IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2023-KA-00512-COA
JAKIA THOMAS APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/01/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WINSTON L. KIDD COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MARCUS AMIR WILLIAMS KEVIN BRIAN BASS LAWRENCE STEPHEN BLACKMON ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/25/2025 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Jakia Thomas was convicted of the second-degree murder of her boyfriend, DeMarcus
Harris. On appeal, she argues that the trial court made errors in the admission and exclusion
of evidence, her conviction was against the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and
cumulative error warrants reversal. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2. In December 2018, Thomas and Harris lived together with their five-month-old child
in Jackson, Mississippi. They had been dating for approximately a year and a half to two years. On December 27, 2018, Harris’s mother, Janice Harris, called Harris and asked him
if her boss could borrow a commercial-grade dolly. Harris agreed. Around 12:30 p.m., he
let Janice know that he was picking up pizza for their lunch, and he arrived at Janice’s
workplace in Jackson with the pizza and dolly around 1 p.m. Janice testified that Harris was
in good spirits and was happy to learn that her boss possibly had a job opportunity for Harris.
Harris left between 3:15 and 3:45 p.m. Janice called him approximately thirty minutes after
he left to let him know that she had given Harris’s phone number to her boss, and Harris was
“fine” during their conversation.
¶3. Harris’s brother, Lynn Harris, testified that he called Harris between 4:30 and
5:30 p.m., and they spoke on the phone for about twenty minutes and discussed meeting up
that evening to smoke weed. Before they ended the call, Harris said to “give him 20
minutes.” Lynn testified that Harris seemed normal during their conversation.
¶4. At approximately 5:43 p.m., shortly after Harris hung up with his brother on the
phone, Thomas called 911 and reported that Harris had shot himself in their home. An
ambulance was dispatched and arrived at the home at 5:57 p.m. Officer Zekia Lewis with
the Jackson Police Department was the first officer on the scene. She testified that when she
arrived, Thomas was crying and saying, “[H]elp him, help him, he tried to harm himself.”
Officer Lewis testified that the scene did not seem “normal” to her. Harris was sitting
slumped over in a chair, a framed picture of a woman “was laying in both of his hands, and
he was tilted over to the right.” Officer Lewis noted that although she later learned from
Thomas that Harris was right-handed, Harris had been shot in the back-left side of his head,
2 and a gun was on the floor to his left. He was moving and able to talk, although she could
not understand what he was saying. Officers later identified the woman in the photograph
as Harris’s sister, who had died in a car accident two years prior.
¶5. Thomas told Officer Lewis that prior to Harris being shot, she and Harris had an
argument, and Harris was holding a photograph of his deceased sister and saying, “I want to
go with you.” Thomas told Officer Lewis that Harris “had just been crying a lot and just
sitting in that chair holding this picture of his deceased sister.” Officer Lewis testified that
Thomas told her that Harris had been holding a gun to his head, and when she tried to take
it from him, the gun discharged.
¶6. Officers examined the gun that was found on the floor to Harris’s left and found a
stove-piped shell casing lodged inside. A second shell casing fell from Harris’s body onto
the front porch as paramedics were transporting him on a stretcher from the house. Harris
died four days later in the hospital. An autopsy showed that Harris’s cause of death was a
gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of death was homicide.
¶7. After Harris was taken to the hospital, Thomas was immediately detained for
questioning. After waiving her Miranda1 rights, she told officers that she and Harris had
been arguing for the past few days because Harris had commented, “I’m hungry,” on another
woman’s Facebook post showing food the woman was preparing. Thomas explained that she
told Harris, “You a man that’s taken you can’t be saying you’re hungry they are going to take
that as I ain’t feeding you or any other thing.” Thomas said that Harris did not understand
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 how his comment was disrespectful. Thomas maintained that Harris shot himself as she was
attempting to stop him. Gunshot residue was found on Thomas’s and Harris’s hands.
¶8. Thomas was indicted in the Hinds County Circuit Court for the first-degree murder
of Harris. After a jury trial, Thomas was found guilty of second-degree murder. On March
1, 2023, the circuit court sentenced Thomas to serve thirty years in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections. The circuit court denied Thomas’s motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, and Thomas appealed.
