James Eugene Mears v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 12, 2003
• Docket: 04-02-00284-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Memorandum Opinion

No. 04-02-00284-CR

James Eugene MEARS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the Criminal District Court of Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 84665

Honorable Charles D. Carver, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice

Sitting: Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen A. Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 12, 2003

AFFIRMED

Following a jury trial, Appellant James Eugene Mears was convicted of intoxiction manslaughter. Mears elected to allow the trial court to assess punishment and was given twenty years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000. Mears now appeals his conviction in one issue, claiming he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions. U.S. Const. am. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10.

Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we affirm the conviction in this memorandum opinion under Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 for the following reasons:

1. Although Mears never filed a notice of appeal, he did file a "request for permission to appeal," which the Jefferson County Clerk's office accepted as notice. The State argues this request does not meet the notice requirements found in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b). We disagree, finding the pro se document to vest jurisdiction with this Court, because it is in writing and shows Mears' desire to appeal from the judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(1), (2).

2. In his only issue, Mears complains he was denied effective assistance of counsel as required by the United States and Texas Constitutions. U.S. Const. am. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. Specifically, Mears complains of three instances in which he claims his counsel's performance was inadequate: (1) counsel's failure to properly question potential jurors during voir dire; (2) counsel's failure to properly cross-examine or object to the testimony of the State's experts; and (3) counsel's failure to object to the admission of certain evidence.

In determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel, this court follows the standard iterated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687, 688 (1984) and adopted in Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). To reverse a criminal defendant's conviction on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, the defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. Any allegations of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and that counsel's actions were the result of sound trial strategy. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). In most cases, a silent record which provides no explanation for counsel's actions will not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

In the case at hand, the record is silent as to the reasons Mears' trial counsel acted as he did. Because the record does not provide an explanation for counsel's actions, we conclude Mears has failed to overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Under the Strickland standard, Mears has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that his counsel's actions

resulted in prejudice to the outcome of his trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We overrule Mears' sole issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Paul W. Green, Justice

Do Not Publish