Jamar Reed v. Kenneth Williams

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 JAMAR REED, 4 Plaintiff, Case No.: 2:24-cv-000267-GMN-NJK 5 vs. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 6 SUMMARY JUDGMENT KENNETH WILLIAMS, 7

Defendant. 8 9 10 Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 46), filed by 11 Defendant Kenneth Williams. Plaintiff Jamarr Reed filed a Response, (ECF No. 51), and 12 Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 58). Also pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion 13 to Seal, (ECF No. 47). Plaintiff did not respond, and the time to do so has passed.1 Further 14 pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply, (ECF No. 60), to 15 which Defendants filed a Response, (ECF No. 62).2 Finally pending before the Court is the 16

17 1 The public has a presumptive right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents. See Kamakana v. City 18 & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, a party seeking to seal a judicial record under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) “bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption” by 19 showing compelling reasons that support maintaining the secret nature of the documents. Id. Defendant seeks to seal an exhibit to his Motion for Summary Judgment that contains Plaintiff’s medical records. Because medical 20 privacy qualifies as a “compelling reason” for sealing records, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Seal. 2 Plaintiff seeks leave to file a surreply in which he argues that Defendant’s Reply includes “false allegations and 21 statements,” which he asks the Court to strike. (Mot. Leave File Surreply 2:4–11, ECF No. 60). To the extent Plaintiff’s Motion requests striking of false statements in the Reply, the Court DENIES that request. FRCP 12(f) 22 provides that the court may order stricken from any pleading any redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A matter will not be stricken from a pleading unless it is clear that it 23 can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation. LeDuc v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Allegedly false statements made in a Reply to Motion for Summary 24 Judgmnent do not meet that standard; thus, the Court denies the request. The other arguments Plaintiff makes in his Surreply are not new and do not respond to newly raised arguments in Defendant’s Reply. Courts in this 25 district routinely interpret Local Rule 7-2 to allow filing of surreplies only to address new matters raised in a reply to which a party would otherwise be unable to respond. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply. 1 Report and Recommendation (R&R), (ECF No. 35), issued by Magistrate Judge Nancy J. 2 Koppe, which recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Add Nurse Toni McGee as 3 Defendant, (ECF No. 33). Plaintiff filed a timely objection to the R&R, (ECF No. 37). 4 For the reasons explained below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in full and DENIES 5 Plaintiff’s Motion to Add Nurse Toni McGee as Defendant. The Court also GRANTS the 6 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 This action arises out of Defendant Kenneth Williams’s alleged failure to provide 9 adequate medical care to Plaintiff Jamarr Reed, who was previously incarcerated at High 10 Desert State Prison. On November 29, 2021, Plaintiff completed a medical intake process. 11 (Medical File at 53, Ex. A to Mot. Summ. J. (“MSJ”), ECF No. 48-1). Plaintiff reported during 12 his medical history questionnaire that he had previously been stabbed and shot, and that he had 13 chronic right knee and lower back pain. (Id. at 54–55). 14 On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a medical kite indicating that he was told he 15 would be given a lower bunk restriction during the intake process. (Grievance No.

16 200631352330 at 4, Ex. B to MSJ, ECF No. 46-1). The response to the kite stated that Plaintiff 17 was “added to the doctor sick call list and will be notified the day of the appointment.” (Id.). 18 There is no indication that Plaintiff was seen by a doctor in response to that kite. (See generally 19 Medical File, Ex. A to MSJ). Plaintiff then filed an informal grievance on May 10, 2023, in 20 which he asked about the status of his request to see a doctor regarding his lower back 21 problems and bottom bunk restriction. (Grievance No. 200631352330 at 1–2, Ex. B to MSJ). 22 In that informal grievance, Plaintiff stated that he was told he would see a doctor but had not 23 been seen for his back and knee pain. (Id.). He further stated that his back and knee hurt and 24 that he would “appreciate some type of pain reliever.” (Id.). The response to Plaintiff’s 25 informal grievance indicated that his classification at intake “was deemed as 1:1,” that he had 1 “medical notes regarding [Plaintiff’s] history of GWS and lower back pain,” and explained that 2 he currently did not need a lower bunk restriction. (Id. at 5). It further instructed Plaintiff to 3 “continue to submit medical requests on a medical kite DOC 2500 for any other medical 4 requests.” (Id.). 5 Plaintiff then filed a first level grievance, disagreeing with the response to his informal 6 grievance. (Id. at 7–9). He once again requested to see a doctor. (Id. at 9). The response to that 7 grievance explained the meaning of classification level 1:1 and reiterated that he did not need a 8 lower bunk restriction. (Response to First Level Grievance, Page 18 of Resp., ECF No. 51). It 9 also indicated that he had already been placed on doctor’s sick call which “is based on priority 10 of medical needs.” (Id.). 11 Plaintiff then filed a second level grievance on August 20, 2023, once again explaining 12 that he had not been seen by a medical provider for this issue. (Grievance No. 200631352330 at 13 16, Ex. B to MSJ). Defendant Williams responded to the second level grievance on December 14 6, 2023, explaining Plaintiff’s classification at intake and stating that he saw “no medical notes 15 regarding [Plaintiff’s] history of gunshot wound and lower back pain.” (Id. at 15). He further

