Jaime Black v. State of Nevada, ex rel. Nevada Gaming Control Board

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 JAIME BLACK, Case No. 3:24-cv-00414-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 STATE OF NEVADA, ex rel. NEVADA 9 GAMING CONTROL BOARD,

10 Defendant.

11 I. SUMMARY 12 The Court previously granted Defendant State of Nevada, ex rel. Nevada Gaming 13 Control Board’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Jaime Black’s complaint with leave to amend 14 to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court’s order. (ECF No. 27 (“Dismissal Order”).) 15 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 30 (“FAC”).) Before the Court is 16 Defendant’s motion to dismiss the FAC. (ECF No. 33 (“Motion”).)1 For the reasons 17 explained below, the Court will grant the Motion. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 The following facts are adapted from the FAC. Plaintiff asserts claims that arise 20 out of her employment with the Nevada Gaming Control Board (“Board”). Plaintiff started 21 working for Defendant in 2014 and worked as a lawyer for the Board “until approximately 22 two years ago.”2 (ECF No. 30 at 2-3.) Plaintiff’s claims stem from her relationship and 23

24 1Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 38) and Defendant replied (ECF No. 40). The Court grants the stipulation for extension of time for Defendant to file their reply (ECF No. 39) 25 nunc pro tunc.

26 2The FAC does not provide clarity as to Plaintiff’s employment status with Defendant. Plaintiff’s reference to being employed “with the State” for 11 years starting in 27 2014 would suggest, based on a simple addition, that her employment with the Board ended in 2025. (ECF No. 30 at 2.) She also alleges that she worked for the Board until 28 about “two years ago” (id.), suggesting her employment with the Board ended in 2023. But other allegations in the FAC suggest Plaintiff’s employment has not terminated. 2 Watkins is “considered a woman of African-American descent.” (Id. at 2, 3.) 3 In April 2021, Brittnie Walkins was appointed to the Board and collectively as a 4 member of the Board “and sometimes individually,” “oversee discharge of various Board 5 duties, and exercise either formal or de facto supervisory authority over various lower 6 ranking employees who work for the Board, including Plaintiff.” (Id. at 3.) In December 7 2021, Board Member Watkins, was assigned the duty of supervising “the Board’s 8 Administration, wherein plaintiff worked as Chief.” (Id.) At the time, Plaintiff’s duties 9 included “significant involvement and responsibility for overseeing the Board’s Human 10 Resources Group (including hiring decisions),” and supervision and oversight over other 11 administrative functions. (Id.) Board Member Watkins allegedly interfered with Plaintiff’s 12 performance of these responsibilities, particularly as to hiring and other personnel 13 decisions which led Plaintiff to oppose what she perceived to be Watkins’ “race-based, 14 discriminatory hiring decisions, and other employment decisions.” (Id. at 9-12.) In March 15 2022, Chairman of the Board Brin Gibson “acknowledged plaintiff’s efforts at opposition 16 to Board Member Watkins race-based agenda and agreed to remove Board Member 17 Watkins from the role of oversight of the Administrative Division.” (Id. at 8.) However, in 18 September 2022, Board Member Watkins “assumed a leadership role as Chair” of the 19 Board and “resumed control over Administrative Division.” (Id.) On January 25, 2023, 20 Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after she opposed “what she perceived in 21 good faith as the pursuit of a discriminatory race-based agenda and related decisions and 22 actions by Board Member Watkins.” (Id. at 12.) 23 The FAC alleges one claim for hostile work environment and three claims for 24 retaliation all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Id. at 14-18.) The 25 three retaliation claims are based on different alleged adverse employment actions 26 allegedly taken because Plaintiff opposed racial discrimination. (Id. at 16-18.) 27 Plaintiff’s allegations in support of her fourth claim for retaliation assert 28 “wrongful/constructive transfer.” (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff also alleges she was placed on 2 Defendant seeks dismissal of the three retaliation claims, contending Plaintiff fails 3 to state two elements of her prima facie case, and dismissal of the hostile work 4 environment claim also for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 33); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 6 544, 570 (2007) (holding that to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a plaintiff must allege 7 facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”); Ashcroft v. 8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (holding that a district court must accept as true all 9 well-pled factual allegations in a complaint, while legal conclusions are not entitled to the 10 assumption of truth). The Court will address each claim in turn. 11 A. Retaliation Claims 12 Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to establish two elements 13 of her prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. To establish a prima facie case of 14 Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must adequately allege that: “(1) she engaged in an activity 15 protected under Title VII; (2) her employer subjected her to adverse employment action; 16 [and] (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” 17 Kama v. Mayorkas, 107 F.4th 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). A plaintiff 18 engages in a protected activity when they oppose a practice made unlawful by Title VII 19 or participate in any manner of investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. See 20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). As Defendant points out, and Plaintiff does not dispute, Plaintiff’s 21 protected activity relies on the opposition clause. (ECF No. 33 at 5.) 22 Defendant argues that the FAC’s allegations as to the first element—Plaintiff’s 23 opposition to race-based employment decisions—are conclusory. (Id. at 5-9.) Plaintiff 24 counters with references and importation of various paragraphs from the FAC to assert 25 how Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged opposition to Board Member Watkins’ “impermissible 26 race-based, discriminatory decisions.” (ECF No. 38 at 2-9.) The Court agrees with 27 Defendant. 28 2 Member Watkins’ race-based, discriminatory decisions, and other employment 3 decisions.” (ECF No. 30 at 7.) While not clearly alleged, Plaintiff appears to claim that 4 Board Member Watkins pushed a “discriminatory racial agenda, i.e., to favor minority 5 personnel, and in particular, persons of African-American descent.”3 (Id. at 8.) As with the 6 initial complaint, the FAC’s allegations as to Plaintiff’s opposition to Watkins’ are largely 7 conclusory as she does not allege specific facts about her resistance. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 8 at 678 (requiring more than a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation). In her 9 response to the Motion, Plaintiff quotes extensively from the FAC. (ECF No. 38 at 3-9 10 (citing ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 19-21, 29-34).) But the paragraphs Plaintiff references contain 11 opaque and conclusory allegations about how Plaintiff “opposed” and “objected” to Board 12 Member Watkins’ “personnel decisions sounding in impermissible racial bias” by taking 13 certain actions to affect employment decisions, including: asserting control over the hiring 14 decisions or delaying and obstructing the recruitment process (ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 19, 26); 15 asking for assistance in 2021 and 2022 from then Board Chair Gibson and Board Member 16 Katsaros citing her “perception” that Board Member Watkins would “undermine plaintiff’s 17 authority over hiring decisions within the Administrative Division” (Id. at ¶ 21); in May 18 2022, opposing “what she perceived as Ms. Watkins’ attempt to effectuate a 19 discriminatory, race-based agenda involved recruitment/hiring for the Professional 20 Standards Officer position” and getting Chair Gibson to allow the candidate Plaintiff had 21 identified to be selected (Id. at ¶ 25);4 in November 2022, objecting to a revision of a 22 “reorganization plan, orchestrated by Ms. Watkins,” that affected the promotion of a white 23 24 25 3Plaintiff alleges that she “understood achieving a diverse work force was one of 26 the goals which attended the Board’s hiring process.” (ECF No. 30 at 4.)

