3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 JAKE T. BELFORD, Case No. 3:25-cv-00653-MMD-CSD
7 Petitioner, SCREENING ORDER v. 8
9 BORGAS, et al.,
10 Respondents.
11 12 Pro se Petitioner Jake T. Belford has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 13 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and a motion 14 for appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 1 (“IFP Motion”), 1-1 (“Petition”), 1-2 (“Motion for 15 Counsel”).) The Court finds that good cause exists to grant the IFP Motion. And, following 16 an initial review of the Petition under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“Habeas 17 Rules”), the Court directs service of the Petition and grants the Motion for Counsel. 18 I. BACKGROUND1 19 Belford challenges a conviction and sentence imposed by the Second Judicial 20 District Court for Washoe County. See State of Nev. v. Jake Taylor Belford, CR18-1787. 21 On May 16, 2019, the state court entered a judgment of conviction convicting Belford of 22 trafficking a controlled substance and battery on a protected person. Belford was 23 sentenced to 60 to 180 months for the trafficking conviction and a concurrent sentence of 24 364 days for the battery conviction. These sentences were ordered to be served 25 26 1The Court takes judicial notice of the online docket records of the Second Judicial 27 1 consecutively to Belford’s sentence in case CR18-1790. Belford was given seven days of 2 credit for time served as to both counts. Belford did not file a direct appeal. 3 Belford filed a pro se state habeas petition on May 20, 2020 and a supplemental 4 counseled petition on March 2, 2021. The state court found that Belford’s state habeas 5 petition was untimely, but it found good cause existed to excuse the untimeliness. (ECF 6 No. 1-1 at 119.) However, the state court ultimately denied Belford post-conviction relief. 7 (Id. at 154.) Belford appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on August 15, 8 2025, finding that Belford’s state habeas petition was filed four days late and that Belford 9 had not demonstrated good cause to excuse the procedural bar. Remittitur issued on 10 September 5, 2025. Belford commenced this federal action on November 13, 2025. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 Habeas Rule 4 requires the assigned judge to examine a habeas petition and order 13 a response unless it “plainly appears” that the petition is not entitled to relief. See Valdez 14 v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019). This rule allows courts to screen and 15 dismiss petitions that are patently frivolous, vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, false, 16 or plagued by procedural defects. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 17 1998); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). 18 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one- 19 year period of limitations for state prisoners to file a federal habeas petition under 28 20 U.S.C. § 2254. The one-year limitation period begins to run from the latest of four possible 21 triggering dates, with the most common being the date on which the petitioner’s judgment 22 of conviction became final by either the conclusion of direct appellate review or the 23 expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The federal 24 limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 25 other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 26 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). But no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of a 27 2 1 direct appeal and the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief in state court because no 2 state court proceeding is pending during that time. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 3 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 Here, it appears that Belford’s conviction became final when the time expired for 5 filing a direct appeal to the Nevada appellate courts on June 15, 2019. See Nev. R. App. 6 P. 4(b)(1) (requiring a notice of appeal to “be filed with the district court clerk within 30 7 days after the entry of the judgment or order being appealed”); see also Gonzalez v. 8 Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 137 (2012) (when a state prisoner “does not seek review in a State’s 9 highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ on the date that the time for seeking such 10 review expires”). Belford’s federal statute of limitations thus began to run the following 11 day on June 16, 2019. Belford’s limitations period expired one year later on June 16, 12 2020.2 Accordingly, absent another basis for tolling or delayed accrual, Belford filed his 13 Petition over five years after his AEDPA limitations period expired. 14 Anticipating this untimeliness, Belford argues he is entitled to equitable tolling 15 because (1) he hired David Houston to file a direct appeal and seek post-conviction relief 16 on his behalf, but Houston failed to do so, (2) COVID prevented the timely delivery of his 17 state habeas petition, which was only four days late, and (3) he was hindered by 18 excessive lockdowns, phone restrictions, and the ability to use the law library due to 19
20 2Although Belford filed a state habeas petition, it would only toll the federal limitations period if it was “properly filed.” The Supreme Court has held that if a habeas 21 petitioner’s state postconviction petition was rejected by the state court as untimely, it is not “properly filed” within the meaning of the statutory tolling provision of the AEDPA 22 limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“Because the 23 state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 24 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (“[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually 25 prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.”). Belford’s state 26 habeas petition was not properly filed given that the Nevada Supreme Court found it to 27 be untimely under state procedural rules. 3 1 COVID. (ECF No. 1-3.) Equitable tolling is appropriate only if a petitioner can show that: 2 (1) he has been pursuing his right diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance 3 stood in his way and prevented timely filing. See Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 4 The state court found that “[i]t was not until Mr. Houston’s email/letter to Mr. Belford 5 and [his girlfriend] on December 23, 2019, [that] Mr.
