James Alger v. Ashford CM Partners LP et al.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: January 26, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-06482
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 O 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California 9 10

11 JAMES ALGER, Case № 2:24-cv-06482-ODW (JCx) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [69] 14 ASHFORD CM PARTNERS LP et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff James Alger brings this action against Defendants Ashford CM Partners 19 LP and Ashford TRS CM LLC (together, “Ashford”), alleging violations of the 20 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), Dkt. 21 No. 68.) Ashford now moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. (Mot. 22 Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), Dkt. No. 69.) For the reasons discussed below, the 23 Court DENIES Ashford’s Motion and ORDERS Ashford’s counsel to SHOW 24 CAUSE why the Court should not sanction him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 (“Rule”) 11(b)(2).1 26 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 Alger has a physical disability resulting in severe difficulty with walking and fine 3 motor skills. (SAC ¶ 6.) Ashford owns and operates the Hilton Orange County Costa 4 Mesa hotel (“Hilton OC”). (Id. ¶¶ 1, 7.) In January 2024, Alger allegedly encountered 5 multiple barriers while staying at Hilton OC which, due to his disability, prevented his 6 full and equal access to the services of Hilton OC. (Id. ¶¶ 21–33.) In subsequent 7 months, Alger stayed at Hilton OC several more times and continued to encounter 8 access barriers. (Id. ¶¶ 38–45, 48–49, 50–53.) Alger intends to return to Hilton OC 9 during his planned future visit to the area. (Id. ¶ 54.) 10 On July 31, 2024, Alger brought this action against Ashford for violations of the 11 ADA, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, and California’s Disabled Persons Act 12 (“CDPA”). (Compl. ¶¶ 55–83, Dkt. No. 1.) On October 11, 2024, the Court declined 13 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Alger’s state law claims. (Min. Order, Dkt. 14 No. 22.) Accordingly, the Court dismissed Alger’s state claims without prejudice, 15 leaving only Alger’s ADA claim in this federal action. (Id.) 16 On December 11, 2024, Alger brought a separate case against Ashford in the 17 Small Claims Division of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange (“Small 18 Claims Action”). (See generally Req. Judicial Notice ISO Mot. Ex. 1 (“Small Claims 19 Complaint”), Dkt. No. 69-2.) Alger asserted violations of the Unruh Act and the CDPA. 20 (Id. at 6.3) On May 8, 2025, after a one-day trial, a small claims court found against 21 Alger and ruled that Ashford “does not owe James Alger any money on [Alger’s] 22 Claim.” (Req. Judicial Notice ISO Mot. Ex. 2 (“Small Claims Judgment”) 20, Dkt. 23 No. 69-2.) Ashford now moves to dismiss, arguing that the Small Claims Judgment 24 precludes Alger’s ADA claim here. (Mot.) 25 2 Alger’s well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of resolving the Motion. 26 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court also considers materials properly subject to judicial notice, including “matters of public record.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688– 27 89 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Evid. 201. 28 3 When citing to the exhibits to the Request for Judicial Notice, including the Small Claims Complaint and the Small Claims Judgment, the Court cites to the CM/ECF pagination. 1 III. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 3 theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable theory. 4 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a 5 motion to dismiss, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 6 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 7 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual allegations in the complaint “must be 8 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 9 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Stated differently, the complaint must “contain sufficient 10 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief is a “context-specific 13 task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 14 sense.” Id. at 679. Generally, a court limits its review to the pleadings and must 15 construe all factual allegations in the complaint “as true and . . . in the light most 16 favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. However, a court need not blindly 17 accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 18 inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 Ashford argues the Small Claims Judgment forecloses further proceedings in this 21 action. Ashford seems to offer two theories: (1) res judicata; and (2) the Rooker- 22 Feldman doctrine. (Mot. 5–14.) Neither argument is persuasive. 23 A. Res Judicata 24 Ashford’s principal argument is that, under the principle of res judicata, the Small 25 Claims Judgment now bars Alger from litigating his ADA claim in this action. As a 26 California small claims court issued the Small Claims Judgment, the Court looks to 27 California res judicata law. White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 28 2012) (quoting Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). 1 Under California law, “res judicata” is often used as “an umbrella term encompassing 2 both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 3 4th 813, 823 (2015). 