James Garlock v. Louis Dejoy

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 18, 2023
• Docket: 22-55467
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 18 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES E. GARLOCK, No. 22-55467

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-03117-DMG- MAA v.

LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General, United MEMORANDUM* States Postal Service,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 10, 2023**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

James E. Garlock appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

in his action alleging federal employment discrimination claims. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo summary judgment, and

for an abuse of discretion the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Ah

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Quin v. County of Kaui Dep’t of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013). We

affirm.

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the basis of

judicial estoppel where Garlock did not disclose his claims in his bankruptcy

proceeding and did not reopen his bankruptcy proceeding to include his claims

until after the district court’s summary judgment order. See id. at 271-76

(explaining application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context; where

plaintiff-debtor reopens bankruptcy proceedings and corrects the initial filing error,

the court will conduct inquiry into inadvertence or mistake; where plaintiff-debtor

has not done so, “a narrow exception for good faith is consistent with . . . the

policies animating the doctrine of judicial estoppel” and “it makes sense to apply a

presumption of deliberate manipulation”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garlock’s post-

judgment motion because Garlock failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration); Jones

v. Aero/Chem Corp., 921 F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining when evidence

is considered “newly discovered” for purposes of a post-judgment motion for

relief).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

2 22-55467 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not

consider documents not filed with the district court. See United States v. Elias, 921

F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

Garlock’s request that this court order DeJoy to supplement DeJoy’s

supplemental excerpts of record, set forth in the reply brief, is denied as

unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

3 22-55467