¶9. On appeal, Thomas argues that this Court should reverse her conviction for the
following reasons: (1) the circuit court erred in granting the State’s motion to exclude a
Facebook post that she alleges was pertinent to Harris’s mental state; (2) the circuit court
erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict based on the Weathersby rule;2 (3) the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (4) the verdict was against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence; (5) the circuit court erred in allowing the medical
examiner to testify outside his area of expertise and give rebuttal testimony; (6) the circuit
court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statement to police; (7) the circuit court
erred in permitting the introduction of gruesome photographs; and (8) cumulative errors
deprived her of a fair trial.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of Facebook Post
¶10. Thomas’s defense at trial was that Harris was depressed following his sister’s death
2 Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481, 482 (1933).
4 two years prior in a car accident and shot himself while Thomas tried to stop him from
committing suicide. Thomas sought to introduce into evidence a post from Harris’s
Facebook page that Thomas contends supported her theory that Harris had a suicidal mental
state. The post was made on May 24, 2018, approximately seven months prior to Harris’s
death on December 27, 2018. The post stated in its entirety, “Just trying to have a life of
happiness, but I’m starting to feel like I shouldn’t have a life at all.”
¶11. Prior to trial, the State moved to exclude the post on the basis that it was too remote
in time and not relevant under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401. Alternatively, the State
argued that the post was improper under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 because its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the post
could be misleading to the jury, and it could not be authenticated. The circuit court granted
the motion, finding that the Facebook post was “of no relevance to the hearing matter and
remote in time.”
¶12. “The standard of review regarding admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of
discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 71 (¶9) (Miss. 2010). We will not disturb an
evidentiary ruling “unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party.” Id.
(quoting Mingo v. State, 944 So. 2d 18, 28 (¶23) (Miss. 2006)). “Evidence that is remote in
time or is otherwise far-removed from an issue at trial is not relevant under M.R.E. 401 and
may be excluded by the trial court in the exercise of discretion.” Tillis v. State, 661 So. 2d
1139, 1142-43 (Miss. 1995).
¶13. Thomas cites Parr v. State, 362 So. 2d 634, 636 (Miss. 1978), where the Supreme
5 Court found no error in the trial court’s admission of threats made by the defendant thirteen
months before the killing. However, there is a key distinction between this case and Parr.
In Parr, the Supreme Court considered that a continuing course of conduct existed between
the defendant and victim between the period before the threats and up until the murder. The
court noted, “The record indicates that for a period before the threats were made up until the
date of the homicide, there was hostility, bitterness, and ill will between appellant and his
wife [(the deceased)]. Such a situation rendered the threats relevant and competent.” Id.
¶14. Similarly, in May v. State, 524 So. 2d 957, 960 (Miss. 1988), a witness testified that
the defendant, Dorothy May, had told her the year prior to May’s husband’s death that she
had tried to poison her husband. On appeal, May argued that the trial court erred in not
striking the statement as too remote in time. Id. at 965. The Supreme Court found no abuse
of discretion because even if the statement was too remote in time, “several other persons
testified to similar threats” that May made leading up to the murder, including a threat made
by May less than a week prior to her husband’s death. Id. Therefore, the court found that
even if the admission of the remote statement was error, it “was surely harmless” given the
testimony of “a more contemporaneous threat.” Id.
¶15. Here, no evidence was presented that Harris continued to make similar allegedly
suicidal statements or exhibit suicidal behavior between his Facebook post and his death
seven months later. Therefore, even if Thomas is correct that Harris’s Facebook post showed
he had suicidal thoughts seven months prior to his death, there is no evidence that those
suicidal thoughts continued until his death. To the contrary, the State presented evidence that
6 Harris did not dwell on his sister’s death and was generally happy.
¶16. Harris’s mother, Janice, testified for the State regarding the events on the day of
Harris’s death and her knowledge of his mental state following his sister’s death. Janice
testified that after her daughter, Harris’s sister, died in a car accident, Harris and his brother
were “torn to pieces.” But, over time, they got better; “[i]t was a normal grief. At first it may
have been unbearable, but as time has went by, you know, they are fine.” Janice testified as
follows regarding Harris’s mental state in December 2018 just prior to this death: “[I’m] not
saying that he didn’t grieve his sister, but he didn’t have mopey feelings or anything like that.
He was back to normal. . . . [H]e was a happy kid . . . .”
¶17. Janice testified that she regularly spoke to Harris on the phone. On the morning of
Harris’s death, she called him and asked if her boss could borrow a commercial-grade dolly.
