuuming, doing the dishes, and taking out the 12 trash. [AR 320.] Plaintiff does some light cooking and baking, plays the violin, 13 knits and crochets, draws, does arts and crafts, scrolls through Tik-Tok, listens to 14 music, and watches tv. [AR 319-20, 322.] When he feels “good enough,” he takes 15 care of his cat. [AR 319.] He goes to the grocery store once a week for 30 minutes 16 to an hour, accompanied by someone else. [AR 321-22.] Plaintiff stated that he 17 gets along “pretty good” with authority figures. [AR 323.]5 18 B. Medical Evidence 19 Plaintiff reported to the doctors treating him for his spinal problem that he 20 smoked cannabis for his physical pain. [AR 413, 416, 423.] On November 26, 21 2019, a treating physician reported that Plaintiff had an appropriate mood and affect. 22 [AR 574.] 23 On December 3 and 17, 2020, a nurse practitioner (Aizzel Trieu) reported that 24 Plaintiff had good eye contact, was alert and oriented, showed no memory or 25 concentration/attention deficits, and had a clear and coherent thought process, 26 27 5 In 2018, Plaintiff reported to his doctor that he had visited Disneyland. [AR 28 397.] 1 although he reported that he was sad, depressed, anxious, lacked motivation, and 2 slept poorly. [AR 695, 697.] In January 11, February 11, March 11, April 1 and 9, 3 May 7, July 16, August 19, September 24, and October 22, 2021 telephonic 4 consultations with NP Trieu, Plaintiff’s mental status evaluations were again 5 primarily normal, with, inter alia, a euthymic mood, good concentration, and no 6 deficit in concentration or attention, and Plaintiff reported that he felt better and did 7 not wish to take antidepressants. [AR 699, 701, 705, 707-14, 718, 722, 724.] On 8 November 15, 2021, Plaintiff’s mental status examination was normal, although NP 9 Trieu described his mood as sad, depressed, and anxious. [AR 769.] On December 10 13, 2021 and January 12, February 10, and March 10, 2022, Plaintiff’s mental status 11 examinations by NP Trieu were again primarily normal and his mood was euthymic 12 on the December, February and March visits, although labile on the January visit. 13 [AR 765-68.] On March 24, 2022, Plaintiff’s mental status examination again was 14 normal, but his mood was labile and irritable. [AR 764.] On April 28, May 26, 15 June 16, and July 29, 2022, Plaintiff’s mental status examination was normal and his 16 mood was euthymic. [AR 824-28.] On August 15, 2022, Plaintiff reported to NP 17 Trieu that he had stopped most of his medications and had increased anxiety, anger, 18 and irritability and unstable mood swings. [AR 823.] On August 25, 2022, 19 Plaintiff’s mental status examination was normal and his mood euthymic. [AR 20 822.] On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff’s mental status examination was normal but 21 his mood was sad, depressed, and labile. [AR 821.] On September 27, October 27, 22 and November 23, 2022, Plaintiff’s mental status examinations were normal and his 23 mood euthymic. [AR 816, 819-20.] On December 22, 2022, Plaintiff’s mental 24 status examination was normal but his mood was anxious. [AR 815.] 6 25 26 6 On September 14, 2022, NP Trieu opined that Plaintiff had moderate to marked to extreme limitations in all work-related mental functions, including an 27 extreme limitation in adaptability. [AR 772-74.] The ALJ found the NP’s opinion to be unpersuasive, because it was inconsistent with the evidence of record, 28 including her own evaluations. [AR 29.] Plaintiff has not challenged that ALJ’s 1 On January 26, February 23, March 23, April 20, and May 18, 2023, Plaintiff 2 was seen by a different nurse practitioner (Lynda Akoto). His mental status 3 examinations showed that he was awake and alert, had a calm and pleasant mood, 4 had an appropriate affect, had a linear, coherent and organized thought process, and 5 appropriate attention and concentration. Plaintiff reported that he has daily anxiety 6 and panic attacks once or twice a year, and that he occasionally uses marijuana. 7 [AR 775-82, 792-801.]7 8 9 III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM 10 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed legal error, because although the 11 ALJ assessed a moderate functional limitation in adapting and managing oneself, the 12 ALJ failed to account for that limitation in crafting the mental RFC. 13 14 IV. GOVERNING STANDARD 15 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Decision to determine if: (1) 16 the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the 17 Commissioner used correct legal standards. See Brewes v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 18 Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. 19 Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008). “Substantial evidence … is ‘more 20 than a mere scintilla’ … [i]t means – and means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a 21 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. 