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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 JAMES FINTA; DINA FINTA, Case No. 3:26-cv-05054-TMC 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 DEFAULT JUDGMENT v. 10 GOLDLINE BRANDS INC., 11 Defendant. 12 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 In this case, self-represented Plaintiffs James and Dina Finta allege that they were early 16 investors in Defendant Goldline Brands, a California winery, and that Goldline breached its 17 agreement to re-purchase their shares at a certain price when the company was not sold within 18 five years of their investment. After Goldline failed to appear or otherwise respond to their 19 complaint, the clerk of court entered default, and the Fintas now move for default judgment. 20 Because the complaint does not provide sufficient factual allegations to establish the Court’s 21 personal jurisdiction over Goldline, the motion for default judgment is DENIED without 22 prejudice. Plaintiffs may re-submit their motion no later than July 13, 2026, accompanied by 23 additional facts to establish that Goldline has sufficient minimum contacts with Washington state 24 for the Court to have personal jurisdiction. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712–13 (9th Cir. 1999). 1 II. BACKGROUND The Fintas allege that in 2016, they invested $10,000 in Goldline Brands, Inc. as “Friends 2 & Family” investors. Dkt. 1 at 2. The term sheet provided that “if no qualifying exit event 3 occurred within five years, the Company was required to offer investors the option to have all or 4 part of their Preferred Stock repurchased” over a 24-month period at 5 times the original 5 investment value. Id.; see also Dkt. 13-2 at 2 (term sheet). Preferred Stock investors also 6 received “1 share free for every 2 shares purchased . . . . For example, an investment of $10,000 7 shall receive $15,000 in shares.” Dkt. 13-2 at 1. The Fintas allege that in 2021, when the five 8 years expired, they were entitled to repurchase of their original $10,000 investment at a value of 9 $75,000, over the 24 months between October 2021 and October 2023. See Dkt. 1 at 3; Dkt. 13-1 10 (Finta declaration). They also contend that Goldline owes them unpaid dividends and 11 prejudgment interest. See Dkt. 13 at 2. 12 The Fintas filed this lawsuit on January 19, 2026. Dkt. 1. They filed proof of service on 13 Goldline on February 9. Dkt. 7. On March 13, after Goldline failed to appear or otherwise 14 defend, the Fintas moved for default. Dkt. 11. The clerk entered default on March 25. Dkt. 12. 15 That same day, the Fintas moved for default judgment. Dkt. 13. 16 17 III. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard 18 Motions for default judgment are governed by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil 19 Procedure. The Rule authorizes the Court to enter default judgment against a party that fails to 20 appear or otherwise defend in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. In deciding motions for default 21 judgment, courts take “the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, except those 22 relating to the amount of damages.” Rozario v. Richards, 687 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2017) 23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (first quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 24 1 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007); and then quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 2 (9th Cir. 1977)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). The court also does not accept the truth of statements in 3 the complaint that amount to legal conclusions. DIRECTV, Inc., 503 F.3d at 854. “[N]ecessary
4 facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established 5 by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 The “starting point is the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored. 7 Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 8 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts weigh the following factors in deciding motions for 9 default judgment: 10 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at 11 stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy 12 underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
13 Id. at 1471–72; see NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616–17 (9th Cir. 2016) 14 (suggesting that district courts “weigh” the Eitel factors). District courts’ decisions on motions 15 for default judgment are discretionary. See NewGen, LLC, 840 F.3d at 616 (“We review . . . the 16 grant of a default judgment for abuse of discretion.”). 17 B. Jurisdiction 18 Before entering a default judgment, a court must consider whether it has subject-matter 19 jurisdiction over the claims asserted and personal jurisdiction over the defendants. In re Tuli, 172 20 F.3d at 712. “A judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over the parties is void.” Id. “To 21 avoid entering a default judgment that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should 22 determine whether it has the power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.” 23 Id. 24 1 The Fintas’ allegations establish subject matter jurisdiction. They claim they are owed 2 more than the minimum amount in controversy of $75,000, and they allege that they are citizens 3 of Washington and Goldline is a citizen of California. Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 13-1; see 28 U.S.C.
