ACCEPTED 04-14-00658-CR FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 4/6/2015 4:25:34 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK
No. 04-14-00658-CR In the FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS For the 4/6/2015 4:25:34 PM Fourth Judicial District of Texas KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk San Antonio, Texas No. 365341 In the County Criminal Court at Law No. 12 Of Bexar County, Texas JAMES SALDANA Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF NICHOLAS “NICO” LAHOOD Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texas JOSHUA SOMERS Assistant Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texas Paul Elizondo Tower 101 West Nueva Street San Antonio, Texas 78205 Phone: (210) 335-2311 Fax: (210) 335-2313 Email: Joshua.Somers@bexar.org State Bar No. 24047261 Attorneys for the State of Texas STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 39.7, the State requests oral
argument only if oral argument is requested by appellant.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(1)(A), a complete list
of names of all interested parties is provided below.
Counsel for the State:
Nicholas “Nico” LaHood – Criminal District Attorney of Bexar County
Joshua Somers – Assistant Criminal District Attorney on appeal
Joshua Sandoval – Assistant Criminal District Attorney at trial
Erica Pena – Assistant Criminal District Attorney at trial
Appellant or Criminal Defendant:
James Saldana
Counsel for Appellant:
James C. Oltersdorf – Attorney on appeal
Joseph Echavarria – Attorney at trial
Trial Judge:
Honorable Scott Roberts
i TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............................................................................... 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 3
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR ......................................... 4
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ............................................................................. 11
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 13
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ............................................................. 4
Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) .............................................................................................. 5
Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ......................................................... 5, 10
Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ...............................................6, 7, 9, 10
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........................................................... 4, 5
Kuykendall v. State, 335 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, pet. ref'd) ........................................ 8, 9
Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ............................................................. 4
Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ............................................................. 4
Solano v. State 371 S.W.3d 5s93 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) ............................7, 9, 10
State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ............................................................. 5
Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ............................................................. 4
Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ...................................................... 5, 6, 10
iii RULES
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) ................................................................................................12
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) ...........................................................................................12
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A) .................................................................................... i
TEX. R. APP. P. 39.7.................................................................................................... i
iv No. 04-14-00658-CR
JAMES SALDANA § IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT § VS. § COURT OF APPEALS § STATE OF TEXAS § SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
BRIEF FOR THE STATE
To the Honorable Fourth Court:
Now comes, Nicholas “Nico” LaHood, Criminal District Attorney of Bexar
County, Texas, and files this brief for the State.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with the misdemeanor offense of
driving while intoxicated (CR 33). Trial counsel for appellant filed a motion to
suppress and a suppression hearing was held on May 14, 2014 (CR 29-32, 2 RR 1).
The court heard testimony from one witness in the hearing, Officer Christopher
Torres, and the State stipulated that the arrest was a warrantless arrest (2 RR 4-5).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the State argued that the officer acted pursuant to
his community-caretaking purpose (2 RR 30). The trial court subsequently denied
appellant’s motion to suppress (2 RR 33). On May 19, 2014, the trial court made
findings of fact and conclusions of law (3 RR 1-6), and Appellant pled guilty to
driving while intoxicated on August 13, 2014 (CR 49). Appellant’s trial counsel
1 filed a notice of appeal and the presiding judge signed the trial court’s certification
of defendant’s right to appeal on the same day (CR 42, 46). An amended trial
court’s certification of defendant’s right to appeal was later signed by the presiding
judge on December 28, 2014 (CR 7).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 26, 2011, Officer Christopher Torres with the City of Alamo
Heights, was travelling southbound on Broadway Avenue (2 RR 7). While
stopped at a red light with his windows down, he “heard a loud bang” and then
looked to his left and observed appellant’s pick-up truck exiting a parking lot (2
RR 7-8). Officer Torres turned onto the 100 block of Elizabeth and saw
appellant’s vehicle “stop somewhat in the middle of the roadway” (2 RR 8).
Officer Torres next observed appellant and his passenger both exit their vehicle,
and he stopped directly behind them (2 RR 8). After appellant and his passenger
exited their vehicle, they walked to the rear of the truck (2 RR 8). At this point,
Officer Torres activated the emergency lights in his patrol vehicle (2 RR 8).
In the suppression hearing, Officer Torres testified that he had not initiated a
traffic stop, rather he activated his lights “just to check on their welfare” (2 RR 8-
9). He testified, “I exited my vehicle, approached the defendant who was looking
in the rear of his truck. I made contact with them at first to say, you know, is
2 everything okay?” (2 RR 9). In discussing his reasoning for making contact with
appellant, he explained, “When I first observed them outside of their vehicle, they
were looking at the rear of their pickup truck as if maybe to look for some damage,
which would correlate with the loud bang that I heard them possibly striking
something in the parking lot from which they exited” (2 RR 12). Upon
encountering appellant, Officer Torres detected signs of intoxication and
conducted a DWI investigation (2 RR 9). The initial contact was made at 12:58
a.m. (2 RR 7).
