RENDERED: JUNE 12, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1442-ME
JAMES BRIAN SNOW APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DAVID CURLIN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-D-00050-002
LORNA COOPER SNOW APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND A. JONES, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: James Brian Snow (Appellant) appeals from an
order of protection/domestic violence order (DVO) entered by the Henderson
Circuit Court, Family Court Division. Appellant raises several arguments,
including his claims that certain events did not constitute domestic violence, and
that the DVO was not supported by substantial evidence. After careful review, we
find no error and affirm the order on appeal. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant and Lorna Cooper Snow (Appellee) are in the midst of a
dissolution of marriage proceeding in Henderson Family Court.1 As part of that
proceeding, the parties entered into an agreed order on May 14, 2024. That order
provided that Appellee would reside in the parties’ house with access to the garage,
while Appellant would live in a separate addition to the main residence. Per the
agreed order, the parties were to have no contact with each other and were not to
interfere with any mail addressed to the other party. Appellant was to cease all
audio or video recording inside the residence.
Shortly after the entry of that order, Appellee alleged that Appellant
was violating the order by walking around the property and looking into the
windows. In response, Appellee installed exterior video cameras. She later
introduced several video exhibits showing Appellant walking around the property,
which she alleged violated the agreed order. She also alleged that her vehicle tires
were flattened.
Appellee would later testify that she was terrified of Appellant and did
not feel safe around him. Appellee’s housekeeper, Diane Nunnelly,2 testified that
1 No. 24-CI-00254. 2 Nunnelly’s name has more than one spelling in the record.
-2- she recorded a video of Appellant walking around the property and yelling in the
direction of Nunnelly.
On July 5, 2024, Appellee filed a motion for contempt, arguing that
Appellant violated the May 14, 2024, agreed order by sending her over 100 text
messages. Appellant stipulated to contempt, and on September 13, 2024, the
circuit court found Appellant to be in contempt for violating the agreed order. It
fined Appellant $250, to be awarded to Appellee’s counsel. On October 9, 2024,
the court entered a calendar order/docket sheet summarizing the facts, and
reiterating the terms of the agreed order. It ordered that Appellant could not walk
around the addition where he was living, except to walk to his vehicle. It further
ordered that Appellant could possess no firearms in the addition or in his vehicle.
Appellee then alleged that Appellant continued to violate the court’s
orders restricting his movement around the residence and contact with Appellee.
On October 26, 2024, Appellee filed a petition seeking an order of protection,
resulting in an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) being issued on that date. The
petition was filed outside of the dissolution action, under Action No. 24-D-00050-
002.
A hearing on the matter was conducted on November 4, 2024, where
Nunnelly and two sheriff’s deputies testified. The deputies had previously
investigated an incident involving Appellant holding a gun in the presence of
-3- Appellee, after which no charges were filed against either party. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the circuit court issued a DVO against Appellant. In support of the
DVO, the court found that domestic violence had occurred and was likely to occur
again. Specifically, the court found that Appellant had repeatedly violated prior
orders of the court; that Appellee testified that she was afraid of Appellant; that
testimony was adduced that Appellant brandished a weapon near Appellee, and
threatened to kill Appellee and her children either intentionally or by accident; and,
that Appellant had destroyed cameras installed by Appellee to protect her.
On November 5, 2024, Appellant moved to amend the DVO, to allow
him exclusive use of an Elm Street residence, which was a restricted location
pursuant to the DVO. The court did not immediately rule on the motion. On
November 21, 2024, Appellee filed a motion to hold Appellant in contempt for
violating the DVO.
On November 29, 2024, Appellant filed the instant appeal from the
issuance of the DVO. Thereafter, this Court entered several orders holding the
appeal in abeyance pending resolution of various matters before the circuit court,
including Appellant’s motion seeking recusal of Judge David Curlin and a motion
to modify the DVO.
On December 5, 2025, this Court entered an order returning the
appeal to the active docket. This appeal followed.