Harris agreed and brought the dolly and pizza for himself and Janice around 1 p.m. Janice’s
boss asked Janice what type of work Harris did and then asked if Harris “would look at the
property and let [him] know how much [Harris] would charge initially to do a cleanup for
[him] and to continue—do the upkeep on it at least once a month.” When Janice relayed this
message to Harris, she said that Harris “was ready to work. He says, well, can I start today[?]
. . . [H]e was excited. He was calling people about the little job.” Janice testified that Harris
left between 3:15 and 3:45 p.m., and she called him around thirty minutes later to tell him
that she was giving her boss Harris’s phone number. Janice testified that during the
conversation, “[h]e was fine.” She testified that he had never expressed having any mental-
health issues to her. Finally, she was asked if he ever said anything between the ages of
7 twenty-five and the time of his death at age thirty-two regarding “if something was
concerning him”; she answered no. Harris’s brother, Lynn, testified that he spoke to Harris
on the phone moments before Harris’s death. He testified that Harris seemed “normal”
during their conversation; he was not depressed or sad, and they did not discuss their sister.
¶18. We cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the Facebook
post as too remote in time and irrelevant to show Harris’s state of mind at the time of his
death. The Facebook post was made seven months prior to Harris’s death, and there was no
evidence that Harris continued to make such statements or exhibit any behavior that would
support Thomas’s theory that Harris continued to have suicidal thoughts. The circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Facebook post.
II. Weathersby Rule
¶19. Thomas argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal under the
Weathersby rule. Our Supreme Court has held that motions “for a directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the guilty verdict,” that the “standards of review for a denial of directed verdict
and JNOV are identical,” and that reversal is warranted where, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable and fair-minded juror could only find the
accused not guilty. Croft v. State, 992 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (¶24) (Miss. 2008).
¶20. The Weathersby rule states:
Where the defendant or the defendant’s witnesses are the only eyewitnesses to the homicide, their version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true, unless substantially contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or witnesses for the state, or by the physical facts or by the facts of common
8 knowledge.
Childress v. State, 395 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (¶27) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Weathersby, 147 So.
at 482). “Where the Weathersby rule applies and the defendant’s version affords an absolute
legal defense, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Johnson v. State,
987 So. 2d 420, 424 (¶10) (Miss. 2008). The applicability of the Weathersby rule is a
determination for the court, not the jury. Id. “[I]t is a rare case that meets all of the
requirements of the Weathersby rule.” McQuarters v. State, 45 So. 3d 643, 650 (¶21) (Miss.
2010) (quoting Sartain v. State, 311 So. 2d 343, 345 (Miss. 1975)). Where factual issues
exist, the case must be submitted to the jury. Id.
¶21. It is undisputed that Thomas and her and Harris’s infant child were the only ones in
the home when Harris was shot. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Thomas moved for
a directed verdict in part based on the Weathersby rule. The circuit court denied the motion.
Thomas argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict because she was the only witness
to the shooting, and the State failed to present substantial evidence to contradict her account
of the events. Thus, she asserts that her version of events must be accepted as true.
¶22. Thomas’s account of Harris’s shooting was that Harris was holding a gun while crying
and holding a picture of his deceased sister, and he was saying, “I want to go with you.” She
approached Harris in an attempt to prevent him from shooting himself, and through accident
and misfortune, the gun went off.
¶23. However, the State presented evidence that contradicted Thomas’s version of events.
For instance, Officer Lewis testified that the scene of the shooting did not appear normal to
9 her or consistent with Thomas’s assertion that Harris shot himself. Officer Lewis testified
that it appeared the gun used in the shooting had been fired twice because a shell casing was
found stove-piped in the gun, and another fell from Harris’s body as he was being transported
by paramedics. Further, Officer Lewis noted that despite Thomas’s statement to her that
Harris was right-handed, he was shot in the left side of his head behind his ear, he was
slumped over to the right, and the gun was on the ground on his left side. Dr. Mark
LeVaughn, a state forensic medical examiner, testified that the manner of death was not
consistent with a suicide because there was no evidence that the gun was in close range to
Harris’s head when it was fired.
¶24. We cannot find that the Weathersby rule applies here. Not only did Officer Lewis
testify that the scene appeared inconsistent with Thomas’s version of events, but Dr.
