1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA, Case No. 5:23-cv-03462-EJD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTIONS 10 v.
11 APPLE, INC, Re: Dkt. No. 64, 75 Defendant. 12
13 Before the Court are Jaiyeola’s two motions: (1) to vacate the Court’s order granting 14 Defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying Jaiyeola’s motion for leave to file, Mot. to Vacate 15 MTD Order, ECF No. 64; Opp’n, ECF No. 66; Reply, ECF No. 69; and (2) to vacate the Court’s 16 order denying Jaiyeola’s motion to disqualify the Undersigned. Mot. to Vacate Disqualification 17 Order, ECF No. 75; Opp’n, ECF No. 76; Reply, ECF No 77. 18 After carefully considering the relevant documents, the Court finds this matter suitable for 19 decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the 20 Court DENIES Jaiyeola’s motions. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The Court previously summarized the procedural history and factual allegations in its prior 23 orders and will therefore only discuss the more recent background relevant to the present motions. 24 On March 27, 2024, the Court granted Apple’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 25 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denied Jaiyeola’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint 26 (“MTD Order”). MTD Order, ECF No. 60. The Court closed this case and entered judgment. 27 Judgment, ECF No. 61. Jaiyeola subsequently filed a motion to vacate the MTD Order under Rule 1 60(b) and a separate motion to disqualify the Undersigned. The Court denied Jaiyeola’s motion to 2 disqualify on May 30, 2025, (“Disqualification Order”) and took his motion to vacate the MTD 3 Order under submission. Disqualification Order, ECF No. 73; ECF No. 74. Five days later, 4 Jaiyeola filed a motion to vacate the Disqualification Order under Rule 60(b). ECF No. 75. The 5 Court now considers Jaiyeola’s two Rule 60(b) motions to vacate the MTD Order and the 6 Disqualification Order. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final 9 judgment, order, or proceeding upon a showing of “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 10 newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; 11 or (6) ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which would justify relief.” Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 12 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A Rule 60(b) motion is not a vehicle to 13 re-litigate the underlying claims. To the contrary, “the merits of a case are not before the court on 14 a Rule 60(b) motion.” Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 61 (9th Cir. 2004). The 15 party seeking relief under Rule 60 bears the burden of establishing one or more of the listed 16 grounds for relief. See Cassidy v. Tenorio, 856 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988). It is within “the 17 sound discretion of the trial court” to determine whether to grant such relief. Thompson v. Hous. 18 Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Judicial Notice 21 As an initial matter, Jaiyeola requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following 22 orders: Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-04145-EJD, Doc. #29 (N.D. Cal. 2016) and 23 Moua v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 5:10-cv-01070-EJD (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012), Doc. # 64. 24 Courts may consider materials outside a complaint where such materials are incorporated 25 by reference or subject to judicial notice. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 26 (9th Cir. 2018). Judicial notice is proper if the facts requested to be noticed are “not subject to 27 reasonable dispute” because they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 1 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). In granting requests for judicial 2 notice, the Court may only take notice as to the existence of the record “and the facts contained 3 therein, not as to the (disputed) inferences that Defendant [may] seek[] to draw from them.” 4 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, No. 5-CV-01597-EDL, 2006 WL 167657, at *3 (N.D. 5 Cal. Jan. 20, 2006); Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (“But a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed 6 facts contained in such public records.”). 7 Here, Jaiyeola asks that the Court take judicial notice of two orders authored by the 8 Undersigned. “As a general rule, a court in one case will not take judicial notice of its own 9 records in another and distinct case even between the same parties, unless the prior proceedings 10 are introduced into evidence.” Lowe v. McDonald, 221 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1955). There are 11 two exceptions to this rule: (1) where the prior action is brought into the pleadings in the case on 12 trial, or (2) where the two cases represent related litigation. Id. Caracciolo and Moua have not 13 been introduced into evidence and neither exception is available here. Accordingly, Jaiyeola’s 14 request is DENIED. 15 B. Motion to Vacate MTD Order 16 Jaiyeola argues that the MTD Order should be vacated under Rules 60(b)(1), (b)(4), and 17 (b)(6). The Court will address each in turn. 18 1. Rule 60(b)(1): Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect 19 Jaiyeola argues that the MTD Order must be vacated under Rule 60(b)(1) for four reasons. 20 First, Jaiyeola argues that the Court failed to apply the McDonnell Douglass framework to 21 his Title VII claims. Mot. to Vacate MTD Order 4–6. “[H]owever, the McDonnell Douglas 22 framework is an evidentiary framework and not a pleading standard.” Duke v. City Coll. of San 23 Francisco, 445 F. Supp. 3d 216, 232 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations 24 omitted) (quoting Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012)). 25 Second, Jaiyeola argues that the Court improperly played “the role of a trier of fact.” Mot. 26 to Vacate MTD Order 7. Jaiyeola quotes the following passages where the Court uses the word 27 “evidence” to demonstrate his argument: 1 Specifically, the Court found that Jaiyeola relied solely on his supervisor’s remarks to demonstrate success on the merits, but the 2 remarks did not evidence any discriminatory or retaliatory intent, and Jaiyeola did not present any evidence for the Court to infer that such 3 intent played a role in causing those remarks.
