3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 JAMELLE RUSSELL, Case No. 3:24-cv-00023-MMD-CSD
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 HUGHES, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Jamelle Russell, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada 13 Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 14 (ECF No. 1-1 (“Complaint”)) against prison officials1 regarding events that occurred while 15 housed at Lovelock Correctional Center (“LCC”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) The Court allowed 16 him to proceed on a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Corrections 17 Officers Wilcoxen and Brown. (ECF No. 6 at 5 (“Screening Order”).) Defendants 18 subsequently filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) and motion for summary judgment 19 (ECF No. 17).2 Russell now timely objects (ECF No. 31 (“Objection”)) to United States 20 Magistrate Judge Craig S. Denney’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), 21 recommending the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17), 22 deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) as moot, and close this case.3 (ECF 23 1Russell sued Defendants Warden Garrett, Associate Warden Collier, Associate 24 Warden LeGrand, Sergeant Silva, Grievance Coordinator Chandler, Sergeant Molnar, Sergeant Chacon, Sergeant Hughes, Corrections Officer Wilcoxen, Corrections Officer 25 Brown, Lieutenant Preston, and Sergeant Odea. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-4.)
26 2Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 22), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 26). 27 3Judge Denney correctly construes Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) 28 as a motion for summary judgment because of its reference to matters outside the 1 No. 30 at 1, 9.) As further explained below, the Court overrules Russell’s Objection and 2 adopts the R&R in full. 3 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 4 A. Russell’s Allegations 5 The Court previously screened Russell’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and found that 6 it stated a colorable retaliation claim under the First Amendment against Defendants 7 Wilcoxen and Brown. (ECF No. 6 at 4-5.) The following facts are taken from the Court’s 8 Screening Order and adapted from the Complaint.4 9 On November 3, 2023, while housed at LCC, Russell was placed in administrative 10 segregation (“the hole”) based on what he characterizes as an improper battery charge. 11 (Id. at 3.) On that same date, Defendants Wilcoxen and Brown inventoried Russell’s 12 personal property. (Id.) Russell alleges that during this process, several items connected 13 to a civil action5 he had filed against prison staff in September 2023 for an earlier alleged 14 assault—including kites, emergency grievances, and ace bandage wrist wraps—were 15 taken and never returned. (Id.) Russell contends that Wilcoxen and Brown confiscated 16 his property to retaliate against him and to hinder his ability to pursue his civil suit. (Id.) 17 Russell further alleges that he submitted kites and grievances concerning the confiscated
18 pleadings. (ECF No. 30 at 2-3.) The Court may not consider any material beyond the 19 pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Lee v. City of L.A., 20 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17 (hereinafter “Motion”)) on its merits and deny the 21 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) as moot.
22 4The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 23 5Russell filed two suits in this District relating to a staff assault at LCC on 24 September 17, 2023. The first suit was filed on November 16, 2023, and it was dismissed without prejudice on August 1, 2024 for failure to file an updated address. See Russell v. 25 LeGrand, Case No. 3:23-cv-00577-ART-CLB (ECF Nos. 1-1, 10). The second suit was filed on November 22, 2023, and a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice was 26 granted on January 6, 2025. Russell v. LeGrand, Case No. 3:23-cv-00593-ART-CSD 27 (ECF Nos. 1-1, 25). The Court may consider materials “incorporated by reference” into the complaint and may take judicial notice of “matters of public record.” See Mack v. S. 28 Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Court sua 1 property but that prison officials failed to respond or take corrective action. (Id. at 3-4.) 2 DISCUSSION6 3 The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 4 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where, as here, 5 a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court must “make a de novo 6 determination of those portions of the R&R to which objection is made.” Id. The Court’s 7 review is thus de novo because Russell filed his Objection (ECF No. 31). The Court 8 addresses the merits of Russell’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Wilcoxen and 9 Brown and finds, on de novo review, that, because Russell cannot satisfy an essential 10 element of his claim, the Court will grant summary judgment. 11 Defendants argue in their Motion that Russell cannot satisfy his First Amendment 12 retaliation claim on the causation element and that they are therefore entitled to summary 13 judgment as a matter of law. (ECF No. 17 at 11-12.) In particular, Defendants assert that 14 because the alleged incident (i.e., placement in solitary confinement and confiscation of 15 personal items) occurred before Russell engaged in the protected conduct (i.e., filing a 16 civil suit), Russell cannot claim that his civil suits motivated the retaliatory conduct in 17 question. (Id.) The Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden on summary 18 judgment by proving that causation is not genuinely in dispute and, therefore, will grant 19 the Motion.7 20
