UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DR. GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-02550 (CRC)
THE HONORABLE JANET T. NEFF and THE HONORABLE SALLY J. BERENS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dr. Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola (“Jaiyeola”), proceeding pro se, filed this action against a
district judge and a magistrate judge of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Michigan. Jaiyeola alleges that the judges’ actions in a prior lawsuit that he brought in that
district violated the Due Process Clause. See Compl. ¶¶ 20–22. For the reasons explained
below, the Court will dismiss this action sua sponte.
I. Background
This case arises from an earlier lawsuit between Jaiyeola and Robert A. Brundage in the
Western District of Michigan, Jaiyeola v. Brundage (“Brundage”), No. 1:21-cv-01053 (W.D.
Mich.). Jaiyeola alleged that Brundage engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when
Brundage represented Toyota in Jaiyeola’s prior lawsuit against that company. See Jaiyeola v.
Brundage, No. 1:21-CV-1053, 2022 WL 368650, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2022). United
States District Judge Janet T. Neff referred the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Sally J.
Berens, who issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the case be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Judge Neff adopted the R&R over
Jaiyeola’s objection. Id. 1 Jaiyeola then sued Judges Berens and Neff. He alleges that Magistrate Judge Berens
“denied [him] due process . . . by converting . . . [a witness] into a Defendant and thereby
destroying . . . diversity jurisdiction” and by issuing the R&R. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. He further
claims that District Judge Neff “denied [him] due process” by adopting the R&R. Id. ¶ 29. As
redress for these claimed injuries, Jaiyeola seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as
equitable relief. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 31, 38.
II. Legal Standards
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual
allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff[s] the benefit
of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642
F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir.
2005)). The plaintiff bears “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F.
Supp. 2d 172, 176 (D.D.C. 2004).
B. Failure to State a Claim
“The Court may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) without notice where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail
based on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Klayman v. Rao, No. 21-cv-02473 (CRC), 2021
WL 4948025, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021) (Cooper, J.) (cleaned up), aff’d, 49 F.4th 550 (D.C.
Cir. 2022); Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
2 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must allege “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). Although “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” it still “must plead factual matter
that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Abdelfattah v. U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “Likewise, although a
pro se complaint “must be construed liberally, the complaint must still ‘present a claim on which
the Court can grant relief.’” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Budik
v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 937 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013)).
III. Analysis
Dismissal is warranted because Jaiyeola fails to state a claim for damages and the Court
lacks jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief he seeks.
First, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Jaiyeola’s equitable claims. Jaiyeola asks that the
Court “declare[] void and vacate[]” the Defendants’ orders in his lawsuit against Brundage. Id. ¶
39. But this Court “is a trial level court in the federal judicial system” that “generally lacks
appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies[.]” United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85
(D.D.C. 2011); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. To obtain the equitable relief he seeks, Jaiyeola’s only
path is an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and following that, a
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. This Court is not on that path and therefore
must dismiss Jaiyeola’s equitable claims. See Moore v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Ariz., No. 10-
cv-434, 2010 WL 1005757, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2010) (“The powers conferred on the federal
district courts do not include the power to review the decisions of other district courts or to force
other district courts to act.”); Swiatkowski v. Bank of Am., Corp., 81 F. Supp. 3d 56, 58 (D.D.C.
3 2015) (“This Court is not a reviewing court and it lacks jurisdiction to compel another court to
act.”).
Second, Jaiyeola’s damages claims are barred by judicial immunity. Jaiyeola seeks
“compensatory and punitive damages” against the Defendants. Compl. ¶ 31. But “[j]udges
enjoy absolute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Judicial immunity
“extends even to actions that are allegedly malicious or corrupt.” Sibley v. Roberts, 224 F. Supp.
3d 29, 37 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“Judicial immunity is
not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.”).
Here, all the challenged acts were taken by the defendants in their judicial capacities. For
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DR. GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-02550 (CRC)
THE HONORABLE JANET T. NEFF and THE HONORABLE SALLY J. BERENS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dr. Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola (“Jaiyeola”), proceeding pro se, filed this action against a
district judge and a magistrate judge of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Michigan. Jaiyeola alleges that the judges’ actions in a prior lawsuit that he brought in that
district violated the Due Process Clause. See Compl. ¶¶ 20–22. For the reasons explained
below, the Court will dismiss this action sua sponte.