-4- STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a domestic violence order, the question is not whether
we would have decided the matter differently. Gibson v. Campbell-Marletta, 503
S.W.3d 186, 190 (Ky. App. 2016). Rather, we must determine if the circuit court’s
findings were clearly erroneous and if the decision constituted an abuse of
discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s ruling is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Henderson Family Court committed
reversible error in issuing the DVO. He maintains that the court erred in treating
certain oral statements of the court as binding orders; that events occurring in
January 2024, and October 2024, do not constitute domestic violence; that
Appellee was never in fear of Appellant; and, that the DVO impermissibly
punishes alleged contempt rather than addressing domestic violence. The focus of
Appellant’s claim of error, though, is that the court’s finding that domestic
violence had occurred and was likely to occur again was not supported by
substantial evidence and was clearly erroneous.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.720(1) defines domestic violence as “physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury,
-5- sexual abuse, or assault between family members . . . .” When entering a DVO, the trial court determines that a petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of domestic violence has occurred and may again occur. See KRS 403.750(1). See also Bissell v. Baumgardner, 236 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Ky. App. 2007). In order to enter a DVO, the trial court must decide that a petitioner is more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007) (quotations omitted).
Gibson, 503 S.W.3d at 189-90.
Turning to the matter before us, the question for our consideration is
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RENDERED: JUNE 12, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1442-ME
JAMES BRIAN SNOW APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DAVID CURLIN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-D-00050-002
LORNA COOPER SNOW APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND A. JONES, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: James Brian Snow (Appellant) appeals from an
order of protection/domestic violence order (DVO) entered by the Henderson
Circuit Court, Family Court Division. Appellant raises several arguments,
including his claims that certain events did not constitute domestic violence, and
that the DVO was not supported by substantial evidence. After careful review, we
find no error and affirm the order on appeal. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant and Lorna Cooper Snow (Appellee) are in the midst of a
dissolution of marriage proceeding in Henderson Family Court.1 As part of that
proceeding, the parties entered into an agreed order on May 14, 2024. That order
provided that Appellee would reside in the parties’ house with access to the garage,
while Appellant would live in a separate addition to the main residence. Per the
agreed order, the parties were to have no contact with each other and were not to
interfere with any mail addressed to the other party. Appellant was to cease all
audio or video recording inside the residence.
Shortly after the entry of that order, Appellee alleged that Appellant
was violating the order by walking around the property and looking into the
windows. In response, Appellee installed exterior video cameras. She later
introduced several video exhibits showing Appellant walking around the property,
which she alleged violated the agreed order. She also alleged that her vehicle tires
were flattened.
Appellee would later testify that she was terrified of Appellant and did
not feel safe around him. Appellee’s housekeeper, Diane Nunnelly,2 testified that
1 No. 24-CI-00254. 2 Nunnelly’s name has more than one spelling in the record.
-2- she recorded a video of Appellant walking around the property and yelling in the
direction of Nunnelly.
On July 5, 2024, Appellee filed a motion for contempt, arguing that
Appellant violated the May 14, 2024, agreed order by sending her over 100 text
messages. Appellant stipulated to contempt, and on September 13, 2024, the
circuit court found Appellant to be in contempt for violating the agreed order. It
fined Appellant $250, to be awarded to Appellee’s counsel. On October 9, 2024,
the court entered a calendar order/docket sheet summarizing the facts, and
reiterating the terms of the agreed order. It ordered that Appellant could not walk
around the addition where he was living, except to walk to his vehicle. It further
ordered that Appellant could possess no firearms in the addition or in his vehicle.
Appellee then alleged that Appellant continued to violate the court’s
orders restricting his movement around the residence and contact with Appellee.
On October 26, 2024, Appellee filed a petition seeking an order of protection,
resulting in an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) being issued on that date. The
petition was filed outside of the dissolution action, under Action No. 24-D-00050-
002.
A hearing on the matter was conducted on November 4, 2024, where
Nunnelly and two sheriff’s deputies testified. The deputies had previously
investigated an incident involving Appellant holding a gun in the presence of
-3- Appellee, after which no charges were filed against either party. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the circuit court issued a DVO against Appellant. In support of the
DVO, the court found that domestic violence had occurred and was likely to occur
again. Specifically, the court found that Appellant had repeatedly violated prior
orders of the court; that Appellee testified that she was afraid of Appellant; that
testimony was adduced that Appellant brandished a weapon near Appellee, and
threatened to kill Appellee and her children either intentionally or by accident; and,
that Appellant had destroyed cameras installed by Appellee to protect her.