22 Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citations omitted); see also Gutierrez v. Comm’r 23 of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Substantial evidence is more than a 24 finding, and thus, the Court will not consider this opinion rendered by NP Trieu 25 further. 26 7 On August 17, 2023, NP Akoto opined as to Plaintiff’s mental functional 27 limitations. [AR 831.] The ALJ found her opinion unpersuasive [AR 29] and Plaintiff has not challenged that finding. Accordingly, the Court will not consider 28 that opinion further. 1 mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 2 omitted). 3 The Court will uphold the Commissioner’s decision when “‘the evidence is 4 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.’” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 5 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 6 1989)). However, the Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in the 7 decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 8 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court will not reverse the 9 Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists if the error is 10 “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or that, despite the 11 error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 12 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 13 14 V. DISCUSSION 15 Before making the step four and five determinations, the ALJ first must 16 determine the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] 17 can still do despite [his or her] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on 18 all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). An RFC determination is a 19 legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. “[I]t is the 20 responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual 21 functional capacity.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). 22 At step three, following the “special technique” described in 20 C.F.R. § 23 416.920a to determine whether Plaintiff’s claimed mental impairments were 24 “severe,” the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s degree of functional limitation in four 25 functional areas. [AR 20-22.] In the fourth area – adapting or managing oneself – 26 the ALJ found that Plaintiff has a moderate limitation. The ALJ further found that 27 this moderate limitation would be accommodated by limiting Plaintiff to simple, 28 routine, and repetitive tasks. [AR 22.] The ALJ then included that simple, routine, 1 and repetitive tasks restriction in the RFC he formulated and in the hypothetical he 2 propounded to the vocational expert. [AR 23, 60.] 3 Plaintiff argues that, as a matter of law, including a simple, routine, and 4 repetitive tasks restriction in the RFC cannot adequately accommodate a finding of a 5 moderate functional limitation for adapting or managing oneself. Plaintiff relies on 6 caselaw finding that, as a general matter, limiting a claimant to simple, routine, and 7 repetitive tasks in the RFC without further restrictions fails to encompass a 8 functional mental limitation such as concentration, pace, and persistence. 9 Defendant, in turn, relies on another line of Ninth Circuit caselaw finding that, when 10 supported by the medical evidence, limitations to simple, routine, and repetitive 11 tasks can account adequately for moderate mental functional limitations. 12 In the Ninth Circuit, the line of caselaw on which Plaintiff relies has its origin 13 in two unpublished Circuit Court decisions involving the step three concentration, 14 persistence, and pace functional limitation. These decisions are often described as 15 holding that, as an abstract principle, this particular functional limitation cannot be 16 adequately accommodated through a simple, routine, and repetitive tasks restriction 17 in the RFC. See Brink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 343 Fed. App’x 211, 212 (9th 18 Cir. 2009) (“The Commissioner’s contention that the phrase ‘simple, repetitive 19 work’ encompasses difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace is not 20 persuasive. Indeed, repetitive, assembly-line work . . . might well require extensive 21 focus or speed.”); see also Lubin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 507 Fed. App’x 22 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Although the ALJ found that the [claimant] suffered 23 moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ 24 erred by not including this limitation in the residual functional capacity 25 determination or in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert.”). There have 26 been a number of district court decisions in this Circuit relying on Brink/Lubin to 27 conclude that when a moderate functional mental limitation is found, adding a 28 simple, routine, and repetitive tasks restriction to the RFC is inadequate to 1 accommodate that restriction. See, e.g., Jill R.C. v. O’Malley, No. 2:22-cv-01663- 2 DJA, 2024 WL 303804, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2024) (collecting cases). 