Jairo Mejia Vega v. Loretta E. Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Jairo Mejia Vega v. Loretta E. Lynch

609 F. App'x 513

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 15, 2015

Docket11-70161, 11-71551

StatusUnpublished

This text of 609 F. App'x 513 (Jairo Mejia Vega v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jairo Mejia Vega v. Loretta E. Lynch, 609 F. App'x 513 (9th Cir. 2015).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Jairo Mejia Vega seeks relief from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) reinstatement of his prior order of removal and its denial of his motion to reopen. We deny his petitions for review.

1. Our review of a reinstatement order is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law where a petitioner can demonstrate a “gross miscarriage of justice” in the prior proceedings. Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir.2013); Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir.2008). Mejia Vega has failed to demonstrate a “gross miscarriage of justice” because the BIA properly sent notice of its decision to the detention center where Mejia Vega was confined. Moreover, Mejia Vega has failed to show prejudice. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 496 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (as amended). The BIA’s denial of Mejia Vega’s appeal from the deportation order issued in ab-sentia was not “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Singh v. I.N.S., 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), because Mejia Vega did not show “that [his] failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).

2. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.2005), and we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s failure to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen. Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir.2011). Contrary to Mejia Vega’s contention, the BIA, in denying Mejia Vega’s motion, did not impose any technical definition of due diligence, but simply held that in light of Mejia Vega’s presence in the United States since March 1999, he *514 had not shown “reasonable diligence” in ascertaining the status of his case or seeking relief from the BIA’s February 1999 order. Mejia Vega has not presented a sufficient factual basis for holding that this decision was an abuse of discretion, and he has not shown that the BIA’s failure to explicitly deny his request that it exercise its sua sponte authority, if judicially reviewable at all, was an abuse of discretion.

The petitions for review are DENIED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

Jairo Mejia Vega seeks relief from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) reinstatement of his prior order of removal and its denial of his motion to reopen. We deny his petitions for review.

1. Our review of a reinstatement order is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law where a petitioner can demonstrate a “gross miscarriage of justice” in the prior proceedings. Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir.2013); Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir.2008). Mejia Vega has failed to demonstrate a “gross miscarriage of justice” because the BIA properly sent notice of its decision to the detention center where Mejia Vega was confined. Moreover, Mejia Vega has failed to show prejudice. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 496 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (as amended). The BIA’s denial of Mejia Vega’s appeal from the deportation order issued in ab-sentia was not “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Singh v. I.N.S., 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), because Mejia Vega did not show “that [his] failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).

2. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.2005), and we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s failure to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen. Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir.2011). Contrary to Mejia Vega’s contention, the BIA, in denying Mejia Vega’s motion, did not impose any technical definition of due diligence, but simply held that in light of Mejia Vega’s presence in the United States since March 1999, he *514 had not shown “reasonable diligence” in ascertaining the status of his case or seeking relief from the BIA’s February 1999 order. Mejia Vega has not presented a sufficient factual basis for holding that this decision was an abuse of discretion, and he has not shown that the BIA’s failure to explicitly deny his request that it exercise its sua sponte authority, if judicially reviewable at all, was an abuse of discretion.

The petitions for review are DENIED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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609 F. App'x 513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jairo-mejia-vega-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2015.

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