James D. Christianson, V. Lawrina Marie-alyce Harris

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 13, 2026
• Docket: 86079-8
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

LAWRINA HARRIS, No. 86079-8-I (consolidated with No. 87284-2-I) Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JAMES CHRISTIANSON,

Appellant.

FELDMAN, J. — James Christianson, representing himself, appeals from a

superior court order granting Lawrina Harris’ petition for a permanent domestic

violence protection order (DVPO) against him and denying his petition for a DVPO

against Harris. Christianson does not establish that the superior court abused its

discretion or otherwise erred. We therefore affirm.

I

Christianson and Harris were previously engaged in a dating relationship

and have a history of seeking prior protection orders. Relevant here, Christianson

obtained a one-year DVPO against Harris, which expired on July 5, 2023. Two

days later, on July 7, 2023, Harris petitioned for a permanent antiharassment

protection order to protect herself and her minor child from Christianson’s

“harassing” and “stalking behavior.” Harris alleged that Christianson repeatedly No. 86079-8-I/2 (consolidated with No. 87284-2-I)

uses process servers or postal mail to send “X-rated photos” of her to her home

and landlord, contacts her family members and her daughter’s daycare to spread

false claims about her, and posts malicious content about her on the internet. A

superior court commissioner declined to enter a temporary order of protection and

set the matter for a full hearing. Shortly thereafter, Christianson petitioned for a

DVPO protecting him from Harris.

On August 22, 2023, the superior court commissioner conducted a hearing

addressing both parties’ petitions. After hearing testimony from Christianson and

Harris, the commissioner found Harris credible and determined that “it is more

likely than not that [Christianson] has engaged in acts of domestic violence through

a course of unlawful harassment and coercive control.” The commissioner

therefore granted Harris’ petition and entered a permanent DVPO protecting Harris

and her minor children. The DVPO required Christianson to surrender weapons,

participate in an approved domestic violence perpetrator treatment program,

delete and cease disclosure of intimate images of Harris, and remove all

references to Harris from his social media. The commissioner also denied

Christianson’s petition for a DVPO against Harris, finding that Christianson was

not credible, that his materials are replete with hyperbolic and unsubstantiated

claims, and that he acted to harm Harris. Christianson moved for reconsideration

of both orders, which the commissioner denied.

Christianson then moved to revise the commissioner’s orders. Christianson

and Harris appeared pro se and testified at a revision hearing on October 27, 2023.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the superior court found that Harris “presented

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evidence sufficient to meet her burden of proof of harassment since August 2022

by Mr. Christianson.” But the court did not find that Christianson exercised

coercive control or that the images he posted were “intimate images” as defined in

RCW 9A.86.010(6)(b), and it declined to order weapons surrender or to direct

Christianson to domestic violence treatment. Accordingly, the court denied in part

and granted in part Christianson’s motion for revision and issued a DVPO reflecting

these modifications. The superior court also found that Christianson did not

present evidence sufficient to meet his burden of proof as petitioner and thus

denied his motion to revise the order denying his petition for a DVPO against

Harris. Christianson filed three motions for reconsideration, all of which the

superior court denied. This timely appeal followed.

II

Christianson argues the superior court erred in denying his motion to revise

with regard to both (a) the DVPO against him and (b) the requested DVPO against

Harris. We disagree with both arguments.

A

A commissioner’s decision granting a DVPO is subject to revision by the

superior court. RCW 2.24.050. On a motion to revise, the superior court reviews

the commissioner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo based on the

evidence and issues presented to the commissioner. In re Marriage of Moody,

137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). A superior court’s decision to

grant or deny a DVPO is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Maldonado v.

Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). So, too, is an order

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denying a motion for reconsideration. In re Marriage of Tomsovic, 118 Wn. App.

96, 108, 74 P.3d 692 (2003). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is

manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In

re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014).

Our review of factual findings is also deferential. We view the evidence and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed below.