4 § 1332(a)(1). 5 For personal jurisdiction, however, the allegations in the complaint fall short. 6 “Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the 7 law of the state in which the court sits.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 8 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). “Washington’s long-arm statute 9 extends the court’s personal jurisdiction to the broadest reach that the United States Constitution 10 permits.” Microsoft Corp. v. Commc’ns & Data Sys. Consultants, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 11 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (citing Byron Nelson Co. v. Orchard Mgmt. Corp., 95 Wn. App. 462, 12 465, 975 P.2d 555 (1999)). Accordingly, “the jurisdictional analysis under state law and federal
13 due process are the same.” Id. (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 14 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004)). 15 Under federal law, personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process if they 16 “have certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit 17 does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 18 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 JAMES FINTA; DINA FINTA, Case No. 3:26-cv-05054-TMC 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 DEFAULT JUDGMENT v. 10 GOLDLINE BRANDS INC., 11 Defendant. 12 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 In this case, self-represented Plaintiffs James and Dina Finta allege that they were early 16 investors in Defendant Goldline Brands, a California winery, and that Goldline breached its 17 agreement to re-purchase their shares at a certain price when the company was not sold within 18 five years of their investment. After Goldline failed to appear or otherwise respond to their 19 complaint, the clerk of court entered default, and the Fintas now move for default judgment. 20 Because the complaint does not provide sufficient factual allegations to establish the Court’s 21 personal jurisdiction over Goldline, the motion for default judgment is DENIED without 22 prejudice. Plaintiffs may re-submit their motion no later than July 13, 2026, accompanied by 23 additional facts to establish that Goldline has sufficient minimum contacts with Washington state 24 for the Court to have personal jurisdiction. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712–13 (9th Cir. 1999). 1 II. BACKGROUND The Fintas allege that in 2016, they invested $10,000 in Goldline Brands, Inc. as “Friends 2 & Family” investors. Dkt. 1 at 2. The term sheet provided that “if no qualifying exit event 3 occurred within five years, the Company was required to offer investors the option to have all or 4 part of their Preferred Stock repurchased” over a 24-month period at 5 times the original 5 investment value. Id.; see also Dkt. 13-2 at 2 (term sheet). Preferred Stock investors also 6 received “1 share free for every 2 shares purchased . . . . For example, an investment of $10,000 7 shall receive $15,000 in shares.” Dkt. 13-2 at 1. The Fintas allege that in 2021, when the five 8 years expired, they were entitled to repurchase of their original $10,000 investment at a value of 9 $75,000, over the 24 months between October 2021 and October 2023. See Dkt. 1 at 3; Dkt. 13-1 10 (Finta declaration). They also contend that Goldline owes them unpaid dividends and 11 prejudgment interest. See Dkt. 13 at 2. 12 The Fintas filed this lawsuit on January 19, 2026. Dkt. 1. They filed proof of service on 13 Goldline on February 9. Dkt. 7. On March 13, after Goldline failed to appear or otherwise 14 defend, the Fintas moved for default. Dkt. 11. The clerk entered default on March 25. Dkt. 12. 15 That same day, the Fintas moved for default judgment. Dkt. 13. 16 17 III. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard 18 Motions for default judgment are governed by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil 19 Procedure. The Rule authorizes the Court to enter default judgment against a party that fails to 20 appear or otherwise defend in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. In deciding motions for default 21 judgment, courts take “the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, except those 22 relating to the amount of damages.” Rozario v. Richards, 687 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2017) 23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (first quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 24 1 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007); and then quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 2 (9th Cir. 1977)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). The court also does not accept the truth of statements in 3 the complaint that amount to legal conclusions. DIRECTV, Inc., 503 F.3d at 854. “[N]ecessary
4 facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established 5 by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). 6 The “starting point is the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored. 7 Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 8 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts weigh the following factors in deciding motions for 9 default judgment: 10 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at 11 stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy 12 underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
