Supreme Court of Florida FRIDAY, JULY 24, 2026
James Aren Duckett, SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Appellant(s) Lower Tribunal No(s).: v. 351987CF001347AXXXXX
State of Florida, Appellee(s)
James Aren Duckett is a prisoner under sentence of death. In
February, Governor Ron DeSantis signed a warrant directing that
sentence to be carried out. Due to post-warrant litigation, Duckett
is now scheduled to be executed at 12:00 noon on Tuesday, July
28, 2026. At issue here is the circuit court’s denial of Duckett’s
sixth successive postconviction motion and his second post-warrant
motion for DNA testing. We affirm the circuit court’s rulings. 1 We
therefore deny Duckett’s motion for a stay of execution.
To recap briefly, almost forty years ago, Duckett was convicted
of the sexual battery and first-degree murder of eleven-year-old
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Two
Teresa McAbee. 2 Shortly after Duckett’s warrant was signed, he
filed a motion pursuant to section 925.11, Florida Statutes, and
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 seeking DNA testing of a
sample taken from the victim’s underwear. 3 He also filed his fifth
successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The circuit court granted his DNA
request but denied his rule 3.851 motion. We stayed Duckett’s
execution to allow for DNA testing to be completed. Ultimately, the
results of that testing did not exonerate Duckett. Accordingly, we
affirmed the denial of Duckett’s rule 3.851 motion, denied his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and lifted our stay of execution.
See Duckett v. State, No. SC2026-0449, 2026 WL 1970442, at *1
(Fla. July 8, 2026).
Subsequently, Duckett filed another motion for DNA testing, in
2. The facts of Duckett’s case are recounted more fully in our prior opinion. See Duckett v. State, No. SC2026-0449, 2026 WL 1970442, at *1-3 (Fla. July 8, 2026).
3. The sample was a swab containing a small number of sperm heads. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Three
which he sought testing of several other items. 4 He also filed his
sixth successive motion for postconviction relief. The circuit court
summarily denied both motions. Duckett appeals.
We begin with the circuit court’s summary denial of Duckett’s
latest motion for postconviction DNA testing. As an initial matter,
this motion is procedurally barred. Duckett was aware of the items
he now wants tested when he filed his prior motion for DNA testing
on March 5, 2026—more than four months ago. See Reynolds v.
State, 373 So. 3d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 2023). He has failed to identify
any valid reason he could not have requested this testing sooner.
Id. at 1127 n.6.
Duckett’s motion for postconviction DNA testing is also
meritless. As the circuit court noted, the record clearly shows that
the items Duckett now wants to test contain no identifiable or
testable genetic material. 5 Thus, the motion does not “includ[e] a
4. These included cuttings from the victim’s underwear and jeans, vaginal swabs and smears, fingernail scrapings, and the packaging containing some of these items.
5. When these items were examined in 2003, no DNA was found on them because they either were degraded or did not CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Four
description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be tested.”
§ 925.11(2)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); see also Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.853(b)(1) (same).
We next address the summary denial of Duckett’s sixth
successive postconviction motion. As alluded to above, the circuit
court previously granted Duckett’s request for DNA testing on a
sample taken from the victim’s underwear. Duckett acknowledged
that the testing would destroy the sample, rendering future testing
impossible. The sample was sent to a private laboratory in
Deerfield Beach, Florida, to be tested using a process known as
Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP), which “allows for more
reliable DNA testing of small, deteriorated samples.” Duckett v.
State, 431 So. 3d 990, 992 (Fla. 2026). 6 Specifically, the laboratory
used a ForenSeq Kintelligence Kit. As expected, the specimen was
totally consumed in the testing process.
In his sixth successive postconviction motion, Duckett argued
contain any DNA in the first place.
6. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement currently does not have the capability to perform SNP testing. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Five
that the State violated his due process rights by declining his
request to send the sample to a laboratory in Texas that uses an
SNP testing method known as Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS).
Relying on Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), he alleges the
State destroyed the sample in bad faith. 7 We disagree.
Under Youngblood, 8 if potentially exculpatory evidence is
“totally consumed” as a result of testing ordered by the State, due
process is violated only if the defendant can “show bad faith by the
State in failing to preserve [the] evidence.” McDonald v. State, 952
So. 2d 484, 494-95 (Fla. 2006) (citing King v. State, 808 So. 2d
1237, 1242-43 (Fla. 2002)). As we have explained, a finding of bad
faith requires that the State intentionally destroy evidence it
believes would exonerate the defendant. See Guzman v. State, 868
7. Duckett also cites California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), but that case does not apply here because the exculpatory value of the sample was not “apparent.” Id. at 489.