I. Background
This case arises from an earlier lawsuit between Jaiyeola and Robert A. Brundage in the
Western District of Michigan, Jaiyeola v. Brundage (“Brundage”), No. 1:21-cv-01053 (W.D.
Mich.). Jaiyeola alleged that Brundage engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when
Brundage represented Toyota in Jaiyeola’s prior lawsuit against that company. See Jaiyeola v.
Brundage, No. 1:21-CV-1053, 2022 WL 368650, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2022). United
States District Judge Janet T. Neff referred the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Sally J.
Berens, who issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the case be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. Judge Neff adopted the R&R over
Jaiyeola’s objection. Id. 1 Jaiyeola then sued Judges Berens and Neff. He alleges that Magistrate Judge Berens
“denied [him] due process . . . by converting . . . [a witness] into a Defendant and thereby
destroying . . . diversity jurisdiction” and by issuing the R&R. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. He further
claims that District Judge Neff “denied [him] due process” by adopting the R&R. Id. ¶ 29. As
redress for these claimed injuries, Jaiyeola seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as
equitable relief. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 31, 38.
II. Legal Standards
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court must “assume the truth of all material factual
allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff[s] the benefit
of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642
F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir.
2005)). The plaintiff bears “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction[.]” Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F.
Supp. 2d 172, 176 (D.D.C. 2004).
B. Failure to State a Claim
“The Court may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) without notice where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail
based on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Klayman v. Rao, No. 21-cv-02473 (CRC), 2021
WL 4948025, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2021) (Cooper, J.) (cleaned up), aff’d, 49 F.4th 550 (D.C.
Cir. 2022); Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
2 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must allege “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). Although “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” it still “must plead factual matter
that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Abdelfattah v. U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “Likewise, although a
pro se complaint “must be construed liberally, the complaint must still ‘present a claim on which
the Court can grant relief.’” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Budik
v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 937 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013)).
III. Analysis
Dismissal is warranted because Jaiyeola fails to state a claim for damages and the Court
lacks jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief he seeks.
First, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Jaiyeola’s equitable claims. Jaiyeola asks that the
Court “declare[] void and vacate[]” the Defendants’ orders in his lawsuit against Brundage. Id. ¶
39. But this Court “is a trial level court in the federal judicial system” that “generally lacks
appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies[.]” United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85
(D.D.C. 2011); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. To obtain the equitable relief he seeks, Jaiyeola’s only
path is an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and following that, a
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. This Court is not on that path and therefore
must dismiss Jaiyeola’s equitable claims. See Moore v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Ariz., No. 10-
cv-434, 2010 WL 1005757, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2010) (“The powers conferred on the federal
district courts do not include the power to review the decisions of other district courts or to force
other district courts to act.”); Swiatkowski v. Bank of Am., Corp., 81 F. Supp. 3d 56, 58 (D.D.C.
3 2015) (“This Court is not a reviewing court and it lacks jurisdiction to compel another court to
act.”).
Second, Jaiyeola’s damages claims are barred by judicial immunity. Jaiyeola seeks
“compensatory and punitive damages” against the Defendants. Compl. ¶ 31. But “[j]udges
enjoy absolute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Judicial immunity
“extends even to actions that are allegedly malicious or corrupt.” Sibley v. Roberts, 224 F. Supp.
3d 29, 37 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“Judicial immunity is
not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.”).
Here, all the challenged acts were taken by the defendants in their judicial capacities. For
example, Jaiyeola claims that Magistrate Judge Berens denied him due process by issuing an
R&R before Brundage was served. Compl. ¶ 20. He alleges that Magistrate Judge Berens
denied him due process “by converting a witness . . . into a [d]efendant and thereby destroying
the diversity jurisdiction in the lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 21. And he contends that District Judge Neff
denied him due process by accepting the R&R and issuing a judgment “before the [c]ourt had
jurisdiction over Brundage.” Id. ¶¶ 28–29. Defendants undertook all these actions while
presiding over Jaiyeola’s lawsuit against Brundage. Therefore, they were acting in their judicial
capacities and are absolutely immune to Jaiyeola’s damages claims.1
Jaiyeola’s damages claim also fails because it arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 1
Compl. ¶¶ 25–32. That statute “does not apply to federal officials acting under color of federal law” like the Defendants. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 4 IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court dismisses this case. A separate Order will follow.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: October 16, 2024