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
5 * * *
6 JAKE T. BELFORD, Case No. 3:25-cv-00653-MMD-CSD
7 Petitioner, SCREENING ORDER v. 8
9 BORGAS, et al.,
10 Respondents.
11 12 Pro se Petitioner Jake T. Belford has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 13 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), and a motion 14 for appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 1 (“IFP Motion”), 1-1 (“Petition”), 1-2 (“Motion for 15 Counsel”).) The Court finds that good cause exists to grant the IFP Motion. And, following 16 an initial review of the Petition under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“Habeas 17 Rules”), the Court directs service of the Petition and grants the Motion for Counsel. 18 I. BACKGROUND1 19 Belford challenges a conviction and sentence imposed by the Second Judicial 20 District Court for Washoe County. See State of Nev. v. Jake Taylor Belford, CR18-1787. 21 On May 16, 2019, the state court entered a judgment of conviction convicting Belford of 22 trafficking a controlled substance and battery on a protected person. Belford was 23 sentenced to 60 to 180 months for the trafficking conviction and a concurrent sentence of 24 364 days for the battery conviction. These sentences were ordered to be served 25 26 1The Court takes judicial notice of the online docket records of the Second Judicial 27 1 consecutively to Belford’s sentence in case CR18-1790. Belford was given seven days of 2 credit for time served as to both counts. Belford did not file a direct appeal. 3 Belford filed a pro se state habeas petition on May 20, 2020 and a supplemental 4 counseled petition on March 2, 2021. The state court found that Belford’s state habeas 5 petition was untimely, but it found good cause existed to excuse the untimeliness. (ECF 6 No. 1-1 at 119.) However, the state court ultimately denied Belford post-conviction relief. 7 (Id. at 154.) Belford appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on August 15, 8 2025, finding that Belford’s state habeas petition was filed four days late and that Belford 9 had not demonstrated good cause to excuse the procedural bar. Remittitur issued on 10 September 5, 2025. Belford commenced this federal action on November 13, 2025. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 Habeas Rule 4 requires the assigned judge to examine a habeas petition and order 13 a response unless it “plainly appears” that the petition is not entitled to relief. See Valdez 14 v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019). This rule allows courts to screen and 15 dismiss petitions that are patently frivolous, vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, false, 16 or plagued by procedural defects. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 17 1998); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). 18 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one- 19 year period of limitations for state prisoners to file a federal habeas petition under 28 20 U.S.C. § 2254. The one-year limitation period begins to run from the latest of four possible 21 triggering dates, with the most common being the date on which the petitioner’s judgment 22 of conviction became final by either the conclusion of direct appellate review or the 23 expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The federal 24 limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 25 other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 26 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). But no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of a 27 2 1 direct appeal and the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief in state court because no 2 state court proceeding is pending during that time. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 3 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 Here, it appears that Belford’s conviction became final when the time expired for 5 filing a direct appeal to the Nevada appellate courts on June 15, 2019. See Nev. R. App. 6 P. 4(b)(1) (requiring a notice of appeal to “be filed with the district court clerk within 30 7 days after the entry of the judgment or order being appealed”); see also Gonzalez v. 8 Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 137 (2012) (when a state prisoner “does not seek review in a State’s 9 highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ on the date that the time for seeking such 10 review expires”). Belford’s federal statute of limitations thus began to run the following 11 day on June 16, 2019. Belford’s limitations period expired one year later on June 16, 12 2020.2 Accordingly, absent another basis for tolling or delayed accrual, Belford filed his 13 Petition over five years after his AEDPA limitations period expired. 14 Anticipating this untimeliness, Belford argues he is entitled to equitable tolling 15 because (1) he hired David Houston to file a direct appeal and seek post-conviction relief 16 on his behalf, but Houston failed to do so, (2) COVID prevented the timely delivery of his 17 state habeas petition, which was only four days late, and (3) he was hindered by 18 excessive lockdowns, phone restrictions, and the ability to use the law library due to 19