16 stated that he scheduled Plaintiff “for the provider as soon as possible for [him] to discuss [his] 17 ongoing medical concerns.” (Id.). Defendant marked the grievance as “Resolved.” (Id.). It 18 does not appear that Plaintiff saw a provider for this purpose after this response, though he 19 received frequent “wellness checks” beginning in March 2024 where he reportedly did not 20 indicate any medical issues. (Medical File at 71–86, Ex. A to MSJ). 21 Plaintiff filed this case on February 7, 2024. (IFP Application, ECF No. 1). The Court 22 issued a screening order on July 31, 2024, allowing Plaintiff to proceed with his claim for 23 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. (Screening Order at 7:27– 24 28:1, ECF No. 2). Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth 25 Amendment deliberate indifference claim. (MSJ, ECF No. 46). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A. Report and Recommendation 3 A party may file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of a 4 United States Magistrate Judge made pursuant to Local Rule IB 1-4. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); 5 D. Nev. R. IB 3-2. Upon the filing of such objections, the Court must make a de novo 6 determination of those portions to which objections are made if the Magistrate Judge’s findings 7 and recommendations concern matters that may not be finally determined by a magistrate 8 judge. D. Nev. L. R. IB 3-2(b). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, 9 the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Nev. 10 L. R. IB 3-2(b). 11 B. Summary Judgment 12 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the 13 pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 14 affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 15 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that

16 may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 17 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on 18 which a reasonable fact-finder could rely to find for the nonmoving party. See id. “The amount 19 of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or 20 judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.’” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 21 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 22 253, 288–89 (1968)). “Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all 23 inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s 24 favor.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). A principal 25 1 purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” 2 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). 3 In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. “When 4 the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come 5 forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went 6 uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing 7 the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. 8 Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and 9 citation omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim 10 or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to 11 negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the 12 nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that 13 party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 14 U.S. at 323–24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be 15 denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S.H.

16 Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1970). 17 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing 18 party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 19 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, 20 the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is 21 sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the 22 parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 23 Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the nonmoving party “may not rely on 24 denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible 25 discovery material, to show that the dispute exists,” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 2 doubt as to the material facts,” Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002). “The 3 mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be 4 insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid 5 summary judgment by “relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.” 6 See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go 7 beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing 8 competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. 9 At summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the 10 truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 11 The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 12 in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is 13 not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249–50. 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 A. Report and Recommendation

16 Magistrate Judge Koppe recommends dismissal of the claims against the Doe 17 Defendants because Plaintiff failed to file a motion to add Nurse Toni McGee until well after 18 the deadline to amend or add parties expired. (R&R 2:11–17, ECF No. 35). Plaintiff filed a 19 timely objection in which he argues: (1) Defendants asked for a 30-day extension of the 20 dispositive motion deadline; (2) Defendants needed additional time to identify Nurse Toni 21 McGee; and (3) Plaintiff has had difficulty accessing the law library and locating a jailhouse 22 lawyer or inmate assistant to help him with the filing of his motions. 23 First, Defendants request for a 30-day extension of the dispositive motion deadline does 24 not bear on whether the Court should accept Plaintiff’s untimely motion to add Nurse Toni 25 McGee as a defendant. Next, when a party seeks to amend the pleadings or add parties after 1 expiration of the governing deadline, courts may treat the filing as an implicit request to modify 2 the case management schedule. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608– 3 09 (9th Cir. 1992). In that scenario, the movant must establish both good cause and excusable 4 neglect. See Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. DMSI, LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2017); 5 see also Local Rule 26-3. 6 Here, Defendant filed a notice with the identity of the nurse on January 27, 2025. (Resp. 7 to Order, ECF No. 23). The deadline to amend or add parties expired on February 18, 2025, 8 about three weeks after Defendants provided the nurse’s name. (Scheduling Order 1:24–27, 9 ECF No. 17). Plaintiff filed his motion to amend nearly three months later, right before the 10 dispositive motion deadline. (Mot. Add Nurse Toni McGee, ECF No. 33); (Order Granting 11 Mot. Ext. Disc., ECF No. 29). 12 That it took time for Defendants to identify the nurse does not justify the almost four 13 months that lapsed between Defendant’s filing of the Notice and Plaintiff’s motion to add nurse 14 Toni McGee. While the Court recognizes the difficulties Plaintiff has had seeking help with 15 legal filings, nothing in Plaintiff’s explanation explains why he failed to move to add nurse

16 Toni McGee for nearly four months after learning of her identity. The Court cannot conclude 17 that Plaintiff’s objection establishes good cause for modifying the case management schedule, 18 nor excusable neglect for his failure to file a motion before the deadline. Accordingly, the 19 Court accepts in full the recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge and adopts the R&R. 20 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Add Nurse Toni McGee is therefore DENIED. 21 B. Summary Judgment 22 Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, 23 arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity both because he did not violate Plaintiff’s 24 constitutional rights and because he was not on clear notice that his actions violated Plaintiff’s 25 constitutional rights. 1 Qualified immunity shields government officials “from money damages unless a 2 plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and 3 (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al- 4 Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Courts “have discretion to choose which qualified immunity 5 prong to address first” and, depending on the conclusion reached for the first-analyzed prong, 6 “need not address the other.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 7 2017) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). 8 The Court first considers whether a constitutional violation occurred. The Eighth 9 Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and “embodies ‘broad 10 and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.’” Estelle v. 11 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 12 1968)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate 13 indifference” to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 14 (1994). “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an 15 objective standard—that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual

16 punishment—and a subjective standard—deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 17 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th 18 Cir. 2014). The official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he “knows of and 19 disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts 20 from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 21 must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Then he must fail to take reasonable 22 measures to abate the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 847. A government official may 23 only be held liable under Section 1983 when his own actions have caused a constitutional 24 deprivation. OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 1 To establish the objective standard, “the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by 2 demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury 3 or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 4 2006). Defendant does not assert that chronic back or knee pain cannot constitute a serious 5 medical need. Indeed, “the existence of chronic and substantial pain” is a serious medical need. 6 Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 7 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir.1992), overruled in part on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. 8 Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc)). 9 Instead, he argues that Plaintiff has not shown that he had a serious medical need 10 because the evidence shows that he has made no attempt to get treated for his back or knee 11 pain. (MSJ 9:1–15). But a review of the record reveals that Plaintiff has sought treatment for 12 this pain, albeit not in the form of a medical kite. (Grievance No. 200631352330 at 1, Ex. B to 13 MSJ, ECF No. 46-1 (“I have been patiently waiting to see a doctor to address my lower back 14 problems . . . . Could you please schedule for an appointment?”)); (Id. at 3 (“I would like to see 15 the doctor I was told I would see at “doctor sick call.” Could you please schedule me for an

16 appointment?”). Having raised no other argument, Defendant fails to meet his initial burden on 17 this issue. 18 As for the subjective standard, a plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful act or failure to 19 respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 20 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. “Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or 21 intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 22 physicians provide medical care.” Id. (quotations omitted). When a prisoner alleges that delay 23 of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led 24 to further injury. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th 25 Cir. 1985) (holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of 1 deliberate medical indifference”). The Ninth Circuit has held that “an inadvertent failure to 2 provide adequate medical care, differences of opinion in medical treatment, and harmless 3 delays in treatment are not enough to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.” Simmons v. G. 4 Arnett, 47 F.4th 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). 5 As Defendant correctly points out, Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence to support a 6 claim that he suffered harm as a result of a delay in treatment. Defendant’s evidence satisfies 7 his initial burden of negating the element of harm: Plaintiff’s lack of medical kites seeking 8 treatment for his back pain, along with the lack of mention of worsening pain or mental 9 suffering in all of his kites and grievances, raise a question of whether Plaintiff experienced 10 harm as a result of a delay in treatment. (See generally Medical Records, Ex. A to MSJ, ECF 11 No. 48); (Grievance No. 200631352330, Ex. B to MSJ, ECF No. 46-1); (Grievance History, 12 Ex. C to MSJ, ECF No. 46-2). Additionally, the focus of his grievance on the lower bunk 13 restriction, rather than on any potential worsening of his pain, further calls into question the 14 harm that Plaintiff experienced. (Grievance No. 200631352330, Ex. B to MSJ). 15 Turning to Plaintiff’s burden, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he is in “constant

16 pain which makes it hard to get out of bed some days,” and “suffer[s] mentally because if this is 17 not in the system I may be moved to a top bunk which would cause more pain.” (Compl. at 3, 18 ECF No. 3). But nothing in Plaintiff’s submitted evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff 19 experienced harm as a result of the delay in treatment. Rather, the submitted evidence 20 undermines such a finding because Plaintiff’s grievances focused largely on the lack of bottom 21 bunk restriction, rather than the pain he was experiencing. In all of the medical kites and 22 grievances Plaintiff filed, he did not assert that his chronic back and knee pain was worsening 23 due to the lack of treatment. (See generally Medical Records, Ex. A to MSJ, ECF No. 48); 24 (Grievance No. 200631352330, Ex. B to MSJ, ECF No. 46-1); (Grievance History, Ex. C to 25 MSJ, ECF No. 46-2). Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a 1 |} genuine issue of material fact as to this element, and the Court thus grants summary judgment 2 |{in favor of Defendant on this claim. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Seal, (ECF No. 47), is 5 || GRANTED. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply, 7 || (ECF No. 60), is DENIED. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation, (ECF No. 35), is 9 || ACCEPTED AND ADOPTED IN FULL. Defendant’s Motion to Add Nurse Toni McGee as 10 || a Defendant is DENIED, and the claims against the doe defendants are DISMISSED without 11 || prejudice. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF 13 || No. 46), is GRANTED. 14 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment for Defendant Kenneth Williams 15 || and to close this case. 16 DATED this 10 day of March, 2026. 17 Yj, " □□ 19 Gloria M. fay arro, District Judge UNITED S¥ATES DISTRICT COURT 20 21 22 23 24 25

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