3 The Brink/Lubin line of cases is distinguishable from the line of cases 4 following the published decision of Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th 5 Cir. 2008), on which Defendant relies. In Stubbs-Danielson, the ALJ did not make a 6 separate step three finding that the claimant had a moderate limitation in 7 concentration, persistence, or pace but, rather, “translated” a physician’s conclusions 8 regarding pace and mental limitations into a restriction to “simple tasks.” The Ninth 9 Circuit found that the ALJ’s translation adequately incorporated the medical 10 evidence concerning the claimant’s impairments and held, as a general rule, that an 11 “assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, 12 persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with the restrictions 13 identified in the medical testimony.” Id. at 1174. 14 Some courts have extended the Stubbs-Danielson reasoning to cases in which 15 the ALJ actually did find a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and 16 pace at step three and accommodated it by assessing an RFC restricting the plaintiff 17 to simple, routine tasks. As many courts have reasoned, “the special analysis for 18 mental disorders, which includes an assessment of concentration, persistence, and 19 pace, is a severity analysis [performed at step three] which is distinct from the 20 functional analysis at step five of the sequential evaluation.” Phillips v. Colvin, 61 21 F. Supp. 3d 925, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Israel v. Astrue, 494 Fed. App’x 22 794, 796 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The limitations identified in step 3, however, are ‘not an 23 RFC assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairment(s) at steps 2 24 and 3.... The ALJ must consider the step-3 limitations along with ‘all of the relevant 25 evidence in the case record,’ . . . when forming the RFC.”) (citation omitted); 26 Bordeaux v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:12–cv–01213–JE, 2013 WL 27 4773577, at *12 (D. Ore. Nov. 18, 2013) (rejecting claimant’s argument that the 28 ALJ was required to incorporate into the RFC and the hypothetical to the vocational 1 expert the particular functional limitations found at step three, because this argument 2 improperly conflated the ALJ’s step three analysis with the ALJ’s RFC assessment 3 at steps four and five). In this line of cases, “the relevant question is whether the 4 medical evidence supports a particular RFC finding” with regard to the functional 5 limitation in question. Phillips, supra, 6 Thus, for example, in Wilder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 545 Fed. App’x 7 638, 639 (9th Cir. 2013), the ALJ rejected a claim of error based on the ALJ’s 8 failure to include a step three finding of moderate difficulties in maintaining 9 concentration, persistence and pace in the RFC assessment and in the hypothetical 10 posed to a vocational expert, because the medical evidence did not support any 11 work-related limitation in the claimant’s ability to sustain concentration, persistence, 12 or pace and “[s]ubstantial evidence therefore does not support functional limitations 13 more severe than limitation to ‘simple, routine, repetitive work’ accounted for in the 14 RFC and the hypothetical question posed to the VE.” In Bordeaux, 2013 WL 15 4773577, at *13, the court found no error in the ALJ’s omission from the RFC of the 16 “specific [concentration, persistence, and pace] finding set out in the special 17 technique,” when “a careful review of the medical evidence and the ALJ’s decision 18 supports the conclusion that the ALJ’s RFC adequately accounted for . . . the ‘less 19 than substantial limitations in concentration, persistence and pace at simple work 20 activities’ identified by” a physician). In Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 21 No. 2:12-CV-0358–CMK, 2013 WL 5372852, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013), the 22 district court found no error based on the plaintiff’s complaint that the “ALJ failed 23 to adequately explain how a limitation to simple instructions would fully account for 24 the acknowledged moderate difficulties with concentration,” reasoning that: “the 25 special analysis for mental disorders, which includes an assessment of 26 concentration, persistence, and pace, is a severity analysis which is distinct from the 27 functional analysis at step five of the sequential evaluation”; and “the Ninth Circuit 28 has held that a limitation to, as here, simple work adequately captures moderate 1 limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace” (citing Stubbs-Danielson). On 2 appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that: “the special analysis for mental disorders . . . 