LeVaughn testified that the manner of death was homicide and inconsistent with suicide. Dr.
LeVaughn’s “expert testimony [regarding the manner of death], admissible under our rules
of evidence, substantially contradicted [Thomas’s] version of the incident and created a
question for the jury to resolve.” Booker v. State, 64 So. 3d 965, 975-76 (¶33) (Miss. 2011).
¶25. The circuit court did not err in denying Thomas’s motion for a directed verdict on this
issue and submitting these factual issues to the jury to decide. This issue is without merit.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶26. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Haymon v. State,
346 So. 3d 875, 881 (¶14) (Miss. 2022). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
“[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
10 rational, reasonable fair-minded jurors could have found that the State proved each essential
element of the crime” beyond a reasonable doubt. Poole v. State, 46 So. 3d 290, 293 (¶20)
(Miss. 2010) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶27. Second-degree murder is a killing “done in the commission of an act eminently
dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although
without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual[.]” Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (Rev. 2020). A finding of intent to kill is not required. McCool
v. State, 328 So. 3d 173, 183 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). However, the defendant’s conduct
must be “so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard of, or utter indifference to, the
safety of human life.” Montana v. State, 822 So. 2d 954, 967 (¶55) (Miss. 2002).
¶28. The jury heard Thomas’s theory of the case that Harris was holding the gun and crying
about his deceased sister while holding her picture, and Harris was shot while Thomas was
trying to prevent Harris from committing suicide. The jury also heard evidence that Thomas
and Harris had been arguing prior to the shooting and that the crime scene and autopsy report
showed Harris’s death was not consistent with suicide. Specifically, the jury heard that
Harris, who was right-handed, was shot in the left side of the head, the gun was found on the
ground to his left, and the autopsy showed no indication that the gun was in close range to
Harris’s head when it was fired. The jury was also told that it appeared that the gun had been
fired twice and that it was not reasonable to believe Harris could have fired the gun a second
time after sustaining the injury from the first shot.
¶29. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could
11 find that Thomas shot Harris and, in doing so, committed “an act eminently dangerous to
others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life[.]” Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-3-19(1)(b). Therefore, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove each essential
element of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. Weight of the Evidence
¶30. “A request for a new trial is a challenge to the weight of the evidence.” Haymon, 346
So. 3d at 883 (¶23). “The trial court’s grant or denial of a new trial is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard, and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict.” Id. (citing Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (¶21) (Miss. 2017)). “We will not
order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice.”
Jones v. State, 390 So. 3d 498, 503 (¶20) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Whitten v. Cox, 799 So. 2d
1, 13 (¶26) (Miss. 2000)).
¶31. Thomas argues that the verdict of second-degree murder was against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence because the State presented no evidence that she took
“any hostile action” toward Harris prior to his death; rather, she called 911 and sought help
for Harris after he was shot. She further argues that the State failed to show a motive for the
murder and that the State’s theory regarding how Harris was shot was not supported by
scientific testing or physical evidence but, instead, was based on speculation.
¶32. Thomas further argues that the testimony of her expert witness “should hold
considerable weight given the facts and circumstances of this case, in addition to the lack of
12 evidence detailing the shooting presented by the State.” Eric Warren, who was tendered as
an expert in the “field of shooting incident reconstruction and firearms,” testified for the
defense. Warren testified that based on summaries of the crime scene, Thomas’s interview
with the police, and the medical evidence, “the scenario that is most consistent with all of
that evidence as a whole is . . . in agreement with the recounting of events that Ms. Thomas
told to the Jackson Police Department.”
¶33. To the contrary, the State presented evidence that Harris’s manner of death was not
consistent with the account Thomas gave to police. Both the medical examiner who
performed the autopsy and the medical examiner who testified at trial agreed that Harris’s
death was a homicide. Law enforcement found it was not plausible that Harris, who was
right-handed, shot himself in the back of his head on the left side. As motive for the murder,
the State presented evidence of an ongoing argument between Harris and Thomas regarding
a Facebook comment that Harris made on another woman’s post. Thomas acknowledged that
she and Harris had been arguing over it prior to his death.
¶34. While Thomas argues that the State’s evidence was speculative and the substantial
weight of the evidence weighs in her favor, we must acknowledge that “where the verdict
turns on the credibility of conflicting testimony and the credibility of the witness, it is the
jury’s duty to resolve the conflict.” Wilson v. State, 343 So. 3d 1041, 1051 (¶47) (Miss.