8. Youngblood involved the alleged destruction of evidence by the State during testing performed before trial. See 488 U.S. at 54. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this issue in the postconviction process, but for purposes of this opinion we assume its reasoning applies. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Six
So. 2d 498, 509 (Fla. 2003) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57).
Duckett has failed to show bad faith. First of all, the State
agreed to test the sample using a newer DNA technology that only a
private laboratory could perform. Moreover, given that the sample
was small and deteriorated, the parties knew the sample would be
consumed in the process and that an inconclusive result was
possible—perhaps probable. The total consumption of the sample
without conclusive results was an unfortunate byproduct of the
testing that Duckett himself requested.
Furthermore, the State gave reasonable grounds for its
objection to the Texas laboratory testing. For one, the State wanted
to keep the sample in Florida. Additionally, the State believed WGS
would unreasonably delay Duckett’s execution and that the
laboratory it chose could provide adequate testing. The State’s
actions under these circumstances do not amount to bad faith.
Consequently, Duckett cannot prevail on his Youngblood claim.
For the reasons given above, we affirm the summary denial of
Duckett’s rule 3.853 motion and sixth successive rule 3.851 CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Seven
motion. Having rejected Duckett’s claims on appeal, we decline to
stay his execution. No motion for rehearing will be considered.
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Supreme Court of Florida FRIDAY, JULY 24, 2026
James Aren Duckett, SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Appellant(s) Lower Tribunal No(s).: v. 351987CF001347AXXXXX
State of Florida, Appellee(s)
James Aren Duckett is a prisoner under sentence of death. In
February, Governor Ron DeSantis signed a warrant directing that
sentence to be carried out. Due to post-warrant litigation, Duckett
is now scheduled to be executed at 12:00 noon on Tuesday, July
28, 2026. At issue here is the circuit court’s denial of Duckett’s
sixth successive postconviction motion and his second post-warrant
motion for DNA testing. We affirm the circuit court’s rulings. 1 We
therefore deny Duckett’s motion for a stay of execution.
To recap briefly, almost forty years ago, Duckett was convicted
of the sexual battery and first-degree murder of eleven-year-old
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Two
Teresa McAbee. 2 Shortly after Duckett’s warrant was signed, he
filed a motion pursuant to section 925.11, Florida Statutes, and
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853 seeking DNA testing of a
sample taken from the victim’s underwear. 3 He also filed his fifth
successive motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.851. The circuit court granted his DNA
request but denied his rule 3.851 motion. We stayed Duckett’s
execution to allow for DNA testing to be completed. Ultimately, the
results of that testing did not exonerate Duckett. Accordingly, we
affirmed the denial of Duckett’s rule 3.851 motion, denied his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and lifted our stay of execution.
See Duckett v. State, No. SC2026-0449, 2026 WL 1970442, at *1
(Fla. July 8, 2026).
Subsequently, Duckett filed another motion for DNA testing, in
2. The facts of Duckett’s case are recounted more fully in our prior opinion. See Duckett v. State, No. SC2026-0449, 2026 WL 1970442, at *1-3 (Fla. July 8, 2026).
3. The sample was a swab containing a small number of sperm heads. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Three
which he sought testing of several other items. 4 He also filed his
sixth successive motion for postconviction relief. The circuit court
summarily denied both motions. Duckett appeals.
We begin with the circuit court’s summary denial of Duckett’s
latest motion for postconviction DNA testing. As an initial matter,
this motion is procedurally barred. Duckett was aware of the items
he now wants tested when he filed his prior motion for DNA testing
on March 5, 2026—more than four months ago. See Reynolds v.
State, 373 So. 3d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 2023). He has failed to identify
any valid reason he could not have requested this testing sooner.
Id. at 1127 n.6.
Duckett’s motion for postconviction DNA testing is also
meritless. As the circuit court noted, the record clearly shows that
the items Duckett now wants to test contain no identifiable or
testable genetic material. 5 Thus, the motion does not “includ[e] a
4. These included cuttings from the victim’s underwear and jeans, vaginal swabs and smears, fingernail scrapings, and the packaging containing some of these items.
5. When these items were examined in 2003, no DNA was found on them because they either were degraded or did not CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Four
description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be tested.”
§ 925.11(2)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); see also Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.853(b)(1) (same).
We next address the summary denial of Duckett’s sixth
successive postconviction motion. As alluded to above, the circuit
court previously granted Duckett’s request for DNA testing on a
sample taken from the victim’s underwear. Duckett acknowledged
that the testing would destroy the sample, rendering future testing
impossible. The sample was sent to a private laboratory in
Deerfield Beach, Florida, to be tested using a process known as
Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP), which “allows for more
reliable DNA testing of small, deteriorated samples.” Duckett v.