4 As a preliminary matter, Ashford merges the two doctrines—claim preclusion 5 and issue preclusion—into a single, undifferentiated argument. (Mot. 7–13.) It is not 6 clear that either applies here. First, courts generally hold that issue preclusion “does 7 not apply to a small claims action.” Sanders v. Walsh, 219 Cal. App. 4th 855, 865 8 (2013) (citing Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 573–75 (1941)). And even the 9 courts holding otherwise and applying issue preclusion to small claims judgments 10 nevertheless require that “the record in the [small claims action] adequately reflects the 11 issues actually litigated and decided in that proceeding.” Pitzen v. Superior Ct., 12 120 Cal. App. 4th 1374, 1384 (2004). Here, the small claims court’s conclusory 13 holding—that Ashford “does not owe [Alger] any money on [Alger’s] claim—does not 14 satisfy the standard in Pitzen because it provides the Court with no detail about what 15 issues the small claims court actually considered. (Small Claims Judgment 20.) Thus, 16 the Court finds that issue preclusion cannot apply and proceeds only on the issue of 17 claim preclusion. 18 It is “well established that the claim preclusion aspect of the doctrine of res 19 judicata applies to small claims judgments.” Pitzen, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1381. Claim 20 preclusion “precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action that has 21 been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Kopp v. Fair Pol. Pracs. 22 Comm’n, 11 Cal. 4th 607, 620 (1995) (en banc). As a threshold matter, Alger argues 23 that the small claims court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction,” meaning that 24 Ashford’s invocation of claim preclusion must fail. (Opp’n 4–6, Dkt. No. 70.) The 25 Court agrees. 26 Alger’s argument raises the “jurisdictional competency exception.” Guerrero v. 27 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 28 Cal. App. 5th 1091, 1103 (2018). Under the Restatement 28 (Second) of Judgments section 26, which the Supreme Court favorably cited in Marrese 1 v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985), claim 2 preclusion does not apply when the “plaintiff was unable to . . . seek a certain remedy 3 or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter 4 jurisdiction of the courts,” and the “plaintiff desires in the second action to . . . seek that 5 remedy or form of relief.” 6 Here, the small claims court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction” for 7 purposes of claim preclusion because it cannot adequately adjudicate an ADA claim. 8 Small claims courts in California are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only grant 9 injunctive or equitable relief “when a statute expressly authorizes a small claims court 10 to award that relief.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 116.220(a)(5). In this case, Alger seeks 11 only injunctive relief under the ADA. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 12 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that injunctive relief is “the only relief 13 available to private plaintiffs under the ADA”). However, Ashford does not identify 14 any statutory authorization giving the small claims court authority to grant injunctive 15 relief under the ADA. Thus, had Alger attempted to bring his ADA claim in small 16 claims court, that court would have been jurisdictionally foreclosed from granting Alger 17 the only possible relief available under the ADA. As such, under the jurisdictional 18 competency exception, Alger’s inability to bring an ADA claim in small claims court 19 means that the Small Claims Judgment cannot preclude his ADA claim in this action. 20 Ashford argues that Alger’s choice of small claims court means he “voluntarily 21 waived the right to seek injunctive relief.” (Reply 2, Dkt. No. 71.) However, the Court 22 finds no support for the proposition that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is at all relevant 23 to a claim preclusion analysis. Nor would such an exception square with how courts 24 apply claim preclusion in practice. See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 385 (declining to “fashion 25 claim preclusion rules that would require a plaintiff to bring suit initially in the forum 26 of most general jurisdiction, thereby resolving as many issues as possible in one 27 proceeding”). The Restatement’s illustration is illuminating: if a party loses a state 28 antitrust action in state court but later brings a federal action upon the same facts, 1 charging violations of federal antitrust laws of which federal courts have exclusive 2 jurisdiction, that federal action is not barred. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 3 cmt. c, illus. 2 (2024). Ashford’s reasoning would require the plaintiff to bring both 4 antitrust claims initially in federal court, which would have been able to concurrently 5 hear the state and federal antitrust claims. This is not the law. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 385. 6 Ashford also argues that Alger “quibbles about the availability of injunctive relief 7 in federal court.” (Reply 2.) Ashford cites two cases, but its reliance on each is 8 misplaced. (Reply 2–3.) The first, Henry v. Clifford, holds that causes of action in two 9 separate cases may be the same for purposes of res judicata even where a plaintiff pleads 10 different forms of remedy. 