2022). “‘[T]he jury is the judge of the weight and credibility of testimony and is free to
accept or reject all or some of the testimony given by each witness.’” Young v. State, 236 So.
3d 49, 57 (¶35) (Miss. 2017) (quoting Meshell v. State, 506 So. 2d 989, 992 (Miss. 1987)).
13 ¶35. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot find that
the jury’s verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The circuit court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Thomas’s motion for a new trial.
V. Admission of Medical Examiner’s Testimony
a. Scope of Expert Testimony
¶36. Thomas argues that State Medical Examiner Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony was outside
the scope of his expertise and mere speculation. Specifically, she argues that Dr. LeVaughn
was unqualified to testify as to the manner of Harris’s death, bullet trajectory, and distance
of the gun from Harris’s body because (1) he did not personally view Harris’s body or the
crime scene or speak with witnesses, and (2) he “is not a shooting incident scene
reconstructionist.”
¶37. The trial court acts “as gatekeeper on questions of admissibility of expert testimony.”
Chisholm v. State, 365 So. 3d 229, 241 (¶43) (Miss. 2023). “This Court reviews the trial
court’s admissibility determination for abuse of discretion.” Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d
278, 295 (¶28) (Miss. 2014).
¶38. No specific objection was made at trial regarding Dr. LeVaughn’s qualification to
testify as to Harris’s cause or manner of death based on the fact that Dr. LeVaughn was not
present for the autopsy. Nor was there any objection made that Dr. LeVaughn impermissibly
testified regarding the trajectory of the bullet through Harris’s head. Therefore, this issue is
waived for appeal. Brady v. State, 337 So. 3d 218, 227 (¶27) (Miss. 2022) (stating that issues
not presented to the trial court are waived). Thomas argues that the issue is not waived
14 because she continuously objected to Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony. While Thomas did object
throughout Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony, the objections were based on the failure of the State
to produce Dr. LeVaughn’s report in a timely manner, the authenticity of the autopsy
photographs, and Dr. LeVaughn’s use of a demonstrative aid.3 Thomas alternatively argues
that the issue should be reviewed for plain error. See id. (stating that an issue may be
reviewed for plain error “in unusual circumstances” affecting a defendant’s substantive or
fundamental rights to “prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice”).
¶39. Because there was no objection made at trial to Dr. LeVaughn’s qualifications or his
ability to give his opinion on the cause and manner of death when he was not present for the
autopsy, we find these issues are waived. We also find the issues are not appropriate for
plain error review. Therefore, we decline to address them on appeal.
b. Rebuttal Testimony
¶40. Thomas argues that the circuit court erred by permitting Dr. LeVaughn to give rebuttal
testimony. Thomas called one witness at trial, Eric Warren, an expert on shooting-incident
reconstruction and firearms. As part of his testimony, Warren simulated how Harris’s
gunshot wound could have been self-inflicted. After his testimony, the State announced its
3 Thomas also objected to Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony that the lack of soot or stippling on a person indicates “that the gun was fired greater than three feet.” Thomas’s counsel immediately moved to strike this statement from the record because the testimony regarding the specific distance of three feet was outside the scope of the autopsy report and not timely disclosed to the defense, and the motion was granted. The circuit court instructed the jury to disregard the statement. To the extent that Thomas challenges this specific testimony on appeal, we find the issue without merit because the circuit court instructed the jury to disregard the statement, and “[t]he jury is presumed to follow instructions from the trial court . . . .” Young, 236 So. 3d at 57 (¶38).
15 intent to call Dr. LeVaughn, who testified for the State in its case-in-chief as an expert in the
field of forensic pathology, back to the stand as a rebuttal witness. The defense objected on
the basis that the rebuttal testimony was a backdoor attempt to introduce Dr. LeVaughn’s
report, which the circuit court had previously excluded, and on the basis that Dr. LeVaughn
was not a proper rebuttal witness because he and Warren were certified in two different areas
of expertise. The prosecution responded that Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony would be
limited to Warren’s testimony regarding “the angle of the projection and stippling.” The
circuit court overruled the objection and allowed Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony, limiting
it to those two issues.