21 6The Court incorporates by reference Judge Denney’s description of the background of the case and recitation of pertinent allegations in the Complaint, provided 22 in the R&R. (ECF No. 30.) 23 7“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is 24 no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The moving party bears the burden 25 of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). To satisfy their initial burden, here, Defendants 26 may present evidence to negate an essential element of Russell’s claim or demonstrate 27 that Russell cannot establish an element of his claim upon which he has the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986) (“[A] complete 28 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 1 The First Amendment guarantees prisoners the right to “seek redress of 2 grievances from prison authorities” in addition to “a right of meaningful access to the 3 courts.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 JAMELLE RUSSELL, Case No. 3:24-cv-00023-MMD-CSD
7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 HUGHES, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 SUMMARY 12 Pro se Plaintiff Jamelle Russell, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada 13 Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 14 (ECF No. 1-1 (“Complaint”)) against prison officials1 regarding events that occurred while 15 housed at Lovelock Correctional Center (“LCC”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) The Court allowed 16 him to proceed on a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Corrections 17 Officers Wilcoxen and Brown. (ECF No. 6 at 5 (“Screening Order”).) Defendants 18 subsequently filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) and motion for summary judgment 19 (ECF No. 17).2 Russell now timely objects (ECF No. 31 (“Objection”)) to United States 20 Magistrate Judge Craig S. Denney’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), 21 recommending the Court grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17), 22 deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) as moot, and close this case.3 (ECF 23 1Russell sued Defendants Warden Garrett, Associate Warden Collier, Associate 24 Warden LeGrand, Sergeant Silva, Grievance Coordinator Chandler, Sergeant Molnar, Sergeant Chacon, Sergeant Hughes, Corrections Officer Wilcoxen, Corrections Officer 25 Brown, Lieutenant Preston, and Sergeant Odea. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-4.)
26 2Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 22), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 26). 27 3Judge Denney correctly construes Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) 28 as a motion for summary judgment because of its reference to matters outside the 1 No. 30 at 1, 9.) As further explained below, the Court overrules Russell’s Objection and 2 adopts the R&R in full. 3 RELEVANT BACKGROUND 4 A. Russell’s Allegations 5 The Court previously screened Russell’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) and found that 6 it stated a colorable retaliation claim under the First Amendment against Defendants 7 Wilcoxen and Brown. (ECF No. 6 at 4-5.) The following facts are taken from the Court’s 8 Screening Order and adapted from the Complaint.4 9 On November 3, 2023, while housed at LCC, Russell was placed in administrative 10 segregation (“the hole”) based on what he characterizes as an improper battery charge. 11 (Id. at 3.) On that same date, Defendants Wilcoxen and Brown inventoried Russell’s 12 personal property. (Id.) Russell alleges that during this process, several items connected 13 to a civil action5 he had filed against prison staff in September 2023 for an earlier alleged 14 assault—including kites, emergency grievances, and ace bandage wrist wraps—were 15 taken and never returned. (Id.) Russell contends that Wilcoxen and Brown confiscated 16 his property to retaliate against him and to hinder his ability to pursue his civil suit. (Id.) 17 Russell further alleges that he submitted kites and grievances concerning the confiscated
18 pleadings. (ECF No. 30 at 2-3.) The Court may not consider any material beyond the 19 pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Lee v. City of L.A., 20 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17 (hereinafter “Motion”)) on its merits and deny the 21 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) as moot.