4 The Court denied Jaiyeola’s second request, finding that Jaiyeola again failed to provide any evidence that would permit the Court to 5 infer that this adverse employment action was the result of discriminatory or retaliatory intent . . . . 6 7 Id. (quoting MTD Order 6) (emphasis added). However, these passages are found in the MTD 8 Order’s procedural background section titled “Ex Parte Applications for Temporary Restraining 9 Orders and Appeals,” where the Court referenced its prior orders on Jaiyeola’s motions for 10 temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctive relief. MTD Order 5–6.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA, Case No. 5:23-cv-03462-EJD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING RULE 60(B) MOTIONS 10 v.
11 APPLE, INC, Re: Dkt. No. 64, 75 Defendant. 12
13 Before the Court are Jaiyeola’s two motions: (1) to vacate the Court’s order granting 14 Defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying Jaiyeola’s motion for leave to file, Mot. to Vacate 15 MTD Order, ECF No. 64; Opp’n, ECF No. 66; Reply, ECF No. 69; and (2) to vacate the Court’s 16 order denying Jaiyeola’s motion to disqualify the Undersigned. Mot. to Vacate Disqualification 17 Order, ECF No. 75; Opp’n, ECF No. 76; Reply, ECF No 77. 18 After carefully considering the relevant documents, the Court finds this matter suitable for 19 decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the 20 Court DENIES Jaiyeola’s motions. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The Court previously summarized the procedural history and factual allegations in its prior 23 orders and will therefore only discuss the more recent background relevant to the present motions. 24 On March 27, 2024, the Court granted Apple’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 25 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denied Jaiyeola’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint 26 (“MTD Order”). MTD Order, ECF No. 60. The Court closed this case and entered judgment. 27 Judgment, ECF No. 61. Jaiyeola subsequently filed a motion to vacate the MTD Order under Rule 1 60(b) and a separate motion to disqualify the Undersigned. The Court denied Jaiyeola’s motion to 2 disqualify on May 30, 2025, (“Disqualification Order”) and took his motion to vacate the MTD 3 Order under submission. Disqualification Order, ECF No. 73; ECF No. 74. Five days later, 4 Jaiyeola filed a motion to vacate the Disqualification Order under Rule 60(b). ECF No. 75. The 5 Court now considers Jaiyeola’s two Rule 60(b) motions to vacate the MTD Order and the 6 Disqualification Order. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final 9 judgment, order, or proceeding upon a showing of “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 10 newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; 11 or (6) ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which would justify relief.” Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 12 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A Rule 60(b) motion is not a vehicle to 13 re-litigate the underlying claims. To the contrary, “the merits of a case are not before the court on 14 a Rule 60(b) motion.” Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 61 (9th Cir. 2004). The 15 party seeking relief under Rule 60 bears the burden of establishing one or more of the listed 16 grounds for relief. See Cassidy v. Tenorio, 856 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988). It is within “the 17 sound discretion of the trial court” to determine whether to grant such relief. Thompson v. Hous. 18 Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Judicial Notice 21 As an initial matter, Jaiyeola requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following 22 orders: Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-04145-EJD, Doc. #29 (N.D. Cal. 2016) and 23 Moua v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 5:10-cv-01070-EJD (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012), Doc. # 64. 24 Courts may consider materials outside a complaint where such materials are incorporated 25 by reference or subject to judicial notice. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 26 (9th Cir. 2018). Judicial notice is proper if the facts requested to be noticed are “not subject to 27 reasonable dispute” because they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 1 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). In granting requests for judicial 2 notice, the Court may only take notice as to the existence of the record “and the facts contained 3 therein, not as to the (disputed) inferences that Defendant [may] seek[] to draw from them.” 4 Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, No. 5-CV-01597-EDL, 2006 WL 167657, at *3 (N.D. 5 Cal. Jan. 20, 2006); Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (“But a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed 6 facts contained in such public records.”). 