James Alvin Skinner v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 24, 2006
• Docket: 12-05-00093-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

                NO. 12-05-00093-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

JAMES ALVIN SKINNER, §          APPEAL FROM THE

APPELLANT

V.        §          COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE   §          SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            James Alvin Skinner pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated.  He appeals the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress.  We affirm. 

Background

            Department of Public Safety Trooper Kyle Argenbright investigated a motorcycle accident that occurred in rural Smith County.  Officers on the scene of the accident told Trooper Argenbright that the accident involved a single motorcycle, that it appeared that the motorcycle had simply run off the side of the road, and that there was no other obvious reason for the accident.  Appellant, the driver of the motorcycle, had been flown by helicopter to the hospital, and Trooper Argenbright met him there.  Appellant was seriously injured and unconscious, and the hospital staff was attempting to intubate him.  A hospital employee told Trooper Argenbright that Appellant admitted consuming eight beers, and the trooper was able to smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage on Appellant’s breath.  The trooper asked the hospital staff to draw Appellant’s blood to be tested for its alcohol content and they complied.

            Prior to trial, Appellant sought to suppress the results of an analysis of the blood draw arguing that the trooper lacked probable cause to seize his blood.  The trial court denied Appellant’s motion, and he pleaded guilty.  The trial court assessed punishment at one hundred eighty days of confinement with that sentence suspended and placed Appellant on community supervision for fifteen months with a fine of three hundred dollars.  This appeal followed. 

Motion to Suppress Evidence

            In one issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the taking of a sample of his blood.

Standard of Review

            We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion. Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  Our review is bifurcated, affording almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and reviewing de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts.  Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  The trial court is the exclusive finder of fact in a suppression hearing and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness’s testimony.  Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement.”  Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Simpson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d). We sustain a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.  State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Applicable Law

            The taking of a blood specimen is a search under both the federal and Texas constitutions.  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1833–34, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).  The warrantless taking of a blood sample, however, is not an unreasonable search or seizure so long as probable cause to arrest exists, the method of extraction is reasonable, and there are exigent circumstances.  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71, 86 S. Ct. at 1836; Aliff, 627 S.W.2d at 170.  It is not relevant whether the person is arrested before or after the search, as long as sufficient probable cause exists for the officer to arrest before the search.  Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

            Probable cause to search exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer would lead a person of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will be found.  State v. Bagby, 119 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2003, no pet.) (citing McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

Analysis

            Appellant concedes that exigent circumstances were present.  See Aliff, 627 S.W.2d at 170 (Taking a blood sample from a person under arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when officers have probable cause to arrest because alcohol dissipates from the blood stream at a rapid rate.).  Instead, Appellant argues that the officer lacked probable cause to conclude that Appellant had operated a vehicle while intoxicated at the time he requested a sample of Appellant’s blood.¹ 

            The facts in this case are very similar to those found in Knisley v. State, 81 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d).  In Knisley, the officer arrived at the scene of a motorcycle accident and saw gouges in the pavement that appeared to have been left by the motorcycle as it slid across the pavement.  Id. at 480.  The driver was unable to answer simple questions and smelled of alcohol.  Id.  The officer traveled to the hospital after the driver was transported there by helicopter and eventually asked the hospital to draw a blood specimen.  Id.  The Fifth Court of Appeals concluded that the officer possessed probable cause to believe an offense had been committed and that the search occasioned by his request for a specimen of the driver’s blood was reasonable.  Id at 484.

            As Appellant points out, there are distinctions between this case and Knisley.  Trooper Argenbright had not been to the scene of the wreck when he requested the blood draw and was not able to converse with Appellant due to his injuries.  Appellant argues that because the officer did not have personal knowledge of “any of the facts of the case,” he could not have had probable cause.             But this is not the standard.  Police officers often rely upon observations of others in formulating probable cause.  An officer is not restricted solely to information or facts that he has personally observed in determining whether an offense has been committed.  See Lunde v. State, 736 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).  An officer may rely on reasonably trustworthy information provided by another person in making the overall probable cause assessment.  Id.   Whether probable cause exists is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances.  See Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

            The questions presented, therefore, are whether the information conveyed to the trooper by fellow officers and, to a lesser extent, by the unnamed hospital employee, was trustworthy and whether the sum of that information and his personal observations rose to the level of probable cause.  In this case, the information provided by his fellow officers and by the hospital staff was consistent with what the trooper observed personally, principally Appellant’s condition and the smell of alcohol about him, and there were no indications of another reason for the wreck.  Therefore, we answer both questions in the affirmative.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the police officer had probable cause to believe that Appellant had been driving while intoxicated.  Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

Conclusion

            We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                                     JAMES T. WORTHEN   

                                                                                                                 Chief Justice

Opinion delivered May 24, 2006.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

---

¹ The parties agree that the implied consent law is not implicated because Appellant was not arrested at the hospital.  See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.011(a) (Vernon 2005); see also Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“But we side with the other jurisdictions that hold that their implied consent statutes do not prevent the State from obtaining evidence by alternative constitutional means.”).  The trooper testified that he could not make an arrest at the hospital because of Appellant’s significant injuries.