1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * *
4 JAMAR JACKSON, Case No. 3:26-CV-00010-MMD-CLB
5 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE1 6 v.
7 RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Before the Court is Plaintiff Jamar Jackson’s (“Jackson”) application to proceed in 11 forma pauperis, (ECF No. 1), and pro se complaint (ECF No. 1-1). The Court will first 12 address the in forma pauperis application and then screen Jackson’s complaint pursuant 13 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 14 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 15 A person may be granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) if the 16 person “submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] 17 possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such 18 affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the 19 person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 20 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all actions filed IFP, 21 not just prisoner actions). 22 Pursuant to LSR 1-1: “Any person who is unable to prepay the fees in a civil case 23 may apply to the court for leave to proceed [IFP]. The application must be made on the 24 form provided by the court and must include a financial affidavit disclosing the applicant’s 25 income, assets, expenses, and liabilities.” 26
27 1 This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Miranda M. Du, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate 1 “[T]he supporting affidavit [must] state the facts as to [the] affiant’s poverty with 2 some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” U.S. v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th 3 Cir. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A litigant need not “be absolutely 4 destitute to enjoy the benefits of the statute.” Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 5 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). 6 A review of the application to proceed IFP reveals Jackson cannot pay the filing 7 fee. Accordingly, the application to proceed IFP, (ECF No. 1), is granted. 8 II. SCREENING STANDARD 9 Prior to ordering service on any Defendant, the Court is required to screen an in 10 forma pauperis complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate under certain 11 circumstances. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126 (noting the in forma pauperis statute at 28 12 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 13 for the enumerated reasons). Such screening is required before a litigation proceeding 14 in forma pauperis may proceed to serve a pleading. Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 507 15 (9th Cir. 2015). 16 “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – (A) 17 the allegations of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or 18 malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 19 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). 21 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 22 granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. When reviewing the adequacy of a complaint 24 under this statute, the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). 25 See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for 26 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 27 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 1 on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2 2000) (citation omitted). 3 The Court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light 4 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 5 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). Allegations in pro se complaints 6 are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Hughes 7 v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 8 A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 9 cause of actions,” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief 10 above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 11 “The pleading must contain something more. . . than. . . a statement of facts that merely 12 creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (citation and quotation 13 marks omitted). At a minimum, a plaintiff should include “enough facts to state a claim to 14 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 15 678 (2009). 16 A dismissal should not be without leave to amend unless it is clear from the face 17 of the complaint the action is frivolous and could not be amended to state a federal claim, 18 or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Cato v. United 19 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th 20 Cir. 1990). 21 III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 22 In his complaint, Jackson sues Defendant Reno Police Department (“RPD”) 23 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for various alleged state law claims. (See ECF No. 1- 24 1.) Jackson alleges that on an unknown date, RPD used excessive force and committed 25 an unlawful detainment and false arrest in violation of his rights under the U.S. 26 Constitution and Nevada laws. (Id.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * *
4 JAMAR JACKSON, Case No. 3:26-CV-00010-MMD-CLB
5 Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE1 6 v.
7 RENO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
8 Defendants.
9 10 Before the Court is Plaintiff Jamar Jackson’s (“Jackson”) application to proceed in 11 forma pauperis, (ECF No. 1), and pro se complaint (ECF No. 1-1). The Court will first 12 address the in forma pauperis application and then screen Jackson’s complaint pursuant 13 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 14 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 15 A person may be granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) if the 16 person “submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] 17 possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such 18 affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the 19 person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 20 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all actions filed IFP, 21 not just prisoner actions). 22 Pursuant to LSR 1-1: “Any person who is unable to prepay the fees in a civil case 23 may apply to the court for leave to proceed [IFP]. The application must be made on the 24 form provided by the court and must include a financial affidavit disclosing the applicant’s 25 income, assets, expenses, and liabilities.” 26