Garza v. Perry, 25 Wn. App. 2d 433, 453, 523 P.3d 822 (2023). We also defer to

the superior court’s determinations regarding the persuasiveness of the evidence,

witness credibility, and conflicting testimony. In re Vulnerable Adult Pet. for Knight,

178 Wn. App. 929, 937, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014). Our role is simply to determine

whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether

those factual findings support the conclusions of law. In re Marriage of Greene,

97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999). Substantial evidence “exists if the

record contains evidence of a sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational

person of the truth of the declared premise.” In re Marriage of Fahey, 164 Wn. App.

42, 55, 262 P.3d 128 (2011).

Under RCW 7.105.225(1)(a), a court must issue a DVPO if it finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that “the petitioner has been subjected to domestic

violence by the respondent.” Domestic violence includes “unlawful harassment

. . . of one intimate partner by another intimate partner.” RCW 7.105.010(10)(a).

Two people are “intimate partners” if they “have or have had a dating relationship

where both persons are at least 13 years of age or older.” RCW 7.105.010(21)(d).

Unlawful harassment is defined, in relevant part, as

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[a] knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.

RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). “Course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct

composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a

continuity of purpose,” including “any form of communication, contact, or conduct,

including the sending of an electronic communication, but does not include

constitutionally protected free speech.” RCW 7.105.010(7)(a).

B

Contrary to Christianson’s principal argument on appeal, substantial

evidence supports the superior court’s finding that he committed domestic violence

against Harris by unlawfully harassing her. In her DVPO petition, Harris attached

photographs of derogatory materials and images Christianson repeatedly caused

to be delivered to her by process server and mail. Christianson addressed these

documents to “LaLaLuvs You Prostitution Services HQ: Attn Owner Lawrina

Harris.” The superior court found Harris credibly testified that Christianson

personally chauffeurs process servers to her residence and that she received

electronic communications from strangers as a result of Christianson’s postings on

the internet. The record also establishes that Christianson contacted people in

Harris’ life to malign her. And Christianson and Harris are intimate partners

because they had a dating relationship. This evidence is enough to persuade a

fair-minded, rational person that Christianson knowingly and willfully engaged in

an annoying, harassing, or detrimental course of conduct directed at Harris that

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served no legitimate or lawful purpose, as required by RCW 7.105.010(36)(a). And

given Harris’ testimony that Christianson “ruined my reputation” and that her “life

is in shambles” because of his actions, substantial evidence also supports the

statutory requirement that the unlawful course of conduct “must actually cause

substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” RCW 7.105.010(37)(a).

Christianson’s contrary arguments lack merit. Christianson argues the

DVPO was not supported by substantial evidence because his conduct did not

constitute “unlawful harassment” as defined by RCW 7.015.010(37)(a). He asserts

he has not contacted her since May 2022 and contends that service of legal

documents and warning others about her is not harassment. But a harassing

“course of conduct” can include “any form of communication, contact, or conduct.”

RCW 7.105.010(7)(a). The derogatory materials Christianson repeatedly sent to

Harris plainly meet this definition. And although service of process is a legitimate

and lawful purpose for contact, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that Christianson’s “willful conduct goes beyond ordinary service of process

and, together with all the acts, is intended to, and does, alarm, annoy, and cause

detriment to Ms. Harris.”

Christianson also challenges the superior court’s credibility findings and

contends that the court failed to consider Harris’ history of hostility and conflict with

others. In doing so, Christianson asks us to reexamine the evidence and reach a

different conclusion than the superior court below. But “[t]his court does not

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court or reweigh the evidence or the

credibility of the witnesses.” In re Marriage of Weaver, 20 Wn. App. 2d 388, 413,

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505 P.3d 560 (2021). Consistent with the deferential standard of review regarding

factual issues, we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the superior court

here.

Next, Christianson argues the order was barred by claim preclusion (also

referred to as res judicata), issue preclusion (also referred to as collateral

estoppel), and judicial estoppel. Issue preclusion “bars relitigation of particular

issues decided in a prior proceeding,” whereas claim preclusion “bars litigation of

claims that were brought or might have been brought in a prior proceeding.”

