James Earl Truitt v. United States

Fifth Circuit

James Earl Truitt v. United States

409 F.2d 569, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 12965

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedApril 4, 1969

Docket26125_1

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 409 F.2d 569 (James Earl Truitt v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

James Earl Truitt v. United States, 409 F.2d 569, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 12965 (5th Cir. 1969).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was convicted by a jury of forging the endorsement of the payee on the back of a U. S. Treasury check in order to obtain currency. (18 U.S.C. § 495). On appeal, he complains first of the failure of the trial judge to give a cautionary instruction as to the weight to be accorded the testimony of a handwriting expert. The case on which he relies, United States v. Acosta, 4th Cir. 1966, 369 F.2d 41, 42 fn. 3, suggests that such an instruction is desirable where the only or major evidence of guilt is that of a handwriting expert, but in this case there was independent evidence of a substantial nature. Testimony indicated appellant’s presence at the place where the check was taken, and appellant’s signature, as well as the forged endorsement by the payee, appeared on the back of the check. Moreover, the trial judge advised the jury to give the expert testimony “such weight as you think it deserves.” His failure to say more was not the subject of an objection and did not approach plain error.

Finally, appellant contends that the charge was defective because it did not include the element of intent. On the contrary, a reading of the entire charge reveals that the jury was fully instructed that illegal purpose or intent was a necessary element of the offense.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM:

Appellant was convicted by a jury of forging the endorsement of the payee on the back of a U. S. Treasury check in order to obtain currency. (18 U.S.C. § 495). On appeal, he complains first of the failure of the trial judge to give a cautionary instruction as to the weight to be accorded the testimony of a handwriting expert. The case on which he relies, United States v. Acosta, 4th Cir. 1966, 369 F.2d 41, 42 fn. 3, suggests that such an instruction is desirable where the only or major evidence of guilt is that of a handwriting expert, but in this case there was independent evidence of a substantial nature. Testimony indicated appellant’s presence at the place where the check was taken, and appellant’s signature, as well as the forged endorsement by the payee, appeared on the back of the check. Moreover, the trial judge advised the jury to give the expert testimony “such weight as you think it deserves.” His failure to say more was not the subject of an objection and did not approach plain error.

Finally, appellant contends that the charge was defective because it did not include the element of intent. On the contrary, a reading of the entire charge reveals that the jury was fully instructed that illegal purpose or intent was a necessary element of the offense.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

409 F.2d 569, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 12965, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/james-earl-truitt-v-united-states-ca5-1969.

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