27 4Plaintiff offers no allegations as to the candidate’s race or how the recruitment for this position showed a discriminatory animus, let alone that she opposed the decision 28 because she believed it was unlawful. (ECF No. 30 at 9.) 2 2022, by objecting to the reorganization of the Administrative Division, “which plaintiff in 3 good faith perceived was being effected so as to facilitate Ms. Watkin’s attempts to further 4 discriminatory, race-based personnel decision” (Id. at ¶ 28);6 as to the hiring of the Deputy 5 Chief position, by “object[ing] based on her perception Board Member Watkins was 6 actively undermining her authority” (Id. at ¶ 31); and by alluding to exclusion of “qualified 7 candidates from northern Nevada” (Id. at ¶ 34). In sum, the allegations as to Plaintiff’s 8 opposition to alleged discriminatory practice are conclusory and are not entitled to the 9 presumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Even where Plaintiff offers specific 10 allegations, the Court cannot reasonably infer the reason Plaintiff offered for her 11 opposition was racially related or motivated to show opposition to an unlawful practice. 12 Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege the third element to state a prima facie 13 case for Title VII retaliation because of the lack of any timeline prevents the Court from 14 inferring causation. (ECF No. 33 at 9-14.) Plaintiff responds that she is not required to 15 plead “exact dates, or a comprehensive timeline” to meet Rule 8’s notice pleading 16 standard and that the temporal connection may be drawn from her allegations. (ECF No. 17 38 at 10-14.) While “exact dates” need not be pled, the lack of any discernable timeline 18 in the FAC, given the length of time that Plaintiff appears to cover, presumably from the 19 time Board Member Watkins was appointed to the Board in April 2021 to when the alleged 20 adverse employment actions occurred, is too expansive for the Court to plausibly infer 21 5Even if the reorganization plan was revised to directly affect the promotion of two 22 employees of different races as alleged in this paragraph, Plaintiff does not allege how the decision was made based on race or that she opposed the reorganization plan 23 because it made based on race. (ECF No. 35 at 9.) Indeed, she does not offer any allegations to allow for any inferences to be drawn as to whether these two employees 24 were similarly situated (i.e., the positions they occupied, their qualifications) and were treated differently because of their race or that she opposed the decision because of the 25 disparate treatment of these two employees based on race.