27 1 This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Miranda M. Du, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate 1 “[T]he supporting affidavit [must] state the facts as to [the] affiant’s poverty with 2 some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” U.S. v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th 3 Cir. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A litigant need not “be absolutely 4 destitute to enjoy the benefits of the statute.” Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 5 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). 6 A review of the application to proceed IFP reveals Jackson cannot pay the filing 7 fee. Accordingly, the application to proceed IFP, (ECF No. 1), is granted. 8 II. SCREENING STANDARD 9 Prior to ordering service on any Defendant, the Court is required to screen an in 10 forma pauperis complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate under certain 11 circumstances. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126 (noting the in forma pauperis statute at 28 12 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 13 for the enumerated reasons). Such screening is required before a litigation proceeding 14 in forma pauperis may proceed to serve a pleading. Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 507 15 (9th Cir. 2015). 16 “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – (A) 17 the allegations of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or 18 malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 19 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). 21 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 22 granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. When reviewing the adequacy of a complaint 24 under this statute, the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). 25 See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for 26 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 27 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 1 on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2 2000) (citation omitted). 3 The Court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light 4 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 5 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). Allegations in pro se complaints 6 are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Hughes 7 v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 8 A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 9 cause of actions,” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief 10 above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 11 “The pleading must contain something more. . . than. . . a statement of facts that merely 12 creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (citation and quotation 13 marks omitted). At a minimum, a plaintiff should include “enough facts to state a claim to 14 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 15 678 (2009). 16 A dismissal should not be without leave to amend unless it is clear from the face 17 of the complaint the action is frivolous and could not be amended to state a federal claim, 18 or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Cato v. United 19 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th 20 Cir. 1990). 21 III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 22 In his complaint, Jackson sues Defendant Reno Police Department (“RPD”) 23 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for various alleged state law claims. (See ECF No. 1- 24 1.) Jackson alleges that on an unknown date, RPD used excessive force and committed 25 an unlawful detainment and false arrest in violation of his rights under the U.S. 26 Constitution and Nevada laws. (Id. at 4.) Jackson alleges that “he believes” the officers’ 27 actions “fell well below the standards for lawful and reasonable police procedure” and as 1 claims for use of excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights, false arrest, 2 unlawful detainment, negligence, negligent training/supervision, and “violation of Nevada 3 Civil Rights Statutes (NRS 41.690 et. seq.)”. (Id. at 3.) Jackson is seeking monetary and 4 emotional distress damages “totaling $300,000.” (Id. at 4.) 5 A. RPD as a Defendant 6 The only named Defendant in this action is RPD in connection with the alleged 7 excessive force, unlawful detainment, false arrest and various state law claims. The 8 United States Supreme Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City 9 of New York that a municipal entity like RPD can be held liable for the constitutional 10 violations of an officer only if the violations occurred because the officer was carrying out 11 a municipal policy or custom. Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th 12 Cir. 2006) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). However, Jackson does not contend that the 13 RPD officer who allegedly illegally arrested him was implementing a policy or custom. 14 Because Monell liability attaches only when an officer is executing a municipal policy or 15 custom, Jackson must explain whether he is asserting that his arrest was part of a policy 16 or custom to support claims against RPD. 17 If Jackson does not intend to assert claims RPD was implementing a policy or 18 custom but is instead trying to allege the wrongful conduct of an individual officer(s) of 19 RPD, then he must state so in his complaint by naming the individual officer(s) as 20 Defendant(s) responsible for the alleged excessive force, unlawful detainment, and other 21 claims he asserts in his complaint. As currently alleged, Jackson does not state a proper 22 claim for Monell liability. Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissal of the complaint, 23 without prejudice and with leave to amend. 24 B. Leave to Amend 25 If Jackson chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended 26 complaint supersedes (replaces) the original complaint and, thus, the amended 27 complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & 1 named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the 2 original”). Any allegations, parties, or requests for relief from prior papers that are not 3 carried forward will no longer be before the court. Jackson should clearly title the 4 amended pleading as “First Amended Complaint.” For each Defendant and each claim, 5 he must allege true facts sufficient to show that the Defendant violated his rights. 6 The Court notes that, if Jackson chooses to file an amended complaint curing the 7 deficiencies, as outlined in this order, Jackson should file the amended complaint within 8 30 days from the date of entry of the District Court’s order addressing this report and 9 recommendation. If Jackson chooses not to file an amended complaint curing the stated 10 deficiencies, the action will be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Jackson’s application 13 to proceed IFP, (ECF No. 1), be granted, the complaint, (ECF No. 1-1), be dismissed, 14 with leave to amend. 15 The parties are advised: 16 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Rule IB 3-2 of the Local Rules of 17 Practice, the parties may file specific written objections to this Report and 18 Recommendation within fourteen days of receipt. These objections should be entitled 19 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” and should be 20 accompanied by points and authorities for consideration by the District Court. 21 2. This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order and any 22 notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the 23 District Court’s judgment. 24 V. RECOMMENDATION 25 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Jackson’s application to proceed in 26 forma pauperis, (ECF No. 1), be GRANTED. 27 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk FILE the complaint, (ECF No. 1- 1 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT 2| PREJUDICE and WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 3 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that if Jackson chooses to file an amended 4) complaint curing the deficiencies of his original complaint, as outlined in this order, 5 | Jackson shall file the amended complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of the 6 | District Court’s order addressing this report and recommendation. 7 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that if Jackson chooses not to file an amended 8 | complaint curing the stated deficiencies of the complaint, the Court recommends dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim. 10 DATED: January 15, 2026
12 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 er