¶41. During rebuttal, the prosecution asked Dr. LeVaughn if Warren’s demonstration
regarding the angle of the gun when it was fired was accurate. Dr. LeVaughn responded that
“based on the actual true wound path through the head, that animation is not consistent with
that.” Dr. LeVaughn was not asked about stippling. On appeal, Thomas argues that Dr.
LeVaughn was not qualified to rebut Warren’s testimony because Dr. LeVaughn is not a
firearms expert, and his rebuttal testimony lacked any probative value and could not be
substantially countered with a surrebuttal.
¶42. “The determination of whether evidence is properly admitted as rebuttal evidence is
within the trial court’s discretion.” Jackson v. State, 840 So. 2d 739, 741 (¶6) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003) (citing Powell v. State, 662 So. 2d 1095, 1098-99 (Miss. 1995)). Our Supreme
Court has set forth the following guidelines on whether the admission of rebuttal testimony
is proper:
Generally, the party bearing the burden of proof must offer all substantive
16 evidence in its case-in-chief. Where, however, there is doubt as to whether the evidence is properly case-in-chief or rebuttal evidence, the court should resolve the doubt in favor of reception in rebuttal if: (1) its reception will not consume so much additional time as to give an undue weight in practical probative force to the evidence so received in rebuttal, and (2) the opposite party would be substantially as well prepared to meet it by surrebuttal as if the testimony had been offered in chief, and (3) the opposite party upon request therefor is given the opportunity to reply by surrebuttal.
McGaughy v. State, 742 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (¶12) (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted).
¶43. Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony was brief, and the defense cross-examined him but
did not seek surrebuttal testimony. As a forensic pathologist, Dr. LeVaughn was qualified
to testify as to a bullet’s trajectory through Harris’s head, and his rebuttal testimony was
limited to his opinion regarding the accuracy of Warren’s demonstration of the trajectory of
the bullet through Harris’s head. Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 632 (¶29) (Miss. 2013)
(“[A] forensic pathologist may testify as to what produced [a victim’s] injuries,” including
“wounds . . . and the means of infliction of injury,” and “what trauma such an injury would
produce.”). The rebuttal testimony could not have been presented during the State’s case-in-
chief because the State was unaware that Warren would provide such a demonstration. Dr.
LeVaughn offered no additional testimony. For these reasons, we cannot find that the circuit
court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. LeVaughn’s rebuttal testimony.
VI. Statement to Law Enforcement
¶44. Before Thomas was interrogated by law enforcement, she was advised of her right to
remain silent and her right to counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Thomas waived her
Miranda rights and signed a waiver-of-rights form. Thomas argues that despite her waiver
of rights, her statements to law enforcement, which were given approximately an hour and
17 a half after the shooting occurred, were not voluntary, and the circuit court erred by denying
her motion to suppress the statements. Specifically, Thomas argues that she was still in a
“very emotional state,” and “officers induced her with leniency and promises to speak on her
behalf to the judge.”
¶45. A valid waiver under Miranda “must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Id. A
“[w]aiver is considered voluntary if it is the result of a ‘free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion or deception.’” Jordan v. State, 995 So. 2d 94, 106 (¶31) (Miss. 2008)
(quoting Coverson v. State, 617 So. 2d 642, 647 (Miss. 1993)). “Knowing and intelligent
waiver must be made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The State bears the burden to show the waiver was valid. Id. “The determination of the
voluntariness of a waiver of rights is a mixed issue of law and fact,” and this Court “will not
reverse a trial court’s findings if they were based on appropriate principles of law and
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at (¶32).
¶46. Despite Thomas’s argument that she was coerced into giving inculpatory statements
because she was in an emotional state, the interrogation video shows she was calm and able
to answer the officers’ questions and give a statement. Thomas’s argument that the officers
coerced her into giving a statement by threatening to speak to a judge about her case is also
without merit. The only specific statement by an officer that Thomas cites from the
interrogation is as follows:
So like I told you when he walked out, it’s best to tell the truth and exactly what happened. But going before a judge saying, no, she wasn’t remorseful,
18 and she shot him. That’s all I’ve got, judge. Instead of saying, judge, they had an argument earlier, it got a little heated, and a gun was involved. It was an accident.
However, Thomas had already given her version of events before the officer mentioned
speaking to a judge, and there is no allegation that the officer’s statement coerced Thomas
to give any further information.