On November 5, 2024, Appellant moved to amend the DVO, to allow
him exclusive use of an Elm Street residence, which was a restricted location
pursuant to the DVO. The court did not immediately rule on the motion. On
November 21, 2024, Appellee filed a motion to hold Appellant in contempt for
violating the DVO.
On November 29, 2024, Appellant filed the instant appeal from the
issuance of the DVO. Thereafter, this Court entered several orders holding the
appeal in abeyance pending resolution of various matters before the circuit court,
including Appellant’s motion seeking recusal of Judge David Curlin and a motion
to modify the DVO.
On December 5, 2025, this Court entered an order returning the
appeal to the active docket. This appeal followed.
-4- STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a domestic violence order, the question is not whether
we would have decided the matter differently. Gibson v. Campbell-Marletta, 503
S.W.3d 186, 190 (Ky. App. 2016). Rather, we must determine if the circuit court’s
findings were clearly erroneous and if the decision constituted an abuse of
discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s ruling is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Henderson Family Court committed
reversible error in issuing the DVO. He maintains that the court erred in treating
certain oral statements of the court as binding orders; that events occurring in
January 2024, and October 2024, do not constitute domestic violence; that
Appellee was never in fear of Appellant; and, that the DVO impermissibly
punishes alleged contempt rather than addressing domestic violence. The focus of
Appellant’s claim of error, though, is that the court’s finding that domestic
violence had occurred and was likely to occur again was not supported by
substantial evidence and was clearly erroneous.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.720(1) defines domestic violence as “physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury,
-5- sexual abuse, or assault between family members . . . .” When entering a DVO, the trial court determines that a petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of domestic violence has occurred and may again occur. See KRS 403.750(1). See also Bissell v. Baumgardner, 236 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Ky. App. 2007). In order to enter a DVO, the trial court must decide that a petitioner is more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007) (quotations omitted).
Gibson, 503 S.W.3d at 189-90.
Turning to the matter before us, the question for our consideration is
whether the court abused its discretion in finding that Appellant committed acts of
domestic violence and that such acts may occur again. English, 993 S.W.2d at
945; Gibson, 503 S.W.3d at 190. Because the preponderance of the evidence
standard is applied, we must determine whether the circuit court properly found
that it was more likely than not that Appellant committed acts of domestic violence
and that they may occur again. Gibson, 503 S.W.3d at 190.
In examining this issue below, the court made specific findings in
support of the DVO. The court found that 1) Appellant repeatedly violated prior
orders in the dissolution proceeding that were in place to protect Appellee; 2)
Appellee had steadfastly testified that she was afraid of Appellant; 3) Appellant
brandished a weapon and threated to kill Appellee; and, 4) Appellant destroyed
video cameras installed by Appellee to protect her from potential harm.
-6- As noted above, the question is not whether we would have decided
the matter differently; rather, we must determine if the circuit court’s findings were
clearly erroneous and if the decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. Here,
the circuit court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. The court largely accepted
Appellee’s testimony and her version of the events. It is entitled to make this
determination, as it is best situated to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Appellee’s testimony, taken alone,
constitutes substantial evidence sufficient for us to conclude that the circuit court’s
findings were not clearly erroneous. In addition, the court’s conclusions of law
were properly grounded in KRS Chapter 403. Further, and as acknowledged by
Appellant in his sixth motion to hold this appeal in abeyance, the dissolution
proceeding was “very related” to the instant DVO proceeding. Judge David Curlin
presided over both matters, and rendered the orders in the dissolution proceeding
which Appellant was accused of violating. Appellee’s testimony taken alone,
however, constitutes substantial evidence sufficient to conclude that the circuit
court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm the order of protection/domestic violence
order of the Henderson Circuit Court, Family Court Division.
-7- COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JONES, A., JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Austin P. Vowels Jesse A. Mudd Henderson, Kentucky William B. McGee Louisville, Kentucky
-8-