26 6As support for this conclusory allegation, Plaintiff asserts that the “reorganization deprived plaintiff of authority regarding Human Resources and Training matters and 27 substituted in plaintiff’s stead a person allied with Ms. Watkins.” (ECF No. 35 at 10.) But accepting this allegation as true, Plaintiff objected to the reorganization because of the 28 effect on her authority over “Human Resources and Training,” not because she believed 2 adverse actions that she relied on to support her claims occurred, including the reduction 3 in Plaintiff’s responsibilities and authorities (ECF No. 30 at 16), “an investigation against 4 plaintiff”7 (Id. at 17) or Plaintiff’s constructive transfer (Id. at 17-18). Accordingly, the Court 5 finds that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege the third element of her prima facie case of 6 retaliation. 7 In sum, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts 8 as to two elements of retaliation to state a claim for relief. The Court will grant the Motion 9 to dismiss the three retaliation claims. 10 B. Hostile Work Environment Claim 11 A hostile work environment requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff was subjected 12 to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature, (2) this conduct was unwelcome, and 13 (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 14 employment and create an abusive working environment. See Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 15 217 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s hostile work 16 environment claim appears to be based on “retaliatory hostility arising in response to her 17 opposition to what she reasonably and in good faith believed to be a course of race-based 18 discrimination engaged in by Board Member Watkins.”8 (ECF No. 30 at 14.) Defendant 19 argues that this claim, like any other hostile work environment claim, still requires Plaintiff 20

21 7Plaintiff alleges she was placed on administrative leave on January 25, 2023 so presumably the “investigation” occurred during this period of time. (ECF No 30 at 12.) 22 She also alleges in another paragraph that she was placed on “a period of administrative leave in excess of five months.” (Id. at 13, 15.) 23 8The Court assumes this claim alleges a hostile work environment based on 24 “retaliatory hostility” even though the allegations in support of this claim also makes references to “racial discrimination” and “retaliatory animus.” (ECF No. 33 at 14.) Indeed, 25 as Defendant argues, the FAC, particularly for this claim, suffers from the same deficiencies as the initial complaint in failing to state a “short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in compliance with Rule 8. (Id. at 4-5.) In response to the Motion, Plaintiff alleges that “she endured a racially hostile work 27 environment” (ECF No. 38 at 21.) But she does not allege a hostile work environment based on her race so the Court does not construe the first claim for relief to state such a 28 claim. In her response, Plaintiff also asserts that she “had not contended acts of retaliation 2 (ECF No. 33 at 11.) Plaintiff’s response does not directly address these elements but 3 instead argues that the Court must consider “all the circumstances” in determining 4 whether the environment was hostile (ECF No. 38 at 5 (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, 5 Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), 19 (citing Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 6 2001).) 7 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts to show Plaintiff was subject to 8 verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature. (ECF No. 33 at 11-12.) The Court 9 agrees. The FAC alleges numerous adverse actions were taken because of “retaliatory 10 hostility” (ECF No. 30 at 4-5) but those alleged actions do not go to the first element. They 11 do not relate to any alleged conduct that Board Watkins directed at Plaintiff to harass or 12 to show “retaliatory hostility.” Plaintiff’s response points to Paragraph 35 of the FAC. (ECF 13 No. 38 at 15.) Paragraph 35 alleges: 14 Board Member Watkins openly and frequently advocated in the presence of managers and supervisory employees of the State for placing 15 unacceptable importance and/or emphasis on race as a criteria for hiring decision and other important personnel decisions.” 16 (ECF No. 30 at 12.) Setting aside the conclusory allegations about what Board Member 17 Watkins purportedly “advocated” for, these allegations at best show she made these 18 statements to all employees, and did not direct them at Plaintiff because of “retaliatory 19 hostility.” 20 In sum, the Court agrees with Defendant that the FAC fails to state a claim. 21 Because Plaintiff was given leave to amend and still failed to cure the deficiencies the 22 Court identified in the Dismissal Order, the Court dismisses the claims in the FAC with 23 prejudice. 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 The Court notes that the parties made several arguments and cited several cases 26 not discussed above. The Court has reviewed these arguments and cases and 27 determines that they do not warrant discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the 28 Motion before the Court. 1 It is therefore ordered that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 33) is granted. 2 || The claims in the FAC are dismissed with prejudice. 3 It is further ordered that the stipulation for extension of time (ECF No. 39) is granted 4 || nunc pro tunc. 5 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment in accordance with this order 6 || and close this case. 7 DATED THIS 11*' Day of February 2026.

9 MIRANDA M. DU 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28