7 Here, Jaiyeola asks that the Court take judicial notice of two orders authored by the 8 Undersigned. “As a general rule, a court in one case will not take judicial notice of its own 9 records in another and distinct case even between the same parties, unless the prior proceedings 10 are introduced into evidence.” Lowe v. McDonald, 221 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1955). There are 11 two exceptions to this rule: (1) where the prior action is brought into the pleadings in the case on 12 trial, or (2) where the two cases represent related litigation. Id. Caracciolo and Moua have not 13 been introduced into evidence and neither exception is available here. Accordingly, Jaiyeola’s 14 request is DENIED. 15 B. Motion to Vacate MTD Order 16 Jaiyeola argues that the MTD Order should be vacated under Rules 60(b)(1), (b)(4), and 17 (b)(6). The Court will address each in turn. 18 1. Rule 60(b)(1): Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect 19 Jaiyeola argues that the MTD Order must be vacated under Rule 60(b)(1) for four reasons. 20 First, Jaiyeola argues that the Court failed to apply the McDonnell Douglass framework to 21 his Title VII claims. Mot. to Vacate MTD Order 4–6. “[H]owever, the McDonnell Douglas 22 framework is an evidentiary framework and not a pleading standard.” Duke v. City Coll. of San 23 Francisco, 445 F. Supp. 3d 216, 232 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations 24 omitted) (quoting Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012)). 25 Second, Jaiyeola argues that the Court improperly played “the role of a trier of fact.” Mot. 26 to Vacate MTD Order 7. Jaiyeola quotes the following passages where the Court uses the word 27 “evidence” to demonstrate his argument: 1 Specifically, the Court found that Jaiyeola relied solely on his supervisor’s remarks to demonstrate success on the merits, but the 2 remarks did not evidence any discriminatory or retaliatory intent, and Jaiyeola did not present any evidence for the Court to infer that such 3 intent played a role in causing those remarks.
4 The Court denied Jaiyeola’s second request, finding that Jaiyeola again failed to provide any evidence that would permit the Court to 5 infer that this adverse employment action was the result of discriminatory or retaliatory intent . . . . 6 7 Id. (quoting MTD Order 6) (emphasis added). However, these passages are found in the MTD 8 Order’s procedural background section titled “Ex Parte Applications for Temporary Restraining 9 Orders and Appeals,” where the Court referenced its prior orders on Jaiyeola’s motions for 10 temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctive relief. MTD Order 5–6. The Court made 11 no such evidentiary findings in its order granting the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 12 Third, Jaiyeola argues that the Court “ignored the facts in the exhibits.” Mot. to Vacate 13 MTD Order 8. However, Jaiyeola does not identify any exhibits or facts therein that the Court 14 ignored and how that impacted the MTD Order. The Court presumes Jaiyeola is referencing the 15 copies of the Court’s prior orders regarding his motions for preliminary injunctive relief that he 16 attached to the first amended complaint (“FAC”) and proposed second amended complaint 17 (“SAC”). But as Jaiyeola highlighted above, the Court did in fact cite these orders in the 18 procedural history summary. Id. at 8 (“The ‘evidence’ . . . referred to by the District Court are in 19 the exhibits attached to the First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint.”). 20 Regardless, the Court’s prior orders, even when attached as exhibits, have no bearing on whether 21 Jaiyeola pled facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. 22 Fourth, Jaiyeola argues that the Court denied leave to amend based on futility without a 23 motion requesting leave to amend. Mot. to Vacate MTD Order 9–10. However, the MTD Order 24 explicitly resolves Jaiyeola’s October 19, 2023, motion for leave to file his SAC at ECF No. 50. 