James B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, W.D. Virginia·Decided February 25, 2026·No. 5:25-cv-00007·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT HARRIFSIOLENDB URG, VA FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 02/25 /2026

Harrisonburg Division LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLERK BY: /s/ Amy Fansler JAMES B., ) DEPUTY CLERK Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-00007 ) v. ) REPORT & RECOMMENDATION ) FRANK BISIGNANO, ) By: Joel C. Hoppe Commissioner of Social Security, ) United States Magistrate Judge Defendant. ) Plaintiff James B. asks this Court to review the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434. ECF No. 1. The case is before me by referral under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having considered the administrative record (“R.”), ECF No. 7, the parties’ briefs, ECF Nos. 16, 18, 19, and the applicable law, I find that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not correctly apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c to a consultative examiner’s medical opinion that James’s impairments prevent him from lifting or carrying more than five pounds and that the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the opinion are not supported by substantial evidence, R. 30–31 (citing R. 849–56). Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the presiding District Judge reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and remand the matter under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Standard of Review The Social Security Act authorizes this Court to review the Commissioner’s final decision that a person is not entitled to disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court’s role, however, is limited—it may not “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment” for that of agency officials. Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Instead, a court reviewing the merits of the Commissioner’s final decision asks only whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence in the existing record supports the ALJ’s factual findings. Meyer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011); see Riley v. Apfel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 572, 576 (W.D. Va. 2000) (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98–100

(1991)). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, id., but not necessarily “a large or considerable amount of evidence,” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). See Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019). Substantial-evidence review considers the entire record and not just the evidence cited by the ALJ. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487–89 (1951); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1984). Ultimately, a court must affirm the ALJ’s factual findings if “conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005). However, “[a]

factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law.” Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). II. Legal Framework A person is “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he or she is unable to engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Social Security ALJs follow a five-step process to determine if a claimant is disabled. The ALJ asks, in sequence, whether the claimant (1) is working; (2) has a severe impairment that satisfies the Act’s duration requirement; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals an impairment listed in the Act’s regulations; (4) can return to his or her past relevant work based on his or her residual functional capacity; and, if not (5) whether he or she can perform other work. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460–62 (1983); Lewis v. Berryhill,

858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861. “At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant can perform other work that ‘exists in significant numbers in the national economy,’ considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 635 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.960(c)(2), 416.1429); accord 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1560, 404.929. “The Commissioner typically offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert responding to a hypothetical that incorporates the claimant’s limitations” and vocational factors. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635; see Britt v. Saul, 860 F. App’x 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Mascio,

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Heckler v. Campbell
461 U.S. 458 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Pierce v. Underwood
487 U.S. 552 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Coffman v. Bowen
829 F.2d 514 (Fourth Circuit, 1987)
Meyer v. Astrue
662 F.3d 700 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)
Jimmy Radford v. Carolyn Colvin
734 F.3d 288 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
Jolly v. Barnhart
465 F. Supp. 2d 498 (D. South Carolina, 2006)
Riley v. Apfel
88 F. Supp. 2d 572 (W.D. Virginia, 2000)
Melkonyan v. Sullivan
501 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Bonnilyn Mascio v. Carolyn Colvin
780 F.3d 632 (Fourth Circuit, 2015)
George Monroe v. Carolyn Colvin
826 F.3d 176 (Fourth Circuit, 2016)
Stacy Lewis v. Nancy Berryhill
858 F.3d 858 (Fourth Circuit, 2017)
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888 F.3d 686 (Fourth Circuit, 2018)
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