COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00317-CR
James Haas § From the 362nd District Court
§ of Denton County (F-2008-0118-D)
v. § January 31, 2013
§ Opinion by Justice Dauphinot
The State of Texas § (nfp)
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By_________________________________ Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00316-CR NO. 02-11-00317-CR
JAMES HAAS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant James Haas appeals the trial court’s revocation of his deferred
adjudication community supervision and decision to adjudicate his guilt in each
case. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s
community supervision or by adjudicating his guilt, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2 In April 2008, Appellant James Haas received deferred adjudication
community supervision on charges of tampering with physical evidence and
possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. His
conditions of community supervision included committing no new criminal
offenses and paying a monthly supervision fee, a fine, court costs, restitution,
and a one-time fee to the district clerk.
On January 28, 2010, the State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication in
each case. The petitions, as later amended, asserted that Appellant had failed to
make the required payments and had committed three new offenses: an October
31, 2009 offense of possession of a controlled substance in the amount of less
than one gram; a February 16, 2010 offense of possession of a controlled
substance in the amount of more than one gram but less than four grams; and
fleeing from an officer with a vehicle.
The trial court held a hearing on the petitions to adjudicate, at which
Appellant pled not true to the allegations of fleeing from an officer and the
October 2009 possession of a controlled substance offense. Appellant pled true
to all other allegations.
Denton County community supervision officer Rhett Wallace testified at the
June 2011 hearing that Appellant had not made any of his payments for almost
two years. The State introduced into evidence and the trial court admitted a
judgment against Appellant for the February 16, 2010 possession of a controlled
substance offense. Appellant admitted that he had been arrested on that charge
3 and had pled guilty. He stated, however, that the drugs had been planted in his
car by his girlfriend.
Appellant also acknowledged that he had been arrested in October 2009
for possession of a controlled substance, but he was not indicted for that offense
because a drug test indicated that the substance was not a drug. The State
abandoned that allegation toward the end of the hearing.
Appellant further acknowledged that he had been arrested on August 23,
2010, for fleeing from a police officer after he ran from an officer who had asked
for his driver’s license. But Appellant testified that he had only run to hide in a
nearby shed because the police officer was the boyfriend of a woman that
Appellant formerly dated, and he was afraid for his safety.
The trial court found all allegations to be true except the allegation
concerning the October 2009 possession offense. The trial court adjudicated
Appellant guilty, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to six
years’ confinement in prison on the tampering with evidence charge and twenty
months’ confinement in a state jail facility for the possession of a controlled
substance charge. Appellant now appeals.
In a single point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by revoking his
community supervision in each case in that the merits of the State’s petitions to
proceed to adjudication were determined under a burden of proof other than
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responds that Appellant did not preserve
his complaint below. The State is correct that Appellant did not raise the issue of
4 the higher burden of proof in the trial court. Generally, to preserve a complaint
for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they
are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. 2 Further,
the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either
expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial
court’s refusal to rule.3
To the extent, however, that Appellant complains that the evidence was
not sufficient to sustain what he considers the appropriate burden of proof,
sufficiency of the evidence may be raised for the first time on appeal. 4 The
burden of proof in a community supervision revocation is by a preponderance of
the evidence.5 Appellant invites us to reverse the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and to declare that the appropriate burden of proof in a community
supervision revocation case is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But this court is
2 Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clay v. State, 361 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). 3 Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 4 Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Moore v. State, 371 S.W.3d 221, 226–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding challenge to cumulation order not forfeited for failure to raise at trial). 5 Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
5 bound by the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and has no
authority to disregard or overrule that binding precedent.6
Appellant entered a plea of not true to the allegations that he committed
the offenses of fleeing from an officer with a vehicle and of possession of a
controlled substance of more than one gram in October 2009. But he pled true to
the allegation that he possessed a controlled substance in an amount of more
than one gram but less than four grams in February 2010, and he also pled true
to the allegations that he failed to pay fees, costs, and restitution. A plea of true
to a single violation, standing alone, is sufficient to support revocation. 7 The trial
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s deferred
adjudication community supervision in either case. We therefore overrule
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00317-CR
James Haas § From the 362nd District Court
§ of Denton County (F-2008-0118-D)
v. § January 31, 2013
§ Opinion by Justice Dauphinot
The State of Texas § (nfp)
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By_________________________________ Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00316-CR NO. 02-11-00317-CR
JAMES HAAS APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant James Haas appeals the trial court’s revocation of his deferred
adjudication community supervision and decision to adjudicate his guilt in each
case. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s
community supervision or by adjudicating his guilt, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2 In April 2008, Appellant James Haas received deferred adjudication
community supervision on charges of tampering with physical evidence and
possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. His
conditions of community supervision included committing no new criminal
offenses and paying a monthly supervision fee, a fine, court costs, restitution,
and a one-time fee to the district clerk.