22 4The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 23 5Russell filed two suits in this District relating to a staff assault at LCC on 24 September 17, 2023. The first suit was filed on November 16, 2023, and it was dismissed without prejudice on August 1, 2024 for failure to file an updated address. See Russell v. 25 LeGrand, Case No. 3:23-cv-00577-ART-CLB (ECF Nos. 1-1, 10). The second suit was filed on November 22, 2023, and a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice was 26 granted on January 6, 2025. Russell v. LeGrand, Case No. 3:23-cv-00593-ART-CSD 27 (ECF Nos. 1-1, 25). The Court may consider materials “incorporated by reference” into the complaint and may take judicial notice of “matters of public record.” See Mack v. S. 28 Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Court sua 1 property but that prison officials failed to respond or take corrective action. (Id. at 3-4.) 2 DISCUSSION6 3 The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 4 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where, as here, 5 a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court must “make a de novo 6 determination of those portions of the R&R to which objection is made.” Id. The Court’s 7 review is thus de novo because Russell filed his Objection (ECF No. 31). The Court 8 addresses the merits of Russell’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Wilcoxen and 9 Brown and finds, on de novo review, that, because Russell cannot satisfy an essential 10 element of his claim, the Court will grant summary judgment. 11 Defendants argue in their Motion that Russell cannot satisfy his First Amendment 12 retaliation claim on the causation element and that they are therefore entitled to summary 13 judgment as a matter of law. (ECF No. 17 at 11-12.) In particular, Defendants assert that 14 because the alleged incident (i.e., placement in solitary confinement and confiscation of 15 personal items) occurred before Russell engaged in the protected conduct (i.e., filing a 16 civil suit), Russell cannot claim that his civil suits motivated the retaliatory conduct in 17 question. (Id.) The Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden on summary 18 judgment by proving that causation is not genuinely in dispute and, therefore, will grant 19 the Motion.7 20
21 6The Court incorporates by reference Judge Denney’s description of the background of the case and recitation of pertinent allegations in the Complaint, provided 22 in the R&R. (ECF No. 30.) 23 7“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is 24 no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The moving party bears the burden 25 of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). To satisfy their initial burden, here, Defendants 26 may present evidence to negate an essential element of Russell’s claim or demonstrate 27 that Russell cannot establish an element of his claim upon which he has the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986) (“[A] complete 28 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 1 The First Amendment guarantees prisoners the right to “seek redress of 2 grievances from prison authorities” in addition to “a right of meaningful access to the 3 courts.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). 4 To succeed on a § 1983 retaliation claim for engaging in activity protected by the First 5 Amendment in the prison context, a plaintiff must make: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state 6 actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 7 protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 8 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional 9 goal.” Id. (citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)). “A plaintiff 10 must show that his protected conduct was the ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind 11 the defendant’s conduct.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, at 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 12 Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1989)). 13 Here, Defendants contend that Russell fails to demonstrate a causal link between 14 the alleged adverse action, i.e., the retaliation, and the protected conduct, i.e., filing the 15 civil suits, because the suits in question were not filed until November 16, 2023 and 16 November 22, 2023, respectively, and, therefore, could not have been a “substantial” or 17 “motivating” factor behind the challenged conduct that took place beforehand on 18 November 3, 2023. (ECF No. 17 at 11-12.) Russell objects, countering that the civil suits 19 that he “spoke of” in his Complaint include Russell v. Henly, et al., Case No. 3:23-cv- 20 00549- ART-CLB (“Henley”) and Russell v. Ley, et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-00531-MMD- 21 CSD (“Ley”). (ECF No. 31 at 3.) 22 The Court identifies similar chronological and causal issues in the cases raised in 23 Russell’s Objection and concludes that Defendants have established that causation is not 24 genuinely in dispute, making summary judgment appropriate. Henly was also filed after- 25 the-fact and, thus, could not have motivated the challenged retaliatory conduct. Moreover, 26 while Ley was filed before the event in question, it pertains to incidents at a different 27 correctional facility. Ley concerned incidents at Northern Nevada Correctional Center, 28 while the present case concerns incidents at LCC. Thus, Russell fails to meet his burden 1 in opposing summary judgment since he cannot show a genuine factual dispute of 2 causation.8 Upon evaluating the timeline of events and viewing the record in the light most 3 favorable to Russell9, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could similarly conclude that 4 the protected conduct could not have caused or motivated the alleged adverse action. 5 The Court will therefore grant the Motion as to Defendants’ causation arguments, as no 6 genuine dispute of material fact exists, and Defendants have met their burden. 7 /// 8 /// 9 /// 10 /// 11 /// 12 /// 13 /// 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24
25 8Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56’s requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 26 for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 27 9In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all 28 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. 1 || IV. CONCLUSION 2 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to several 3 || cases not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 4 || determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 5 || Motion before the Court. 6 It is therefore ordered that Russell's Objection (ECF No. 31) to Judge Denney’s 7 || Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 30) is overruled. 8 It is therefore ordered that Judge Denney’s Report and Recommendation (ECF 9 || No. 30) is accepted and adopted in full. 10 It is further ordered that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) 11 || is granted. 12 It is further ordered that Defendants’ motion for to dismiss (ECF No. 16) is denied 13 || as moot. 14 It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court enter judgment in accordance with this 15 || Order and close this case. 16 DATED THIS 4** Day of November 2025. 17
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