James E. Saylor v. State of Indiana ex rel. Department of Workforce Development (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 25, 2020
• Docket: 20A-CC-343
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 25 2020, 8:31 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE James E. Saylor Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Carlisle, IN Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James E. Saylor, November 25, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CC-343 v. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lawrence County State of Indiana ex rel. The Honorable Nathan Nikirk, Department of Workforce Judge Development, Trial Court Cause No. Appellee-Plaintiff 47C01-0411-CC-1357

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 1 of 10 [1] James E. Saylor 1 appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in

favor of the State of Indiana ex. rel. Department of Workforce Development

(“DWD”). He argues the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him

and the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of DWD. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1. Administrative Action [2] Saylor received unemployment compensation insurance benefits from July 19,

2003, until November 22, 2003. On April 20, 2004, DWD mailed a

determination of eligibility letter to Saylor seeking repayment of the benefits

given to Saylor between October 10, 2003, and November 22, 2003, because

Saylor was incarcerated during that period and, thus, ineligible for benefits.

Saylor requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and the

ALJ set the matter for hearing on July 1, 2004. Saylor did not appear at the

appeal hearing, and the ALJ dismissed Saylor’s appeal. The notice of dismissal

stated the ALJ’s “determination will become final unless the party requesting

the appeal files a written request for reinstatement within seven days from the

mailing date of this Notice and shows good cause why the appeal should be

1 Saylor is currently incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction serving sentences for Class A felony child molesting, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (1998), and Class B felony vicarious sexual gratification, Ind. Code 35-42-4-5 (2003). His earliest possible release date is February 14, 2075. Indiana Department of Correction Offender Search [https://perma.cc/CVN4-GL73].

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 2 of 10 reinstated.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 125.) Saylor did not take any

additional action at the administrative level.

2. Collection Action [3] On November 29, 2004, DWD filed a complaint in the Lawrence County

Superior Court 2 alleging Saylor had not fully repaid the illegal unemployment

benefits he received. DWD moved for default judgment after Saylor failed to

appear in the collection action. The court granted the State’s motion on

September 6, 2005, and entered judgment in the State’s favor for $1,731.

[4] Saylor filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule

60(B) on June 27, 2016. In his motion for relief from judgment, Saylor stated

that he was not aware the court had entered default judgment against him until

he learned DWD intercepted his 2015 state and federal income tax refunds.

The trial court denied his motion, and Saylor appealed to this court. We held

the trial court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over Saylor due to

inadequate service, and we remanded the case with instructions for the trial

court to vacate the default judgment entered against Saylor. Saylor v. State,

47A04-1611-CC-2641, 2018 WL 895547, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2018).

We did not address the other arguments Saylor raised on appeal, concluding the

“issues should be addressed on remand.” Id. at *1 n.3.

2 The case was later transferred to the Lawrence County Circuit Court pursuant to a change in the local rules.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 3 of 10 [5] On March 1, 2018, Saylor filed a “Motion for Return of Property Seized by

State Agency” in the trial court, and he subsequently amended the motion.

(Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 2.) In response to Saylor’s amended motion, DWD

argued,

as Respondent has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this Court through his requests for relief and various motions, the Department requests that the Court take judicial notice of its personal jurisdiction over Respondent in this matter, so as to allow the Department to move forward with the proceedings towards obtaining judgment against Respondent.

(Id. at 17.)

[6] Following a hearing in which Saylor appeared telephonically, the trial court

denied Saylor’s motion for return of property and found he had submitted

himself to the personal jurisdiction of the court. The trial court went on to

explain that because the initial default judgment granted to DWD “was

determined by the Indiana Court of Appeals to be void on a procedural basis

(lack of personal jurisdiction), and not due to any factual basis or invalid claim,

the substantive nature of the claim has not changed and [DWD] still has a right

to pursue a final judgment.” (Id. at 45.) Saylor attempted to pursue a

discretionary interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order on his motion for

return of property, but we denied the motion for interlocutory appeal on

December 5, 2018. Saylor v. State, 18A-CC-02580, slip op. at *2. (Ind. Ct. App.

Dec. 5, 2018).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 4 of 10 [7] Saylor subsequently filed a motion to dismiss DWD’s complaint pursuant to

Indiana Trial Rule 41 on January 9, 2019, and the trial court denied Saylor’s

motion on February 5, 2019. DWD filed a motion for summary judgment on

December 6, 2019. DWD argued the administrative order finding Saylor

illegally received unemployment benefits while incarcerated was a final agency

order not subject to collateral attack and, therefore, DWD was entitled to

collect on that action. Saylor argued the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction

over him because DWD never properly served him, and he argued the ALJ’s

order dismissing his appeal in the administrative action was not a valid agency

action. On January 10, 2020, the trial court granted DWD’s motion for

summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of DWD for $1,621.76.

Discussion and Decision [8] Initially, we note Saylor proceeds before this court pro se. A pro se litigant “is

held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent

leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17

N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to

follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the

consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. Pro se litigants have “‘no license to harass

others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already

overloaded court dockets.’” Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 266 (quoting Farguson v.

MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 5 of 10 A. Personal Jurisdiction [9] Saylor argues DWD never properly served him and, therefore, the trial court

never acquired personal jurisdiction over him. “Personal jurisdiction is the

court’s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process and render a valid

judgment over a person. The existence of personal jurisdiction over a defendant

is a constitutional requirement to rendering a valid judgment, mandated by the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Keesling v. Winstead, 858

N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). It is generally within the trial court’s discretion to determine facts that

may decide whether the court possesses personal jurisdiction over a litigant. Id.