During the course of the suppression hearing, Officer Torres emphasized
that the primary purpose of the encounter was to conduct a welfare check “to make
sure that they didn’t need any type of assistance” (2 RR 12). He testified, “My
intent was to conduct a welfare check after they exited their vehicle,” and, more
specifically, that his “intent was to get close to the vehicle and observe it for any
type of damage” (2 RR 19).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to
suppress. Officer Torres properly invoked his community-caretaking function,
because he was primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose and he
had a reasonable belief that appellant needed help. In viewing the evidence in the
3 light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, this Court should affirm the trial
court’s decision.
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR
I. Standard of Review for Motions to Suppress Evidence
Texas appellate courts review trial court decisions on motions to suppress
evidence for abuse of discretion. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, the
reviewing court evaluates the trial court’s ruling under a bifurcated standard.
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The reviewing
court first views all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s
ruling. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
“[A]lmost total deference [is given] to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts that are supported by the record, particularly if the findings of fact are based
on credibility and demeanor.” Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 262 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012); see also Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(explaining that courts must give the prevailing party “the strongest legitimate
view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence”). Courts also give “almost total deference . . . to a trial judge’s ruling on
mixed questions of law and fact that depend upon evaluations of credibility and
demeanor.” Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. However, “when mixed questions of law
4 and fact do not depend on evaluation of credibility and demeanor, [courts] review
the trial judge’s ruling de novo.” Id. In addition, “[a]ll purely legal questions are
reviewed de novo.” State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011).
II. Applicable Law Regarding the Community-Caretaking Exception
In Cady v. Dombroski, the United States Supreme Court established the
“community-caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement in recognizing that
police officers may contact citizens without probable cause or reasonable suspicion
that an offense has occurred “and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be
described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.” Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 447-48 (1973). The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals recognized the community-caretaking exception in Wright v.
State, holding that “[a]s part of his duty to ‘serve and protect’ a police officer may
stop and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the
circumstances, would believe is in need of help.” Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148,
151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (emphasis in original). However, “a police officer
may not properly invoke his community caretaking function if he is primarily
motivated by a non-community caretaking purpose.” Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d
272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
5 Since recognizing this exception, the Court of Criminal Appeals has
developed a two-prong test to determine whether a police officer has properly
invoked his community-caretaking function: (1) the officer must be primarily
motivated by his community-caretaking purpose; and (2) the officer must
reasonably believe that the individual was in need of help. Gonzales v. State, 369
S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In Wright, the Court of Criminal
Appeals listed factors courts could consider in determining the reasonableness of
an officer’s belief that an individual needs assistance: (1) the nature and level of
distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether
or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that
offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual—if not assisted—
presented a danger to himself or others. Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151-52. The Court of
Criminal Appeals later clarified that “[t]he Wright factors were intended to assist
courts in determining reasonableness in this context, they are not elements of
reasonableness.” Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 855.
Pursuant to this standard, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Gonzales found
that the two-prong test was satisfied in a DWI case in which a police officer, while
sitting at a red light just before 1:00 a.m., observed a defendant’s vehicle pull off
of the road and come to a stop on the shoulder just a short distance ahead. Id. at
853. Believing that the driver needed assistance, the officer activated his front-
6 facing and rear-facing lights and pulled behind the vehicle. Id. The officer
testified that the sole reason he pulled behind the driver was “to check on them, see
if they had a flat tire, if everything was okay, if maybe they were lost” and “to see
if he was . . . having trouble, if he needed assistance.” Id. (quotations original).
The Court held that the officer “could have reasonably concluded that [the driver]
was suffering from distress resulting from car trouble, a flat tire, or running out of
gas—a distress no less significant to an officer’s function as a public servant.” Id.
at 856 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Solano v. State, a deputy pulled in front of a driver’s vehicle
and activated his emergency lights after seeing the vehicle pull to the side of the
road and raise its hood. Solano v. State, 371 S.W.3d 593, 594 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2012, no pet.). This caused the deputy to “want[] to make sure that
everything was fine, everything was running.” Id. (quotations original). The
Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for possession of a
controlled substance and held that the initial interaction “could be justified as an
instance of an officer legitimately exercising his community caretaking function.”
Id. at 595. The Seventh Court of Appeals specifically noted that “it is within the
realm of reasonable debate to infer from seeing a car on the side of a road with its
hood up that those occupying the vehicle are experiencing car troubles.” Id.
