James Copeland v. Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon.com Services LLC; and Does 1 through 20, inclusive

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 5, 2025·No. 2:25-cv-00445·Unknown

Opinion

Douglas E. Dexter (State Bar No. 115868) ddexter@fbm.com Kevin L. Jones (State Bar No. 324068) kjones@fbm.com Benjamin R. Buchwalter (State Bar No. 301130) bbuchwalter@fbm.com Margaret J.C. Salisbury (State Bar No. 354442) msalisbury@fbm.com Farella Braun + Martel LLP One Bush Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, California 94104 Telephone: (415) 954-4400 Facsimile: (415) 954-4480

Attorneys for Defendant AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SACRAMENTO DIVISION JAMES COPELAND, Case No. 2:25-cv-0445-TLN-JDP

Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER vs. Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson AMAZON.COM, INC.; AMAZON.COM Courtroom 9, 13th Floor SERVICES LLC; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Trial Date: None Set.

Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between Plaintiff James Copeland (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC (collectively “Defendants”) (collectively “the parties”), through their respective attorneys of record, hereby stipulate for the purpose of jointly requesting that the honorable Court enter a protective order regarding confidential documents and information in this matter (and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, 7, and 26, as well as, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Cal. Local Rule 141, 141.1, 143, and 251) as follows: 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve the production of confidential, proprietary, sensitive, and/or private information that has not been disseminated to the public, which is not readily discoverable by competitors, and has been the subject of reasonable efforts by the parties to maintain its secrecy. Such information warrants special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to the following Stipulated Protective Order, which, among other things, identifies categories of “CONFIDENTIAL” information and items, and how the parties may use and disclose such information and items. Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(3), the Parties request that this Court “So Order” the following Stipulated Protective Order to ensure that the parties have sufficient recourse if they cannot resolve a dispute amongst themselves; need to modify any terms of this Order; and/or if a third party violates the terms of this Order. The parties acknowledge that this Stipulated Protective Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Paragraph 13.4, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 141 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the Court to A. Good Cause Statement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, the parties stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery, and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under applicable legal principles. The parties recognize that, generally, the public can gain access to litigation documents and information produced during discovery unless the party opposing disclosure shows “good cause” why a protective order is necessary. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable, necessary uses of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this case. Particularized Need for Protection: Pursuant to Local Rule141.1(c)(2), Defendants assert that there exists a specific, particularized need for protection as to the information covered by this stipulated protective order. Defendants represented to the Court and Plaintiff that the materials designated to be covered by this stipulated protective order are limited solely to those which would qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and does not include information designated on a blanket or indiscriminate basis. See, e.g., In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, Showing of Need for a Protective Order: Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(c)(3), protection afforded by this stipulated protective order is for the convenience of Defendants and the Court. Defendants seek to avoid litigation and expenditure of resources concerning a potential motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The entry of this stipulated protective order may prevent the parties and the Court from conducting the usual document-by-document analysis necessary to obtain protection, in favor of a procedure whereby presumptive protection is afforded based on Defendants’ good faith representations of the need for protection. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he burden of justifying the confidentiality of each and every document sought to be covered by a protective order remains on the party seeking the protective order; any other conclusion would turn Rule 26(c) on its head.”). As a result, production may be made with this stipulated protective order in place and, if necessary, it will permit discrete and narrowed challenges to documents designated for protection. B. Statement Pursuant to L.R. 141.1 In accordance with the provisions of Local Rule 141.1, the parties state as follows: (1) L.R. 141.1(c)(1): The information eligible for a protective order in this case is: a. Medical records of parties and non-parties, including but not limited to records of medical, psychological, or psychiatric diagnosis and/or treatment, which records may contain private health information and other sensitive and private personal identifying information b. Personnel information, including compensation information, evaluations, investigation-related documents, or ot

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James Copeland v. Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon.com Services LLC; and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

James Copeland v. Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon.com Services LLC; and Does 1 through 20, inclusive (James Copeland v. Amazon.com, Inc.; Amazon.com Services LLC; and Does 1 through 20, inclusive) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or.
661 F.3d 417 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
785 F.2d 1108 (Third Circuit, 1986)