However, once those jurisdictional facts are determined, the existence of

personal jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. at

1001.

[10] An individual “who seeks affirmative relief from a court voluntarily submits

himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and is thereafter estopped from

challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction.” Sims v. Beamer, 757 N.E.2d 1021,

1025 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Similarly, a litigant “can waive lack of personal

jurisdiction and submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or

appears and does not contest the lack of jurisdiction.” Heartland Resources, Inc.

v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Even if a party timely

objects to jurisdiction, it may still be estopped from raising a jurisdictional

challenge ‘if subsequent actions by the [party] go beyond matters of defense and

seek affirmative relief from the court.’” Allen v. Proksch, 832 N.E.2d 1080, 1096-

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 6 of 10 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Hotmix & Bituminous Equip. Inc. v. Hardrock

Equip. Corp., 719 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans.

denied).

[11] Our first opinion in the collection action vacated the default judgment entered

against Saylor, but it did not prohibit DWD from continuing to pursue the

collection action. See Saylor v. State, 47A04-1611-CC-2641, 2018 WL 895547, at

*1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2018). On remand, Saylor sought affirmative relief

from the trial court when he petitioned the court to order DWD to return his

intercepted tax refunds. Thus, Saylor submitted himself to the trial court’s

jurisdiction, and the trial court had personal jurisdiction over him when it

granted DWD’s motion for summary judgment in 2020. See Allen, 832 N.E.2d

at 1097 (holding father estopped from challenging trial court’s jurisdiction over

child custody case when father filed motion to modify custody and information

for contempt in the court).

B. DWD’s Summary Judgment Motion [12] Saylor also argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor

of DWD. Our standard for reviewing a trial court’s order on summary

judgment is well-settled.

We review summary judgment using the same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016). All facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the non-

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 7 of 10 moving party. City of Beech Grove v. Beloat, 50 N.E.3d 135, 137 (Ind. 2016). Where the challenge to summary judgment raises questions of law, we review them de novo. Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 320.

ONB Ins. Group, Inc. v. Estate of Megel, 107 N.E.3d 484, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018),

reh’g denied, trans. denied. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to

resolve the truth of the matter; a fact is ‘material’ if its resolution affects the

outcome of the case.” Henderson v. Kleinman, 103 N.E.3d 683, 686 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2018) (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)).

[13] A party cannot collaterally attack a final agency action in a suit to enforce the

action. In Yellow Cab Co. of Bloomington, Inc. v. Williams, the Yellow Cab

Company sought judicial review of the Bloomington Human Rights

Commission’s order directing the company to pay $1500 to Williams after a cab

driver refused to serve Williams because of her race. 583 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. The Yellow Cab Company did not timely file the

agency record, and the trial court dismissed the company’s petition for judicial

review. Id. The Commission then filed a petition to enforce its administrative

action when the Yellow Cab Company failed to pay Williams. Id. at 777. We

held that because the Yellow Cab Company failed to comply with the statutory

procedures for challenging the Commission’s action through a petition for

judicial review, the Yellow Cab Company could not collaterally attack the

administrative order in a proceeding to enforce the administrative order. Id. at

779. Like the Yellow Cab Company, Saylor did not avail himself of the proper

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 8 of 10 procedures to contest the administrative action, and therefore, he may not

collaterally attack the administrative action in the present collection action.

[14] Saylor further contends, “If this matter had been dismissed, the summary

judgment could not be filed. Since the dismissal was warranted under Trial

Rule 41, summary judgment should not have been available to DWD and the

order should be reversed.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) Trial Rule 41(E) outlines a

procedure for dismissing a case due to failure to prosecute if no action has been

taken in the case for a period of sixty days. Saylor attempted to appeal the trial

court’s order denying his motion for return of property. The chronological case

summary indicates the completion of clerk’s record was filed on November 16,

2018, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. See Ind. Appellate Rule 8 (“The

Court on Appeal acquires jurisdiction on the date the Notice of Completion of

Clerk’s Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.”). We remanded

the case back to the trial court on December 5, 2018, and Saylor filed his

motion to dismiss only thirty-five days later, on January 9, 2019. Therefore,

Saylor’s motion was premature and the trial court properly denied it. 3 The

trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of DWD because

3 Saylor asserts the trial court “threatened Saylor with monetary penalties that he could and cannot afford,” and he “was denied Due Process of Law.” (Appellant’s Br. at 8.) However, Saylor fails to develop such arguments in his brief, and they are consequently waived. See Tavake v. State, 131 N.E.3d 696, 702 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding appellant waived argument regarding alleged jury instruction error because he failed to develop a cogent argument on appeal), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court in a civil action may order a party to pay the opposing party’s attorney fees if the party continues to litigate an “action or defense after the party’s claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless[.]” Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b). Thus, Saylor has not demonstrated error.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 9 of 10 Saylor did not properly contest DWD’s administrative action and his

arguments in the collection action to avoid enforcement of the ALJ’s order lack

support in law. See Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 952 N.E.2d 817, 831 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2011) (holding trial court properly granted collection agency’s motion for

summary judgment in action to collect medical debt), trans. denied.

Conclusion [15] We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for DWD because

the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Saylor and DWD is entitled to

enforce the ALJ’s decision requiring Saylor to repay unemployment benefits he

illegally obtained.

[16] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CC-343 | November 25, 2020 Page 10 of 10