32 Cal. App. 4th 315, 321 (1995). However, Ashford 11 conflates the res judicata doctrine’s “same cause of action” element, id., with the 12 doctrine’s threshold requirement that the preclusive judgment come from a “court of 13 competent jurisdiction,” Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 620. Courts addressing the former need 14 not consider which form of remedy the plaintiff pleaded, Henry, 32 Cal. App. 4th 15 at 321, but courts considering the latter must consider whether the remedy was even 16 available to the plaintiff in the first action’s forum, Guerrero, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 1103. 17 Second, Ashford relies on Guerrero but egregiously misrepresents that case. 18 (Reply 3.) Ashford quotes a paragraph from Guererro that seems to stand for the 19 proposition that, when a federal court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state 20 claims, the plaintiff is forced to either proceed with the remaining federal claims or 21 dismiss and re-file all claims in state court. (Id.) However, Guerrero was itself quoting 22 from Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa, 106 Cal. App. 3d 441 (1980), a thirty-five-year- 23 old decision that the Guerrero court ultimately declined to follow. Guerrero, 28 Cal. 24 App. 5th at 1107 n.16 (rejecting Mattson as outdated in light of case law adopting the 25 more recent, “widely endorsed pronouncement of the law” reflected in the Second 26 Restatement). Moreover, even assuming California courts consistently found Mattson 27 persuasive, it still does not address the threshold requirement of jurisdictional 28 competency. 1 For these reasons, the Court finds that California small claims court lacks 2 competent jurisdiction to hear an ADA claim. Thus, the Small Claims Judgment has 3 no preclusive effect on the ADA claim in the instant action. 4 B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 5 Ashford also argues that this action represents an improper attempt to appeal the 6 Small Claims Action, as prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Mot. 13–14.) 7 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court lacks subject matter 8 jurisdiction to review state court decisions. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 9 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). After 10 several courts attempted to expand the doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the 11 doctrine is “confined” to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 12 caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 13 commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon 14 Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Under this 15 framework, Ashford’s argument fails for the simple reason that the small claims court 16 here issued its judgment after proceedings commenced here, not before. See id. at 293– 17 94 (finding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply where plaintiff filed suit “well 18 before any judgment in state court”). Thus, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman 19 doctrine is inapplicable and does not bar this action. 20 C. Order to Show Cause 21 Rule 11 provides in relevant part that, by presenting a signed filing to a court, an 22 attorney “certifies” that the filing’s “legal contentions are warranted by existing law or 23 by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 24 establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). When a party or attorney violates 25 Rule 11(b), courts may impose an “appropriate sanction,” including a monetary 26 sanction, “after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). 27 Sanctions for Rule 11 violations are mandatory. Pipe Trades Council of N. Cal. v. 28 Underground Contractors Ass’n of N. Cal., 835 F.3d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1987). 1 In his reply brief, Ashford’s counsel cites two paragraphs from Guerrero, the 2 latter of which he appears to represent as Guerrero’s holding. (Reply 4.) However, as 3 the Court notes above, the paragraph that Ashford’s counsel cites was from Mattson, a 4 decision the Guerrero court stated it disagreed with. Guerrero, 28 Cal. App. 5th 5 at 1105–07. The Guerrero court took great pains to analyze what it believed to be the 6 Mattson court’s analytical gaps, finding that the Mattson court failed to consider 7 relevant sections of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Id. at 1107 n.16. The 8 Guerrero court also stated that the general claim splitting rule—which Ashford’s 9 counsel relies on—“dovetails with the jurisdictional competency exception” and “limits 10 the preclusive effect” of judgments where, as in Guerrero, the first court dismissed 11 claims because it found it could not hear them. Id. (finding that plaintiff’s claims, 12 initially brought in federal court, had no preclusive effect because the first court 13 dismissed “on Eleventh Amendment grounds, which was not a discretionary 14 disposition”). 15 As the Guerrero court clearly states that it does not agree with the Mattson court’s 16 analysis, Ashford’s counsel’s attempt to pass off a passage from Mattson as Guerrero’s 17 holding is arguably frivolous. Therefore, the Court ORDERS Ashford’s counsel to 18 SHOW CAUSE why the Court should not sanction him for misrepresenting the holding 19 in Guerrero to this Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Vv. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Ashford’s Motion. (Dkt. 3 || No. 69.) Ashford’s counsel is also ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE, in writing, no later 4|| than FEBRUARY 6, 2026, why the Court should not sanction him for misrepresenting 5 || authority to this Court. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 January 26, 2026 N . 10 ae

2 OTIS D. HT, II 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28