3 is a severity analysis which is distinct from the functional analysis at step five of the 4 sequential evaluation”; and there was no error in “the ALJ's failure to include his 5 own finding of moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace in the 6 residual functional capacity assessment,” because the ALJ had accounted for the 7 moderate limitation “proper[ly]” and “complete[ly]” in the RFC and the 8 hypothetical by limiting the claimant to simple, repetitive tasks, notwithstanding the 9 vocational expert’s statement that adding in a moderate limitation as to 10 concentration, persistence and pace would mean no work was available. Mitchell v. 11 Colvin, 642 Fed. App’x 731, 733 (9th Cir. 2016). 12 As noted by one Judge in this District, the distinction between the Ninth 13 Circuit’s decision in Stubbs-Danielson and Brink is a “well-worn track.” Juanita S. 14 v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-7659-MRW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163468, at *6 (C.D. 15 Cal. Sep. 24, 2018). In Stubbs-Danielson, the circuit court concluded that moderate 16 pace limitations may translate into a “simple task” RFC without additional 17 conditions when consistent with the evidence of record. Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d 18 at 1173-74. That is, an ALJ can “account[ ] for [a claimant’s] moderate functional 19 limitations in the residual functional capacity” with a simple work limit. Mitchell, 20 642 Fed. App’x at 733. On the other hand, under Brink/Lubin, a simple work 21 restriction in an RFC generally does not adequately address a step two/three 22 functional limitation. 23 The Court finds no error in this case under either the Brink/Lubin or Stubbs- 24 Danielson lines of cases, because Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ’s inclusion of 25 a simple, routine, or repetitive tasks restriction in the RFC failed to adequately 26 accommodate Plaintiff’s moderate functional limitation found at step three. 27 Significantly, Plaintiff does not identify any evidence of record that renders him 28 unable to do simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. There is no doctor or other 1 medical professional opinion that, if credited, would “translate” into an RFC 2 restriction more severe than the limitation to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. 3 There also is no doctor or other medical professional opinion that, had it been 4 credited, would “translate” into an inability to perform the three light, unskilled jobs 5 that the vocational expert identified as able to be performed by Plaintiff with the 6 restriction to non-public, simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.8 7 Plaintiff simply is incorrect in asserting that the ALJ did not consider 8 Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in adapting or managing oneself. The ALJ did 9 consider that functional limitation, discussed the record evidence, and expressly 10 concluded that the limitation would be “accommodated” by limiting Plaintiff to 11 simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. [AR 22.] In doing so, the ALJ found that, 12 despite Plaintiff’s moderate limitation, he was “capable of responding to demands, 13 adapting to changes, managing psychologically based symptoms, distinguishing 14 between acceptable and unacceptable work performance, making plans for [himself] 15 independently of others, maintaining personal hygiene and attire appropriate to a 16 work setting, and being aware of normal hazards and taking precautions despite his 17 alleged mental impairment.” [Id.] The ALJ surveyed the medical evidence, 18 recounted Plaintiff’s various daily activities, and concluded that Plaintiff’s “mental 19 status evaluations were mostly within normal limits,” further observing that in 20 January and May 2023, he reported “compliance and effectiveness of his 21 medication,” a stable mood, motivation and energy, improved sleep, manageable 22 anxiety, decreased anger and irritability, and regular activities of daily living. [AR 23 22, 27-28.] 24
25 8 Plaintiff asserts that the three jobs found “exceed” the step three moderate 26 functional limitation found by the ALJ, but Plaintiff fails to proffer any explanation or basis for this assertion. All three jobs are light, unskilled work with an SVP of 1 27 or 2, and nothing about their descriptions in the DOT indicates that a person with a moderate limitation in adapting or managing oneself could not perform these jobs. 28 1 The ALJ gave a detailed consideration to the record of Plaintiff’s mental 2 limitations, both in determining their severity at steps two and three and in 3 formulating Plaintiff’s RFC at step four. Plaintiff does not point to any additional 4 evidence that the ALJ failed to consider in reaching his conclusions. The ALJ’s 5 interpretation of the evidence – viz., that it demonstrates that a restriction to simple, 6 routine, and repetitive tasks will adequately accommodate Plaintiff’s moderate 7 adapting or managing oneself functional limitation – is not irrational, and when the 8 evidence “‘is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s 9 conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 10 2020) (citation omitted). 