¶47. After review, we find that the circuit court applied “appropriate principles of law,”
and the circuit court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was “ supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. at (¶32). Therefore, we find the circuit court properly admitted Thomas’s
statements to law enforcement into evidence.
VII. Autopsy Photographs
¶48. Thomas argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the autopsy photographs
marked as Exhibits S-14 E and G, which showed Harris’s skull and brain, over her objection
on the basis that they were gruesome and provided minimal evidentiary or probative value.
Thomas argues that the State introduced other sufficient photographs to identify Harris and
the gunshot wound. She asserts that it was undisputed that Harris died of a gunshot wound
to the head, and the admission of Exhibits S-14 E and G was unnecessary, highly prejudicial,
and improperly inflamed the jury. The circuit court found that while the photographs were
gruesome, their probative value was not outweighed by their prejudicial effect.
¶49. We review a trial court’s decision to admit a photograph into evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Barfield v. State, 22 So. 3d 1175, 1181 (¶14) (Miss. 2009). We “must consider
whether the pictures were so gruesome and inflammatory as to lack any evidentiary purpose
19 and, therefore, be inadmissible.” Id. “[P]hotographs have evidentiary value when they (1)
aid in describing the circumstances of the killing; (2) describe the location of the body and
cause of death; and (3) supplement or clarify witness testimony.” Id. at (¶15) (quotation
marks omitted). “Some probative value is the only requirement needed in order to support
a trial judge’s decision to admit photographs into evidence.” Martin v. State, 289 So. 3d 703,
705 (¶7) (Miss. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Chamberlin v. State, 989 So. 2d 320, 340
(¶73) (Miss. 2008)). “So long as a photograph has probative value and its introduction serves
a meaningful evidentiary purpose, it may still be admissible despite being gruesome, grisly,
unpleasant, or even inflammatory.” Id. Gruesomeness alone will not render a photograph
inadmissible in a murder trial; it is not unusual for crime-scene photos to be “gruesome,
grisly, [or] unpleasant.” Id.
¶50. Exhibits S-14 E and G are autopsy photographs depicting the injury to Harris’s skull
and brain. Dr. LeVaughn described Exhibit S-14 E as “a photograph after the top of the skull
bone is removed and also the brain is removed, so we’re looking at in this photograph what
we call the base of the skull or the bottom part of the skull,” and the photograph showed “a
probe through the cranial cavity.” Dr. LeVaughn testified that Exhibit S-14 G was “a view
from the left side of the head” showing “the entry wound into the skull.”
¶51. At trial, Thomas’s theory of defense was that Harris shot himself while Thomas tried
to stop him from committing suicide. The State’s theory was that the entry wound to the
back-left side of Harris’s head and the subsequent wound path were consistent with a
homicide. Testimony regarding the wound path was highly disputed at trial, with Thomas
20 objecting to Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony that the wound path was “slightly upward” rather
than “upward” as described in the report of Dr. Eserman, the medical examiner who
performed the autopsy.4
¶52. Because the photographs were relevant to the wound path, which was a disputed issue
at trial, we cannot find that the circuit court erred in concluding that the probative value of
the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect. See Martin, 289 So. 3d at 705 (¶7)
(stating that only “[s]ome probative value” is needed to support the admission of photographs
into evidence (emphasis added)). This issue is without merit.
VIII. Cumulative Error
¶53. Thomas argues that cumulative error deprived her of a fair trial. “Under the
cumulative-error doctrine, individual harmless errors may be aggregated with other errors to
create reversible error ‘where the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a
fundamentally fair trial.’” Warren v. State, 187 So. 3d 616, 628 (¶34) (Miss. 2016) (quoting
Osborne v. State, 54 So. 3d 841, 848 (¶27) (Miss. 2011)). However, “where there is no error
in part, there can be no reversible error to the whole.” Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 970 So.
2d 151, 157 (¶24) (Miss. 2007)).
¶54. We have identified no reversible error. Therefore, there can be no cumulative error.
This issue is without merit. Thomas’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
4 Dr. LeVaughn prepared his own report; however, Thomas moved to exclude any findings from Dr. LeVaughn’s report because it was produced to the defense only four days before trial. The circuit court granted the motion on the basis that Dr. LeVaughn’s report was not timely produced, and the circuit court limited Dr. LeVaughn’s testimony to the findings in Dr. Eserman’s report.
21 ¶55. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. EMFINGER, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.