James Earl Bender v. Commonwealth

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedFebruary 23, 1999
Docket0176981
StatusUnpublished

This text of James Earl Bender v. Commonwealth (James Earl Bender v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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James Earl Bender v. Commonwealth, (Va. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Bray and Senior Judge Overton ∗ Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

JAMES EARL BENDER MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY v. Record No. 0176-98-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON FEBRUARY 23, 1999 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON Walter J. Ford, Judge

Charles E. Haden for appellant.

Robert H. Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

James Earl Bender (defendant) appeals his conviction of

forcible sodomy, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1. Defendant

presents five questions for review: (1) was the evidence

sufficient to support the verdict, (2) did the trial court err

when it denied defendant's motion for a continuance, (3) did the

trial court err when it ruled that defense counsel could not ask

the victim about her past history of drug use and prostitution

before laying a proper foundation, (4) did the trial court err by

admitting into evidence a prior sexual felony conviction when the

∗ Judge Overton participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on January 31, 1999 and thereafter by his designation as a senior judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401, recodifying Code § 17-116.01:1. ∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. Commonwealth filed a notice with an incorrect date of the

conviction, and (5) was the chain of custody sufficient to admit

into evidence a gun found in defendant's car? Because we hold

that the trial court did not err, we affirm.

The parties are fully conversant with the record in this

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedental

value, no recitation of the facts is necessary.

Defendant first asserts that the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction. When the sufficiency of the evidence

is challenged on appeal, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth and grant to it all reasonable

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v.

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). We

may not disturb the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or

unsupported by the evidence. See Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.

App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). Viewed in this light,

we cannot say that defendant's forcible sodomy conviction was

erroneous.

"In prosecutions for rape, an accused may be convicted upon

the sole and uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix." Lear

v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 187, 193, 77 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1953).

Similarly, if the trial court found the victim's testimony to be

credible, and the testimony established that defendant committed

forcible sodomy, then no further evidence was necessary. The

victim testified that defendant threatened her with a gun, took

her in his car to a secluded location and engaged in anal

- 2 - intercourse with her against her will. Notwithstanding

defendant's testimony to the contrary, see Lea v. Commonwealth,

16 Va. App. 300, 303, 429 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1993), such evidence

supports the conviction, and we affirm.

Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred when it

denied his motion for a continuance. Defendant requested the

continuance because one of his witnesses, Officer Hanrahan of the

City of Hampton Police Department, failed to respond to her

subpoena. The decision to grant a continuance is submitted to

the trial court's sound discretion, and we may not reverse that

decision unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion or is

"plainly wrong." Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501, 508, 450

S.E.2d 146, 151 (1994). When the reason for the continuance is

to secure an absent witness, the proponent of the motion must

show that due diligence was used to secure the witness' presence

and that the witness was material. See Shifflet v. Commonwealth,

218 Va. 25, 30, 235 S.E.2d 316, 319-20 (1977). A witness is

material if her testimony tends "'to establish a probability or

improbability . . . of a fact in issue' at the defendant's

trial." Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 697, 701, 432 S.E.2d

514, 516 (1993) (quoting Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App.

380, 388, 399 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1990)).

Defendant proffered that Officer Hanrahan was the first

officer to interview the victim. He did not proffer what effect

this might have had on the evidence or any possible prejudice

that might result from Officer Hanrahan's absence. In fact,

- 3 - several people interviewed the victim and two of them, Officer

Lewis Johnson and Detective Pat Orr, testified at trial. What

effect Officer Hanrahan's testimony would have made is not

apparent from the record and had defendant desired to preserve

the issue, he should have proffered his rationale for materiality

of the witness. We cannot base a reversal on defendant's

unfounded suspicion that Officer Hanrahan's testimony would have

been anything but duplicative of the other officers' testimony.

Therefore, we affirm the trial court's refusal to grant the

continuance.

Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by

stopping defendant from asking the victim about her past history

of drug use or prostitution until defendant laid a proper

foundation for the questions. The trial court ruled that such

questions were highly inflammatory, prejudicial and outside the

scope of direct examination. Therefore, defendant's request to

explore these subjects was denied unless defendant could first

introduce some other evidence that established the subjects were

relevant. "'Once a [witness] has testified as to certain

matters, the proper scope of cross examination lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court.'" Fisher v. Commonwealth,

16 Va. App. 447, 455, 431 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1993) (citation

omitted). The trial court may limit cross-examination to those

matters explored through the witness' direct testimony. See

Stewart v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 563, 567, 394 S.E.2d 509,

512 (1990).

- 4 - Later in the trial defendant testified that the victim was a

prostitute who agreed to intercourse in exchange for money to

purchase drugs. Defendant's testimony established a basis for

further questioning of the victim regarding these issues. "If a

party desires to question an opponent's witness about matters not

covered on direct examination, the proper course is to wait and

call the witness as a part of the party's own case-in-chief,

thereby making the witness the party's own." C. Friend, The Law

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Related

Lebedun v. Commonwealth
501 S.E.2d 427 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1998)
Gibbs v. Commonwealth
432 S.E.2d 514 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Smith v. Commonwealth
248 S.E.2d 805 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1978)
Stewart v. Commonwealth
394 S.E.2d 509 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1990)
Shifflett v. Commonwealth
235 S.E.2d 316 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1977)
Ferrell v. Commonwealth
399 S.E.2d 614 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1990)
Traverso v. Commonwealth
366 S.E.2d 719 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Lea v. Commonwealth
429 S.E.2d 477 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Bassett v. Commonwealth
284 S.E.2d 844 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1981)
Cardwell v. Commonwealth
450 S.E.2d 146 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1994)
Pope v. Commonwealth
360 S.E.2d 352 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1987)
Lear v. Commonwealth
77 S.E.2d 424 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1953)
Fisher v. Commonwealth
431 S.E.2d 886 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Crews v. Commonwealth
442 S.E.2d 407 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1994)
Higginbotham v. Commonwealth
218 S.E.2d 534 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1975)
Smith v. Stanley
75 S.E. 742 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1912)

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