7 The Ninth Court of Appeals also affirmed a defendant’s conviction for
possession of a controlled substance under similar facts. Kuykendall v. State, 335
S.W.3d 429, 435 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, pet. ref'd). In Kuykendall v. State, police
officers “decided to stop and check on the welfare of [a] truck because the truck
was parked on the side of the road with parking lights on, no residences or streets
were within close distance, and it was an extremely dark area.” Id. (international
quotations marks omitted). One of the officers testified that under those
circumstances, “we are going to turn around and check and make sure the driver is
okay, make sure they are not having any kind of medical problems or something
along those lines. If they are broke down, we will get them a tow truck or
whatever we need to do to help them out.” Id. (quotations marks original).
III. Officer Torres Properly Invoked His Community-Caretaking Function
Officer Torres conducted a lawful encounter of appellant and properly
invoked his community-caretaking function in accordance with the two-prong test
established by the Court of Criminal Appeals. First, Officer Torres was primarily
motivated by a community-caretaking purpose, and second, he had a reasonable
belief that appellant was in need of help.
Throughout the course of the suppression hearing, Officer Torres testified
that his intent was to conduct a welfare check of appellant to see whether
appellant’s vehicle was damaged and whether he needed any type of assistance.
8 Officer Torres stated that he simply wanted to see whether appellant was “okay.”
Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Officer Torres’s belief
that appellant was in need of help was a reasonable belief. It was late at night,
appellant was stopped in the middle of the roadway, and appellant had exited his
truck and appeared to be checking the rear of the truck for damage. Given that
Officer Torres heard the “loud bang” just as appellant was pulling out of a parking
lot and then observed appellant stop and check the rear of this truck, it was
reasonable for Officer Torres to infer that the vehicle had sustained damage.
The facts of this case are analogous to Gonzales, Solano, and Kuykendall. In
all three of those cases, the courts found that an officer checking on an individual
who may be experiencing car trouble acted pursuant to his community-caretaking
purpose. Just as the Court of Criminal Appeals found in Gonzales that an officer
who checked on a driver pulled off on the side of the road conducted a lawful
encounter under the community-caretaking exception, so should this court hold in
the present case that Officer Torres conducted a lawful encounter to see whether
appellant, who had stopped toward the middle of the road, had damaged his vehicle
and needed assistance. All three of these cases also stand for the proposition that
an encounter is not escalated into any sort of detention requiring reasonable
suspicion or probable cause just because an officer activates his emergency lights.
In Solano, for example, the officer activated his emergency lights when checking
9 on a vehicle with its hood up. Officer Torres thus did not escalate his encounter
into a detention by turning on his lights to check on appellant’s vehicle stopped in
the middle of the road.
Appellant’s reliance on the facts of Corbin is misplaced. The Court of
Criminal Appeals’s decision in Corbin involved an actual traffic stop, as opposed
to an officer checking on the welfare of a vehicle already stopped on the side of or
in the middle of the roadway experiencing apparent car troubles. Appellant also
lists the Wright factors to support his argument. But, as noted in Gonzales, these
factors merely serve to provide guidance to the lower courts in evaluating the
reasonableness of an officer’s belief. They are not elements of reasonableness per
se. Officer Torres’s decision to check on a vehicle stopped in the middle of the
road late at night after it might have been damaged is exactly the sort of law
enforcement conduct the community-caretaking exception was designed to allow.
For these reasons, and in giving due deference to the trial court’s role as the
finder of fact and judge of the credibility of Officer Torres’s testimony, appellee
requests that this court hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and
affirm the trial court’s decision.
10 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the State of Texas submits
that the judgment of the trial court should, in all things, be AFFIRMED.
Respectfully submitted,
NICHOLAS “NICO” LAHOOD Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texas
/s/ Joshua Somers JOSHUA SOMERS Assistant Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texas Paul Elizondo Tower 101 West Nueva Street San Antonio, Texas 78205 Phone: (210) 335-2311 Fax: (210) 335-2313 Email: Joshua.Somers@bexar.org State Bar No. 24047261
11 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i), the undersigned
attorney certified that there are 2,174 words in the foregoing computer-generated
document, based upon the representation provided by the word processing program
that was used to create the document, and excluding the portion of the document
exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Joshua Somers JOSHUA SOMERS Assistant Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texas Paul Elizondo Tower 101 West Nueva Street San Antonio, Texas 78205 Phone: (210) 335-2311 Fax: (210) 335-2313 Email: Joshua.Somers@bexar.org State Bar No. 24047261
12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has
been mailed to James C. Oltersdorf, appellant’s attorney of record on appeal, at the
following address on: April 6, 2014.
James C. Oltersdorf 509 South Main Street San Antonio, Texas 78204
/s/ Joshua Somers JOSHUA SOMERS Assistant Criminal District Attorney Bexar County, Texas Paul Elizondo Tower 101 West Nueva Street San Antonio, Texas 78205 Phone: (210) 335-2311 Fax: (210) 335-2313 Email: Joshua.Somers@bexar.org State Bar No. 24047261