State, 431 So. 3d 990, 992 (Fla. 2026). 6 Specifically, the laboratory
used a ForenSeq Kintelligence Kit. As expected, the specimen was
totally consumed in the testing process.
In his sixth successive postconviction motion, Duckett argued
contain any DNA in the first place.
6. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement currently does not have the capability to perform SNP testing. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Five
that the State violated his due process rights by declining his
request to send the sample to a laboratory in Texas that uses an
SNP testing method known as Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS).
Relying on Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), he alleges the
State destroyed the sample in bad faith. 7 We disagree.
Under Youngblood, 8 if potentially exculpatory evidence is
“totally consumed” as a result of testing ordered by the State, due
process is violated only if the defendant can “show bad faith by the
State in failing to preserve [the] evidence.” McDonald v. State, 952
So. 2d 484, 494-95 (Fla. 2006) (citing King v. State, 808 So. 2d
1237, 1242-43 (Fla. 2002)). As we have explained, a finding of bad
faith requires that the State intentionally destroy evidence it
believes would exonerate the defendant. See Guzman v. State, 868
7. Duckett also cites California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), but that case does not apply here because the exculpatory value of the sample was not “apparent.” Id. at 489.
8. Youngblood involved the alleged destruction of evidence by the State during testing performed before trial. See 488 U.S. at 54. The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this issue in the postconviction process, but for purposes of this opinion we assume its reasoning applies. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Six
So. 2d 498, 509 (Fla. 2003) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57).
Duckett has failed to show bad faith. First of all, the State
agreed to test the sample using a newer DNA technology that only a
private laboratory could perform. Moreover, given that the sample
was small and deteriorated, the parties knew the sample would be
consumed in the process and that an inconclusive result was
possible—perhaps probable. The total consumption of the sample
without conclusive results was an unfortunate byproduct of the
testing that Duckett himself requested.
Furthermore, the State gave reasonable grounds for its
objection to the Texas laboratory testing. For one, the State wanted
to keep the sample in Florida. Additionally, the State believed WGS
would unreasonably delay Duckett’s execution and that the
laboratory it chose could provide adequate testing. The State’s
actions under these circumstances do not amount to bad faith.
Consequently, Duckett cannot prevail on his Youngblood claim.
For the reasons given above, we affirm the summary denial of
Duckett’s rule 3.853 motion and sixth successive rule 3.851 CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Seven
motion. Having rejected Duckett’s claims on appeal, we decline to
stay his execution. No motion for rehearing will be considered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs with an opinion. TANENBAUM, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
LABARGA, J., concurring.
While I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the
summary denial of relief, I strongly disagree with the dissent’s
characterization of Duckett’s postconviction motion as frivolous
and, even more so, with the suggestion that Duckett’s counsel
should be ordered to show cause why sanctions should not be
levied against them.
In these most serious of cases, where death warrants have
been signed and execution dates are imminent, counsel on both
sides have a solemn obligation to the process. They are guided by
their professional and ethical responsibilities, with the
understanding that even those condemned to death and facing
execution are entitled to access to our courts. CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Eight
TANENBAUM, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
As the majority notes in the margin, Youngblood stems from
pre- or in-trial due process concerns, similar to those addressed in
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976); and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
The defendant does not have the same rights to due process
regarding post-conviction DNA testing under section 925.11, Florida
Statutes, certainly not after all that has transpired in this case.
After all, what would be the relief if the defendant had
demonstrated that the State destroyed samples in bad faith—
decades after he was put on death row? Vacate his murder
conviction and let him walk? Commute his sentence? Even
presuming its application here for the sake of argument is a
perilous analytical road to go down.
The defendant’s latest, and presumably last, post-conviction
motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 was both
time-barred and frivolous, undoubtedly filed only for the purpose of
unreasonably delaying his execution further. We should affirm the CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Nine
summary denial in case number SC2026-1083 on that basis alone
but also order his counsel to show cause why there should not be
sanctions imposed.
As to the matter under case number SC2026-1084 (an appeal
from the denial of yet another motion for DNA testing under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853), we simply should dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. See Duckett v. State, 431 So. 3d 990, 997–1004
(Fla. 2026) (Tanenbaum, J., dissenting).
A True Copy Test:
SC2026-1083 7/24/2026 SC2026-1084 7/24/2026
SO Served: STEPHEN D. AKE CAPAPPEALS TLH ATTORNEY GENERAL SCOTT ANDREW BROWNE LAKE CLERK COURTNEY MARIE HAMMER BRITTNEY LACY CASE NOS.: SC2026-1083 & SC2026-1084 Page Ten
HON. DANIEL B. MERRITT, JR. CHARMAINE MILLSAPS MARILYN FRANCES MUIR NAOMI NICHOLS NICOLE ROCHELLE SMITH MARY WELLS