13 Id. at 1471–72; see NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616–17 (9th Cir. 2016) 14 (suggesting that district courts “weigh” the Eitel factors). District courts’ decisions on motions 15 for default judgment are discretionary. See NewGen, LLC, 840 F.3d at 616 (“We review . . . the 16 grant of a default judgment for abuse of discretion.”). 17 B. Jurisdiction 18 Before entering a default judgment, a court must consider whether it has subject-matter 19 jurisdiction over the claims asserted and personal jurisdiction over the defendants. In re Tuli, 172 20 F.3d at 712. “A judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over the parties is void.” Id. “To 21 avoid entering a default judgment that can later be successfully attacked as void, a court should 22 determine whether it has the power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to enter the judgment in the first place.” 23 Id. 24 1 The Fintas’ allegations establish subject matter jurisdiction. They claim they are owed 2 more than the minimum amount in controversy of $75,000, and they allege that they are citizens 3 of Washington and Goldline is a citizen of California. Dkt. 1 at 2; Dkt. 13-1; see 28 U.S.C.
4 § 1332(a)(1). 5 For personal jurisdiction, however, the allegations in the complaint fall short. 6 “Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the 7 law of the state in which the court sits.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 8 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). “Washington’s long-arm statute 9 extends the court’s personal jurisdiction to the broadest reach that the United States Constitution 10 permits.” Microsoft Corp. v. Commc’ns & Data Sys. Consultants, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 11 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (citing Byron Nelson Co. v. Orchard Mgmt. Corp., 95 Wn. App. 462, 12 465, 975 P.2d 555 (1999)). Accordingly, “the jurisdictional analysis under state law and federal
13 due process are the same.” Id. (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 14 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004)). 15 Under federal law, personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process if they 16 “have certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit 17 does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 18 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 19 “[T]here are two forms that personal jurisdiction may take: general and specific.” Picot v. 20 Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). The Fintas’ complaint asserts specific jurisdiction. 21 See Dkt. 1 at 2. 22 The Ninth Circuit applies a three-prong test to determine whether a defendant had
23 sufficient contacts with the forum state to be subject to specific jurisdiction: 24 1 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some 2 act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; 3 (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum- 4 related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, 5 i.e. it must be reasonable. 6 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two 7 prongs. CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d at 1076. 8 The Fintas’ complaint alleges purposeful availment, but the allegation is conclusory. The 9 complaint says: “Defendants purposefully availed themselves of this forum by directing post- 10 accrual conduct, silence, and withholding of required performance and disclosures into 11 Washington with foreseeable effects in this District.” Dkt. 1 at 2. This allegation does not contain 12 facts that would allow the Court to meaningfully apply the purposeful availment test. It is also 13 unclear what the Fintas mean by alleging that Goldline directed “silence” and “withholding” of 14 performance to this state. Because the Fintas have not sufficiently established personal 15 jurisdiction, the Court does not have the power to enter default judgment. 16 As the Ninth Circuit has instructed, however, when a district court raises the issue of 17 personal jurisdiction on a motion for default judgment, it must give the moving party “notice and 18 an opportunity to assert facts” to establish the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum. In 19 re Tuli, 172 F.3d at 713. The Court will therefore deny the default judgment motion without 20 prejudice and allow the Fintas 30 days from the filing of this Order to re-submit their motion 21 with additional facts to establish personal jurisdiction over Goldline. 22 23 24 l IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, the motion for default judgment (Dkt. 13) is DENIED
3 without prejudice. Plaintiffs may re-file their motion with additional supporting facts no later
4 than July 13, 2026.
5 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and
6 || to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address.
7 Dated this 12th day of June, 2026.
9 Tiffany-M. Cartwright United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24