Jalen B. Landers v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 27, 2023
• Docket: 07-23-00185-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00185-CR

JALEN B. LANDERS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 47th District Court Armstrong County, Texas Trial Court No. 001471, Honorable Dan L. Schaap, Presiding

November 27, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Jalen B. Landers, was charged by indictment with the offense of evading

arrest or detention with a vehicle.1 The trial court denied Appellant’s pretrial motion to

suppress evidence, and he was found guilty of the charged offense by a jury. Punishment

was submitted to the court which, after finding two enhancement paragraphs true,

imposed a sentence of confinement in prison of 35 years.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04. Through two issues on appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion

to suppress and affirm the judgment.

Background

On January 6, 2021, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Aaron Tarnutzer,

while patrolling Interstate 40 west of Amarillo, received a report from Amarillo dispatch.

The report was triggered by an automated license plate reader that reported the vehicle’s

owner was wanted on multiple outstanding arrest warrants. The vehicle in the photograph

also did not match the one for which tags had been issued.

Trooper Tarnutzer identified the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. The vehicle

initially stopped, but as Tarnutzer approached, it fled the scene. A high-speed chase

ensued, covering approximately sixty miles, and ended east of Claude, Texas, after law

enforcement used spike strips to stop the vehicle. Appellant was identified as the driver.

Appellant was indicted for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle.2 He filed a

motion to suppress which alleged law enforcement’s actions violated his rights as

protected under the state and federal constitutions, and stated:

A warrantless stop of Defendant was based solely on information obtained pursuant to an Automatic License Plate Reader. No observable traffic offense or other criminal activity was observed by the Texas Department of Public Safety trooper who initiated the initial traffic stop.

During the suppression hearing, Appellant’s counsel argued the traffic stop was an

unreasonable search and seizure because it was initiated solely based on a hit from an

2 A second count charged Appellant with the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. On the morning of trial, the State abandoned that count. 2 automated license plate reader, absent any other criminal activity to justify the stop of

Appellant’s vehicle. Counsel argued that using an automated license plate reader as the

sole basis for a traffic stop is unconstitutional because it treads on the individual’s

reasonable expectation of privacy as protected under the United States Constitution, the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Texas Constitution.

Trooper Tarnutzer was the sole witness testifying on behalf of the State. During

cross-examination, he acknowledged that apart from the dispatch report triggered by the

license plate reader, he observed no other factors about Appellant’s vehicle that would

independently justify a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

Analysis

Via two issues which we consider jointly, Appellant argues the evidence at the

suppression hearing was insufficient to support the trial court’s ruling and that the

unilateral use of a license plate reader does not provide reasonable suspicion to initiate

a traffic stop. Citing Woods v. State,3 the State counters that a motion to suppress is not

an appropriate mechanism for challenging an element of the State’s evading case,

namely the legality of the initial detention. Therefore, the State posits that the trial court

did not commit an error in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. We agree with the

State.

The legality of the detention is an element of the offense of evading: “A person

commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer . .

. attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a) (emphasis

3 153 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

3 supplied); Woods, 153 S.W.3d at 415 n.8; Rodriguez v. State, No. 07-14-00407-CR, 2016

Tex. App. LEXIS 8494, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 8, 2016, pet. ref’d). Because the

legality of the stop was also a fundamental element of the charged offense, it would be

inappropriate to resolve this question through a pretrial motion to suppress. See

Lovington v. State, No. 07-16-00109-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13215, at *3–5 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo Dec. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);

Pickens v. State, 159 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (observing

when the accused is charged with evading arrest or detention “it is improper to request

the trial court to rule upon a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when the movant

questions the validity of the detention.”).

We find our prior opinions, and that of Woods, to be instructive here. “By asking

for the trial judge to suppress the arrest, and the details of his flight and evasion of the

detention . . . Appellant was in effect asking the trial judge to rule on whether the

prosecution had proof of an element of the offense.” Woods, 153 S.W.3d at 415. Under

such circumstances, “the issue should simply be litigated as part of the State’s case at

trial.” York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The trial court did not

err in denying the motion to suppress.

Moreover, even if we were to conclude the parties continued litigating the

suppression issue through trial, our determination would not be altered. See Gutierrez v.

State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“when the parties subsequently re-

litigate the suppression issue at the trial on the merits, we consider all evidence, from

both the pre-trial hearing and the trial, in our review of the trial court’s determination.”).

Trial evidence established Appellant committed several traffic offenses after he fled the

4 stop of Trooper Tarnutzer and led law enforcement on a four-county high-speed chase.

Law enforcement’s pursuit of Appellant around Amarillo reached speeds “well over” one

hundred miles an hour, as did the chase through downtown Claude, where the speed limit

is 35 miles per hour. In turn, other pursuing troopers and officers witnessed these new

offenses and took pursuit; they are independently documented in the dash cam videos

admitted at trial. Witnessing these new offenses supplied reasonable suspicion to pursue

and stop Appellant regardless of the legality of the initial stop. See State v. Iduarte, 268

S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (concluding the exclusionary rule does not

“provide limitless protection” for individual to commit subsequent independent criminal

acts that are causally disconnected from alleged illegality by state agent). See also

Massey v. State, 667 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (discussing continuation

of taint doctrine and observing that “if a defendant commits a new offense in response to

police misconduct, the police misconduct will almost never result in suppression of

evidence of the new offense that was committed in reaction or in response to it.”).

Appellant’s two issues are overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lawrence M. Doss Justice

Do not publish.