James Edward Spencer v. Bob Riley

Eleventh Circuit

James Edward Spencer v. Bob Riley

524 F. App'x 498

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

DecidedJuly 25, 2013

Docket12-13844

StatusUnpublished

This text of 524 F. App'x 498 (James Edward Spencer v. Bob Riley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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James Edward Spencer v. Bob Riley, 524 F. App'x 498 (11th Cir. 2013).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

James Spencer, a convicted sex offender, is currently incarcerated for 2006 and 2007 violations of the Alabama Community Notification Act, Ala.Code § 15-20-20 et seq. (repealed July 1, 2011). He filed a lawsuit against several Alabama officials *499 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, for various reasons, the ACNA could not be constitutionally applied to him. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Mr. Spencer, proceeding pro se, now appeals. Exercising plenary review, see, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 911 (11th Cir.2007), we affirm.

We read pro se briefs liberally, see Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 514 n. 2 (11th Cir.1991), but even so it is difficult to figure out what arguments Mr. Spencer is making on appeal. He does not, for example, list any specific issues. Nor does he say why he believes the district court erred. In a prior appeal by Mr. Spencer, we noted the same problems. See Spencer v. King, 333 Fed.Appx. 488, 489 (11th Cir.2009) (“Although we construe pro se filings liberally, Spencer’s appeal gives us very little to work with.”).

The one argument we think we can discern from the brief is Mr. Spencer’s contention that the ACNA — and specifically its residency and registration requirements — cannot be constitutionally applied to him because of ex post facto and equal protection concerns. The problem for Mr. Spencer is that a challenge to a criminal conviction cannot be brought under § 1983. See Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir.2002) (“[Hjabeas Corpus [rather than § 1983] is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.”) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)). And insofar as Mr. Spencer seeks damages for his ACNA convictions, that claim is, as the district court explained, currently barred by Heck v. Humphrey 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (damages action under § 1983 is not cognizable if a judgment in the plaintiffs favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the] conviction or sentence,” and the conviction and sentence have not been reversed, vacated, or otherwise invalidated.).

AFFIRMED.

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PER CURIAM:

James Spencer, a convicted sex offender, is currently incarcerated for 2006 and 2007 violations of the Alabama Community Notification Act, Ala.Code § 15-20-20 et seq. (repealed July 1, 2011). He filed a lawsuit against several Alabama officials *499 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, for various reasons, the ACNA could not be constitutionally applied to him. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Mr. Spencer, proceeding pro se, now appeals. Exercising plenary review, see, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 911 (11th Cir.2007), we affirm.

We read pro se briefs liberally, see Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512, 514 n. 2 (11th Cir.1991), but even so it is difficult to figure out what arguments Mr. Spencer is making on appeal. He does not, for example, list any specific issues. Nor does he say why he believes the district court erred. In a prior appeal by Mr. Spencer, we noted the same problems. See Spencer v. King, 333 Fed.Appx. 488, 489 (11th Cir.2009) (“Although we construe pro se filings liberally, Spencer’s appeal gives us very little to work with.”).

The one argument we think we can discern from the brief is Mr. Spencer’s contention that the ACNA — and specifically its residency and registration requirements — cannot be constitutionally applied to him because of ex post facto and equal protection concerns. The problem for Mr. Spencer is that a challenge to a criminal conviction cannot be brought under § 1983. See Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir.2002) (“[Hjabeas Corpus [rather than § 1983] is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release.”) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)). And insofar as Mr. Spencer seeks damages for his ACNA convictions, that claim is, as the district court explained, currently barred by Heck v. Humphrey 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (damages action under § 1983 is not cognizable if a judgment in the plaintiffs favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the] conviction or sentence,” and the conviction and sentence have not been reversed, vacated, or otherwise invalidated.).

AFFIRMED.

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524 F. App'x 498, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/james-edward-spencer-v-bob-riley-ca11-2013.

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