Weaver v. City of Everett, 194 Wn.2d 464, 473, 450 P.3d 177 (2019). Judicial

estoppel is “an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an advantage

by asserting one position in a court proceeding and later seeking an advantage by

taking a clearly inconsistent position.” Cunningham v. Reliable Concrete Pumping,

Inc., 126 Wn. App. 222, 224-25, 108 P.3d 147 (2005). Whether these doctrines

apply is a question of law reviewed de novo. Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wn. App. 891,

899, 222 P.3d 99 (2009).

Christianson argues Harris’ claims are barred because they were already

litigated and dismissed in her four previous petitions for orders of protection against

him. Relatedly, he asserts that the superior court’s order is not based on new

allegations. But the superior court expressly found that “[r]es judicata does not bar

Ms. Harris’s claims, which are based on current harassment today upon

consideration of the totality of circumstances, with a focus on conduct from August

2022 to the present.” The record before us does not include the report of

proceedings from the August 22, 2023 hearing before the commissioner, so no

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evidence supports Christianson’s assertion that the commissioner announced on

the record that she was “going to waive res judicata” and allow the whole history

of the parties’ disputes to be relitigated. And because Christianson argues that

Harris’ positions were the same, not that they were inconsistent, judicial estoppel

does not apply.

Next, Christianson argues both the superior court and the commissioner

below displayed judicial bias and violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. We

generally review claims of judicial bias under the appearance of fairness doctrine,

which states that “a judicial proceeding is valid only if a reasonably prudent and

disinterested person would conclude that all parties obtained a fair, impartial, and

neutral hearing.” In re Marriage of Meredith, 148 Wn. App. 887, 903, 201 P.3d

1056 (2009). A party claiming an appearance of fairness violation must present

specific evidence of a violation; mere speculation is not enough. Tatham v.

Rogers, 170 Wn. App. 76, 96, 283 P.3d 583 (2012). Applying these principles

here, Christianson’s judicial bias claims easily fail. He principally claims “overt

egregious bias” is the only possible explanation for the superior court’s orders, but

substantial evidence supported the superior court’s rulings so the outcome does

not demonstrate bias. He also claims the superior court commissioner was

incapable of treating him objectively because he filed a complaint alleging that the

commissioner violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. This purely speculative

assertion is not evidence of bias.

Lastly, Christianson argues “[t]he disregard for due process was egregious”

because he “was not served and didn’t get to see pleadings or claims before the

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hearing.” He insists that he was treated “like a black man in Jim Crow South or

like a Japanese citizen during [World War] 2 or a woman victim of assault before

rape shield laws.” But the amended DVPO contains findings stating that

Christianson was served and had actual notice of the hearing. And the superior

court expressly found that “[t]he proceedings were regularly conducted and all

parties were given an opportunity to present materials and testimony.” The record

amply supports these findings. The superior court did not abuse its discretion, or

otherwise err, in entering the DVPO protecting Harris and her minor child.

C

Turning to the requested DVPO against Harris, substantial evidence also

supports the superior court’s order denying Christianson’s motion to revise the

commissioner’s order denying Christianson’s petition. The record shows that

Christianson’s evidence and testimony consists largely of documents and

affidavits from other matters and allegations regarding Harris’ character that were

not relevant to his claim that she committed domestic violence against him during

the previous year. In its written order, the superior court noted that credible

evidence showed Harris threatened Christianson by text in August 2022, but that

there is no persuasive evidence that Harris thereafter harassed him or pursued

any contact with him during the following year. Christianson alleged that Harris

posed as “yousofake” to harass him via Instagram in May 2023. But Harris denied

this under oath, and Christianson’s claims to the contrary were speculative at best.

Christianson also submitted minutes from a January 23, 2023 district court hearing

in support of his claim that Harris harassed him at the hearing. But the superior

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court found that no witnesses corroborated this claim and that Christianson’s

credibility was diminished by evidence that he redacted information about his

arguably negative behavior and by his admission that he failed to disclose all court

actions between the parties in his petition. We will not reweigh this evidence or

disturb the court’s credibility determinations. Knight, 178 Wn. App. at 937. And as

discussed above, Christianson has not shown that the proceedings were

procedurally deficient.

III

Because the superior court’s rulings were not manifestly unreasonable or

based on untenable grounds, it did not abuse its discretion by denying

Christianson’s motion to revise the commissioner’s orders.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: