James Edward Hughes v. State

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: August 22, 1997
• Docket: 01C01-9605-CC-00188
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED JULY 1997 SESSION August 22, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk

JAMES EDWARD HUGHES, ) NO. 01C01-9605-CC-00188 a.k.a. LARRY WAYNE HUGHES ) ) Appellant ) RUTHERFORD COUNTY ) V. ) HON. J.S. DANIEL, JUDGE ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction) ) Appellee ) )

FOR THE APPELLANT FOR THE APPELLEE

Cheryl J. Skidmore John Knox Walkup 629 East Main Street Attorney General and Reporter Hendersonville, Tennessee 37075 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493 (appeal only) Eugene J. Honea Assistant Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493

William C. Whitesell District Attorney General Judicial Building, third floor Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130

OPINION FILED:______

AFFIRMED William M. Barker, Judge Opinion

The Appellant, James Edward Hughes, appeals as of right the Rutherford

County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On July 10,

1985, the Appellant pled guilty to robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. On

December 9, 1993, the Appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

The District Court used the robbery conviction to enhance the Appellant’s sentence.

The Appellant filed this post-conviction relief petition to overturn the Rutherford County

robbery conviction in order to have his sentence in the federal penitentiary reduced.

On March 21, 1996, without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the

petition, ruling that it was barred by the statute of limitations.

Pursuant to the now-repealed Post-Conviction Procedure Act, the statute of

limitation applicable to the Appellant’s post-conviction claims was three years.1 Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). That three-year period began running on

July 1, 1986, the effective date of the statute. The last day on which the Appellant

could have filed such a petition was in July of 1989. See e.g. State v. Mullins, 767

S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Smith v. State, 757 S.W.2d 683, 685

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1988); Abston v. State, 749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The

Appellant’s petition was filed in March of 1996, more than six years after the statute

expired. Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed the Appellant’s petition.

Any contention by the Appellant that the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act,

effective May 10, 1995, provided him with a one-year window of opportunity within

which to file his post-conviction petition is meritless. Similar attempts to circumvent

the statute of limitations in this manner have been previously rejected by panels of this

1 Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Post-Conviction Procedure Act, no statute of limitations for post-conviction applications existed.

2 Court. See Roy Barnett v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9512-CV-00394 (Tenn. Crim.

App., Knoxville, Feb. 20, 1997); Stephen Koprowski v. State, C.A.A. No. 03C01-9511-

CC-00365 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Jan. 28, 1997); Johnny L. Butler v. State,

C.C.A. No. 02C01-9509-CR-00289 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Dec. 2, 1996). But

see Arnold Carter v. State, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9509-CC-00270 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Knoxville, July 11, 1996).

Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the Appellant’s petition for post-

conviction relief is affirmed.

__________________________ WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE

CONCUR:

__________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE

__________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE