COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Bray and Senior Judge Overton * Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
JAMES D. DAILEY MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY v. Record No. 0327-98-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK FEBRUARY 9, 1999 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS Robert W. Curran, Judge Robert E. Kowalsky, Jr., for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
James D. Dailey (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial
of two counts of burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-91, and
two counts of grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95. On
appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove
his guilt. We agree and reverse the convictions.
I.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
* Judge Overton participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on January 31, 1999 and thereafter by his designation as a senior judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401, recodifying Code § 17-116.01:1. ** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493
S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997).
At trial, the parties stipulated that on November 26, 1996,
and January 8, 1997, two homes in Newport News were burglarized
and that goods valued at more than $200 were stolen from each
home. The Commonwealth's evidence further established that
police investigators recovered various items belonging to the
victims from the American Enterprise Pawn Shop (American
Enterprise). The Commonwealth introduced into evidence police
inventory records and photographs that listed the items recovered
from the pawn shop. Edward Emmerson (Emmerson), an employee of American
Enterprise, testified that on November 26, 1996, appellant
"pawned some items . . . he came in and disposed [sic] some items
that day." Emmerson did not review his notes prior to coming to
court, and he did not have any business records with him.
Additionally, Emmerson could not remember exactly what items
appellant pawned on November 26, 1996, or whether appellant
pawned any items on January 8, 1997.
Appellant was arrested on April 22, 1997, and taken before a
magistrate. The arresting officer, C.T. Hazlegrove (Hazlegrove),
served the warrants on appellant and read him the charges. On
the way to the holding cell, appellant indicated to Hazlegrove
that he was not sure what the charges were about. The officer
told him, "Something about some items that were pawned that were
- 2 - apparently stolen." Appellant responded, "Someone paid me to
pawn some of that stuff." Hazlegrove could not recall whether
appellant said, "that stuff or some stuff."
The Commonwealth then rested, and appellant offered no
evidence. The trial court took the issue of appellant's guilt
under advisement to review the transcript of the testimony and
the applicable case law. The trial court later found appellant
guilty as charged. II.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on
appeal, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the reasonable inferences
fairly deducible from that evidence support each and every
element of the charged offense. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 254
Va. 184, 186, 491 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1997); Derr v. Commonwealth,
242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991). "In so doing, we
must discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of
the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence
favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be
drawn therefrom." Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 349,
494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). We will not reverse the judgment of
the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact in a bench trial,
unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415,
418 (1987).
- 3 - The Commonwealth makes a prima facie case of breaking and
entering against an accused when it proves: (1) "'a breaking and
entering, and a theft of goods'"; (2) "'that both offenses were
committed at the same time, by the same person, as a part of the
same criminal enterprise'"; and (3) "'that the stolen goods
[were] found soon thereafter in the possession of the accused.'"
Cobb v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 418, 421, 494 S.E.2d 899, 901
(1998) (quoting Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 501, 211
S.E.2d 73, 76 (1975)). In the present case, the parties stipulated that two homes
in Newport News were burglarized and that goods valued at more
than $200 were stolen from each home. However, without an
established link to the pawned items, no evidence links appellant
to the burglaries of the homes. None exists. Where a conviction
is based upon circumstantial evidence, "`all necessary
circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence.'" Stover v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.
618, 623, 283 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1981) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)).
"When from the circumstantial evidence, `it is just as likely, if
not more likely,' that a `reasonable hypothesis of innocence'
explains the accused's conduct, the evidence cannot be said to
rise to a level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Littlejohn
v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 401, 414, 482 S.E.2d 853, 859 (1997)
(quoting Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562, 567-68, 458
- 4 - S.E.2d 606, 609 (1995)).
In the instant case, the evidence does not exclude the
reasonable hypothesis that another person committed the crimes.
Although the evidence established, through the testimony of
Emmerson, that appellant pawned some items on November 26, 1996,
there was no evidence presented as to what those items were.
Significantly, Emmerson testified that the pawn shop contract,
which was not introduced into evidence, would have identified
each item, its value and how much was paid for the item.
However, Emmerson did not review his notes prior to trial and
remembered "very little" about the transaction. Additionally,
the witness could not recall whether appellant pawned any items on January 8, 1997. In short, no evidence proved that appellant
pawned the victims' property. 1
Nonetheless, the Commonwealth contends that appellant's
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Bray and Senior Judge Overton * Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
JAMES D. DAILEY MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY v. Record No. 0327-98-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK FEBRUARY 9, 1999 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS Robert W. Curran, Judge Robert E. Kowalsky, Jr., for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
James D. Dailey (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial
of two counts of burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-91, and
two counts of grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95. On
appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove
his guilt. We agree and reverse the convictions.
I.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
* Judge Overton participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on January 31, 1999 and thereafter by his designation as a senior judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401, recodifying Code § 17-116.01:1. ** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493
S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997).
At trial, the parties stipulated that on November 26, 1996,
and January 8, 1997, two homes in Newport News were burglarized
and that goods valued at more than $200 were stolen from each
home. The Commonwealth's evidence further established that
police investigators recovered various items belonging to the
victims from the American Enterprise Pawn Shop (American
Enterprise). The Commonwealth introduced into evidence police
inventory records and photographs that listed the items recovered
from the pawn shop. Edward Emmerson (Emmerson), an employee of American
Enterprise, testified that on November 26, 1996, appellant
"pawned some items . . . he came in and disposed [sic] some items
that day." Emmerson did not review his notes prior to coming to
court, and he did not have any business records with him.
Additionally, Emmerson could not remember exactly what items
appellant pawned on November 26, 1996, or whether appellant
pawned any items on January 8, 1997.
Appellant was arrested on April 22, 1997, and taken before a
magistrate. The arresting officer, C.T. Hazlegrove (Hazlegrove),
served the warrants on appellant and read him the charges. On
the way to the holding cell, appellant indicated to Hazlegrove
that he was not sure what the charges were about. The officer
told him, "Something about some items that were pawned that were
- 2 - apparently stolen." Appellant responded, "Someone paid me to
pawn some of that stuff." Hazlegrove could not recall whether
appellant said, "that stuff or some stuff."
The Commonwealth then rested, and appellant offered no
evidence. The trial court took the issue of appellant's guilt
under advisement to review the transcript of the testimony and
the applicable case law. The trial court later found appellant
guilty as charged. II.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on
appeal, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the reasonable inferences
fairly deducible from that evidence support each and every
element of the charged offense. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 254
Va. 184, 186, 491 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1997); Derr v. Commonwealth,
242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991). "In so doing, we
must discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of
the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence
favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be
drawn therefrom." Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 349,
494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). We will not reverse the judgment of
the trial court, sitting as the finder of fact in a bench trial,
unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415,
418 (1987).
- 3 - The Commonwealth makes a prima facie case of breaking and
entering against an accused when it proves: (1) "'a breaking and
entering, and a theft of goods'"; (2) "'that both offenses were
committed at the same time, by the same person, as a part of the
same criminal enterprise'"; and (3) "'that the stolen goods
[were] found soon thereafter in the possession of the accused.'"
Cobb v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 418, 421, 494 S.E.2d 899, 901
(1998) (quoting Schaum v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 498, 501, 211
S.E.2d 73, 76 (1975)). In the present case, the parties stipulated that two homes
in Newport News were burglarized and that goods valued at more
than $200 were stolen from each home. However, without an
established link to the pawned items, no evidence links appellant
to the burglaries of the homes. None exists. Where a conviction
is based upon circumstantial evidence, "`all necessary
circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence.'" Stover v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.
618, 623, 283 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1981) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)).
"When from the circumstantial evidence, `it is just as likely, if
not more likely,' that a `reasonable hypothesis of innocence'
explains the accused's conduct, the evidence cannot be said to
rise to a level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Littlejohn
v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 401, 414, 482 S.E.2d 853, 859 (1997)
(quoting Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562, 567-68, 458
- 4 - S.E.2d 606, 609 (1995)).
In the instant case, the evidence does not exclude the
reasonable hypothesis that another person committed the crimes.
Although the evidence established, through the testimony of
Emmerson, that appellant pawned some items on November 26, 1996,
there was no evidence presented as to what those items were.
Significantly, Emmerson testified that the pawn shop contract,
which was not introduced into evidence, would have identified
each item, its value and how much was paid for the item.
However, Emmerson did not review his notes prior to trial and
remembered "very little" about the transaction. Additionally,
the witness could not recall whether appellant pawned any items on January 8, 1997. In short, no evidence proved that appellant
pawned the victims' property. 1
Nonetheless, the Commonwealth contends that appellant's
statement to Officer Hazlegrove constituted a spontaneous and
gratuitous comment, which is highly probative of guilt. 2 1 The Commonwealth's reliance upon Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 188, 269 S.E.2d 352 (1980) (per curium), is misplaced. There, the defendant was convicted of grand larceny. At trial, the Commonwealth presented direct evidence that the defendant was the individual who pawned the stolen property. See id. at 189-90, 269 S.E.2d at 352-53. In the present case, there is no such direct evidence. 2 The cases cited by the Commonwealth are inapplicable. See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 374 S.E.2d 303 (1988) (considering the prejudicial value of an untimely disclosed statement); Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 484, 323 S.E.2d 567 (1984) (discussing whether the defendant's spontaneous admission constituted a waiver of his constitutional right to counsel); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 539 (1984) (addressing "other crimes" exceptions).
- 5 - However, the officer's testimony is clear he could not recall
whether appellant indicated that he pawned "that stuff" or "some
stuff." (Emphasis added). Even viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, this statement creates only a
suspicion of guilt.
"Suspicious circumstances, '"no matter how grave or strong,
are not proof of guilt sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.
The actual commission of the crime by the accused must be shown
by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his
conviction."'" Burchette v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 438-39, 425 S.E.2d 81, 86 (1992) (citations omitted). See also
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441 S.E.2d 342, 344
(1994); Littlejohn, 24 Va. App. at 414, 482 S.E.2d at 859. "A
conviction based upon a mere suspicion or probability of guilt,
however strong, cannot stand." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.
App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601-02 (1986).
In summary, although there was some evidence that appellant
"disposed [sic] some items" at the pawn shop on November 26,
1996, there was no evidence indicating what these items were.
Significantly, there was no evidence establishing when the
Furthermore, the case of King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 416 S.E.2d 669 (1992), is distinguishable. Although the defendant's voluntary exclamation in King constituted circumstantial evidence that he was the "trigger man," the defendant also admitted to the police on a prior occasion that he stabbed the victim. See id. at 366, 323 S.E.2d at 547. Thus, there was direct evidence of the defendant's involvement in the crime, which has not been established in the present case.
- 6 - victims' property was left at American Enterprise or who pawned
the property. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say,
as a matter of law, that the Commonwealth proved each element of
the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse
and dismiss the convictions.
Reversed and dismissed.
- 7 -