11 While Plaintiff obviously disagrees with the ALJ’s conclusion that a simple, 12 routine, and repetitive tasks restriction in the RFC would accommodate Plaintiff’s 13 moderate functional limitation in adapting and managing oneself, he does not show 14 that it was error given Plaintiff’s failure to identify any medical evidence indicating 15 otherwise.9 See Sabin v. Astrue, 337 Fed. Appx. 617, 621 (9th Cir.2009) (observing 16 that “[t]he ALJ determined the end result of [claimant’s] moderate difficulties as to 17 concentration, persistence, or pace was that she could do simple and repetitive tasks 18 on a consistent basis,” and finding no error in an RFC restriction to simple and 19 repetitive tasks when doing so was consistent with the medical evidence and 20 “adequately captured” the tasks the claimant was able to perform despite her step 21 three moderate functional limitation); Phillips, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 939-40 (“Moderate 22 limitations do not have to be exactly mirrored in the RFC determination” as long as 23 the relevant medical evidence supports the ALJ’s finding as to the appropriate RFC 24 restriction). “Moderate mental functional limitations – specifically limitations in 25 social functioning and adaptation – are not per se disabling, nor do they preclude the 26
27 9 Again, the ALJ found the two NP opinions assessing more substantial limitations to be not persuasive, and Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s treatment 28 of those opinions. Accordingly, they have no bearing on the claim at issue here. 1 performance of jobs that involve simple, repetitive tasks.” McLain v. Astrue, No. 2 SACV 10-1108-JC, 2011 WL 2174895, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2011); see also 3 Rose M.E. v. Saul, No. 5:20-cv-01199-AFM, 2021 WL 1612091, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 4 April 26, 2021) (“The SSA defines a ‘moderate’ limitation to mean ‘[t]here is more 5 than a slight limitation in this area, but the individual can still function 6 satisfactorily.’”) (citations omitted). “Although a limitation to simple and repetitive 7 tasks (or similar verbiage) is not a catchall accommodation for all mental 8 limitations, it is notable that ‘district courts throughout the Circuit have [ ] 9 concluded a claimant’s low tolerance for stress or moderate limitations in dealing 10 with changes are encompassed in a residual functional capacity of simple, repetitive 11 tasks.’” Trede v. Commission of Social Security, No. 1:23-cv-1691-GSA, 2024 WL 12 4855271, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2024) (citation omitted and collecting cases). 13 At its core, Plaintiff’s argument is that an RFC restriction to simple, routine, 14 and repetitive tasks cannot constitute an accurate translation or accommodation of a 15 claimant’s moderate difficulties with adapting or managing oneself as an 16 unassailable legal proposition, not that this is so based on the particular facts of his 17 case. Plaintiff’s “as a matter of law” type argument is unpersuasive in light of 18 Stubbs-Danielson and the numerous Ninth Circuit and District Court cases since 19 then making clear that a step three functional limitation need not be mirrored 20 precisely in an RFC assessment as long as the medical evidence of record supports 21 the accommodation made for that limitation in the RFC. And Plaintiff has failed 22 entirely to show any “as applied” type error, as he has not shown that the medical 23 evidence of record that was properly credited required any further restriction and 24 accommodation in his RFC for the step three functional limitation than he received. 25 On this record, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ failed to adequately 26 translate his moderate limitation in adapting or managing oneself when formulating 27 the RFC. As substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC formulation in this 28 respect, no error occurred. Reversal and remand, therefore, are not required. 1 VI. CONCLUSION 2 For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court: 3 (1) denies Plaintiff’s request for an order remanding this case to the 4 Commissioner for the immediate payment of benefits or for further 5 proceedings pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) consistent with 6 the Order Accepting this Report and Recommendation; 7 (2) affirms the decision of the Commissioner; and 8 (3) directs that Judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 9 10 DATED: April 25, 2025 11 __________________________________ GAIL J. STANDISH 12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28