Jamal Hendrix v. Rohan

Ninth Circuit

Jamal Hendrix v. Rohan

689 F. App'x 530

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 21, 2017

Docket16-16229

StatusUnpublished

This text of 689 F. App'x 530 (Jamal Hendrix v. Rohan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jamal Hendrix v. Rohan, 689 F. App'x 530 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Jamal Damon Hendrix, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations, including excessive force and inadequate medical care during his pretrial detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed Hendrix’s § 1983 claims as time-barred because, even allowing for tolling while Hendrix was allegedly incompetent, Hendrix’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. See Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 actions are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims; two-year statute of limitations under Nevada law). However, Hendrix alleged in his amended complaint that he had exhausted available administrative grievance procedures at the Clark County Detention Center. Liberally construed, these allegations show that Hendrix may be entitled to further tolling on the ground that he was completing the mandatory exhaustion process. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.”); Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting dismissal as time-barred at the pleading stage is inappropriate where complaint alleges facts indicating potential tolling may apply); see also Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] complaint cannot be *531 dismissed [for untimeliness] unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.”).

We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Jamal Damon Hendrix, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations, including excessive force and inadequate medical care during his pretrial detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). We vacate and remand.

The district court dismissed Hendrix’s § 1983 claims as time-barred because, even allowing for tolling while Hendrix was allegedly incompetent, Hendrix’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. See Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 actions are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims; two-year statute of limitations under Nevada law). However, Hendrix alleged in his amended complaint that he had exhausted available administrative grievance procedures at the Clark County Detention Center. Liberally construed, these allegations show that Hendrix may be entitled to further tolling on the ground that he was completing the mandatory exhaustion process. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.”); Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting dismissal as time-barred at the pleading stage is inappropriate where complaint alleges facts indicating potential tolling may apply); see also Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] complaint cannot be *531 dismissed [for untimeliness] unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.”).

We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.

VACATED and REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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