20 2Although Belford filed a state habeas petition, it would only toll the federal limitations period if it was “properly filed.” The Supreme Court has held that if a habeas 21 petitioner’s state postconviction petition was rejected by the state court as untimely, it is not “properly filed” within the meaning of the statutory tolling provision of the AEDPA 22 limitations period. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“Because the 23 state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).”); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 24 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (“[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually 25 prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.”). Belford’s state 26 habeas petition was not properly filed given that the Nevada Supreme Court found it to 27 be untimely under state procedural rules. 3 1 COVID. (ECF No. 1-3.) Equitable tolling is appropriate only if a petitioner can show that: 2 (1) he has been pursuing his right diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance 3 stood in his way and prevented timely filing. See Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 4 The state court found that “[i]t was not until Mr. Houston’s email/letter to Mr. Belford 5 and [his girlfriend] on December 23, 2019, [that] Mr. Houston made clear he was not 6 proceeding any further with the matter until he received compensation for his services.” 7 (ECF No. 1-1 at 118.) The Nevada Supreme Court then found that because Belford’s 8 state habeas petition was not filed for many months after this December 23, 2019 letter, 9 “Belford did not demonstrate that the petitions were filed within a reasonable time after 10 [he] learned that counsel had not filed anything.” Belford appears to dispute that he ever 11 received the December 23, 2019 letter, explaining that “no letters, or notifications of any 12 kind were sent to Mr. Belford from Dave Houston or any member of his firm” because if 13 such a letter had been sent, “there would be record on file within [the] Nevada Department 14 of Corrections.” (ECF No. 1-3.) It appears that the December 23, 2019 letter was sent to 15 Belford’s home address even though he was incarcerated. 16 Given these facts, the Court finds it is not plainly apparent that Belford’s Petition 17 will be found to be time barred; in fact, it appears that Belford has a potentially3 meritorious 18 equitable tolling argument. As such, the Court directs that the Petition be served on 19 Respondents. 20 The Court now turns to Belford’s Motion for Counsel. There is no constitutional 21 right to appointed counsel for a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Pa. v. Finley, 481 22 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 642 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Lawrence 23 v. Fla., 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007)). An indigent petitioner may request appointed 24 counsel to pursue that relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). The decision to appoint 25 counsel is generally discretionary. See id (authorizing appointed counsel when “the 26 3The Court makes no finding at this time whether or not Belford is entitled to 27 equitable tolling. 4 1 interests of justice so require”). However, counsel must be appointed if the complexities 2 of the case are such that denial of counsel would amount to a denial of due process and 3 where the petitioner is a person of such limited education as to be incapable of fairly 4 presenting his claims. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Brown v. 5 United States, 623 F.2d 54, 61 (9th Cir. 1980). 6 The Court provisionally appoints the Federal Public Defender to represent 7 Belford. The Court finds that the appointment of counsel is in the interests of justice given, 8 among other things, the complex procedural history of this case. 9 III. CONCLUSION 10 It is therefore ordered that the IFP Motion (ECF No. 1) is granted. 11 It is further kindly ordered that the Clerk of Court (1) file the Petition (ECF No. 1- 12 1), (2) add Aaron Ford, Attorney General of the State of Nevada, as counsel for 13 Respondents, (3) electronically provide Respondents’ counsel a copy of the Petition (ECF 14 No. 1-1), this Order, and all items previously filed in this case by regenerating the Notices 15 of Electronic Filing, (4) send the Federal Public Defender a copy of this Order and the 16 Petition (ECF No. 1-1), and (5) send a copy of this Order to Belford and the CJA 17 Coordinator for this division. 18 It is further ordered that Respondents’ counsel enter a notice of appearance within 19 21 days of entry of this Order. No further response will be required until further order. 20 It is further ordered that the Motion for Counsel (ECF No. 1-2) is granted. The 21 Federal Public Defender is provisionally appointed as counsel and will have 30 days to 22 (1) undertake direct representation of Belford by filing a notice of appearance or (2) 23 indicate the office’s inability to represent Belford in these proceedings. If the Federal 24 Public Defender is unable to represent Belford, the Court will appoint alternate counsel. 25 Appointed counsel will represent Belford in all federal proceedings related to this matter, 26 including any appeals or certiorari proceedings, unless allowed to withdraw. A deadline 27 5 1 || for the filing of an amended petition and/or seeking other relief will be set after counsel 2 || has entered an appearance. 3 It is further ordered that any deadline established and/or any extension thereof will 4 || not signify any implied finding of a basis for tolling during the time period established. 5 || Belford remains responsible for calculating the running of the federal limitation period and 6 || timely presenting claims. That is, by setting a deadline to amend the Petition and/or by 7 || granting any extension thereof, the Court makes no finding or representation that the 8 || Petition, any amendments thereto, and/or any claims contained therein are not subject to 9 || dismissal as untimely. See Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2013). 10 DATED THIS 18" Day of November 2025. 1 AGA 12 MIRANDAM.DU ——(‘“‘:™SCSC~S™S 43 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28