On January 28, 2010, the State filed a petition to proceed to adjudication in
each case. The petitions, as later amended, asserted that Appellant had failed to
make the required payments and had committed three new offenses: an October
31, 2009 offense of possession of a controlled substance in the amount of less
than one gram; a February 16, 2010 offense of possession of a controlled
substance in the amount of more than one gram but less than four grams; and
fleeing from an officer with a vehicle.
The trial court held a hearing on the petitions to adjudicate, at which
Appellant pled not true to the allegations of fleeing from an officer and the
October 2009 possession of a controlled substance offense. Appellant pled true
to all other allegations.
Denton County community supervision officer Rhett Wallace testified at the
June 2011 hearing that Appellant had not made any of his payments for almost
two years. The State introduced into evidence and the trial court admitted a
judgment against Appellant for the February 16, 2010 possession of a controlled
substance offense. Appellant admitted that he had been arrested on that charge
3 and had pled guilty. He stated, however, that the drugs had been planted in his
car by his girlfriend.
Appellant also acknowledged that he had been arrested in October 2009
for possession of a controlled substance, but he was not indicted for that offense
because a drug test indicated that the substance was not a drug. The State
abandoned that allegation toward the end of the hearing.
Appellant further acknowledged that he had been arrested on August 23,
2010, for fleeing from a police officer after he ran from an officer who had asked
for his driver’s license. But Appellant testified that he had only run to hide in a
nearby shed because the police officer was the boyfriend of a woman that
Appellant formerly dated, and he was afraid for his safety.
The trial court found all allegations to be true except the allegation
concerning the October 2009 possession offense. The trial court adjudicated
Appellant guilty, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to six
years’ confinement in prison on the tampering with evidence charge and twenty
months’ confinement in a state jail facility for the possession of a controlled
substance charge. Appellant now appeals.
In a single point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by revoking his
community supervision in each case in that the merits of the State’s petitions to
proceed to adjudication were determined under a burden of proof other than
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responds that Appellant did not preserve
his complaint below. The State is correct that Appellant did not raise the issue of
4 the higher burden of proof in the trial court. Generally, to preserve a complaint
for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they
are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. 2 Further,
the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either
expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial
court’s refusal to rule.3
To the extent, however, that Appellant complains that the evidence was
not sufficient to sustain what he considers the appropriate burden of proof,
sufficiency of the evidence may be raised for the first time on appeal. 4 The
burden of proof in a community supervision revocation is by a preponderance of
the evidence.5 Appellant invites us to reverse the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and to declare that the appropriate burden of proof in a community
supervision revocation case is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But this court is
2 Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clay v. State, 361 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). 3 Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 4 Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Moore v. State, 371 S.W.3d 221, 226–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding challenge to cumulation order not forfeited for failure to raise at trial). 5 Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
5 bound by the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and has no
authority to disregard or overrule that binding precedent.6
Appellant entered a plea of not true to the allegations that he committed
the offenses of fleeing from an officer with a vehicle and of possession of a
controlled substance of more than one gram in October 2009. But he pled true to
the allegation that he possessed a controlled substance in an amount of more
than one gram but less than four grams in February 2010, and he also pled true
to the allegations that he failed to pay fees, costs, and restitution. A plea of true
to a single violation, standing alone, is sufficient to support revocation. 7 The trial
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s deferred
adjudication community supervision in either case. We therefore overrule
Appellant’s sole point on appeal in each case.
6 Hailey v. State, No. 02-10-00247-CR, 2012 WL 4936655, at *25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2012, pet. filed); Sierra v. State, 157 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), aff’d, 218 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 7 Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
6 Having overruled Appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: January 31, 2013