25 This motion was fully briefed at ECF Nos. 54 and 56 and taken under submission. But even 26 without a motion seeking leave, the Court is permitted to grant dismissal without leave to amend 27 upon a finding that amendment would be futile, which the Court found here. 1 Therefore, the Court DENIES Jaiyeola’s motion to vacate the MTD Order under Rule 2 60(b)(1). 3 2. Rule 60(b)(4): Void Judgment 4 Next, Jaiyeola argues that the Judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) because the Court 5 denied Jaiyeola’s due process rights by failing to liberally construe his pleadings as a pro se party. 6 Mot. to Vacate MTD Order 11–14. This is not a proper ground for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4). 7 Regardless, the Court provided Jaiyeola procedural leniency and liberally construed his pleadings, 8 but the special considerations afforded to pro se parties have their limits. As the Court stated in its 9 MTD Order, “even pro se pleadings ‘must meet some minimum threshold in providing a 10 defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong’ and how they are entitled to relief.” 11 MTD Order 6 (quoting Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995)). 12 Jaiyeola also argues that the Judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) because the Court made 13 improper conclusory statements when it compared the allegations in the FAC and proposed SAC, 14 contending that “[a] District Court is not allowed to ‘conclude’ at the pleadings stage.” Mot. to 15 Vacate MTD Order 16. While it is true that the Court may not reach conclusions regarding the 16 merits of Jaiyeola’s claims in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may compare 17 proposed amendments and the operative complaint to conclude that amendment would be futile, as 18 it did here. 19 Therefore, the Court DENIES Jaiyeola’s motion to vacate the MTD Order under Rule 20 60(b)(4). 21 3. Rule 60(b)(6): Other Extraordinary Circumstances Justifying Relief 22 Finally, Jaiyeola argues that the MTD Order must be vacated under Rule 60(b)(6) because 23 Apple’s witness Sowmya Laxminarayanan committed perjury in her declaration attached to 24 Apple’s motion. Mot. to Vacate MTD Order 17. The Court need not determine the veracity of 25 this allegation because, even if true, Court did not rely on Laxminarayanan’s declaration in the 26 MTD Order. 27 Jaiyeola also argues that the Court improperly used a stamped order to deny one of his 1 prior Rule 60(b) motions challenging the Court’s denial of his second ex parte motion for 2 preliminary injunctive relief without any reasoned analysis. Mot. to Vacate MTD Order 18 3 (presumably referencing ECF No. 46). This is not a proper ground for vacatur under Rule 4 60(b)(1), and it is irrelevant to Jaiyeola’s challenge of the MTD Order. The Court also notes that 5 its order denying Jaiyeola’s second ex parte motion for preliminary injunctive relief was affirmed 6 by the Ninth Circuit. ECF No. 63. 7 Therefore, the Court DENIES Jaiyeola’s motion to vacate the MTD Order under Rule 8 60(b)(6). 9 C. Motion to Vacate Disqualification Order 10 Jaiyeola filed a second motion arguing that the Disqualification Order should be vacated 11 under Rule 60(b). Apple filed a notice of opposition but indicated that it did not intend to file an 12 accompanying brief because Jaiyeola failed to offer any proper basis for vacatur. Opp’n to Mot. to 13 Vacate Disqualification Order, ECF No. 76. Jaiyeola filed a reply requesting sanctions against 14 Apple for its “frivolous opposition.” Reply in. Supp. of Mot. to Vacate Disqualification Order, 15 ECF No. 77. 16 The Court agrees that Jaiyeola has failed to offer any proper basis to vacate the 17 Disqualification Order. Although Jaiyeola cites to Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(4), Jaiyeola does not 18 advance any arguments regarding a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or 19 voidness. Instead, Jaiyeola repeats arguments made in his original motion for disqualification and 20 disputes the conclusions of the Court. These are not grounds for vacatur under Rule 60(b). 21 Apple’s notice of opposition is appropriate and not subject to sanctions. 22 Therefore, the Court DENIES Jaiyeola’s motion to vacate the Disqualification Order 23 under Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(4). 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Jaiyeola’s motions to vacate the MTD Order 26 and Disqualification Order. This case remains closed. 27 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Dated: January 30, 2025 3 4 EDWARD J. DAVILA 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 a 12
© 15 16
it
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 || Case No.: 5:23-cv-03462-EJD ORDER DEN. RULE 60(B) MOTS.